Horayot 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

And it follows that Israel were warned against

war

specifically!

that they may not

wage against them;

but causing them distress,

it is permitted

to cause them distress.

Whereas

regarding the descendants of Lot’s

younger daughter, whom she called

her son

Ben-Ami,

for she gave him this name in refined language and did not wish to publicize that she had conceived him from her father,

the Holy One, blessed be He, said

to Moses,

“Do not harass them, and do not provoke them.”

And He did not say: “Do not provoke them in war,” because He wished to teach that they should not provoke them

at all; even by causing them distress, do not

cause them distress.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha said: A person should always anticipate and hasten

and be quick

to perform a mitzva,

as we find

that because of the reward for one night by which the elder daughter preceded

Lot’s

younger daughter

in consorting with Lot [and they indeed did so for the sake of a mitzva], therefore

the elder daughter merited

that the

preceded her

younger sister

by four generations in attaining kingship.

For Obed, the son of Ruth, came from Moab, which is descended from the elder daughter. Whereas the descendant who converted from Ammon, which is descended from the younger daughter, and from whose descendants the kingship of Israel arose, converted only after four generations [Obed, Jesse, David, and Solomon]. For only Rehoboam, the son of Solomon, was descended from Ammon, as he was the son of Naama the Ammonite, and she converted only in the days of Solomon.

The Sages taught:

It is stated [Leviticus 4] concerning the sin offering of an ordinary individual: “And if any person of the people of the land sins unwittingly.” And they expounded it as follows: “

From the people of the land” —

but not all the people of the land;

to exclude

a

Messiah anointed priest.

They further expounded it: “

From the people of the land” —

to exclude a ruler.

If the Messiah anointed priest or the ruler sinned unwittingly, he does not bring a female sheep or female goat as a sin offering, as does an ordinary member of the people.

The beraita asks: Why do I need “from the people of the land” to exclude them,

when it has already

been explained, in the wording of Scripture, that

they were excluded

from the category of the sin offering of an ordinary individual?

For a priest

anointed

was excluded from the category of the community

to be judged through a bull —

that is, he brings a bull for his sin offering when he acted on the basis of his own ruling.

Likewise, a

ruler

was excluded from their category

to be judged through a goat.

If so, why is it necessary to exclude them again through the verse “from the people of the land”?

Rather, this exclusion was necessary to teach us that

it could

occur to you to say that the

Messiah

was not distinguished in every respect, but only in one manner:

for an error concerning a matter,

when the law escaped him and he consequently ruled for himself that one of the mitzvot was permitted, together

with an unwitting act,

when he unwittingly performed an act on the basis of that ruling, only then does he

bring a bull

for his sin; that is, only in this case is his law unlike that of an ordinary person who sinned, who brings a female sheep or female goat.

But

for an unwitting act alone,

when the Messiah sinned through mere inadvertence, not on the basis of a ruling, in which case he does not bring a bull, his law is like that of an ordinary person, and he

brings a female sheep or female goat.

Therefore,

the verse states: “From the people of the land” —

to exclude the Messiah.

Likewise,

“from the people of the land” —

to exclude the ruler.

This teaches you that the law of the High Priest is changed completely, even when he sins through an unwitting act without a ruling, and he is entirely exempt from an ordinary sin offering. He never brings anything other than a bull, when there was an unwitting ruling together with an unwitting act. This concludes the words of the beraita.

The Gemara discusses the conclusion of the beraita, that the exclusion “from the people of the land” teaches us that the High Priest is exempt from an ordinary sin offering even when he sinned through an unwitting act.

That works

with regard to a

Messiah

anointed priest; indeed, that is his law.

But

with regard to a

ruler,

this cannot be said, for the entire offering that was introduced for a ruler — namely, that he brings a goat —

he brings specifically for an unwitting act!

The question remains: Why is it necessary to exclude a ruler through “from the people of the land,” when it was already stated previously that the sin offering of a ruler differs from that of an individual, as he brings a goat for an unwitting act without an unwitting ruling?

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: Here we are dealing with a case in which he ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat

unwittingly

when he was an ordinary person,

before he was appointed ruler,

and

then

was appointed

ruler,

and afterward it became known to him

that he had sinned.

