Horayot 11a — the Talmud in English

And it follows that Israel were warned that

war

only,

is what is not

to wage against them;

but causing them pain,

it is permitted to

cause them pain.

Whereas among the descendants of Lot’s daughter, the

younger one, whom she

called

her son

Ben-Ammi,

for she called his name in a refined language and did not wish to make known that she had conceived from her father,

He said to him

the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses:

“Do not distress them, and do not provoke them.”

And He did not say: “Do not provoke them in war,” because He wished to teach that they should not provoke them

at all—even causing them pain, do not

cause them pain.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rabbi Joshua ben Korha: A person should always anticipate

and hasten

to [perform] a mitzva,

as we find

that as a reward for one night by which the elder

daughter of Lot

preceded the younger

in their intercourse with Lot [and they indeed did so for the sake of a mitzva], therefore

she merited

the elder daughter

and preceded

the younger daughter

by four generations for royalty.

For Obed, the son of Ruth, came from Moab, which is the son of the elder daughter. Whereas the descendant who converted from Ammon, which is the son of the younger daughter, from whose descendants the kingship of Israel came, converted only after four generations [Obed, Jesse, David, and Solomon]. For only Rehoboam, the son of Solomon, was from the seed of Ammon, since he was the son of Naamah the Ammonite, and she converted only in the days of Solomon.

The Sages taught:

It is stated [Leviticus 4] concerning the sin-offering of an individual: “And if one person should sin unwittingly, from the people of the land.” And this is how they expounded it: “

From the people of the land”—

but not all the people of the land,

excluding

a

anointed priest.

And they further expounded it: “

From the people of the land”—

excluding a king.

For if the anointed priest or the king sinned unwittingly, he does not bring a female sheep or female goat as a sin-offering, like the rest of the people of the land.

And the beraita asks: Why do I need “from the people of the land” to exclude them,

when it has already

been explained, in the words of Scripture, that both

went out

from the general category of the law of the sin-offering of an ordinary individual?

For an

anointed

priest went out from the general category

to be judged by a bull—

for he brings a bull for his sin-offering when he acted according to his own ruling.

And likewise a

king

went out from their general category

to be judged by a goat.

And if so, why is it necessary to exclude them again from the verse “from the people of the land”?

Rather, this exclusion was necessary to teach us, since

it could

occur to you to say that an

anointed

priest’s law was not changed in every respect, but only in one manner: that

for the concealment of a matter,

when the law was concealed from him and therefore he ruled for himself that one of the mitzvot was permitted, together

with unwitting action,

when he erred and performed an act according to this ruling, only then does he

bring a bull

for his sin; that is, only in this manner is his law unlike that of an ordinary person who sinned, who brings a female sheep or female goat.

But

for unwitting action alone,

when the anointed priest sinned through mere unwittingness, not according to a ruling, in which case he does not bring a bull, his law is equal to that of an ordinary person, and he

brings a female sheep or female goat.

Therefore

the verse states “from the people of the land”—

excluding the anointed priest.

And likewise

“from the people of the land”—

excluding the king.

To teach you that the law of the High Priest was changed entirely, even in a case in which he sinned through unwitting action without a ruling, and he is entirely exempt from an ordinary sin-offering. And he never brings anything except a bull, when there was unwittingness concerning the ruling together with unwittingness concerning the action. These are the words of the beraita.

And the Gemara discusses the conclusion of the beraita, that the exclusion “from the people of the land” teaches us that the High Priest is exempt from an ordinary sin-offering even if he sinned through unwitting action.

That works

with an

anointed

priest; indeed, this is his law.

But regarding a

king,

the

entire offering that was newly established for a king—namely, that he brings a goat—

he brings specifically for unwitting action!

The question thus remains: Why is it necessary to exclude “from the people of the land,” excluding a king, when it was already stated previously that the law of the king’s sin-offering differs from that of the individual’s sin-offering, for he brings a goat for unwitting action, without unwittingness concerning a ruling?

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which he ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat

unwittingly

when he was an ordinary person,

before he was appointed king,

and

then

he was appointed

king,

and afterward it became known to him

that he had sinned.

