Gittin 3a — the Talmud in English

Because of igguna, the Rabbis were lenient with her.

The Sages were lenient to believe the agent bringing the get, even though he is only one witness, in order not to lengthen the time of her igguna. However, the Gemara also raises an objection against this:

Why do you say that the Sages were lenient? And is it so that

this is a leniency?

But

it is a stringency!

For if you require two,

for if the Sages had required two witnesses [that is, that two agents bring the get and say: “In our presence it was written and in our presence it was signed”], then

he would not come —

he would not come —

the husband and challenge it

concerning the get [saying: “It is forged!]

and disqualify it.

The husband would not be able to disqualify it, because there are two witnesses against him, and he is not believed against them.

But

one,

now that the Sages were satisfied with the testimony of the agent, who is only in the category of one witness,

the husband will come and challenge it.

The husband will come and challenge it, and we will not know which of them to believe, the husband or the agent, because they are one against one,

and disqualify it —

and the husband will disqualify the get because of the doubt.

And is

this,

this belief in the agent,

a leniency?

But

it is a stringency!

For

if you require two —

if you required two witnesses and not one —

not

would

the husband come and challenge it

concerning the get

and disqualify it,

because the words of one — the challenging husband — have no standing against two witnesses and are considered nothing! But now, when you have believed one

one,

there is concern lest

the husband come,

the husband come afterward,

and challenge

the fitness of the get,

and disqualify it

as a get. For we will set their words [those of the agent and the husband] one against one. And the result is a stringency, that the words of the agent will not be accepted!

And the Gemara answers:

Since the Master said

[below, 5b]:

In the presence of how many

witnesses must the agent

give it

[the get]

to her

[the woman], and say before them, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”? They disagreed about this,

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Hanina.

One

of them

said: In the presence of two

witnesses.

And one said: In the presence of three,

so that they would be a court, fit to ratify the get.

Therefore, already

from the outset,

when the agent receives the get from the husband’s hand,

the agent examines precisely

and knows that the husband is divorcing her out of a desire to divorce her, and is not plotting to trouble her by sending a disqualified get, and will not come afterward to challenge the fitness of the get. For even if he challenges the get, he will not be believed. And therefore

he will not come to damage himself —

the husband will not come to ruin himself, since the court will not believe him. At the beginning of the discussion, the Gemara brought the disagreement of Rabba and Rava concerning the reason for the enactment that the agent must say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Until here, the Gemara discussed Rabba’s method: why testimony from two witnesses is unnecessary, and the testimony of the agent alone suffices. Now the Gemara begins to discuss Rava’s method.

And according to Rava, who said

that the reason for the enactment requiring the agent to say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is

because witnesses are not readily available

here

to ratify it, let us require two,

let us require two witnesses to say this —

just as it is,

as is the law in

all other ratification of documents,

which are ratified only through two witnesses.

The Gemara explains as before:

One witness is believed concerning prohibitions —

and here his testimony concerns permitting a married woman!

The Gemara again raises an objection:

Perhaps we say

— perhaps that which the Sages said, that

one witness is believed concerning prohibitions,

applies specifically where there is a doubt.

For example,

where there is before us

a piece

that is

possibly the forbidden fat

of an animal,

possibly the permitted fat

of an animal,

where the prohibition has not been established,

where the prohibition has not been established here with certainty.

But here,

with regard to permitting the woman through this get,

there has been established

for us

the prohibition of a married woman

with certainty.

And if so,

it is the permitting of the prohibition of a married woman in this woman, in every

“

matter concerning sexual relations.”

And the rule is that testimony is not accepted concerning

a matter concerning sexual relations

with

fewer than two

witnesses?!

The Gemara answers:

By rights —

according to the law —

also for ratification of documents there should be no requirement

there is no need for two witnesses,

and in accordance with the view of Reish Lakish

in tractate Ketubot [page 18b].

For he said

there:

The witnesses who signed a document have become

those witnesses are believed

as if

as though

their testimony had been examined in court

and found correct. For it is an established presumption for us that no person is so brazen as to forge the signatures of witnesses.

