Gittin 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara further explains:

What is the meaning of “konam”

that it is relevant to a vow to divorce? After all, konam is the imposition of a prohibition upon a particular object; and what did he prohibit here

? Rav Huna said: This is referring to one who says

the husband : “

All the fruits in the world shall be forbidden

as a konam

to me if I do not divorce you.”

We learned in the Mishna: There was also an incident in Sidon involving a man who said to his wife, “A konam that I divorce you,” and he divorced her,

and they permitted him to remarry her:

And we raise an objection: Is it not

obvious

that he may remarry her? What is there for us to be concerned about ?

And we explain:

Lest you say that we should decree

that the husband may not remarry his wife, because he fulfilled his vow and did not seek its annulment, and

because of the statement of Rabbi Natan.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Natan says: One who vows

has performed an act

as though he built an altar

at a time when it is prohibited to build an altar outside the Temple,

and one who fulfills it

the vow, by not seeking its annulment,

is as though he sacrificed an offering upon it—

And in order that he should not become lax with regard to vows, we should decree that he may not remarry the wife whom he divorced because he fulfilled the vow.

It teaches us

that we do not issue such a decree.

We learned in the Mishna: The Sages permitted him to remarry her

for the betterment of society.

And we are perplexed:

What betterment of society

is achieved by permitting him to remarry her ?

Rav Sheshet said:

The phrase “for the betterment of society” that we learned at the end of the Mishna does not refer to the case at the end, when he vowed, but rather

to the beginning,

when she vowed. In that case he should not remarry her for the betterment of society, so that he will not cause her harm, or so that the daughters of Israel will not become promiscuous with regard to illicit relations and vows.

Ravina said: Actually,

the phrase “for the betterment of society” that we learned at the end refers

to the end, and this is what it teaches: There is no betterment of society in this case,

meaning: The Sages permitted him to remarry her for the betterment of society, since no factor is found here that would warrant prohibiting it.

Mishna:

The following Mishna is a continuation of the preceding Mishna, in which we learned: One who divorces his wife because of a bad reputation or because of a vow may not remarry her. The tannaim disagreed there whether the reason is concern that he might later undermine the divorce, or a penalty, so that the daughters of Israel should not become promiscuous with regard to illicit relations and vows.

One who divorces his wife

with a bill of divorce

because

he discovered that she was

an aylonit.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He may not remarry her,

because of concern that he might undermine the divorce: Perhaps she will be found not to be an aylonit, and he will undermine her status by saying that he did not divorce her with that understanding. Therefore, they instituted that he may not remarry her.

And the Sages say: He may remarry her,

and their rationale will be explained in the Gemara.

He divorced her and did not give her a ketuba because she was an aylonit, and since he had not known this at the time of the marriage, she was not entitled to a ketuba and she went and

married another man, and bore him sons,

and it became clear that she was not an aylonit, since an aylonit cannot give birth.

And she

returned to the first husband and

demanded her ketuba

from him, since she had not misled him, and he had deprived her of her ketuba for no reason.

Rabbi Yehuda said: He says to her

the first husband :

“Your silence is better for you than your speech!”

Meaning: It is better for you to remain silent and not claim your ketuba on the basis of the fact that you have been found to be healthy. For if you claim your ketuba and I am compelled to pay it, I too will answer you: “Had I known that I would ultimately have to give you your ketuba, I would not have divorced you,” and I would render your sons mamzerim. Therefore, it is better for you not to claim it than to claim it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who divorces his wife because she is an aylonit—Rabbi Yehuda says, he may not remarry her, and the Sages say, he may remarry her:

And we raise an objection:

Does this mean

[is it possible to say this

], that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned that he might undermine the divorce

and therefore prohibits him from remarrying her,

while

if

the Rabbis are not concerned that he might undermine the divorce,

and therefore permit him to remarry her ?

But we have heard the opposite from them

in the preceding Mishna:

As we learned: One who divorces his wife because of a bad reputation may not remarry her, and because of a vow he may not remarry her,

and the reason is concern that he might undermine the divorce.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the vow was known to the public, he may not remarry her; and if it was not known to the public, he may remarry her,

and his reason is that he is not concerned that he might undermine the divorce, but rather with promiscuity; and promiscuity exists only with regard to a vow known to the public, which cannot be annulled.

Evidently,

for it is proven that

the Rabbis

[the first tanna in the preceding Mishna

are concerned that he might undermine the divorce, whereas Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned that he might undermine the divorce,

while here their positions have been reversed !?

Shmuel said: Reverse them

in our Mishna: Change the statement of the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda, and the statement of Rabbi Yehuda to the Sages. Thus Rabbi Yehuda follows his position, and the Sages follow their position.

And we raise an objection to this:

But from the fact that the latter clause teaches

of our Mishna:

“She married another man and bore him sons, and she demands her ketuba. Rabbi Yehuda said: He says to her: ‘Your silence is better for you than your speech.’”

By inference,

it is proven

that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned that he might undermine the divorce!?

For it is evident from his words that if he wished to say, “I divorced you on the condition that you would be found healthy,” he could undermine her.

And we answer:

This—

the latter clause—

must also be reversed,

and it was not Rabbi Yehuda who said this, but the Sages.

Abaye said: Actually, do not reverse

anything in our Mishna. Indeed, Rabbi Yehuda is the one who is concerned in our Mishna that he might undermine the divorce. And as for what is difficult for you—that in the preceding Mishna Rabbi Yehuda was not concerned that he might undermine the divorce with regard to one who divorces his wife because of a vow—this is not difficult, for Rabbi Yehuda too agrees that it is necessary to prohibit remarriage where there is concern that he might undermine the divorce—

And Rabbi Yehuda,

in the preceding Mishna, who was not concerned about undermining the divorce when one divorces his wife because of a vow, held this because in his view there is no such concern in one who divorces his wife because of a vow. This is because the Mishna there records a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar concerning the reason for the concern about undermining the divorce through a vow:

Rabbi Meir holds that the principal concern about undermining the divorce is that perhaps he will say, “I did not know that a Sage could annul the vow.” But he cannot undermine her by saying, “I did not know that the husband could nullify it.” Therefore, he distinguishes between a vow requiring specifically the annulment of a Sage and a vow that does not require the annulment of a Sage, for which the husband’s nullification is sufficient.

Whereas Rabbi Elazar holds, on the contrary, that the principal concern about undermining the divorce is that he will claim that he did not know about the husband’s nullification. But he cannot undermine her by saying, “I did not know about the annulment by a Sage,” because a person does not want his wife to be degraded in court.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

in that

dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar,

agrees with

them

with

the position of

Rabbi Meir, and

also

agrees with

the position of

Rabbi Elazar.

That is:

With

a vow that

requires

the investigation of a Sage, and the husband cannot nullify it [when the woman made the vow

, Rabbi Yehuda agrees with

Rabbi Yehuda

with Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that a person does not want his wife to be degraded in court, and consequently he cannot undermine her.

And

with

a vow

that does not require

the investigation of a Sage, and for which the husband’s nullification is sufficient [when the woman made the vow

, Rabbi Yehuda agrees with

Rabbi Yehuda

with Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a person cannot say, “I did not know that a husband can nullify his wife’s vows,” and consequently he can no longer undermine her.

It follows that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no possibility of undermining the divorce at all when one divorces his wife because of a vow. If so, the reason he may not remarry her in the case of a vow must be concern about promiscuity, and therefore there is a distinction between a vow involving promiscuity and a vow that is not so strongly associated with promiscuity.

All of this applies when one divorces his wife because of a vow. But when one divorces his wife because she is an aylonit, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that there is reason for concern that he might undermine the divorce.

He

— objected

— Rava

to Abaye’s answer:

Is it so that only

Rabbi Yehuda’s position in one place contradicting Rabbi Yehuda’s position in another place

is

difficult,

so that it is enough for you to reconcile Rabbi Yehuda’s position, so that his statements will not contradict one another?

But

is the contradiction between the Rabbis’ position in one place and their position in another place not difficult?

After all, their statements too contradict one another: With regard to a vow they were concerned that he might undermine the divorce, whereas with regard to an aylonit they said that he may remarry her and were not concerned that he might undermine the divorce. This question has still not been resolved by Abaye’s answer.

Rather,

Rava said: The contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda’s statements is not difficult, as we answered,

meaning, in accordance with Abaye’s answer .

The contradiction between the Rabbis’ statements is not difficult,

because

who are the Sages

in our Mishna?

Rabbi Meir,

it is ,

who says: We require a doubled condition

in order to invalidate an act: He must say, “If the condition is fulfilled, the act shall take effect; and if the condition is not fulfilled, the act shall not take effect.”

And here,

in our Mishna,

what case are we dealing with? One in which he did not double his condition

when he said to her: “Know that I am divorcing you because you are an aylonit,” but he did not add and say to her, “And if you are not an aylonit, the bill of divorce shall not take effect.” Therefore, even if it is established that she is not an aylonit, he cannot undermine her, since the act of divorce remains valid and there is nothing to invalidate it, even once it has been established that she is not an aylonit. Consequently, he may remarry her, since there is no concern here that he might undermine the divorce.

Mishna:

One who sells himself and his children to gentiles

so that they will enslave him and his children in exchange for the money they pay, and he is accustomed to doing so, again

is not redeemed.

For the betterment of the world, so that he will not accustom himself to doing so.

But the children are redeemed after their father’s death, so that they will not assimilate among the gentiles; but during their father’s lifetime, he guards them.

Gemara:

Rav Asi said:

The statement that we learned in our Mishna, that he is not redeemed,

applies when he sold

himself

and repeated and did so a third time;

that is, he is redeemed the first and second times, but the third time he is not redeemed.

There were these sons of Bei Mikhesi

[residents of the place called “Bei Mikhesi”],

who borrowed money from gentiles and were unable to repay it, and the gentiles came and seized them

[they borrowed money from gentiles, and when they had no way to repay it, the gentiles came and took them captive].

They came

[the captives came]

before Rav Huna:

Rav Huna said to them

Rav Huna said:

What can I do for you

[what, after all, can I do for you]!?

For

namely,

it is taught

in our Mishna:

One who sells himself and his children to gentiles is not redeemed,

and these men are likewise considered as though they sold themselves to gentiles.

Rabbi Abba said to him

to Rav Huna: But

you taught me, our teacher: This applies when he sold himself and repeated and did so a third time!?

He said to him

Rav Huna said to Rabbi Abba:

These

sons of Bei Mikhesi

are habitually accustomed to doing so,

[they are accustomed to this].

There was a certain man who sold himself to the Luda’im,

[an incident involving a man who sold himself to the Luda’im, a nation that eats human beings].

He came before Rabbi Ami,

[that man came before Rabbi Ami] and

said to him

to Rabbi Ami: