Gittin 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

For the betterment of the world.

Gemara:

Rav Budya said to Rav Ashi,

and inferred from the Mishna: “

More than their value”

is the amount above which one may not purchase

Torah scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzot from the captors;

but for their value one may purchase them.

And if so,

come and hear

that the Mishna accords with the opinion stated below:

When a Torah scroll is found in the possession of a gentile, it may be read from,

and there is no concern that perhaps he wrote it, and wrote it for the sake of idol worship.

And

we reject this inference:

Perhaps

the Mishna did not teach that they may be purchased in order to read from them, but rather in order

to be stored away

as a precaution, in case it is a valid Torah scroll, so that it should not lie in disgrace.

And if

a gentile wrote it,

it

must be stored away,

because he is unfit to write it, as anyone who is not subject to the binding of tefillin is not subject to writing, as stated below.

And if

a Torah scroll is found

in

the possession of a sectarian,

and it is not known whether he wrote it or perhaps found it, it

must be stored away

as a matter of doubt. However, one may not read from it on the basis of a compound doubt: perhaps he did not write it, or perhaps he wrote it not for the sake of idolatry; for the sectarian is devoted to idol worship, and he certainly wrote it for the sake of idol worship.

And if it

is found in the possession of an idolater,

and it is not known whether he wrote it:

Some say

[there are those who say]

it must be stored away,

because perhaps he wrote it.

And some say: One may read from it,

because it involves a compound doubt: perhaps an Israelite wrote it; and if you wish to say that he himself wrote it, perhaps he wrote it in order to sell it to an Israelite, and not for the sake of idol worship.

A Torah scroll written by a gentile:

It was taught

in

one beraita: It must be burned,

and the reason is explained as it proceeds.

And it was taught

in

another

beraita:

It must be stored away,

and the reason is explained as it proceeds.

And it was taught

in

another

[a third beraita]:

One may read from it,

and this is explained as it proceeds.

And we explain that

it is not difficult,

that the beraitot contradict one another, because:

This beraita that was taught,

in the first beraita: “

It must be burned,”

is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: A gentile’s unspecified intention is for idol worship,

and therefore it must be burned.

And this beraita that was taught,

in the second beraita: “

It must be stored away,”

is the following tanna! As Rav Hamnuna, son of Rava of Pashronya,

[the name of a place],

taught: A Torah scroll, tefillin, and mezuzot written by an informer,

an idolater, a slave, a woman, a minor, or a Samaritan,

[who are gerim of lions],

or an apostate Israelite,

are all

disqualified, as it is stated: “

And you shall bind them

[as a sign upon your arm, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes.]

And you shall write them”;

anyone who is subject to the

mitzva of

binding is subject to writing, and anyone who is not subject to binding is not subject to writing.

And since this is not idol worship, but rather a disqualified Torah scroll, it must be stored away.

And this beraita that was taught

in the third beraita: “

One may read from it,”

is the following tanna.

For it was taught: One may purchase scrolls from gentiles everywhere, provided that they are written according to their halakhic requirements; and there was an incident involving a certain gentile in Sidon, who used to write scrolls, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted purchasing [scrolls] from him.

As it was taught: One may purchase scrolls from gentiles everywhere, provided that they are written in accordance with halakha; and there was an incident involving a certain gentile in Sidon who would write scrolls, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted purchasing one from him.

And

we ask: Does

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel require

the processing of the leather “

for its sacred purpose”

[does he require it, as will be explained], whereas

the writing “

for its sacred purpose”

he does not require?!

And how could Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel validate the writing of a gentile?!

As it was taught

[that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel requires processing the leather lishmah]:

If one plated

the compartments for the passages of his tefillin

with gold,

that is, he made the compartments of gold,

or if he covered

[an expression related to a patch]

them with the hide of a non-kosher animal,

that is, he made the compartments from the hide of an animal forbidden for consumption, they are

disqualified.

This is because the compartments must be made of leather, and not of gold,

and the hide of a non-kosher animal is disqualified, because it is stated: “So that the Torah of the Lord shall be in your mouth,” and the Sages expounded: “from that which is permitted in your mouth,” and not from a non-kosher animal.

But if he made the compartments from

the hide of a kosher animal,

they are

valid, even though he did not process them for their sacred purpose.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if

he made them from

the hide of a kosher animal,

they are

disqualified until he processes them for their sacred purpose.

It follows that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that even the processing must be lishmah; then certainly he should disqualify writing that was not lishmah?!

Rabbah bar Shmuel

answered:

The gentile who was writing in Sidon, whose writing Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel validated, was not actually a gentile. Rather,

the incident involved

a convert who returned to his evil ways

[a term for returning to one’s former ways]—and he knew that the writing had to be lishmah. And we ask: But if he

returned

to his evil ways, all the more so he should be considered a sectarian,

and his intention would be for idol worship?!