It might enter your mind to say

that since he sinned while he was an ordinary person,

he should bring a female sheep or female goat

like an ordinary person, and not according to the law of a ruler, who brings a goat; and it is for this reason that the exclusion is stated.

It teaches us

that he does not bring any offering at all, since the two conditions that obligate him in that offering were not present in him: both the act of sin and the awareness that he had sinned must occur while he is subject to the obligation of that offering.

But the Gemara rejects this:

That is satisfactory

in this regard

according

to the

view of Rabbi Shimon, who follows awareness.

He states in our Mishna that this is the law: If they sinned before they were appointed and became aware that they had sinned only after they were appointed, they are entirely exempt. He derives this from this verse, which requires that the one who is obligated be in the same status at the time of the sin and at the time of awareness of the sin; if his status changed, he is entirely exempt.

But according to the Rabbis, who follow

with regard to the obligation to bring an offering only

the sin,

for the sin occurred while he was an ordinary person, and they state in our Mishna that even when his status changed and he was appointed ruler, and he then became aware that he had sinned, his law is to bring a female sheep or female goat, as the law of an ordinary person who sinned,

what can be said?

Why was the exclusion “from the people of the land — to exclude a ruler” necessary, when according to their view the ruler was not excluded from bringing a female sheep or female goat?

Rather, Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: Here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing? —

For example, he ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat while he was an ordinary person, and was appointed

ruler, and ate another half olive-bulk after his appointment as ruler [within the time required to eat a half-loaf], thereby

completing

a full olive-bulk.

And afterward it became known to him

that he had sinned.

It might enter your mind to say: The second half should combine

with the first half-olive-bulk that he ate while he was an ordinary person, so that it is found that he ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat,

and he should bring a female sheep or female goat

as an ordinary person.

It teaches us

through the exclusion “from the people of the land” that he does not bring any offering at all. The two halves do not combine to form one olive-bulk, since he did not eat both of them while subject to the obligation of the same offering.

Rava asked Rav Nahman: What is the law regarding a period of rulership—is it capable of interrupting

between two halves of the obligation for an offering of an ordinary person?

What are the circumstances? For example, he ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat while he was an ordinary person, and was appointed

ruler,

and

then

left

his appointment and became an ordinary person again, and ate another half olive-bulk,

and

thereby

completed

an olive-bulk. What is the law?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Perhaps we should say that

there, specifically,

when he ate half an olive-bulk while he was an ordinary person and another half olive-bulk after he was appointed ruler, the law

is that the two acts of eating do not combine

to obligate him in an offering as an ordinary person, since

he ate

this olive-bulk

half while he was an ordinary person and half while he was a ruler.

But here,

with regard to the two halves of the olive-bulk,

both of them,

this half olive-bulk of forbidden fat that he ate before being appointed and that half olive-bulk of forbidden fat that he ate after being appointed and then leaving the rulership,

he ate them while he was an ordinary person; they combine,

and this is like one who ate an olive-bulk while an ordinary person, and he brings a female sheep or female goat.

Or perhaps it is no different.

Since there was an intervening period between the acts of eating, when he was a ruler, during which, had he eaten the second half, it would not have combined with the first half, because his law then would have been to bring the ruler’s goat, therefore there is no difference between eating half an olive-bulk while an ordinary person and half an olive-bulk while a ruler: They do not combine.

I poetomu vopros zaklyuchaetsya v sleduyushchem,

chto zhe,

kakovo ego zakon?

Razreshi etu

problemu

iz skazannogo Ulo imya rabbi Yohananom:

tot, kto

sluchayno syel khelev i vydelil zhertvu

za etot grekh,

otrekshis

ot svoey very,

i

potom

vozvratilsya

k iudeystvu, posle ego vozvrashcheniya ne mozhet prinosit zhertvu, kotoruyu on vydelil za svoj grekh; no zakon v ego sluchae takov:

poskolku ona byla otvergnuta

ot zakona o prinesenii zhertvy v period ego apostasii [tak kak apostat ne mozhet prinosit zhertvu, kak budet razyasneno vskore], poetomu

ona otvergaetsya

navsegda, tak kak obyazannost prinosit zhertvu prekratilas dlya nego, kogda on byl apostatom. I eto tak, nesmotrya na to, chto khelev on syel v to vremya, kogda mog prinosit zhertvu, i dazhe teper on podkhodit dlya prineseniya zhertvy.

