Gittin 86b — the Talmud in English

And

concerning this Rav said that

specifically

if there was

his handwriting and one witness,

it is invalid ab initio, but the child is fit.

But if there was the scribe’s handwriting and one witness, not so!

Rather, the child too is unfit.

And according to Rav’s reasoning, the final clause of the Mishna comes to teach us that one should not say that if there was his handwriting and one witness, she may marry even ab initio. Therefore Rav said that the final clause speaks specifically of his handwriting and one witness, and teaches that ab initio this is an invalid bill of divorce [but the child is fit], whereas if it was the scribe’s handwriting and one witness

And Shmuel said: Even

if there was

the scribe’s handwriting and one witness,

the child is fit.

For we learned

in a Mishna below [87b]:

The scribe’s handwriting and one witness: it is fit.

And the Gemara explains Rav’s answer to Shmuel’s proof:

And Rav—are they comparable?

How did Shmuel compare the words of the Mishna below to our matter!?

For

there,

there it speaks of the scribe having signed the bill of divorce together with the witness, and this is a completely valid bill of divorce, with the signatures of two witnesses; and the proof is that it says there:

she may marry

with it

ab initio.

Whereas

here,

it speaks of the scribe having only written and not signed, and he is disqualified, and she is forbidden to marry by means of it, while the child is fit only when she transgressed and married,

after the fact.

And Shmuel

answered Rav’s astonishment: there too it speaks only of the scribe’s writing and one witness, and it does not speak of the scribe having signed together with one witness.

And as for Rav’s claim—that there they taught “she may marry ab initio,” whereas here the child is fit only after the fact, and necessarily here it speaks of the scribe’s writing and one witness, while there it speaks of the scribe’s signature and one witness:

It is not difficult: this,

the Mishna below, speaks

of an expert scribe,

who is proficient in the laws of writing a bill of divorce, and he will write the bill of divorce only if he heard from the husband that he should write it, and his writing has the status of a witness’s signature.

And this,

our Mishna, speaks

of a non-expert scribe,

who does not know the laws of bills of divorce, and there is concern that he may write the bill of divorce without the husband instructing him, through his writing, to be a witness concerning it.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said

as Rav said:

“We learned: his handwriting.”

Rabbi Elazar said to him: “We learned: there are witnesses on it!”

[That is, the first clause, not the final clause.]

He said to him: “I was referring to the final clause,”

as was explained above.

At times Rav said,

concerning the three bills of divorce in our Mishna, if she married,

she must leave.

At times Rav said: She need not leave.

How so?

If she has children, she need not leave.

If she has no children, she must leave.

Mar Zutra bar Toviyya objected

from the Mishna at the beginning of tractate Yevamot:

A woman who falls before her husband’s brother for levirate marriage, and she is forbidden to the levir with a forbidden-kin prohibition, does not enter into levirate marriage and does not require halitza; rather, she is immediately permitted to marry any person.

Likewise, the rival wife of this levirate wife, who had been married together with her to the deceased brother, does not enter into levirate marriage and does not require halitza, even though she herself is not forbidden to the levir with a forbidden-kin prohibition.

And if the forbidden-kin women were divorced from the brother before his death, the designation “rival wife of a forbidden-kin woman” is removed from their rival wives, and they require levirate marriage or halitza.

And all of them,

all the rival wives of the forbidden-kin women,

with regard to whom there had been

for the forbidden-kin women

a uncertainty of betrothal or a uncertainty of divorce—these,

the rival wives of the forbidden-kin women,

perform halitza,

lest the forbidden-kin women had not been married to the deceased brother, or lest they had been divorced from him, and consequently their rival wives are not rival wives of a forbidden-kin woman, and they require halitza in order to marry outside;

but they do not enter into levirate marriage,

because perhaps the forbidden-kin women had been married to the deceased brother, or perhaps they had not been divorced from him, and they are therefore rival wives of a forbidden-kin woman, who are forbidden in levirate marriage.

What is meant by “a uncertainty of betrothal”?

He threw to her

money

of betrothal; it was uncertain

whether the money arrived

near her,

in which case she is betrothed;

it was uncertain

whether the money fell

near him,

in which case she is not betrothed;

this is a uncertainty of betrothal.

What is meant by

“a uncertainty of divorce”?

He wrote it in his own handwriting, and there are no witnesses on it.

There are witnesses on it, but there is no date in it.

There is a date in it, but there is only one witness in it; this is

as though

“a uncertainty of divorce,”

so they neither perform halitza nor enter into levirate marriage.

And if you say

that with these three bills of divorce, if she married,

she need not leave,

there is concern that people will think that this bill of divorce is an excellent bill of divorce [when it is only valid after the fact]; therefore, if her husband dies and she and her rival wife fall before her husband’s brother, although she herself may not enter into levirate marriage, just as she should not have married the husband who died, but

her rival wife—does she come to levirate marriage!?

And we answer:

She may enter into levirate marriage, and there is nothing in this,

because it is only

a rabbinic concern.

Levi said: In all circumstances, she need not leave.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said: In all circumstances, she need not leave.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said to the sons of Rabbi Halafta of Huna, “Thus your father said,”

two halakhot:

The first, concerning the matter of bills of divorce here:

In all circumstances, she need not leave.

