Gittin 41b — the Talmud in English

he is already half free, and a free man is prohibited from marrying a maidservant. And even to marry

a free woman is impossible

for him,

since

he is

already half a slave

, and a slave is forbidden to marry a free woman.

Lest you say: Since he is forbidden to all the women in the world,

he should withdraw

from having children.

That cannot be said, for

was the world created for anything other than having children?

—

He did not create it for emptiness

: «

to be inhabited

[so that it would be settled],

He formed it.”

Rather, for the sake of improving the world

so that it will be inhabited,

the court compels his master

and makes him a free man

, and he can then marry a free woman and settle the world.

And he writes

for himself—the slave, who thereby acquired himself without payment—

a document

of debt

for half his value

that the master lost.

And Beit Hillel returned to rule in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: If one frees half of his slave

and retains the other half for himself,

Rabbi says: He acquires

the half that was freed.

And the Sages say: He does not acquire

the other half of himself.

And Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed about the explanation of their dispute:

Rabba said: The dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages applies only when he freed half of his slave

with a document

of freedom; and this is the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi holds:

Since it is written in the passage concerning a betrothed maidservant [Leviticus 19:20]: “And a man who lies with a woman with an emission of semen, and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man

; and she has been redeemed but not completely redeemed

[with money],

or freedom was not given to her

[with a document], she shall be examined; they shall not be put to death, because she was not freed,”

the verse compares

the freeing of a maidservant or a slave by

a document to

their redemption with

money:

Just as money

is used to redeem a slave,

both

his

entire

self

and

his

half,

when half of him is redeemed—for the verse says: “And she has been redeemed but not completely redeemed,” meaning that half of her has been redeemed, as the Gemara will explain—

so too, a document

frees a slave,

both

when the master frees

all

,

and

when the master frees

half

of him.

But

if the Sages derived

the equal-expression principle

“to her, to her”

from a woman—

as it says concerning a maidservant, “or freedom was not given to her,” and concerning a woman, “and he shall write for her a document of severance and place it in her hand”—

just as a woman—

a man

cannot

divorce half of her,

so too

a

slave—

the master

cannot

free half of him with a document.

But when

the slave was redeemed

with money, everyone

—both Rabbi and the Sages—

agrees

that the slave acquires the other half of himself.

For the verse cited above says: “And she has been redeemed but not completely redeemed,” and this is a maidservant who is

redeemed

with money

but is not redeemed—that is, half of her is redeemed and half is not redeemed. Thus we learn that a maidservant or a slave can be redeemed by halves.

The Gemara asks:

Let us say

—

is it possible to say—

that this is the basis of the dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages:

One

—Rabbi—

holds: The explicit comparison is preferable

to the equal-expression principle, and from the comparison of a document to money we should learn that half a slave is freed by a document as well.

And the other

—the Sages—

holds: The equal-expression principle is preferable

, and from the equal-expression principle “to her, to her,” derived from the case of a woman, we should learn that a master cannot free half of his slave with a document.

And we reject this:

No

, it is not necessarily the basis of their dispute; rather, it can be explained as follows:

Everyone

—both Rabbi and the Sages—

holds that the equal-expression principle is preferable,

and indeed, had there been no refutation of that derivation, Rabbi too would have agreed that half a slave cannot be freed with a document.

But here it is different

with regard to this equal-expression principle, for Rabbi considers the teaching from the explicit comparison preferable , because

there is a possible objection

to the equal-expression principle:

What is the case with a woman? She cannot leave through money

at all, and therefore the verse was stringent with her and did not allow half of her to leave through a document.

Can you say the same about a slave, whom

the verse treated more leniently, and who

leaves

even

through money

? It may therefore be said that half of him is freed through a document as well.

And Rav Yosef said

in explaining the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages:

The dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages applies only when the slave was redeemed

with money;

and this is the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi holds—

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s view in Keritot 11a—in explaining the verse:

“And she has been redeemed but not completely redeemed,”

that this is a maidservant

redeemed

with money

but not redeemed

—that is, half of her was redeemed. Thus, redemption with money is effective for half of a maidservant or slave.