Takim zhe budet zakon, kogda mezhdu dvumya polovinkami olivok, kazhdaya iz kotorykh imeet razmer kazayit, byla ustanovlena ego prezi­dent­skaya vlast: on osvobozhdaetsya ot zhertvy, nesmotrya na to, chto oba priema pishchi proiskhodili v vremya, obyazyvavshee obychnogo cheloveka prinesti khatat, potomu chto, poskolku posle pervogo priema pishchi on stal prezidentom i byl otvergnut ot zakona o prinesenii ovtsy ili kozy, on navsegda ostayotsya otvergnutym, i dazhe posle prekrashcheniya ego naznacheniya i vozvrashcheniya k statusu obychnogo cheloveka ego pervaya obyazannost prinosit khatat prekrashchaetsya .

I otvergayem:

razve mozhno sravnivat!?

Kakoe mezhdu etimi sluchayami podobie?! Ved tolko ob apostate govorят: poskolku otvergnuto, ono otvergaetsya, tak kak

apostat voobshche ne podkhodit dlya prineseniya zhertvy

nikak.

No

etot

prezident, dazhe v period ego naznacheniya prezidentom, nesmotrya na izmenenie v etot moment zakona o ego zhertve, vse eshche

podkhodit dlya prineseniya zhertvy.

Poetomu mozhno skazat, chto togda on ne schitaetsya otvergnutym ot svoey obyazannosti kak obychnogo cheloveka, i dve s\"edennye im polovinki soedinyatsya, obyazyvaya ego prinesti ovtsu ili kozu kak obychnogo cheloveka.

Sprosil rabbi Zeira u Rav Shesheta: syel

po oshibke kusok, kotoryy yavlyaetsya

somnitelnym khelevom,

somnitelnym zhiv­otnym zhirom,

kogda on byl obychnym chelovekom, i byl naznachen

prezidentom, a posle naznacheniya

uznal o svoem somnenii,

chto syel somnitelnyy khelev,

kak zakon?

Dolzhen li on teper prinesti asham taluy ili net?

Gemara razyasnyaet, chto rabbi Zeira rassuzhdaet ne soglasno vsem mneniyam.

Soglasno rabbanam,

kotorye skazali, chto esli on syel kazayit khelev, buduchi obychnym chelovekom, byl naznachen prezidentom, a zatem uznal, chto sogreshil, to prinosit khatat kak obychnyy chelovek, potomu

chto

rabbany

sledovali

vremeni

soversheniya grekha —

tebe net neobkhodimosti sprashivat, prinesti li emu asham taluy,

tak kak ochevidno, chto i v sluchae somnitelnogo khelevа oni budut sle­dovat vremeni soversheniya grekha, i prezident prineset asham taluy po zakonu dlya obychnogo cheloveka, somnevayushchegosya, sovershil li on grekh, za kotoryy obyazan prinesti khatat; ved v moment soversheniya grekha on byl obychnym chelovekom.

No tebe sleduet sprashivat, soglasno rabbi Shimonu,

kotoryy skazal, chto esli on sogreshil, kogda byl obychnym chelovekom, a uznal ob etom posle naznacheniya, to voobshche ne prinosit zhertvu, tak kak, po ego mneniyu, on stanovitsya obyazannym tolko togda, kogda i grekh, i uznavanie o nem proiskhodyat v vremya, obyazyvayushchee prinesti imenno etu zhertvu; soglasno emu sleduet rassudit, kak budet zakon v sluchae somnitelnogo khelevа:

Skazhem li my:

poskolku pri nesomnennom grekhe ego sostoyanie izmenilos

iz-za togo, chto on byl naznachen prezidentom, i v rezultate etogo izmenilsya ego zakon, tak chto on osvobozhdaetsya ot khatata, kogda posle naznacheniya uznal, chto nesomnenno sogreshil, buduchi obychnym chelovekom, tak kak u nego ne bylo uznavaniya v moment, obyazyvavshiy obychnogo cheloveka prinesti zhertvu, poetomu

izmenilsya

ego zakon i

v

otnoshenii

somnitelnogo sluchaya,

tak chto on osvobozhdaetsya ot asham taluy i v tom sluchae, kogda posle naznacheniya uznal, chto, buduchi obychnym chelovekom, syel somnitelnyy khelev?