It might enter your mind to say,

since he sinned when he was an ordinary person,

he should bring a female sheep or female goat

as an ordinary person, and not according to the law of a king who brings a goat; and for this purpose the exclusion comes,

it teaches us

that he brings no offering at all, since the two conditions that obligate him in that offering were not fulfilled in him—namely, that both the sinful act and the knowledge that he sinned should occur while he is subject to that offering.

But the Gemara rejects this:

That works

this,

according

to the

view of Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of knowledge.

For he said in our Mishna that this is the law: if they sinned before they were appointed and became aware that they had sinned only after they were appointed, they are entirely exempt; and he learned this from this verse, which requires that the one who becomes obligated at the time of the sin and at the time of knowledge of the sin be in the same status, and if his status changed, he is entirely exempt.

But according to the Rabbis, who follow

with regard to the obligation of the offering only

the sin,

for the sin occurred while he was an ordinary person, and they said in our Mishna that even when his status changed and he was appointed king, and he then became aware that he had sinned, his law is to bring a female sheep or female goat, as the law of an ordinary person who sinned—if so,

what is there to say?

For what purpose was the exclusion “from the people of the land,” excluding a king, necessary, when according to their view the king was not excluded from a female sheep or female goat?

Rather, Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: Here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing?—

For example, he ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat while he was an ordinary person, and he was appointed

king, and ate another half olive-bulk after his appointment as king [within the time of eating a half-loaf], and thereby

completed

a full olive-bulk.

And afterward it became known to him

that he had sinned.

It might enter your mind to say: Let the second half join

with the first half of the olive-bulk that he ate while he was an ordinary person, so that it turns out that he ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat,

and he should bring a female sheep or female goat

as an ordinary person.

It teaches us

the exclusion “from the people of the land,” that he brings no offering at all. For the halves do not join to form one olive-bulk, since he did not eat both of them at the time when he became obligated in that offering.

Rava asked Rav Nahman: What is the law concerning kingship—does it interrupt

between two halves of the obligation of an ordinary-person’s offering?

What are the circumstances? For example, he ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat while he was an ordinary person, and he was appointed

king,

and

again

passed

from his appointment and became an ordinary person, and ate another half olive-bulk,

and

thereby

completed

an olive-bulk—what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Should we say that

there

specifically, in the case in which he ate half an olive-bulk while he was an ordinary person and an additional half olive-bulk after he was appointed king, the law

is that they do not join

his two acts of eating to obligate him in an offering as an ordinary person, since

he ate it

this olive-bulk

half while he was an ordinary person and half while he was a king.

But here,

the two halves of the olive-bulk,

both this and that,

this half olive-bulk of forbidden fat that he ate before he was appointed and this half olive-bulk of forbidden fat that he ate after he was appointed and had passed from his kingship,

he ate it while he was an ordinary person; they join,

and this is like one who ate an olive-bulk while he was an ordinary person, and he brings a female sheep or female goat.

Or perhaps it is no different.

Since there was an interval between the acts of eating, during which he was king—for if he had eaten the second half at that time, it would not have joined the first half, since his law then would have been to bring the goat of a king—therefore it is no different from eating half an olive-bulk while an ordinary person and half an olive-bulk while a king, and they do not join.

And therefore the question is,

what,

what is its law?

Resolve for him

this problem

from what Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

One who

ate forbidden fat and set aside a korban

for his sin,

and apostatized

from his religion,

and

again

returned

to his Judaism—when he returns, he cannot bring the korban that he set aside for his sin; rather, this is his law:

since it was rejected

from the law of bringing the korban during the time of his apostasy [for an apostate cannot bring a korban, as will be explained nearby], therefore it

is rejected

forever, since the obligation of a korban was removed from him while he was an apostate. And this is so even though he ate the forbidden fat at a time when he could bring a korban, and now too he is fit to bring a korban.

And likewise, the law will be when the ruler’s office interrupted between two half-olive-portions: he is exempt from a korban, even though both acts of eating took place at a time obligating a sin-offering as an ordinary individual. Nevertheless, since he was a ruler after the first eating, and was rejected from the law of bringing a female sheep or female goat, he is rejected forever; and even though he passed from his office and returned to being an ordinary individual as at first, the obligation of the first sin-offering is removed from him .

