Gittin 88b (פח:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Learn from this

from Ulla’s statement that the period of time referred to by

“quickly,” as used by the Master of the Universe,

is

eight hundred and fifty-two years,

as it is written: “And you will grow old in the land, and you will surely perish quickly.”

Mishna:

“A coerced bill of divorce,”

where they compelled the husband to give it, and he did not give it willingly: If the coercion was carried out in a court

in Israel,

it is a

valid bill of divorce.

But if the coercion was carried out in a court

of gentiles, it is invalid.

And through gentiles, it is possible to compel the giving of a bill of divorce when a court

in Israel is unable to compel him: They may appoint the court of gentiles as their agents, so that they will beat him and say to him: “Do what Israel tells you.”

Gemara:

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: A coerced bill of divorce —

in Israel,

when the coercion is

in accordance with the law,

because he is one of those men who are obligated to divorce their wives,

is valid.

But if the court obligated him

unlawfully,

and compelled him to divorce her,

the bill of divorce is invalid

for permitting her to marry another,

but it disqualifies

the woman from marrying into the priesthood, by virtue of the law of the mere scent of a bill of divorce.

And

if they compelled him in a court

of gentiles,

and the coercion was

in accordance with the law, the bill of divorce is invalid

for permitting her to marry through it,

and it disqualifies

her from the priesthood by virtue of the law of the mere scent of a bill of divorce.

But if they compelled him

unlawfully, it does not even impart the mere scent of a bill of divorce,

and she is permitted to marry into the priesthood.

And we challenge this:

Whichever way you look at it: If gentiles are capable of

legally coercing a divorce, the bill should likewise be rendered valid

for permitting her to marry through it.

And if they are not capable of legally coercing a divorce, the bill should not be disqualifying

the woman from the priesthood either!

And we answer:

Rav Mesharshiyya said: By Torah law, a coerced bill of divorce administered by gentiles is valid

when the coercion was in accordance with the law, just as in Israel.

And for what reason did the Sages say that it is invalid?

The Sages instituted this

so that every woman would not go and attach herself to a gentile,

hiring him to compel her husband to divorce her unlawfully,

thereby freeing herself from her husband’s control.

And we refute this:

If so,

given that coercion by gentiles carried out in accordance with the law is effective by Torah law, just as in Israel, why did you say that if their coercion was carried out

unlawfully, it does not even impart the mere scent of a bill of divorce?

Let it be considered unlawful coercion, as in Israel, and let it also disqualify her

from the priesthood!

Therefore, the Gemara’s conclusion is:

Rather, this statement of Rav Mesharshiyya is a fabrication!

And what is the reason? That is, regarding your argument, “Whichever way you look at it”: If their coercion is not considered coercion even when they compelled him in accordance with the law, why is she disqualified from the priesthood? The answer is:

Coercion by gentiles

in accordance with the law, in

coercion

in accordance with the law by Israel, is confused with it.

If we permit her to marry into the priesthood, people will come to permit her even when the coercion was carried out in Israel.

But

unlawful

coercion by gentiles

in

coercion

in accordance with the law

by

Israel is not confused with it:

Abaye found Rav Yosef sitting and compelling husbands to give bills of divorce.

He said to him: But we are

ordinary judges,

and not judges who possess ordination,

and it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Tarfon would say: Wherever you find tribunals

[an assembly for judgment]

of gentiles, even though their laws are like the laws of Israel, you may not resort to them.

As it is stated: “And these are the laws that you shall place before them,”

and we interpret it:

“Before them,” but not before gentiles.

Alternatively: “Before them,” but not before

ordinary Jewish

judges,

who do not possess ordination.

He said to him: We

derive our authority to compel the giving of a bill of divorce from the fact that

we act as their agents

of the ordained judges of the Land of Israel;

that is what we do!

And proof that ordinary judges have such an option, to judge by virtue of their agency from the ordained judges, is the following:

Just as with

the laws of

admissions and loans,

which we judge in Babylonia even though we are not ordained, and which we judge in Babylonia so that the door will not be closed before borrowers, so too we compel husbands to divorce so that Jewish women will not be prevented from marrying.

And we challenge this:

If so,

given that ordinary judges can judge by virtue of the agency of the ordained judges, the laws of

robbery and personal injury should also

be judged in Babylonia!

And we answer:

When we act as the agents

of the ordained judges, it is

in a matter that is common,

such as admissions and loans.

In a matter that is uncommon,

such as robbery and personal injury,

we do not act as their agents:

Mishna:

A woman who had been presumed unmarried, and now

her name emerged,

a rumor emerged concerning her

in the city

that she was

betrothed

to a certain man,

she is considered betrothed

as a matter of uncertainty, and she may not marry another man without a bill of divorce.

And the Gemara explains that this is referring to a case in which there is a basis for concern regarding the betrothal.

If a rumor emerged concerning a woman who was married that she was

divorced —

if her husband is a priest,

she is considered divorced

as a matter of uncertainty, stringently, and she may not remain married to him.

But if her husband is an Israelite, this has no consequence, and we do not permit a married woman to the world on the basis of a rumor.

Provided that there is not

in the rumor that emerged concerning her

a plausible explanation —

an account or reason that causes the rumor to be nullified.

What is an example of a plausible explanation? A rumor emerged

that

a certain man divorced his wife conditionally.

Since we do not know whether the condition was fulfilled, we do not presume that she was divorced; therefore, she may remain married to her priest-husband.

Likewise, if a rumor emerged

that her

husband threw the money of her

betrothal

to a place that was

possibly closer to her and possibly closer to him,

there is no clear rumor of betrothal.

This is a plausible explanation

that nullifies the rumor, and we do not concern ourselves with it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If a rumor emerged that she was divorced, she is considered divorced.

And we ask: Do we indeed

forbid her, if she is the wife of a priest,

on account of

the man,

her priest-husband, under the law governing a divorced woman, because of the rumor!?

But Rav Ashi said: Any rumor that emerges after marriage,

such as if she married a priest and a rumor emerged that she was a prostitute or a divorced woman,

we do not take it into consideration

unless witnesses come and testify to it!

And we answer: Rather,

this is what it is saying:

If a rumor

emerged concerning

her

name in the city that she was

betrothed, she is considered betrothed

and

she may not marry another man except with a bill of divorce.

And if a rumor subsequently emerged that this woman who had been

betrothed

to a certain man had

again

become

divorced

from him,