Gittin 88b — the Talmud in English

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Learn from this

from Ulla’s words, that the measure of time of

“quickly,” of the Master of the World,

is

eight hundred and fifty-two years,

for it is written: “And you will grow old,” for you will surely perish quickly.”

Mishna:

“A coerced get,”

where they compelled the husband to give it, and he did not give it willingly, if the coercion was carried out in a court

in Israel,

this is a get

that is valid.

And if the coercion was carried out in a court

of gentiles, it is invalid.

And through gentiles it is possible to compel the get when the court of Israel is unable to compel him, for they can appoint the court of gentiles as their agents, so that they will be

beating him and saying to him: Do what Israel tells you.

Gemara:

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: A coerced get—

in Israel,

when the coercion is

according to law,

where he is among those men who are obligated to divorce their wives,

is valid.

But if the court obligated him

unlawfully, and compelled him to divorce,

the get is

invalid

for marrying through it another man,

and disqualifies

the woman from the priesthood, on account of the law of the trace of the get.

And

if they compelled him in a court

of gentiles, and the coercion was

according to law,

the get is invalid

for marrying through it,

and disqualifies

her from the priesthood by the law of the trace of the get.

But if they compelled him

unlawfully, it does not even contain a trace of the get,

and she is permitted to the priesthood.

And we challenge this:

Whichever way you look at it: If gentiles are fit

to carry out coercion, it should also be fit

to marry through it.

If they are not fit to carry out coercion, it should not disqualify

her from the priesthood!

And we answer:

Rav Mesharshya said: By Torah law, a get coerced by gentiles is valid

if the coercion was according to law, as in Israel.

And for what reason did they say that it is invalid?

The Sages instituted this so that

every single woman should not go and attach herself to a gentile,

to hire him to compel her husband to divorce her unlawfully,

and free herself from her husband’s authority.

And we refute this:

If so,

that coercion by gentiles which is carried out according to law is effective by Torah law just as in Israel, why did you say that if their coercion was carried out

unlawfully, it does not even contain a trace of the get?

Let unlawful coercion be like that in Israel, and let it also disqualify

her from the priesthood!

And therefore the Gemara’s conclusion is:

Rather, this statement of Rav Mesharshya is a fabrication!

And what is the reason? That is, regarding what you argued, “Whichever way you look at it”: If their coercion is not coercion even when they compelled him lawfully, why is she disqualified from the priesthood? The answer is:

Coercion by gentiles

according to law, in

coercion

according to the law of Israel, is confused with it.

And if we permit her to the priesthood, they will come to permit her also when the coercion was in Israel.

But coercion

unlawfully

by gentiles

in

coercion

according to law

of

Israel is not confused with it:

Abaye found Rav Yosef sitting and coercing with regard to divorce documents.

He said to him: But we are

lay judges,

and not judges who possess ordination,

and it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Tarfon used to say: Wherever you find tribunals [

an assembly for judgment]

of gentiles, even though their laws are like the laws of Israel, you may not resort to them.

As it is stated: “And these are the judgments that you shall place before them,”

and we expound: “‘Before them,’ and not before

gentiles.”

Alternatively, “‘before them,’ and not before

Israelite judges who are

laymen,

who do not possess ordination.

He said to him: We,

our power to compel regarding the get is because

we act as their agents

of the judges possessing ordination in the Land of Israel,

we are acting!

And proof that there is such a possibility for laymen to judge by virtue of the agency of judges possessing ordination:

As is the case with

laws of

admissions and loans,

which we judge in Babylonia even though we do not possess ordination, and we judge them in Babylonia so that the door should not be locked before borrowers; therefore we also compel with regard to divorce, so that the daughters of Israel will not be prevented from marrying.

And we challenge this:

If so,

that laymen can judge by virtue of the agency of those possessing ordination, the laws of

robbery and bodily injuries also

should be judged in Babylonia!

And we answer:

When we act as the agents

of those possessing ordination,

it is in a matter that is common,

such as admissions and loans.

In a matter that is uncommon,

such as robbery and bodily injuries,

we do not act as their agents:

Mishna:

A woman who had been presumed unmarried, and now

her name went out,

a voice went out concerning her

in the city

that she was

betrothed

to so-and-so,

she is betrothed

by uncertainty, and she is forbidden to marry another without a get. [

And the Gemara explains that this is speaking where there is grounds for the matter that give reason to be concerned about the betrothal.]

If a voice went out concerning one who is married that she was

divorced—

if her husband is a koen,

she is divorced

by uncertainty, stringently, and she is forbidden to remain under him.

But if her husband is an Israelite, there is nothing to it, and we do not permit a married woman to the world on account of a voice.

Provided that there is not

in the voice that went out concerning her

a rationale—

an example and a reason that cause the voice to be nullified.

What is a rationale?

A voice went out

that a certain man divorced his wife conditionally.

Since we do not know whether the condition was fulfilled or not, we do not presume that she was divorced; therefore she is permitted to remain under her koen husband.

And likewise, if a voice went out

that he threw

her husband’s money of

betrothal

to a place that is

uncertainly closer to her, uncertainly closer to him,

for there is no clear voice of betrothal —

This is a rationale

that nullifies the voice, and we are not concerned about it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If a voice went out concerning her that she was divorced, she is divorced.

And we ask: Is it so that

we forbid

her, if she is the wife of a koen,

to the man

—to her koen husband, by the law of a divorcee, on account of the voice!?

But Rav Ashi said: With regard to every voice that is after marriage,

for example, if she married a koen and a voice went out that she was a prostitute and a divorcee,

we are not concerned

about it, unless witnesses come concerning it!

And we answer: Rather,

this is what it is saying:

If

a voice went out

concerning

her name in the city

that she was

betrothed, she is betrothed,

and she is forbidden to marry another except with a get.

And if afterward a voice went out that this woman who had been

betrothed

to so-and-so had

also

become

divorced

from him,