Gittin 46b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara further explains:

What is “konam”

doing in a vow to divorce? For konam is the imposition of a prohibition upon a particular thing, and what did he prohibit here

Rav Huna said: When he says

the husband: “

Let there be forbidden

[‘konam’]

to me all the fruit in the world if I do not divorce you.”

We learned likewise in the Mishna: There was also an incident in Sidon involving one who said to his wife, “Konam, I am forbidden to divorce you,” and he divorced her,

and they permitted him to take her back:

And we ask: Is it not

obvious

that he can take her back? For what is there for us to fear

And we explain:

Lest you say, let us decree

against the husband that he may not take his wife back, because he fulfilled his vow and did not seek its annulment, and

because of Rabbi Natan.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Natan says: One who vows

—his act is as serious

as though he built a private altar

at a time when it is forbidden to build a private altar outside the Temple,

and one who fulfills it

—the vow, without seeking its annulment,

is as though he offered a sacrifice upon it—

And in order that he not be uninhibited with vows, let us decree against him that he may not take back the wife whom he divorced because of fulfilling the vow.

It teaches us

that we do not decree so.

We learned in the Mishna: The Sages permitted him to take her back

for the sake of the betterment of the world:

And we wonder:

What betterment of the world

is there in this, that we permit him to take her back

Rav Sheshet said:

This statement that we learned at the end, “for the sake of the betterment of the world,” does not refer to the ending, where he made the vow, but

to the beginning,

where she made the vow. It is for this reason that he may not take her back: for the sake of the betterment of the world, so that he not undermine her, or so that women not become uninhibited with forbidden sexual relations and vows.

Ravina said: Actually

what we learned at the end, “for the sake of the betterment of the world,” does refer

to the ending, and this is what it teaches: There is no betterment of the world in this,

that is, the Sages permitted him to take her back for the sake of the betterment of the world, for no circumstance is found here that would require prohibition.

Mishna:

The following Mishna is a continuation of the preceding Mishna, in which we learned: One who divorces his wife because of an evil name or because of a vow may not take her back. The tannaim disagreed there whether the reason is concern of undermining, or a penalty, so that Jewish women would not become uninhibited with forbidden sexual relations and vows.

One who divorces his wife

with a bill of divorce

because

it became known to him that she is

an aylonit.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He may not take her back,

because of concern of undermining: perhaps she will be found not to be an aylonit, and he will undermine her and say that he did not divorce her with this understanding. Therefore they instituted that he may not take her back.

And the Sages say: He may take her back,

and their reason will be explained in the Gemara.

He divorced her and did not give her a ketuba because she was an aylonit, and he had not known this at the time of the marriage, so she had no ketuba, and she went and

married another, and had children from him,

and it became clear that she was not an aylonit, for an aylonit does not give birth.

And she

returned to the first husband and

claimed her ketuba

from him, for she had not misled him, and he had deprived her of her ketuba for no reason.

Rabbi Yehuda said: The first husband says to her

:

Your silence is better for you than your speech!

That is, it is better for you to remain silent and not claim your ketuba on the basis of having been found healthy; for if you claim your ketuba and I must pay, I too will answer you: If I had known that I would ultimately have to give you your ketuba, I would not have divorced you, and I would disqualify your sons as mamzerim. If so, it is better for you not to claim than to claim.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who divorces his wife because she is an aylonit—Rabbi Yehuda says, he may not take her back, and the Sages say, he may take her back:

And we ask:

Does this mean

[is it possible to say this],

that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about undermining

and therefore prohibits him from taking her back,

while

if

the Sages are not concerned about undermining,

and therefore permit him to take her back!?

But we heard the opposite from them

in the preceding Mishna:

For we learned: One who divorces his wife because of an evil name may not take her back, and because of a vow he may not take her back,

and the reason is concern of undermining.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Concerning every vow that many people knew about, he may not take her back; but one that many people did not know about, he may take her back,

and his reason is that he is not concerned about undermining, but about uninhibitedness; and uninhibitedness exists only with a vow known to many people, which cannot be annulled.

Thus

it is proven that

the Sages

[the first tanna in the preceding Mishna]

are concerned about undermining, while Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about undermining, whereas here their positions have been reversed!?

And we answer:

Shmuel said: Reverse it

in our Mishna: attribute the words of the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda, and the words of Rabbi Yehuda to the Sages. Rabbi Yehuda then follows his position, and the Sages follow their position.

And we raise an objection to this:

But since the ending teaches

of our Mishna:

She married another and had children from him, and she claims her ketuba. Rabbi Yehuda said: He says to her: Your silence is better for you than your speech.

By implication,

it is proven

that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about undermining!?

For it is proven from his words that, if he wishes to say, “Had I known that you would be found healthy, I would not have divorced you,” he would undermine her.

And we answer:

This—the ending—

the latter clause—

must also be reversed,

and it was not Rabbi Yehuda who said this, but the Sages.

