Keritot 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

As we learned:

with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day:

if he slaughtered

the mother

and

then slaughtered

its granddaughter [

and he has still transgressed no prohibition, since only “it and its offspring” are prohibited, and not it and its grand-offspring],

and then slaughtered its daughter

there are two transgressions of “it and its offspring” in this slaughter of the daughter: one, because she is the daughter of the mother that was already slaughtered; and the other, because she is the mother of the granddaughter that was already slaughtered. Nevertheless, he

incurs

only

the forty lashes—that is, only one set of lashes—

because there is here only one act of slaughter and one designation of prohibition, both being the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes, two sets of lashes. Thus, Sumakhos holds that separate sin-offerings are required for two transgressions that are of one designation and committed through one act.

Rava said: Perhaps this is not so,

for

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri did not say here

that he is liable for three sin-offerings

except because the designations are distinct

:

one prohibition is called “his mother-in-law,” another is called “his mother-in-law’s mother,” and another is called “his father-in-law’s mother.”

But with regard to it and its offspring, since all of them are called “it and its offspring,” there

are no

distinct designations; Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri did not

say that he is liable for two sets of lashes, in accordance with Sumakhos, but only for one set of lashes, in accordance with the Rabbis.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Perhaps

Sumakhos does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

For

Sumakhos said that he is liable for two

only

with regard to it and its offspring, since the

two sets of lashes for slaughtering the middle cow are incurred on account of

distinct bodies

—that is, two cows. One set of lashes is incurred because of slaughtering the mother of the middle cow, and the other because of slaughtering its daughter.

But here,

with regard to one’s mother-in-law, although this woman became prohibited to him through three marriages to his three wives, under three prohibitions—his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother—and it would seemingly be comparable to distinct bodies, nevertheless it is as though

there are no distinct bodies,

for

perhaps

Sumakhos

holds in accordance with the view that Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

As Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

It is stated: “The nakedness of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover; you shall not take her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness.”

“They are her kin; it is lewdness.” The verse rendered them all one lewdness!

The verse reveals that their status is like that of a single body, and one is liable for only one sin-offering for all of them [in accordance with the explanation of the Arukh LaNer and the glosses of Ben Aryeh].

Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market

where animals were sold

of Emmaum

[the name of the city], while

they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast

the wedding feast of

Rabban Gamliel’s son:

[This is stated to praise them: Although they were occupied, they were engaged in words of Torah. Tosafot Yeshanim.]

One who engages in intercourse with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister

unwittingly—

what is the law?

Is he

liable

for one sin-offering

for all of them, or is he liable for each and every one?

They said to me

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: This

we have not heard.

But we have heard

a similar case:

One who engages in intercourse with five wives

who are

menstruating, in a single lapse of awareness, is liable for each and every one. And we see that the matter—

the question you asked—

is subject to a kal va-homer:

he is liable for three sin-offerings. The Gemara will explain the matter.

Gemara:

And we discuss it:

What are the circumstances

of Rabbi Akiva’s question?

If you say it is as it is taught

—that he engaged in intercourse with three women, one of whom was his sister, the second his father’s sister, and the third his mother’s sister—then

what was he asking about?

It is obvious that he is liable for three sin-offerings.

For

there are also

distinct designations,

since each one is a separate prohibition, and

there are distinct bodies as well?

And we answer:

Rather, this is what it teaches: One who engages in intercourse with his sister who is his father’s sister who is

also

his mother’s sister

[the Gemara will explain how this is possible]—

what is the law?

Is he

liable for one for all of them, or is he liable for each and every one?

And these are the sides of the question:

Do we say: There are distinct designations

?

Or perhaps, there are no distinct bodies?

They said to him

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: This

we have not heard.

But we have heard: One who engages in intercourse with five menstruating wives at once

in a single lapse of awareness

is liable for each and every one because of menstruation.

And we see that the matter follows by a kal va-homer: Just as one who engages in intercourse with five menstruating wives at once,

in a single lapse of awareness,

who have one designation,

since there is one prohibition of menstruation applying to all of them, nevertheless

he is liable for each and every one,

one who engages in intercourse with

his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister, who have three designations,

since each is a separate prohibition,

is it not logical that he should be liable for each and every one?

And we say: There is a basis for refuting

the kal va-homer:

What is the basis for distinguishing five menstruating women? They are distinct bodies,

and therefore it is logical that he should be liable for a separate sin-offering for each body. By contrast, in Rabbi Akiva’s question, it is one body.

Rather,

we derive it from here:

The verse states: “He has uncovered the nakedness of his sister,”

and this verse is superfluous [see above, at the end of page 2], in order to teach

that one who engages in intercourse with his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister

is liable for

a separate

sin-offering for each prohibition—that is, three sin-offerings.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It can occur

that one woman is his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister

in the case of a wicked son of a wicked son: His father engaged in intercourse with his mother

[his father’s mother]

and fathered two daughters, and then

the father

engaged in intercourse with one of them

his daughters

and fathered a son, and his son engaged in intercourse

with this

with

the second daughter of his father, who is

his mother’s sister, who is his sister

through his father [since they share one father],

who is his father’s sister

through his mother [since they share one mother],

so he became

this son a

wicked son of a wicked son 70 .