Ili, mozhet byt, kogda

my govorim, chto

izmenilsya

ego zakon pri nesomnennom grekhe, tak chto on osvobozhdaetsya, kogda uznal ob etom posle naznacheniya, eto tolko potomu,

chto

teper, kogda on uzhe prezident,

izmenilas ego zhertva,

ved esli by on sogreshil teper, to prines by kozla; poetomu on osvobozhdaetsya ot khatata obychnogo cheloveka, tak kak uznavanie i grekh ne proiskhodili v vremya, obyazyvavshee prinesti imenno etu zhertvu.

No zdes,

kogda on syel somnitelnyy khelev,

ego zhertva ne izmenilas,

ved dazhe esli by on teper, buduchi prezidentom, syel somnitelnyy khelev, ego zakon ostavalsya by takim zhe, kak u obychnogo cheloveka, — on byl by obyazan asham taluy,

skazhi, chto on dolzhen prinesti asham taluy,

nesmotrya na to, chto uznal ob etom somnitelnom prieme pishchi posle naznacheniya .

I my zaklyuchaem:

teyku 9 .

Nauchili mudretsy:

v razdele o zhertve khatat skazano

«ot naroda zemli»,

a smysl slova «ot» — chast naroda. Pisanie uchit, chto zhertvu prinosit tolko chast naroda, no ne ves narod zemli,

za isklyucheniem apostata,

iz ruk kotorogo zhertvu ne prinimayut.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yosi skazal ot imeni rabbi Shimona:

eto zakon ne izvlekaetsya iz tochnogo analiza stikha «ot naroda zemli», a iz skazannogo v Pisanii

«kotorykh ne sleduet delat po oshibke i vinovat».

A neposredstvenno posle etogo skazano: «Ili emu stalo izvestno o ego grekhe, kotoryy on sovershil, i on prineset svoyu zhertvu». Iz etogo sleduet, chto obyazannost khatat voznikayet tolko v sluchae, kogda ego grekh schitaetsya «kotorykh ne sleduet delat»: esli by on znal, chto eto zapreshchennaya veshch, on ne sogreshil by, a prichina, po kotoroy on prishel k grekhu, v tom, chto on oshibsya i ne znal, chto eto zapreshcheno; poetomu on prinosit khatat za svoy grekh.

No esli on sovershil by grekh dazhe znaya, chto eto zapreshchennaya veshch, zhertva ne iskupaet ego. Obshchee pravilo takovo:

vozvrashchaetsya, uznav —

esli by on znal, to vozvratilsya by i vozderzhalsya ot soversheniya prestupleniya, — on

prinosit zhertvu za svoyu oshibku.

No esli on

ne vozvrashchaetsya, uznav —

to est dazhe esli by on znal, chto eto zapreshcheno, on ne vozvratilsya by i ne vozderzhalsya ot soversheniya prestupleniya, —

on ne prinosit zhertvu za svoyu oshibku.

Iz etogo ty uznaesh, chto apostat ne prinosit zhertvu za svoy grekh, ved dazhe esli by on znal, chto eto zapreshcheno, on ne vozderzhalsya by. I Gemara sprashivaet: poskolku oba soglasny, chto apostat ne prinosit zhertvu, togda

v chem mezhdu nimi raznitsa,

kakovo prakticheskoe sledstvie dlya nas ot togo, otkuda izvlekaetsya etot zakon?

Skazal Rav Hamnuna:

est prakticheskoe razlichie v zakonakh mezhdu etimi tolkovaniyami, tak kak eti tannai sporyat o prirode zakona, soglasno kotoromu apostat ne prinosit zhertvu.

Po mneniyu pervogo tanna, eto osobyy zakon, ustanovlennyy imenno v otnoshenii apostata. Po mneniyu rabbi Shimona, eto obshchiy zakon, rasprostranyayushchiysya na kazhdogo, kto ne vozvrashchaetsya, uznav.

Prakticheskoe razlichie mezhdu nimi otnositsya k cheloveku, kotoryy

yavlyaetsya apostatom

v otnoshenii odnogo zapreta: naprimer, privyknul

est khelev,

ne vozderzhivayas ot etogo zapreta, no vozderzhivaetsya ot ostalnykh zapretov. I esli sluchilos, chto on po oshibke syel krov i zhelaet iskupitsya,

i prinosit zhertvu za

svoy grekh, svyazannyy s poedaniem

krovi,

to v etom sluchae

mezhdu nimi est razlichie,

tak kak oni sporyat, prinimat li ot nego zhertvu:

tot —

pervyy tanna, kotoryy vyvel zakon, chto apostat ne prinosit zhertvu, iz analiza stikha «ot naroda zemli», —

schitaet,

chto eto osobyy zakon, ustanovlennyy imenno dlya apostata: apostat ne prinosit zhertvu. Poetomu i v etom sluchae,

tak kak

on

apostata v otnoshenii poedaniya khelevа,

to

v

otnoshenii zapreta

krovi takzhe

k nemu primenyaetsya zakon

apostata,

i on ne prinosit zhertvu.

A tot,

rabbi Shimon, kotoryy vyvel ego osvobozhdenie iz «kotorykh ne sleduet delat po oshibke» i ustanovil obshchiy zakon dlya kazhdogo, kto ne vozvrashchaetsya, uznav, tak chto on ne prinosit zhertvu,

schitaet,

chto apostat v otnoshenii poedaniya khelevа prinosit zhertvu za svoyu oshibku pri poedanii krovi, tak kak v otnoshenii zapreta

krovi, vo vsyakom sluchae, on vozvratilsya by, uznav.

Ved nesomnenno, esli by on znal, chto eto krov, on vozderzhalsya by, tak kak on ne izvesten kak tot, kto est krov .

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Hamnuna, who said that according to the opinion of the first tanna, one who habitually eats forbidden fat but not other forbidden substances is considered an apostate also with regard to the prohibition against blood:

But didn’t Rava say that everyone

agrees that a person who is

an apostate

only with regard to

eating forbidden fat,

is

not considered an apostate with regard to

the prohibition against

blood

and the other mitzvot of the Torah? If so, according to everyone, one who habitually eats forbidden fat brings a sacrifice for inadvertently eating blood.

Rather,

necessarily, the practical difference between the tannaitic opinions concerns another matter:

Here, it is referring to

a person who

eats neveila

only

for appetite,

meaning that he eats forbidden food only when he has no permitted meat available and desires to eat, but when permitted meat is before him, he does not eat the forbidden food, since he does not eat forbidden food arbitrarily in order to anger his Creator.

The case is one in which this person wanted to eat fat,

but it was exchanged for him

with forbidden fat

in place of the fat, and he ate it,

because he thought it was permitted fat. And concerning this

they disagree

—these tannaim—whether he brings a sacrifice:

One master,

the first tanna, who holds that a special law was established concerning an apostate, that his sacrifice is not accepted,

held

that even in this case he is considered an apostate:

since he eats forbidden food for appetite,

when he desires it, he will eat it even

intentionally;

therefore,

he is an apostate,

and his sacrifices are not accepted.

And one master,

Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an apostate does not bring a sacrifice because he is included among those who do not repent once informed of their wrongdoing,

held that since, had he found

a piece

of permitted food, he would not have eaten

a piece

of forbidden food, he is not an apostate;

therefore, if forbidden fat was exchanged for permitted fat and he subsequently learned of it, he is considered one who repents once informed of his wrongdoing, and a sacrifice is accepted from him.

The Sages taught:

One who

ate forbidden fat

intentionally,

that is an apostate!

And who is an apostate?

This is one who

ate neveilot,

or

tereifot,

or

reptiles and creeping creatures,

or

drank wine used for idolatrous libation.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who wears shaatnez.

The Gemara explains what is stated in the beraita:

The master said, “

He ate forbidden fat; that is an apostate.”

But later the beraita says, “

And who is an apostate?

It is one who

eats neveilot

and tereifot.”

The wording of the beraita later is very difficult:

What is it saying?