Abaye said: Actually, do not reverse

our Mishna at all. Indeed, Rabbi Yehuda is the one who is concerned in our Mishna about undermining. And what is difficult for you—that in the preceding Mishna Rabbi Yehuda was not concerned about undermining in the case of one who divorces his wife because of a vow—this is not difficult, for Rabbi Yehuda too maintains that it is necessary to prohibit taking her back wherever there is concern of undermining—

And Rabbi Yehuda,

in the preceding Mishna, where he was not concerned about undermining in the case of one who divorces his wife because of a vow, this is because in his view such concern does not apply when he divorces her because of a vow; and this is because there we learned a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar concerning the reason for undermining through a vow:

Rabbi Meir holds that the principal concern of undermining is lest he say, “I did not know that the Sage would permit it.” But he cannot undermine her by saying, “I did not know that the husband could nullify it.” Therefore he distinguishes between a vow that specifically requires the annulment of a Sage and a vow that does not require the annulment of a Sage, for the husband’s nullification is sufficient for it.

But Rabbi Elazar holds, on the contrary, that the principal undermining is because he will claim that he did not know about a husband’s nullification; but he cannot undermine her by saying, “I did not know about the annulment of a Sage,” because a person does not want his wife to be disgraced in court.

And Rabbi Yehuda

in that

dispute in which Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar disagreed

holds

both

according to

the reasoning of

Rabbi Meir, and

also

holds according to

the reasoning of

Rabbi Elazar.

That is:

With

a vow that

requires

the investigation of a Sage and the husband cannot nullify it [because the woman made that vow],

he holds

Rabbi Yehuda

according to Rabbi Elazar,

who holds: A person does not want his wife to be disgraced in court, and consequently he cannot undermine her.

And

with

a vow

that does not require

the investigation of a Sage, and for which the husband’s nullification is sufficient [because the woman made that vow],

he holds

Rabbi Yehuda

according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds: A person cannot say, “I did not know that a husband nullifies his wife’s vow,” and consequently he can no longer undermine her.

It follows that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, undermining does not apply at all to one who divorces his wife because of a vow. If so, the reason that he may not take her back in the case of a vow must be uninhibitedness; therefore there is a distinction between a vow involving uninhibitedness and a vow that involves less uninhibitedness.

All this applies to one who divorces his wife because of a vow. But one who divorces his wife because she is an aylonit—even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that there is concern of undermining.

Rava

objected

and said

against Abaye’s answer:

Is it really the case that

Rabbi Yehuda’s position against Rabbi Yehuda

alone is

difficult,

so that it is enough for you to reconcile Rabbi Yehuda’s view, so that his statements not contradict one another?

But

the Sages’ position against the Sages’ position is not difficult!?

Yet their words too contradict one another: In the case of a vow they were concerned about undermining, whereas in the case of an aylonit they said that he may take her back and were not concerned about undermining. And this question has still not been answered by Abaye’s words.

Rather,

Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda’s position against Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we answered,

that is, in accordance with Abaye’s answer.

The Sages’ position against the Sages’ position is not difficult,

because

who are the Sages

of our Mishna?

It is Rabbi Meir,

as

he says: We require a doubled condition

in order to annul an act: He must say, “If the condition is fulfilled, the act will take effect, and if the condition is not fulfilled, the act will not take effect.”

And here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing? With a case in which he did not double his condition,

where he said to her, “Know that I am divorcing you because you are an aylonit,” but he did not repeat it and say to her, “And if you are not an aylonit, the bill of divorce shall not take effect.” If so, even if it becomes clear that she is not an aylonit, he cannot undermine her, since the act of divorce remains valid, and there is nothing to annul it even once she is found not to be an aylonit. Therefore he may take her back, since there is no concern of “undermining.”

Mishna:

One who sells himself and his sons to gentiles

so that they enslave him and his sons in exchange for the money that they pay, and he is accustomed to doing so, again

they do not redeem him.

Because of the betterment of the world, so that he will not accustom himself to doing so.

But they redeem the sons after the death of their father,

so that they will not become assimilated among the gentiles; but during the lifetime of their father, he guards them.

Gemara:

Rav Asi said:

this that we learned in our Mishna, that they do not redeem him,

is when he sold

himself

and repeated and did it a third time,

that is to say: the first and second times they redeem him, and the third time they do not redeem him.

Those sons of Bei Mikhesi [

residents of the place “Bei Mikhesi”]],

who borrowed money from gentiles, and did not have the means to repay it, and the gentiles came and seized them, [

they borrowed money from gentiles, and when they did not have the means to repay it, the gentiles came and took them captive].

They came [

the captives came]

before Rav Huna:

He said to them

Rav Huna:

What can I do for you [

what, indeed, can I do for you]!?

For

for

we learned

in our Mishna:

one who sells himself and his sons to gentiles—they do not redeem him,

and these too are as though they sold themselves to gentiles.

Rabbi Abba said to him

to Rav Huna: But

you taught me, our teacher: It is when he sold and repeated and did it a third time!?

He said to him

Rav Huna to Rabbi Abba:

These

sons of Bei Mikhesi

are accustomed and habitually do this, [

they are accustomed to doing so].

There was a certain man who sold himself to the Ludai, [

an incident involving a man who sold himself to the Ludai, who are a nation that eats human beings].

That man came before Rabbi Ami, [

that man came before Rabbi Ami, and

said to him

to Rabbi Ami: