Gittin 41b (מא:) — the Talmud in English

And even to marry

a free woman is impossible

for him,

for

he is

already half-slave

, and a slave is forbidden to marry a free woman.

Perhaps you will say: Since he is forbidden to all the women in the world,

he should desist

from procreation.

This cannot be said, for

was the world not created solely for procreation

—

as it is stated: “

He did not create it to be empty [the Creator of the earth did not create the earth so that it would be empty and uninhabited, but]

to be inhabited [so that it would have inhabitants]

[so that it would be settled],

did He form it.”

See the Tosafot, who explained why the Mishna cited this verse, which is from the Writings, rather than the mitzva of having children, which is derived from what the Torah says: “Be fruitful and multiply.”

Rather, for the betterment of the world

so that it should be inhabited,

the court compels his master

and makes him a free man

, and he can then marry a free woman and populate the world.

And he writes

the slave—for he has acquired himself without payment—

a document

of debt

for half his value

that the master has lost.

And Beit Hillel returned to rule in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: With regard to one who frees half of his slave

and retains the other half for himself,

Rabbi says: He acquires

the half that was freed.

And the Sages say: He does not acquire

the half that was freed.

Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed concerning the explanation of their dispute:

Rabba said: The dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages applies only where the master freed half of his slave

with a document

of emancipation; and this is the subject of their dispute:

For Rabbi holds:

Since it is written in the passage concerning a betrothed maidservant [Leviticus 19:20]: “And a man who lies with a woman with an emission of semen, and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man,

but she has not been fully redeemed

[with money],

or she has not been given her freedom

[with a document], there shall be an inquiry; they shall not be put to death, for she was not freed,”

the verse juxtaposes

the freeing of a maidservant or slave by

a document to

their redemption by

money:

Rashi wrote, s.v. “And she has been redeemed”: “ The ordinary redemption is with money or something of monetary value

Just as money

is used to redeem a slave,

whether

his

all of him

or

whether

his

half of him

if half of him is redeemed—for the verse states: “but she has not been fully redeemed,” meaning that half of her was redeemed, as the Gemara will explain—

so too, a document

frees a slave,

whether

the master freed

all of him

or

whether

the master freed

half of him.

And

if

the Sages derive

the gezeira shava

“lah, lah”

from a woman,

as it is stated concerning a maidservant, “or she has not been given her freedom,” and it is stated concerning a woman, “And he shall write for her a document of severance and place it in her hand”:

Just as a woman—

a person cannot divorce

half of her

with a divorce document—

so too

a

slave—

the master cannot free

half of him

with a document.

But with

a case where the slave was redeemed

with money, everyone

—both Rabbi and the Sages—

agrees

that the slave acquires his half.

For in the verse cited above it is stated: “but she has not been fully redeemed,” and this is a maidservant who is

redeemed

with money

but is not redeemed—that is, half of her is redeemed and half of her is not redeemed. We have thus learned that a maidservant or slave can be redeemed as to half of himself or herself.

The Gemara asks:

The Gemara asks:

Let us say

that

this is the subject of their dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages:

One master—

Rabbi—

holds: The juxtaposition is superior

to the gezeira shava, and from the juxtaposition of a document to money we should derive that half a slave is freed even by a document.

And the other master—

the Sages—

holds: The gezeira shava is superior,

and from the gezeira shava “lah, lah” from a woman we should derive that the master cannot free half of his slave with a document.

And we reject this:

No,

it is not necessarily the reason for their dispute, for it can be explained as follows:

Everyone—

both Rabbi and the Sages—

holds that the gezeira shava is superior,

and indeed, if there were no refutation of the gezeira shava, Rabbi too would agree that it is impossible to free half a slave with a document—

But here the case is different

with regard to this gezeira shava, for Rabbi holds that the teaching from the juxtaposition is preferable, because

there is grounds to refute

the gezeira shava:

What is distinctive about a woman is that she does not leave through money

at all, and therefore the verse was stringent with regard to her, so that half of her cannot leave through a document.

Can you say the same with regard to a slave, for

the verse was lenient with regard to him, and he

leaves

even

through money

, so perhaps half of him is freed through a document as well.

And Rav Yosef said

in explaining the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages:

The dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages applies only where the slave was redeemed

with money;

and this is the subject of their dispute:

For Rabbi holds—

in accordance with the view of Rabbi Akiva in Keritot 11a—in interpreting the verse

“but she has not been fully redeemed”

, that this is a maidservant who is

redeemed

with money

but is not redeemed—that is, half of her was redeemed. Thus, redemption with money is effective for half of a maidservant or slave.

