Keritot 15a — the Talmud in English

For it was taught:

with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring on one day:

If he slaughtered

the mother

and

afterward slaughtered

the daughter of its daughter [

and he had still not transgressed any prohibition, for only “it and its offspring” is prohibited, and not it and its grand-offspring],

and afterward he slaughtered its daughter

and in this slaughter of the daughter there are two transgressions of “it and its offspring”: one, that she is the daughter of the mother that was already slaughtered; and the second, that she is the mother of the daughter of the daughter that was already slaughtered; nevertheless, he does not

receive lashes

except

the forty—that is, only one set of lashes. For here there is only one act of slaughter and one designation of prohibition, both of which are the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He receives eighty—two sets of lashes. Thus, Sumakhos obligates separate sin-offerings for two transgressions that are of one designation and in one act.

Rava said: Perhaps it is not so,

for

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri did not say here

that one is liable for three sin-offerings

except because the designations are divided

—for one is called “his mother-in-law,” another is called “his mother-in-law’s mother,” and another is called “his father-in-law’s mother.”

But with regard to it and its offspring, all of them are called “it and its offspring,” and there are no

divided

designations; Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri did not

say that one is liable for two sets of lashes, like Sumakhos, but only for one set of lashes, like the Rabbis.

distinct

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Perhaps

Sumakhos does not hold like Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. For

Sumakhos said only that one is liable for two

with regard to it and its offspring, for

the two sets of lashes for slaughtering the middle cow are imposed because of

separate bodies—that is, two cows. One set of lashes is on account of slaughtering the mother of the middle cow, and the second on account of slaughtering the daughter of the middle cow.

But here,

with regard to his mother-in-law, although on account of three marriages to his three wives this woman became prohibited to him with three prohibitions—as his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother—and apparently this is like separate bodies, nevertheless it is as though

there are no separate bodies, for

say

Sumakhos

holds like Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

For Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

“The nakedness of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover; her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter you shall not take, to uncover her nakedness;

they are her relatives, it is lewdness.” The verse made them all one lewdness!

For the verse reveals that their status is like one body, and one is liable for only one sin-offering for them. [According to the explanation of the Arukh la-Ner and the glosses of Ben Aryeh]

Mishna: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua in the meat market where animals were sold of Emmaum [ the name of the city], at the time when they went to purchase an animal for the feast the wedding meal of

As Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

“You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter to uncover her nakedness.

They are her close relatives; it is depravity.” The verse made them all one act of depravity! The verse reveals that their legal status is that of one body, and one is liable to bring only one sin-offering for all of them. [According to the explanation of the Arukh LaNer and the glosses of Ben Aryeh]

It therefore follows according to the words of the Arukh LaNer that, logically, we would also have said with regard to one’s mother-in-law that the prohibition is defined as marrying both women [at least according to Sumakhos]. It would consequently follow that the bodies should be regarded as distinct and that he should be liable to bring two sin-offerings, as in the case of the animal and its offspring. Rather, the verse teaches us that the definition of the prohibition is that he may not marry his mother-in-law. Therefore, there is no distinction between bodies. Although he married three women, through whom she became his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother, these are merely different causes, involving different bodies, that bring about the prohibition concerning her; they do not participate in the actual prohibited act, as stated above with regard to the animal and its offspring. However, the Or Sameaḥ [Prohibited Relationships 2:8] explains that, logically as well, we know that there is no distinction between bodies with regard to one’s mother-in-law and one’s mother-in-law’s mother, since this prohibition is unlike the prohibition of the animal and its offspring. Nevertheless, we need to derive from the verse “It is depravity” that he is liable to only one sin-offering, lest we say that they are distinct categories of prohibition, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. Regarding the reason for the distinction between one’s mother-in-law and the animal and its offspring, the Or Sameaḥ explains that since the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring is not permanent—for after the day of slaughter has passed, he may slaughter its daughter—it is more logical to say that the definition of the prohibition is the slaughtering of both animals [and if so, they involve a distinction between bodies, as stated above]. By contrast, the prohibition concerning one’s mother-in-law is permanent. In that case, it is more likely that the prohibition is based on her status as his mother-in-law, which applies to her forever [and if so, they are not distinct bodies]. See there, where the early authorities disagree on this point: whether, after his wife’s death, his mother-in-law remains prohibited to him by a prohibition punishable by karet, or not. Tosafot write that if a man marries two women who have a sister in common—that is, she is the paternal sister of one of them and the maternal sister of the other—he is liable to bring two sin-offerings for relations with her, as in the case of the animal and its offspring. The Or Sameaḥ explains their intent according to the above: Since the prohibition against a wife’s sister is not permanent—for after his wife’s death, he may marry her sister, even though she always retains the status of “his wife’s sister”—this prohibition should likewise be compared to that of the animal and its offspring, in which the prohibition is the taking of both. Therefore, here too there is a distinction between bodies. In truth, even according to the explanation of the Arukh LaNer, Tosafot’s words can be understood, since the Torah states concerning the prohibition of a wife’s sister, “You shall not take one in rivalry with the other.” The meaning of the prohibition is that he may not take both, unlike the case of one’s mother-in-law, where we derive from the verse “It is depravity” that the prohibition is due to her status as his mother-in-law. All this is according to Sumakhos. But the Rabbis hold that the prohibition concerning the animal and its offspring is the slaughtering of the second [and not the slaughtering of both], and therefore there is no distinction between bodies. In tractate Hullin [82b] we learned that one who slaughters a mother and her two offspring is liable to two sets of lashes. But if he slaughters the two offspring and afterward their mother, he receives only forty lashes. Rashi and Tosafot there explain that this distinction applies specifically according to the Rabbis. According to Sumakhos, however, he receives two sets of lashes in every case. In light of the above, this matter is well understood: According to the Rabbis, who hold that the prohibition lies in slaughtering the second animal, there is therefore a distinction between slaughtering the two offspring last, in which case there is a distinction between bodies in the actual prohibited act, and slaughtering the offspring and afterward the mother, in which case there is no distinction between bodies in the actual prohibited act, as stated above. But according to Sumakhos, who holds that the prohibition is the slaughtering of both animals, he receives eighty lashes in every case, since in every case there is a distinction between bodies. In any event, we learn that everyone agrees that the law of a distinction between bodies applies to the prohibition of the animal and its offspring. This matter will be explained further below [16, note 85].