But

if

the Sages hold—

in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael’s view in Keritot 11a—in explaining the verse “And she has been redeemed but not completely redeemed,” that it refers to a maidservant who was not redeemed at all, and the verse repeated its wording only because

the Torah speaks in ordinary human language—

but

when the master freed half of his slave

with a document, everyone

—both the Sages and Rabbi—agrees that the slave

does not acquire

the other half of himself, because we derive the equal-expression principle “to her, to her” from the case of a woman.

They raise an objection

to Rav Yosef, who holds that there is no dispute concerning a document, and that everyone agrees that a slave is not freed by halves, from the following teaching:

If one frees half of his slave with a document: Rabbi says, he acquires it; and the Sages say, he does not acquire it.

This is a conclusive refutation of Rav Yosef

from this beraita, since it explicitly teaches that their dispute concerns a document, contrary to Rav Yosef’s view!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is a conclusive refutation

!

The Gemara analyzes the wording: Since the beraita presented the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages with regard to a document, it apparently implies that

they disagree only with regard to a document, but they do not disagree with regard to money

, because even the Sages agree that a slave can be redeemed by halves.

Let us say—

is it indeed

a conclusive refutation of Rav Yosef

from this beraita

in two respects

—not only is what he said concerning a document refuted by this beraita, but what he said, that Rabbi and the Sages disagree concerning money, is also refuted by it?

Rav Yosef can say to you

in defense of his position concerning money:

Rabbi and the Sages disagree

with regard to a document,

and the same law applies

that they disagree

with regard to money.

And according to Rav Yosef, the reason that they disagreed specifically with regard to a document is that everyone prefers comparing a document to money rather than deriving an equal-expression principle from the case of a woman. Since they also disagree about whether money is effective for half of a slave, they necessarily disagree about a document as well.

Lest you say: If so, why did the beraita state their dispute specifically with regard to a document, when they also disagree with regard to money? One may answer:

The fact that they disagree with regard to a document is to inform you of Rabbi’s strength

: He holds that the slave acquires half of himself even through a document. This is a greater novelty than the ruling concerning money, because with regard to a document one might derive through the equal-expression principle from the case of a woman that a document is not effective for half of a slave. The beraita therefore teaches us that Rabbi compares a document to money, and just as, in his view, a slave is redeemed by halves with money, so too he is freed by halves through a document.

And we challenge this:

Let them disagree with regard to money

—the beraita should state their dispute with regard to money

to inform you of the strength of the Sages

, that they hold that even with money half of the slave is not redeemed!? This would be the greater novelty: that he is not redeemed by halves with money, since one might have said, “But it is written: ‘And she has been redeemed but not completely redeemed.’”

Since the beraita did not state their dispute with regard to money, this apparently indicates that they do not disagree in that case!?

And we answer:

The force of the lenient ruling

—that is, the leniency—

is preferable

to him

—it is preferable for the tanna to teach a novel lenient ruling. Therefore, the tanna taught us that even with a document Rabbi holds that half of the slave is freed, but he did not teach us the novel stringent ruling that the Sages hold that a slave cannot be redeemed by halves even with money.

Come and hear

a proof supporting Rav Yosef’s view, that they disagree both with regard to a document and with regard to money, from the following beraita:

This is what the verse says: “And a man who lies with a woman with an emission of semen, and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man [betrothed to a man]

; and she has been redeemed

but not completely redeemed, or freedom was not given to her; there shall be an examination; they shall not be put to death [the adulterer and the adulteress], because she was not freed. And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, a guilt-offering ram”:

One might think

that since the verse says “and she has been redeemed,” the verse is speaking about one who was redeemed

completely

—that is, a maidservant who was entirely redeemed— and the verse teaches that although she was redeemed, the offenders are not liable to death, but only to a guilt-offering.

Therefore,

The verse therefore says: “

She was not redeemed

,” which implies that she has still not been redeemed.

