Gittin 40b — the Talmud in English

And the slave is sent to him,

and

he will

rattle coins before him

[the slave will rattle a few coins before him] in order to entice him with these coins to free him,

and he will write for him

the minor

a deed of freedom in his name

[and the minor will write a deed of freedom in the name of the slave].

The Sages taught:

One who says

to his slave [that is, he writes in a document, as it proceeds to explain]: “

I have made so-and-so, my slave, free.”

Or: “So-and-so, my slave,

is made free.”

Or: “

Behold, he is free”—

With each of these expressions,

he

the slave becomes

free!

For all of them are expressions of freeing.

And if he wrote: “

I will make him free”:

Rabbi says: He acquires

the slave himself, for this expression too implies that now I am freeing him, with this freeing that I am doing to him now.

And the Sages say: He does not acquire

the slave himself, for this is not an expression of freeing, but merely a promise that he will make him free in the future with another document, and he has not yet done so.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And all of them,

all these expressions, are effective only when they are written

in a document

of freedom, and through the delivery of a document in which this is written, he goes out to freedom; but if he said one of these expressions to him orally, he does not go out to freedom.

And likewise

the Sages taught

concerning a document of sale:

One who says

to the purchaser [that is, he writes in a document, as it proceeds to explain]: “

I have given such-and-such a field to so-and-so.”

Or: “Such-and-such a field

is given to so-and-so.”

Or: “Such-and-such a field

behold, it is his”—

With each of these expressions,

behold,

the field is acquired by him, and

it is his.

And if he said: “Such-and-such a field,

I will give it to so-and-so”:

Rabbi says: He acquires

it, for this expression too implies a granting of acquisition: now, through this act, I am granting it to him.

And the Sages say: He does not acquire

it, for this is not an expression of granting acquisition, but merely a promise that he will acquire the field for him in the future.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And all of them,

all these expressions, are effective only when they are written

in a document

of acquisition; but through a mere statement the field is not acquired.

The Sages taught:

One who says,

by way of admission: “

I have made so-and-so, my slave,

free,”

and he,

the slave,

says: “

My master did not make me

free”—behold, he is free.

And because

we are concerned:

perhaps he granted it to him

the master granted his deed

through

a person

other

than the slave, and the slave did not know; and if indeed the master granted the slave his freedom through another, the slave is freed, because it is a benefit for a slave to go out from under his master’s hand to freedom, and “one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence.”

But if the master said: “

I wrote and gave him

a deed to the slave,”

and he,

the slave,

says: “He did not write for me or give me

any deed,”—he is not free.

And the slave is believed in his words even though the master denies him, because

“the admission of a litigant is equivalent to a hundred witnesses”!

For a person is believed when obligating himself; and although the master admits that he freed him, he can retract his words and say: “I mistakenly thought that he received his deed from my hand, but in truth that was not so.”

And likewise

one who says: “

I have given such-and-such a field to so-and-so,”

and he

[that same so-and-so]

says: “

He did not give me

this field ever”—that so-and-so acquires the field.

And because

we are concerned that perhaps he granted him

the field

through

a person

other

than him, for “one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence,” and the recipient did not know.

But if he said: “

I wrote and gave him

a document of acquisition for the field,”

and he says: “

He did not write or give me

any document”—he does not acquire it.

Because

“the admission of a litigant”—

of the recipient—

is equivalent to a hundred witnesses”!

And since he admitted that he did not receive it, the giver can retract his words and say: I mistakenly thought that I had given it to him.

The Gemara discusses: When the recipient’s admission opposed the giver’s admission:

who

among them

eats

the

produce

of the land?

Rav Hisda says: The giver eats the produce,

because of the recipient’s admission.

And Rava said: The produce is divided into thirds,

that is, it is uncertain, and the produce is placed in the hands of a trustworthy third party until Elijah comes.

And we conclude:

And they do not disagree!

This

that Rav Hisda said, “The giver eats the produce,” means

in the case of the father!

That is, when the recipient is still alive, and he is the one who admitted and said, “He did not give it to me”; therefore he is entirely believed, and he can never retract his admission.

And

this

that Rava said, “The produce is divided into thirds,” means

in the case of the son

[of the recipient] who died, and that is, the father did not admit, “I did not receive [it],” but his son is the one who admitted, “My father did not receive this gift,” because in this case his admission has no greater force than the giver’s admission, for it is possible that the son too erred and did not know about the gift; therefore the produce is divided into thirds, lest witnesses come and testify that the field was given to his father without the son’s knowledge. One who borrowed money from his fellow can encumber an asset among his assets with a special lien, in such a manner that he writes to the lender, “From here you shall collect,” and this is called an apotiki [that is, “here it shall stand”; upon this property you shall stand and collect your debt]!

And there are two types of apotiki:

An ordinary apotiki, which is when the borrower writes to the lender: “If I do not repay you from another place, behold this is before you, to collect it.”

An “explicit apotiki,” which is when the borrower writes to the lender: “You shall have no repayment except from this”; and some of the distinctions between them in law are explained in this sugya.

Mishna:

A slave whom his master made an apotiki to others—

who wrote to his creditor: “If I do not repay your debt with other property, collect the slave” —

and

afterward

freed him:

The essential

[the primary]

law

is:

the slave owes nothing.

Rather,

the Sages instituted

for the sake of the betterment of the world,

that they should

compel his master

to free him,

and make him free!

And he writes a document for his value!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He does not write; rather, he frees him!

And all the words of the Mishna will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

A slave whom his master made an apotiki and freed him,

the essential law is that the slave owes nothing; rather, for the sake of the betterment of the world they compel his master, and he makes him free:

And the Gemara brings the dispute of Rav and Ulla in explaining the Mishna:

Who freed him -

Rav said: his master

the

first

is the one who freed him!

And this is the explanation of the Mishna:

The strict law

is that

the slave owes nothing to his master

the

second,

that is: the slave is not obligated to serve his second master, for the first master freed him, and the creditor cannot collect the slave, who does not belong to the borrower -

And the lien by which the slave was encumbered to the creditor likewise does not prevent his first master from freeing him,

as

the words of

Rava.

For Rava said:

these three things: a.

consecration.

b.

leavened matter.

c.

and manumission -

remove from a lien,

as was explained.

And this is what we learned in our Mishna: that according to the essential law he is a free man and owes nothing. And this that we learned, “But because of the rectification of the world, they compel his master and make him a free man and he writes a deed for his value,” is

only because of the rectification of the world,

for the Sages said that although he is not at all the slave of the creditor, and he does not need a deed of manumission from him, nevertheless they compel him to write a deed of manumission, because we are concerned:

lest he find him

the creditor as a slave

in the marketplace,