And we reject this:

Can this really be compared!?

What is the similarity between the cases under discussion!? Is it not only concerning an apostate that we say, “since it was rejected, it is rejected,” since

an apostate is not fit at all to bring a korban

?

But

this

ruler—even during the time of his appointment as ruler, although at that moment the law of his korban changed, he still

is fit to bring a korban.

And therefore it is possible to say that he is not considered to have then been rejected from his obligation as an ordinary individual; rather, the two halves that he ate should combine, to obligate him in a female sheep or female goat as an ordinary individual.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: If he ate

unintentionally a piece that was

possibly forbidden fat,

possibly permitted fat,

when he was an ordinary individual, and he was appointed

ruler, and after he was appointed

it became known to him concerning his uncertainty,

that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat,

what

is the law? Should he now bring a conditional guilt-offering, or not?

And the Gemara explains that Rabbi Zeira did not discuss the matter according to all opinions.

According to the Rabbis,

who said, in a case where he ate an olive-portion of forbidden fat when he was an ordinary individual, was appointed ruler, and afterward learned that he had sinned, that he brings a sin-offering as an ordinary individual, since

the

Rabbis

follow

the time of

the sin—

you need not ask whether he brings a conditional guilt-offering,

for it is obvious that also in the case of possibly forbidden fat they follow the time of the sin, and the ruler brings a conditional guilt-offering, like an ordinary individual who is uncertain whether he committed a sin for which he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, since at the time of his sin he was an ordinary individual.

Rather, when you ask, it is according to Rabbi Shimon,

who said that when he sinned while he was an ordinary individual and learned of it after he was appointed, he brings no korban at all, because in his view he is not obligated until there are both the sin and the knowledge at a time obligating the bringing of that korban. And according to him, the matter is to be considered: What is the law in the case of possibly forbidden fat?

Shall we say:

Since his status changed from certainty

when he was appointed ruler, and as a result his law changed, so that he became exempt from a sin-offering—in a case where he learned after being appointed that he had certainly sinned while he was an ordinary individual, since he did not have knowledge at a time obligating a korban as an ordinary individual, therefore

it changed

his law also

with

regard

to uncertainty,

so that he is exempt from a conditional guilt-offering also in a case where he learned after being appointed that, while he was an ordinary individual, he had eaten possibly forbidden fat.

Or perhaps, when

we say that

his law changed

with regard to certainty, so that he becomes exempt when he learns after being appointed, this is specifically when he learns that he certainly sinned, since

now,

at the time when he is already a ruler,

his korban has changed,

for if he were to sin now he would bring a goat; therefore he is exempt from an individual’s sin-offering, because the knowledge and the sin did not occur at a time obligating that same korban.

But here,

where he ate possibly forbidden fat,

his korban has not changed,

for even if he were now to eat possibly forbidden fat while he was a ruler, his law would be that he brings a conditional guilt-offering, as does an ordinary individual;

say that he should bring a conditional guilt-offering,

even though he learned of this possible eating only after he was appointed .

And we conclude:

It stands unresolved 9 .

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the section concerning a sin-offering,

“from the people of the land,”

and the meaning of “from” is part of the people. The verse teaches that only part of the people brings a korban, but not every person of the land:

to exclude an apostate,

from whose hand a korban is not accepted.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

This law is not learned from the precision of the verse “from the people of the land,” but from the words of the verse

“which he would not do unintentionally, and he bears guilt.”

And nearby it says: “Or it became known to him his sin that he committed, and he shall bring his korban.” This implies that the obligation of a sin-offering applies only in a case where his sin is considered “which he would not do”: he would not have sinned had he known that it was a prohibited matter. The reason that he came to sin was that he acted unintentionally and did not know that it was prohibited; therefore he brings a sin-offering for his sin.

But when he would have sinned even if he had known that it was a prohibited matter, he does not achieve atonement through a korban. And the rule is:

one who would turn back through his knowledge—

if he had known, he would have turned back and refrained from the act of transgression, he

brings a korban for his unintentional act.

But if

he would not turn back through his knowledge—

even if he had known that it was prohibited, he would not have turned back and refrained from the act of transgression—

he does not bring a korban for his unintentional act.