If she was not redeemed, one might think she was completely unredeemed

—that is, perhaps you would say: Since the verse says “she was not redeemed,” the Torah is speaking about a maidservant who was not redeemed at all, and the verse teaches that although betrothal does not take effect with a maidservant, nevertheless, since she was designated for a Hebrew slave [who is permitted to a maidservant], one who has intercourse with her is liable to a guilt-offering—

The verse therefore

says: “

And she has been redeemed

,” which implies that the maidservant was in fact redeemed.

How, then

are these two verses to be reconciled?

The verse is speaking about a maidservant who is

redeemed but not redeemed

—she was redeemed by halves

with money or something of monetary value

and was betrothed to a Hebrew slave; this is the case to which the verse refers.

And I know this only with regard to money

through which a maidservant leaves for freedom.

But

in a document

of release,

from where

is it established that one can free a slavewoman or a slave?

Therefore

the verse states: “

And she shall surely be redeemed, she was not redeemed, or he did not give her her freedom.”

And below,

with regard to a woman who leaves through a divorce document,

it says: “

And he shall write for her a document of severance

and place it in her hand.”

And behold, you learn by a gzera shava, “her, her”:

Just as there,

with regard to a woman,

in a document

the verse speaks.

So too here,

with regard to a slavewoman,

in a document

as well the verse speaks; and we have learned that a person can free his slavewoman or his slave by means of a document.

And still I say:

I have only

release of a slave

but

by one of two ways:

All of him, or even

half of him—

with money.

Or all of him by a document.

But

half of him,

of a slave whom the master can free

by a document—from where?

Therefore

the verse states: “

And she shall surely be redeemed, she was not redeemed, or he did not give her her freedom.”

The verse juxtaposes

the

document with money,

in order to teach us:

just as money applies both to all of him and to half of him, so too a document applies both to all of him and to half of him.

And now we prove from this beraita according to the position of Rav Yosef above, in the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages:

Granted according to

the view of

Rav Yosef after he was refuted [after his position was refuted, for he had said: The dispute is only with regard to money and not with regard to a document], this beraita is satisfactory, because

whose view is this? It is Rabbi’s,

this is Rabbi,

who holds, according to Rav Yosef after his retraction, that one frees half of a slave both with money and with a document.

But according to Rabbah,

who holds: Rabbi and the Sages disagreed only with regard to a document, but with regard to money everyone agrees that he is redeemed as to half of him, a difficulty arises: Is it to be said that

the opening clause,

in which we learned that a slave is redeemed as to half of him with money, is

the view of everyone

?

And

if

the latter clause,

in which we learned that even by means of a document it is possible to free half of a slave, is

Rabbi’s

view and not that of the Sages—

But if the matter were so, the tanna who taught this beraita would have explained and said: This one is the view of everyone, and in this one Rabbi and the Sages disagreed. Rather, certainly the opening clause too is only according to Rabbi, and this is difficult for Rabbah!?

And we answer:

Rabbah could say to you: No,

indeed this is the explanation of the beraita:

the opening clause is the view of everyone

and

if

the

latter clause is Rabbi’s

view alone.

Rav Ashi said:

Indeed, if any tanna were saying the law stated explicitly in the beraita, it would not be reasonable that the opening clause should be according to everyone and the latter clause according to Rabbi alone, for he should have explained this. However, this beraita

is Rabbi

himself

who it is, meaning: He is the one who taught this beraita, and he taught it according to his position.

[This segment has no separate source text: unclear—source segmentation assigns the continuation of the preceding sentence to A0079.]

We raise another difficulty against Rav Yosef:

But the Mishna [

our Mishna ]

which states: One who is half slave and half free,

and we learned that there is a slave who is freed as to half of him.

Granted according to Rabbah,

who holds that everyone redeems a slave as to half of him with money,

he interprets it [

he explains our Mishna ]

as

a slave who was redeemed

with money

as to half of him,

and

our Mishna

is the view of everyone

.

But according to Rav Yosef,

who holds that according to the Sages there is no slave who is freed as to half of him, then shall we

say

that our Mishna

is Rabbi’s view and not that of the Rabbis!?