And

the second, concerning another matter, the water of purification of the red heifer:

A grasshopper of the sheaf does not disqualify the water of purification.

That is, if an animal or bird drank from the water of purification, the water becomes disqualified, because when the water enters the mouth of the animal or bird, the designation “water of purification” is annulled from it; and since it is the way of an animal or bird to return part of the water in its mouth to the vessel, all the water becomes disqualified.

But the grasshopper drinks and does not return the water in its mouth to the vessel; therefore, if it drank from the water of purification, the water does not become disqualified.

What is a “grasshopper of the sheaf”?

Abaye said: A didavta that is among the crevices,

a large fly, resembling a locust, found among the sheaves.

Rav Daniel bar Rav Ketina objected

from the Mishna in tractate Parah, in which we learned:

All birds

disqualify the water of purification, except for the dove, because it sucks

and does not return the water in its mouth to the vessel.

And if it is so, let us teach: “Except for the dove and the grasshopper of the sheaf.”

And we answer: The grasshopper of the sheaf

was not stated categorically,

for it is not certain that every grasshopper of the sheaf does not disqualify;

for a large one does not disqualify, while a small one does disqualify,

and therefore the tan‌nay did not teach it.

And how large

is a small grasshopper of the sheaf?

Rabbi Yirmeya said, and some say Rabbi Ami: Up to the size of an olive:

we learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar says: Even though, and so on: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

When I stated this before Shmuel, he said: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar

even with regard to documents.

And the Gemara is astonished:

And

when

Rav holds

that

with regard to documents, not

do we say that the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar?

But it is taught: “And he collects from liened property,”

and this law of collection applies to every document.

And we answer: Indeed,

Rabbi Elazar stated two things,

that witnesses of delivery are effective both with a bill of divorce and with every document; however:

Rav agrees with him in one matter,

with regard to a bill of divorce,

and disputes him in one matter,

with regard to other documents.

And Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi likewise: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

And Rabbi Yannai said: It does not even have the scent of a bill of divorce!

And the Gemara is astonished:

And

when

Rabbi Yannai—does he not accept Rabbi Elazar’s position!?

This is what he is saying: According to the Rabbis, it does not even have the scent of a bill of divorce.

And Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina likewise said:

Reish Lakish said: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce; and Rabbi Yohanan said: It does not even have the scent of a bill of divorce.

Let us say: Rabbi Yohanan does not accept Rabbi Elazar’s position!?

This is what he is saying: According to the Rabbis, it does not even have the scent of a bill of divorce.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda sent to Mari bar Mar:

Ask Rav Huna whether the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce, or whether the halakha does not follow him.

Meanwhile,

in the interim,

Rav Huna died.

His son Rabba said to him: “Thus my father said”

[Rav Huna]

in the name of Rava:

The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

And our teachers, who were proficient in the matter of halakha

[Rav Hama bar Gurya], said

in the name of our teacher

[Rav],

they said: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

For Rav Hama bar Gurya said in the name of Rav: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

There are those who say: And our colleague

[Rav Hisda],

who was proficient in the matter of halakha, and the students of our teacher in the name of our teacher, said: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

For Rav Hisda said in the name of Rav Hama bar Gurya in the name of Rav: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

Mishna:

Two men who sent two bills of divorce,

whose husbands’ and wives’ names were

identical, and the two bills of divorce became mixed up,

so it is not known which bill of divorce belongs to each one:

The agent gives

the

two of them to this one, and the two of them to that one.

Therefore, if one of them was lost, the other,

which remained in the agent’s possession,

is nullified.

For it is not known who are the divorcing husband and the divorced wife to whom this bill of divorce belongs.

Five men who wrote a “general formulation” within the bill of divorce: “So-and-so divorces so-and-so, and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so.” And the witnesses are below.

All of them are valid, and it shall be given to each and every one.

If he was writing a “template”

[as will be explained in the Gemara]

for each and every one, and the witnesses are below, the one with which the witnesses are read is valid:

Gemara:

And the Gemara explains:

Who is the tan‌nay,

who is the tan‌nay of our Mishna, who holds that it is possible to give both bills of divorce to each of them, despite the fact that it is not known by which bill of divorce she is divorced?

Rabbi Yirmeya said:

This tan‌nay is

not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.

For if it were Rabbi Elazar, since he said, “Witnesses of delivery effect the divorce,” here they do not know by which of them he is divorcing her,

and this is not “giving” for her sake, which is giving clarified so that she is divorced by this particular bill of divorce; and since according to Rabbi Elazar the witnesses of delivery are those who give the bill of divorce its force, the law of “for her sake” applies to the giving.

Abaye said: You may even say [that it is] Rabbi Elazar.

Say that Rabbi Elazar requires the writing

of the bill of divorce

for her sake.

“Giving” for her sake—

does he require it!?

We learned in the Mishna:

“Five men who wrote a general formulation,” and so on: What are the circumstances of a “general formulation”? What are the circumstances of a “template”?

Rabbi Yohanan said:

If one date was mentioned in the bill of divorce

for all of them, this is a “general formulation.”

And if

a date was mentioned for each and every one, this is a “template.”