The first clause has already explained who is considered an apostate, so why does the beraita repeat the question, “Who is an apostate?”

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is what

the tanna

said: A. One who

eats forbidden fat for appetite is an apostate.

B. But if he eats forbidden food and explains that his intention is

to anger

his Creator, he is a min,

whose status is more severe than that of an apostate, and the ordinary slaughter of a min is deemed to have been performed for the sake of idolatry.

The beraita continued and explained an additional law, saying:

And who is an apostate

who eats forbidden food, even though he did not explain that he does so in order to anger, nevertheless he is considered one concerning whom

his unstated intention

demonstrates that he is

a min,

and that he certainly acts in order to anger?

That is to say,

it is one who

eats

one of these forbidden foods—

neveila and tereifa, reptiles and creeping creatures, or drinks wine used for idolatrous libation—

for a person does not eat any of these for appetite, since they are repulsive things; rather, he certainly does so in order to anger. The Gemara now continues to explain the continuation of the beraita:

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Even one who wears shaatnez

is an apostate.

It follows that according to the first tanna, one who wears shaatnez is not considered an apostate.

The Gemara raises an objection:

What is the difference between them?

Why would the first tanna disagree and hold that a person who eats forbidden fat is considered more of an apostate than a person who wears shaatnez? After all, both have violated Torah prohibitions!

It answers:

There is a difference between them

in a case where he wore a garment containing a type of shaatnez that involves only the prohibition of

rabbinic shaatnez.

By Torah law, a garment made of wool and linen together is prohibited only when the wool and linen were joined in the manner of “combed, spun, and woven,” as we expound from the word shaatnez: “combed,” meaning that the wool and flax fibers were smoothed together with a comb; “spun,” meaning that a thread was spun from a mixture of wool and flax; and “woven,” meaning that the mixed thread was woven and made into a garment. But if they made “felt” by pressing wool and flax together, or if they wove a wool thread into a linen garment, this involves only a rabbinic prohibition. It is concerning such a case that they disagree:

One master,

the first tanna,

held

that only a person who violates a prohibition that is

of Torah origin is an apostate,

but one who violates a

rabbinic prohibition is not an apostate.

And

if

the other master,

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

held

like the first tanna with regard to all other prohibitions, that one does not become an apostate if he violates only a rabbinic prohibition concerning them, his view is that the prohibition of

shaatnez

is more severe

because its prohibition is publicized.

And

therefore, even

when he violates it

with a

rabbinic

prohibition, he is an apostate.

The Gemara explains that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s interpretation, that the latter clause of the beraita intends to teach that an apostate who acts in order to anger is considered a min,

they disagree about it,

concerning this law,

Rav Aḥa and Ravina.

One said:

One who violates

for appetite is an apostate,

whereas one who violates

in order to anger

is

a min.

And one said:

One who violates

in order to anger as well

is considered only an

apostate

and not a min.

Rather, who is a min? Anyone who worships idolatry

alone.

The following objection is raised

against the one who says that one who eats in order to anger is considered a min:

We learned in a beraita:

If one ate a single flea or a single mosquito, he is an apostate!

But here,

certainly

he acts in order to anger,

for no person desires to eat a flea or a mosquito;

and

nevertheless,

he is called an apostate,

and not a min.

And we answer: In fact, one who acts in order to anger is considered a min and not an apostate.

And there,

with regard to eating a flea, there is reason to consider him an apostate and not a min, because the case concerns one who acts for appetite—for example,

he says, “I will taste the taste of forbidden food.”

Thus, it is possible to taste something for appetite even when it is something repulsive to the soul. We learned in our Mishna:

And who is this nasi? It is a king, etc.

The Sages taught:

From where do we know that a

nasi

who is singled out by the Torah as one who brings a male goat for his unwitting transgression is specifically a king?

But you

can

say that this refers to a

tribal nasi, such as Nahshon ben Aminadav,

who was the nasi of the tribe of Judah, and likewise the other tribal leaders.

The verse states

in the passage concerning the offering of a nasi: “

from all the mitzvot of the Lord his God,” and

a gezerah shavah is derived, for

below,

with regard to a king,

it says

(Deuteronomy 17):

“So that he may learn to fear the Lord his God.”