Rav Ashi said:

He did not return to his evil ways out of belief. Rather,

he returned to his evil ways out of fear

of the gentiles, lest they kill him because he had converted.

The Sages taught:

Although we learned in our Mishna that one may not purchase Torah scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzot from gentiles for more than their value, nevertheless

one may increase their price up to a tarifek

beyond the price.

And we explain:

What is a tarifek?

Rav Sheshet said: An is t ir a,

which is a sela of provincial currency, one-eighth of a Tyrian sela.

The reason that one may increase the price by this amount is that the principal reason for the enactment is to prevent the gentiles from taking notice and troubling themselves to plunder scrolls from Israelites. But when one increases their price by a small amount, this is not a noticeable increase that would cause them to take notice and plunder them for that reason.

A certain Ishmaelite woman

[a Muslim woman]

who brought a sack of tefillin before Abaye

[she brought before Abaye a small sack filled with tefillin].

He said to her,

Abaye: Will you

give them to me one by one in exchange for dates

[sell me each pair of tefillin for one date]?

The Ishmaelite woman filled with venom

became enraged

[she became filled with venom from excessive anger],

took

the sack,

and threw it into the river

[she took the sack and threw it into the sea].

Abaye said:

I should not have disparaged them so greatly in her presence

[it was improper to show such contempt for the tefillin in her presence].

Mishna:

One who divorces

[dismisses]

his wife because of an evil reputation

[a rumor of illicit relations had circulated about her],

may not remarry her

ever, whether the allegations were found to be false or were not found to be false.

And likewise, one who divorces his wife

because of a vow

that she took, because he cannot tolerate being married to a woman who takes vows,

may not remarry her

ever, whether the vow was annulled or was not annulled.

Concerning the reason of the first tanna, the Gemara disagrees:

Some say: “Because of potential mischief,”

for if you say that he may remarry her, perhaps she will go and marry another man, and it will emerge that the evil reputation was baseless; or she will go and have the vow annulled by a Sage, and her first husband will cause her harm by saying: Had I known that the rumor was baseless, and that she could have her vow annulled by a Sage, even if they had given me one hundred maneh I would not have divorced her. According to his claim, it would emerge that she is still a married woman, since the bill of divorce was void, and her children would be found to be mamzerim.

Therefore, from the outset they say to him: “Know that one who divorces his wife because of these matters may not remarry her, and if she is dear to you, do not hasten to divorce her.” Consequently, if he later seeks to cause her harm, he is not believed, since he knew that she would be forbidden to him and nevertheless did not take care to investigate the matter.

And some say: It is a penalty imposed by the Sages, who penalized the woman by decreeing that he may never remarry her, so that Jewish women would not become licentious with regard to illicit relations and vows.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

One who divorces his wife because of a vow—the Sages enacted that he may not remarry her in order

to prevent Jewish women from becoming licentious with regard to vows; therefore,

any vow known to many people

[a vow that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, cannot be annulled by a Sage], is an especially excessive act of licentiousness, and they penalized her so that he may not remarry her.

And

if he vowed

that it was unknown to many

and it can be released, then he shall

return her.

Rabbi Meir says:

one who divorces his wife because of a vow, concerning whom the Sages instituted that he may not return her, did so because of the concern of a later complication; and therefore:

Any vow that requires the investigation of a sage,

and the husband cannot nullify it, since it is neither one of the matters between him and her nor a vow involving affliction of the soul, then he shall

not return her,

because the concern of a later complication applies here: perhaps he will say, “Had I known that a sage could release the vow, I would not have divorced her.”

And

if he vowed

a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage,

but he himself could nullify it, then he shall

return her,

because he cannot create a later complication, since he could have nullified the vow but did not do so.

Rabbi Elazar said:

On the contrary!

They did not prohibit this;

they did not prohibit the husband from returning her when she had made a vow requiring the investigation of a sage

but because of this,

because of a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage.

That is to say: Fundamentally, there would have been no reason to prohibit returning a wife who had made a vow requiring the investigation of a sage, because he cannot create a later complication. For certainly, even had he known that a sage could release the vow, he would have divorced her, since according to Rabbi Elazar he does not want his wife to be humiliated before the court.

Rather, they prohibited him from returning her even in this case because, in the case of a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage, he could create a later complication and say: “Had I known that I could nullify the vow, I would not have divorced her.” And because of these vows, they prohibited returning a woman who had made any kind of vow.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident in Sidon involving a man who said to his wife:

Konam if I do not divorce you,”

and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to return her, for the sake of the betterment of the world,

and the Gemara will explain the relevance of this incident to our Mishna.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who divorces his wife because of an evil report may not return her; because of a vow, he may not return her:

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Nahman said: And this

—what we learned, that he may not return her until she has married another— applies only when he

said to her

when he divorced her:

“I am divorcing you because of an evil report,”