From here you learn that an apostate does not bring a korban for his sin, for even if he had known that it was prohibited, he would not have refrained. And the Gemara asks: Since both agree that an apostate does not bring a korban, then

what is the difference between them,

what practical legal difference is there for us as to from where this law is learned?

Rav Hamnuna said:

There is a practical legal difference in these expositions, for these tannaim disagree concerning the nature of the law that an apostate does not bring a korban.

According to the first tanna, it is a law stated specifically concerning an apostate. But according to Rabbi Shimon, it is a general law, applying to anyone who would not turn back through his knowledge.

And there is a practical legal difference between them concerning a person who is

an apostate

with regard to one matter—for example, he is accustomed

to eating forbidden fat,

and does not refrain from this prohibition, but refrains from the other prohibitions. If it happened that he ate blood unintentionally and wishes to achieve atonement,

and brings a korban for

his sin through eating

the blood,

in such a case

there is a difference between them:

they disagree whether his korban is accepted from him:

This master,

the first tanna, who learned the law that an apostate does not bring a korban from the precision of the verse “from the people of the land,”

holds

that it is a law newly established specifically concerning an apostate, that an apostate does not bring a korban. Therefore, also in this case,

since

he is

an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat,

then

with

regard to the prohibition of

blood as well

the law of

an apostate applies

to him, and he does not bring a korban.

And this master,

Rabbi Shimon, who learned his exemption from “which he would not do,” and who holds this as a general rule concerning anyone who would not turn back through his knowledge, that he does not bring a korban,

holds

that one who is an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat brings a korban for his unintentional eating of blood. Since with regard to the prohibition of

blood, at least, he would turn back through his knowledge.

For certainly, if he had known that this was blood, he would have refrained, since he is not established as one who eats blood.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav Hamnuna, who said that according to the first tanna, one who is an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat but not with regard to other matters is considered an apostate also concerning the prohibition of blood:

But Rava said that everyone

holds that a person who is

an apostate

only with regard to

eating forbidden fat,

he

is not an apostate with regard to

the prohibition of

blood

and the other mitzvot of the Torah. If so, certainly according to everyone, an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat brings an offering for eating blood inadvertently.

Rather,

necessarily, the practical difference in the dispute of the tannaim concerns another matter:

Here, with regard to

a person who

eats unslaughtered carcasses

only

for appetite,

who eats a forbidden thing only when he has no permitted meat and desires to eat, but when permitted meat is before him, he does not eat the forbidden thing, because he does not eat a forbidden thing merely in order to anger his Creator.

And it is speaking of a case in which this person wished to eat suet,

and it was exchanged for him

forbidden fat

in place of suet, and he ate it,

because he thought that it was suet. And concerning this

they disagree,

these tannaim, whether he brings an offering:

One master,

the first tanna, who holds that a new law was stated concerning an apostate, that he does not bring an offering,

holds

that even in this case he will be considered an apostate,

since he eats a prohibition for appetite;

for when he desires it, he will eat it even

intentionally.

Therefore

he is an apostate,

and his offerings are not accepted.

And one master,

Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an apostate does not bring an offering because he is included among one who does not repent upon learning,

holds: since, if he had found

if a piece of

permitted food had presented itself to him, he would not have eaten

a piece

of forbidden food, he is not an apostate,

and therefore, if forbidden fat was exchanged for him with suet and he learned of it afterward, he is considered one who repents upon learning, and an offering is accepted from him.

The Sages taught:

One who

ate forbidden fat

intentionally,

that is an apostate!

And who is an apostate?

This is one who

ate unslaughtered carcasses,

or

animals with fatal organic defects,

or

reptiles and creeping things,

or

drank wine libated to idolatry.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who wears a garment containing shaatnez.

And the Gemara explains what is stated in the baraita:

The master said, “

He ate forbidden fat; that is an apostate.”

But afterward the baraita says, “

And who is an apostate?

This is one who

eats unslaughtered carcasses

and animals with fatal organic defects.”

And the wording of the baraita afterward is very perplexing:

What is it saying?

It was already explained in the first clause who is considered an apostate, so why does the baraita repeat and ask who is an apostate!?

Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: This is what

the tanna

is saying: a. One who ate forbidden fat for appetite is an apostate.

b. But if he ate a forbidden thing and stated that his intention was

to anger

his Creator by doing so,

he is a min,

whose law is more severe than that of an apostate, and the ordinary slaughter of a min is considered as slaughter performed for the sake of idolatry.

And the baraita continued and explained another law, saying:

And who is an apostate

who eats a forbidden thing, and although he did not state that he does so to anger, nevertheless he is considered as one

whose ordinary conduct

proves about him that he is

a min,

and that he certainly acts to anger?

You must say,

this is one who

eats

one of these prohibitions —

an unslaughtered carcass or an animal with a fatal organic defect, reptiles and creeping things, or drinks wine libated to idolatry,

since a person does not eat any of these for appetite, because they are things toward which the soul feels revulsion; rather, he certainly acts to anger. And now the Gemara continues to explain the continuation of the baraita:

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Even one who wears shaatnez,

that is an apostate.

And it follows that according to the first tanna, one who wears shaatnez is not considered an apostate.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

What is the difference between them?

Why should the first tanna disagree and hold that a person who eats forbidden fat is considered an apostate more than a person who wears shaatnez? After all, both transgressed prohibitions of the Torah!

And it answers:

There is a difference between them

in a case where he wore a garment containing a type of shaatnez that involves only the prohibition of

rabbinic shaatnez.

From the Torah, a garment of wool and linen together is prohibited only if the wool and linen were joined in the manner of “combed, spun, and woven,” as we expound from the word “shaatnez” [that is, “combed,” where the tufts of wool and flax were smoothed together with a comb; “spun,” where a thread was spun from a mixture of wool and flax; and “woven,” where the mixed thread was woven and made into a garment]. But if they made “felt” by pressing wool and flax together, or wove a wool thread into a linen garment, this involves only a rabbinic prohibition, and in this case they disagree:

One master,

the first tanna,

holds

that only a person who transgresses something prohibited

by Torah law is an apostate,

but one who transgresses a prohibition

by rabbinic law is not an apostate.

And

if

one master,

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

holds

like the first tanna with regard to all the other prohibitions, that one does not become an apostate if he transgressed only a rabbinic prohibition concerning them, but his view is that the prohibition of

shaatnez

is more severe,

since its prohibition is publicized.

And

therefore, even

when he transgressed

a

prohibition

by rabbinic law, he is an apostate.

And the Gemara explains that in Rabbi Yohanan’s explanation, according to which the intention of the final clause of the baraita is to teach us that an apostate who acts to anger is considered a min,

they disagree about it,

concerning this law,

Rav Aha and Ravina.

One said,

one who transgresses

for appetite is an apostate,

whereas one who transgresses

to anger

is

a min.

And one said,

one who transgresses

to anger also

is considered only an

apostate

and not a min.

Rather, who is a min? Anyone who worships idolatry

alone.

A challenge is raised against the one who says that one who eats to anger is considered a min:

And it was taught in a baraita:

One who

ate one flea or one mosquito, that is an apostate!

But here,

certainly

he acts to anger,

for a person does not desire to eat a flea or a mosquito,

and

nevertheless

he calls him an apostate,

and not a min.

And we answer: In fact, one who acts to anger is considered a min and not an apostate.

And there,

with regard to eating a flea, there is a reason to consider him an apostate and not a min, because it is speaking of one who acts for appetite, such as

when he says, “I will taste the taste of a forbidden thing.”

In that case, tasting for appetite is possible even with regard to something toward which the soul feels revulsion. We learned in our Mishna:

And who is this president? This is a king, and so on.

The Sages taught:

From where [do we know] that a

nasi

\[for whom the Torah innovated that he brings a male goat for his inadvertent transgression\] means specifically a king?

But can you not

say

that it refers to a

nasi of a tribe, like Nahshon son of Amminadav,

who was the nasi of the tribe of Judah, and similarly the other tribal leaders?

The verse says

in the section of the offering of the nasi: “

from all the commandments of the Lord his God,” and

we learn a gzera shava, for

below,

with regard to a king,

it says

\[Deuteronomy 17\]

“so that he may learn to fear the Lord his God.”