Rabban Gamaliel’s son: [to make known their praise, that although they were occupied, they were engaged in words of Torah. Tosafot Yeshanim]

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market

where animals were sold

of Emmaus

[the name of the city], while

One who had intercourse with his sister, with his father’s sister, and with his mother’s sister

unintentionally—

what

is the law?

Does he incur liability for one sin-offering for all of them, or is he liable for each one individually? They said to me

Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua: This

we have not heard.

But we have heard

a similar matter:

one who had intercourse with five wives

while they were

menstruating, in one lapse of awareness, is liable for each one individually. And we see that the matter—

the question that you asked—

is a kal va-chomer:

he should be liable for three sin-offerings, and the matter will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection concerning it:

What are the circumstances

of Rabbi Akiva’s question?

If you say as it is taught

that he had intercourse with three women, one of whom was his sister, the second his father’s sister, and the third his mother’s sister, if so,

what is there for him to ask?

For it is obvious that he is liable for three sin-offerings. For

after all

they also have

divided designations, since each one is a separate prohibition, and

after all, are there not separate bodies?

And we answer:

Rather, this is what it teaches: One who had intercourse with his sister who is his father’s sister who is

also

his mother’s sister [below it explains how this is possible]—

what

is the law?

Does he

incur one liability for all of them, or is he liable for each one individually?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say: After all, there are divided designations

they are?

Or perhaps, after all, there are no separate bodies?

They said to him

Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua: This

we have not heard.

But we have heard: One who had intercourse with five menstruating wives at one time

in one lapse of awareness,

is liable for each one individually on account of menstruation.

And we see that the matter is a kal va-chomer: What of one who had intercourse with five menstruating wives at one time,

in one lapse of awareness,

who have one designation,

for there is one prohibition of menstruation upon all of them, and nevertheless

he is liable for each one individually.

One who had intercourse with

his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister, who have three designations,

for each one is a separate prohibition,

is it not logical that he should be liable for each one individually?

during one lapse of awareness,

who are subject to one category of prohibition,

And we say:

There is a way to refute

the kal va-chomer:

What is true of the five menstruating women? They are separate bodies,

and therefore it is proper that he be liable for a separate sin-offering for each body. This is not so in Rabbi Akiva’s question, where it is one body.

is it not logical that he should be liable for each and every one?

And we say: There is a basis for refuting

And we say:

The a-fortiori inference can be challenged

because:

Rather,

from here we derive it.

The verse says, “He uncovered his sister’s nakedness,” and this verse is superfluous [see above, the end of page 2], in order to teach to obligate one who had intercourse with his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister for a separate sin-offering for each prohibition—that is, three sin-offerings. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It can be found that one woman is his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister: with a wicked son of a wicked son, where his father had intercourse with his mother [

his father’s mother]

and fathered two daughters, and afterward

the father

had intercourse with one of them

of his daughters

and fathered a son, and his son had intercourse this with the second daughter of his father, who was

his mother’s sister, who was his sister

from his father [for both of them had one father],

who was his father’s sister

from his mother [for both of them had one mother],

so this one was

the son

a wicked son of a wicked son 70.

and his son fathered a son

this son

engaged in intercourse with

his father’s second daughter, who was

his mother’s sister, and his sister

from his father [they shared one father],

who was his father’s sister

from his mother [they shared one mother],

so this son became

this

son of a thoroughly wicked man, son of a thoroughly wicked man 70 .

The Sages taught:

If he had intercourse with one of the forbidden relations inadvertently,

and then had intercourse with her again, and then had intercourse with her again,

and all the acts of intercourse were within one period of unawareness—

he is liable for each and every one,

because the acts of intercourse divide [the liability],

the words of Rabbi Eliezer. 71 .