—that is, half of her was redeemed. Thus, redemption with money is effective for half of a maidservant or slave.

And

if

the Sages hold—

in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yishmael in Keritot 11a—in interpreting the verse “but she has not been fully redeemed,” that it refers to a maidservant who was not redeemed at all, and the verse repeated its wording only because

the Torah speaks in human language.

That is: Since we find no additional wording indicating that she can be redeemed by halves with money, we consequently learn from the case of a woman that she cannot be redeemed by halves, even with money, which does not apply to a woman. This is evidently Rashi’s position below, 42a, s.v. “Owned by two,” as will be explained in the note there.

But

where the master freed half of his slave

with a document, everyone

—both the Sages and Rabbi—agrees that the slave

does not acquire

his half, because we derive the gezeira shava “lah, lah” from a woman.

Meytivi

against Rav Yosef, who holds that there is no dispute with regard to a document, and everyone agrees that half of the slave is not freed, from what is taught in a beraita:

One who frees half of his slave with a document: Rabbi says: He acquires it, and the Sages say: He does not acquire it.

A refutation of Rav Yosef

from this beraita, for we have explicitly learned that their dispute is with regard to a document, contrary to Rav Yosef’s view!?

And we conclude: Indeed, it is

a refutation

of his view!

The Gemara infers: Since the beraita presented the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages with regard to a document, it would seemingly indicate that

they disagree with regard to a document, but they do not disagree with regard to money

, for even the Sages agree that a slave can be redeemed as to half of himself.

Let us say—

is it indeed the case that

there is a twofold refutation of Rav Yosef

from this beraita

in two respects

—for not only has his statement concerning a document been refuted by this beraita, but even his statement that Rabbi and the Sages disagree with regard to money has been refuted by it?

Rav Yosef could have said

to resolve the difficulty with his position concerning money:

They disagree—

Rabbi and the Sages—

with regard to a document, and the same law

applies that they disagree

with regard to money.

The reason that they disagreed with regard to a document, according to Rav Yosef, is that everyone considers it preferable to juxtapose a document to money rather than derive a gezeira shava from a woman. And since they also disagree as to whether money is effective for half of him, it follows that they likewise disagree with regard to a document.

Perhaps you will say: If so, why did the beraita state their dispute specifically with regard to a document, when they also disagree with regard to money? We can answer:

And the fact that they disagree with regard to a document is to inform you of Rabbi’s strength

, that he holds that the slave acquires half of himself even through a document. This is a greater novelty with regard to a document than with regard to money, because with regard to a document one might derive from a woman through a gezeira shava that a document is ineffective for half a slave. The beraita therefore teaches us that Rabbi juxtaposes a document to money, and just as, in his view, a slave is redeemed as to half of himself through money, so too is he freed as to half of himself through a document.

And we challenge this:

Let them disagree with regard to money

—let the beraita state their dispute with regard to money—

to inform you of the strength of the Sages

, that they hold that half of him is not redeemed even through money. For it is a greater novelty that he is not redeemed as to half of himself through money, since one might say: But it is written, “but she has not been fully redeemed.”

Since the beraita did not state their dispute with regard to money, it apparently means that they do not disagree in that regard!?

And we answer:

The strength of the permitting view

[that is, leniency]

is preferable

to him

[it is preferable for the tanna to teach a novel leniency], and therefore the tanna teaches us that Rabbi holds that even through a document half of the slave is freed, but he does not teach us the stringent novelty that the Sages hold that even through money a slave is not redeemed as to half of himself.

Ta shma—in accordance with Rav Yosef’s view that they disagree both with regard to a document and with regard to money—from what is taught in a beraita:

This is what the verse states: “And a man who lies with a woman with an emission of semen, and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man [betrothed to a man

This is what the verse says: “And a man who lies with a woman with an emission of semen, and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man [betrothed to a man]

and she has been redeemed

but not fully, or she has not been given her freedom; there shall be an inquiry; they shall not be put to death [the adulterer and the adulteress], for she was not freed. And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, a guilt-offering ram”:

It could be

that since the verse says “and she has been redeemed,” the verse is speaking of one who was redeemed

completely

—that is, a maidservant who was entirely redeemed— and the verse teaches that although she was redeemed, they are not liable to death for intercourse with her, but only to a guilt-offering.