The Sages taught:

If he engaged in intercourse with one of the women with whom intercourse is forbidden, unwittingly,

and then engaged in intercourse with her again, and then engaged in intercourse with her again,

and all the acts of intercourse occurred during one period of unawareness—

he is liable for each and every one,

because the acts of intercourse divide the transgressions,

the statement of Rabbi Eliezer 71 .

And the Sages say: He is liable only once,

since all of them were performed during one period of unawareness, and the acts of intercourse do not divide the transgressions.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his five wives who are menstruating simultaneously,

during one period of unawareness,

that he is liable for each and every one.

For

since he caused

his wives to bring a sin-offering each, he too is liable to bring five sin-offerings, corresponding to the number of sin-offerings that he caused his wives to bring.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Do we say: Since he caused them? But it was taught:

If he engaged in intercourse with one forbidden woman five times,

he,

the man engaging in intercourse, performed them

during one period of unawareness,

as he was not aware of his transgression in the interim.

And she,

the woman with whom he engaged in intercourse, performed them

during five periods of unawareness,

as she became aware between each act of intercourse that she had sinned.

He is liable only once, whereas she is liable for each and every one.

[Another version: He engaged in intercourse with five women, five times with each one, while he was in one period of unawareness with regard to all of them, and each of them was in five periods of unawareness. He is liable to bring one sin-offering for each woman, and they are liable to bring five sin-offerings, each of them.]

And if we say “since,” he too should have to bring five sin-offerings [for each woman], since he caused the woman to bring five sin-offerings?

And we answer:

Rather, say

that the reason for the Sages’ statement, and therefore they concede with regard to his five menstruating wives, is:

since the bodies

are distinct.

They raised a dilemma: If one reaped

on Shabbat the measure of a dried fig [which is the measure for which one is liable to stoning if he did so intentionally, and to a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly], and then

reaped

another measure of a dried fig during one period of unawareness,

what did Rabbi Eliezer say?

What would Rabbi Eliezer say in this case? Would he also hold him liable to bring two sin-offerings here?

The sides of the dilemma are as follows: Is

the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling there

with regard to five acts of intercourse

because he performed two

acts,

and because of this

therefore

he said

that he is

liable for each and every one?

And

if so,

here too

he should be liable to bring two,

as

he

performed two

acts.

Or perhaps the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling there is that it is impossible for him to combine these acts of intercourse with one another,

to perform them as one act; therefore, each act of intercourse has independent significance. And

because of this he said

Rabbi Eliezer that he is

liable for each and every one.

But if he reaped the measure of a dried fig and then reaped another measure of a dried fig during one period of unawareness, since it is possible for him to combine the two measures of dried figs

and reap them

simultaneously,

therefore each act of reaping does not have independent significance, and

he is liable only once. What is the ruling?

Rabba said: The reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling there is that he performed two,

and

here too, he performed two.

And Rav Yosef said: The reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling there is that it is impossible for him to combine them, but when it is possible for him to combine them, he is liable only once 72 .

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba:

It was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable for the offspring of labors in place of their primary labors,

so that if one performed a primary labor and its derivative during one period of unawareness, he is liable to bring two offerings.

And we infer: It is specifically because this is a primary labor and that is a derivative that he is liable to bring two.

But

if he performed a

primary

labor

and

then performed the same

primary

labor

simultaneously, he is exempt

with regard to the second, and he is liable only once—that is, when both acts occurred during one period of unawareness.

And if you say

that

the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is that he performed two, why is he exempt

with regard to two primary labors? Here too, he performed two.

And we answer:

Mar, son of Rabba, said: Rav Naḥumi bar Zekharya and I interpreted

this beraita in order that it would not pose a difficulty to Rabba:

With what are we dealing here? With a vine branch

a branch of a grapevine

trained

that is growing

on top of

a

fig tree,

and he cut the barren branch and the fruit from the fig tree

simultaneously,

so there is here a primary labor and a derivative. With regard to the fig tree, he violated the primary labor of reaping, while with regard to the branch, he violated only the derivative of reaping.

And for this reason Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable

to bring two offerings even though he performed them through one act,

since the designations

are distinct, as this is a primary labor and that is a derivative,

and the bodies

are distinct, as they are two trees .

The same applies

to what we inferred—“if it is a primary labor and another primary labor, he is exempt”—namely,

if he reaped and reaped, how can you find a case in which he is exempt?

It must necessarily be in a case like this, involving a primary labor and a derivative; that is,

for example,

he reaped from one tree

two measures of a dried fig simultaneously.

Therefore Rabbi Eliezer exempts him there, since he performed them through one act, and there are also no distinct designations, as both this and that are primary labors, nor are there distinct bodies, as it is one tree.

But if he reaped the measure of a dried fig and then reaped another measure of a dried fig

through two acts,

he is liable

to bring two offerings according to Rabbi Eliezer, in accordance with Rabba.

Mishna:

And Rabbi Akiva further asked

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua:

What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal

that was torn from the animal but remained loosely attached to it—

what is it?

Is its status that of a limb completely torn off, in which case a limb torn from a live animal transmits impurity like an animal carcass? Or is its status that of a limb still attached to the animal, in which case it does not transmit impurity?

They said to him:

This

we have not heard, but we have heard

a similar case:

a dangling limb of a person is ritually pure.

Its status is not that of a limb completely torn off, which would transmit impurity like a corpse.