And the Sages say: He is liable only once,

since all of them were performed within one period of unawareness, and the acts of intercourse do not divide [the liability].

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning one who had intercourse with his five menstruant wives at once

within one period of unawareness

that he is liable for each and every one.

For

since he caused

his wives to bring a sin-offering each, therefore he too is liable for five sin-offerings, corresponding to the number of sin-offerings that he caused his wives to bring.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Do we say, “Since he caused them”? But it was taught:

If he had intercourse with one forbidden relation five times, when

he,

the one having intercourse, performed them

within one period of unawareness,

so that he did not become aware in the interim,

whereas she,

the woman with whom he had intercourse, performed them

within five periods of unawareness,

as she became aware between each act of intercourse and the next that she had sinned.

He is liable only once, whereas she is liable for each and every one.

Another version: He had intercourse with five women, five acts of intercourse with each one, and he was in one period of unawareness concerning all of them, whereas they were each in five periods of unawareness. He is liable for one sin-offering for each woman, and they are liable for five sin-offerings, each one of them.

And if we say “since,” he too should have brought five sin-offerings [for each woman], since he caused the woman to bring five sin-offerings?

And we resolve it:

Rather, say

in the words of the Sages, that this is why they concede concerning his five menstruant wives:

since the bodies are divided

from one another.

They raised a question before them: If he cut

on Shabbat an amount the size of a dried fig [which is the measure for which one is liable to stoning when acting intentionally and to a sin-offering when acting inadvertently], and then

cut

an amount the size of a dried fig within one period of unawareness,

what did Rabbi Eliezer say?

What would Rabbi Eliezer say in this case—would he also make him liable for two sin-offerings here?

The sides of the doubt are: Is it that

the reason of Rabbi Eliezer there,

concerning five acts of intercourse,

is because he performed two

acts, and

for this reason,

therefore, he

said

that he is

liable for each and every one?

And

if so,

here too

he is liable for two,

for

indeed he

performed two [acts].

acts.

Or perhaps the reason of Rabbi Eliezer there is because it is impossible for him to combine these acts of intercourse with one another,

to perform them together; therefore each act of intercourse has significance in itself. And

for this reason he said

Rabbi Eliezer that he is

liable for each and every one.

But if he cut an amount the size of a dried fig and then cut an amount the size of a dried fig within one period of unawareness, since it is possible for him to combine the two dried-fig measures

and cut them

at once,

therefore each cutting does not have significance in itself, and

he is liable only once. What [is the answer]?

Rabba said: The reason of Rabbi Eliezer there is because he performed two,

and

here too, indeed he performed two.

And Rav Yosef said: The reason of Rabbi Eliezer there is because it is impossible for him to combine them; but when it is possible for him to combine them, he is liable only once. 72 .

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba:

It was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer makes one liable for derivatives of labors in the place of primary categories

so that if one performed a primary category of labor and its derivative within one period of unawareness, he is liable for two.

And we infer: It is specifically because this is a primary category and that is a derivative that he is liable for two.

But

if he performed

a primary category of

labor

and

then performed the same

primary category of

labor again

at once, he is exempt

for the second and is liable only once—that is, when it was within one period of unawareness.

And if you say

that

the reason of Rabbi Eliezer is because he performs two, why is he exempt

for two primary categories? Here too, after all, he performed two.

And we resolve it:

Mar, son of Rava, said: Rav Naḥumi bar Zekharya and I interpreted

this beraita so that no difficulty would be raised from it against Rabba:

With what are we dealing here? With a vine branch

a branch of a grapevine

trained

riding

upon

a

fig tree,

and he cut the barren branch and the fruit from the fig tree

at once,

and there is here a primary category and a derivative. For the fig tree he transgressed the primary category of reaping, while concerning the branch he transgressed only the derivative of reaping. And

for this reason Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable

for two, even though he performed them in one act,

since the designations are divided,

as this is a primary category and that is a derivative,

and the bodies are divided,

as they are two trees .

Correspondingly,

the inference we made, “But if it is a primary category and a primary category, he is exempt,” means:

If he cut and cut, how can you find a case in which he is exempt?

It must be in such a case involving a primary category and a derivative, namely

for example

that he cut from one tree

two dried-fig measures at once.

Therefore Rabbi Eliezer exempts him there, since he performed them in one act, and there are also no divided designations there, since both this and that are primary categories, nor are there divided bodies, since it is one tree.

But if he cut an amount the size of a dried fig and then cut an amount the size of a dried fig

in two acts,

he is liable

for two according to Rabbi Eliezer, like Rabba.

Mishna:

And Rabbi Akiva further asked

Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua:

A limb dangling from an animal

that was torn from the animal but still remained loosely attached to it—

what is [its status]?

Is its law like that of one completely torn off, in which case a limb torn from a living animal conveys impurity like a carcass? Or is its law like that of one still attached to the animal, and it does not convey impurity?

They said to him:

This

we have not heard, but we have heard

something similar:

a limb dangling from a human being, which is pure.

For its law is not like that of one completely torn off, in which case it would convey impurity like a corpse.