Therefore,

the verse states: “

she has not been redeemed

,” which indicates that she has still not been redeemed.

If she has not been redeemed, it could be that she was redeemed completely

, that is, perhaps you will say: Since the verse says “she has not been redeemed,” the Torah is speaking of a maidservant who was not redeemed at all, and the verse teaches that although betrothal does not take effect with a maidservant, nevertheless, since she was designated for a Hebrew slave [who is permitted to a maidservant], one who has intercourse with her is liable to a guilt-offering—

Therefore,

the verse states: “

and she has been redeemed

,” indicating that the maidservant was indeed redeemed.

How, then

are these two verses to be reconciled?

The verse is speaking of a maidservant who is

redeemed but not redeemed

—she was redeemed as to half of herself

with money or an item of equivalent value

and became betrothed to a Hebrew slave; this is the case to which the verse refers.

And I have derived only that she leaves through money

with which a maidservant attains freedom.

But

in a document

of manumission,

whence do we know that it is possible to free a maidservant or a slave?

Therefore,

the verse states: “

She was redeemed, but not fully redeemed; or she was set free, but he did not give her freedom.”

And below,

with regard to a woman who leaves her husband through a bill of divorce,

it says: “

And he writes for her a document of severance

and places it in her hand.”

And you learn by the gzera shava “to her, to her”:

Just as there,

with regard to a woman,

in a document

the verse speaks,

so too here,

with regard to a maidservant,

in a document

the verse also speaks, and we learn that a person can free his maidservant or his slave by means of a document.

Yet I would still say:

I have no source

for the manumission of a slave,

except

by one of two means:

Either all of him or even

half of him—

with money.

Or all of him by means of a document.

But

half

of a slave, whom the master can free

by means of a document—whence?

Therefore,

the verse states: “

She was redeemed, but not fully redeemed; or she was set free, but he did not give her freedom.”

The verse juxtaposes

the

document with money,

in order to teach us:

Just as money can effect either the release of all of him or of half of him, so too a document can effect either the release of all of him or of half of him.

We can now demonstrate from this beraita that the view of Rav Yosef cited above is correct, in his explanation of the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages:

Granted according to

the view of

Rav Yosef after his position was refuted

[after his view—that the dispute applies only to money and not to a document—was disproved], this beraita is readily understood, for

it is Rabbi’s

beraita, who, according to Rav Yosef after his retraction, holds that half of a slave can be freed both with money and with a document.

But according to Rabba,

who holds that Rabbi and the Sages disagreed only with regard to a document, but with regard to money everyone agrees that a slave can be redeemed as to half of himself, there is a difficulty: Are we to say that

the first clause,

which teaches that a slave can be redeemed as to half of himself with money, is

the view of everyone?

?

And

if

the latter clause,

which teaches that it is possible to free half of a slave even by means of a document, is the view of

Rabbi

but not of the Sages?

If this were so, the tanna who taught this beraita should have explained and said: “This clause is the view of everyone, while in that clause Rabbi and the Sages disagree.” Rather, it is certainly the case that even the first clause reflects only Rabbi’s view—and this is difficult for Rabba!?

And we answer:

Rabba could say to you: No,

this is indeed the meaning of the beraita:

the first clause is the view of everyone,

and

the

latter clause is

Rabbi’s

view alone.

Rav Ashi said:

Indeed, if some tanna had stated the law explicitly in the beraita, it would not be reasonable for the first clause to reflect everyone’s view and the latter clause Rabbi’s view alone, since he should have explained this. However, this beraita

is Rabbi

himself

who taught it,

meaning that he was the one who taught this beraita, and he taught it in accordance with his own view.

We raise another objection against Rav Yosef:

But our Mishna

[our Mishna]

which states: “One who is half slave and half free”,

and we learn from it that there is a slave who can be freed as to half of himself.

Granted according to Rabba,

who holds that everyone agrees that a slave can be redeemed as to half of himself with money,

he interprets it

[he interprets our Mishna]

as referring to a

slave who was redeemed

with money

as to half of himself,

and

our Mishna

is the view of everyone

.

But according to Rav Yosef,

who holds that according to the Sages there is no slave who can be freed as to half of himself, then are we to

say that

our Mishna

is Rabbi’s view and not that of the Sages!?