And only the Rabbis required

the Sages were the ones who required ratification of the signatures of the witnesses on the document.

And here,

here, in the case of a woman’s get,

because of igguna,

in order not to leave her aguna,

the Rabbis were lenient with her,

and were satisfied with one witness who would say: “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”

The Gemara again raises an objection:

Is this a leniency!?

But

it is a stringency!

For

if you require him

now

two

in one place,

he will not come,

he will not come afterward

with the husband challenging and disqualifying it

as a get. For he knows that he will not be believed. But after you required only one witness

one,

from now there is concern

that the husband will come,

challenge and disqualify the get.

And if in the meantime the woman managed to marry, she will now be obligated to leave her second husband, and likewise, she will also be unable to return to her first husband. This is indeed a great stringency for her!

The Gemara answers:

Since the Master said

[on page 5b]

in the presence of how many

witnesses must the agent

give it

[the get]

to her

[the woman], and say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”? They disagreed about this,

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Hanina. One

of them

said: In the presence of two

witnesses.

And one

of them

said: In the presence of three.

Therefore, already

from the outset,

when the agent receives the get from the husband’s hand,

he examines precisely

to ascertain that the husband intends to divorce her willingly, and is not plotting to trouble her by sending a get that is unfit, and afterward challenging the fitness of the get,

and he will not come

the husband to challenge

and damage himself,

for in any event he is not believed to challenge.

Now the Gemara is occupied with clarifying the views of Rabba and Rava, and why they disagreed with one another.

And Rava,

who said that the reason is that witnesses are not readily available to ratify it,

what is the reason —

what is the reason — that he

did not say like Rabba,

that the reason is that they are not expert concerning “for her sake”?

Rava could say to you: Does the Mishna state

— and did we learn in the Mishna —

“In my presence it was written for her sake and in my presence it was signed for her sake,”

which would certainly have meant that he testifies concerning the writing of the get for her sake?!

And Rabba

will answer this question:

By rights, he should have stated it this way,

by law the tanna should have taught it this way, but he was concerned

that if you increase the wording,

if they enact that the agent say in a long formulation, “In my presence it was written for her sake, and in my presence it was signed for her sake” —

he may come to cut it short,

the agent will sometimes cut it short, out of disregard for the long formulation, and say only, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed,” thereby disqualifying the get. For there is a rule: “Anyone who changes from the formulation that the Sages instituted for gittin, the get is disqualified.” And if a woman who was divorced with this get marries another man, her child is a mamzer, because she is still considered the first man’s married wife. Therefore, the Sages preferred to enact that the agent say only the two words “In my presence it was written,” and another two words, “In my presence it was signed,” and the agent would not come to cut it short.

And the Gemara asks:

Now too—

even now, when they instituted that he say only two words—

he may cut it down,

and sometimes say only one word out of the two.

And the Gemara answers:

One out of three—

one word out of three—

he may cut down.

However,

one out of two—

one out of two—

he may not cut down.

And he is particular to say the two words that they instituted for him to say, “before me it was written,” and then either they ask him whether it was written lishmah, or they understand his intention without specification, that the get was written lishmah. In any event, they obligated him to say the words, “before me it was written, and before me it was signed,” in order to ensure that each of them was done lishmah. And since each one of them is a law in its own right, there is no concern that he will cut down his statement.

And now the Gemara asks from the other side:

And Rabbah,

who said that the reason is because they are not expert in lishmah,

what is the reason that he did not say like Rava,

that the reason is because witnesses are not available to authenticate it?

And the Gemara answers:

If so,

that it is as Rava says,

let it teach,

the Mishna should have taught

“Before me it was signed”

alone,

and no more,

for authentication is performed only with regard to the signatures of the witnesses.

“Before me it was written”—why do I need it?—

Why nevertheless must the agent testify also about the writing? Rather, certainly

infer from this—

we hear from this [that is, we learn from this]

that it is necessary

to have testimony also concerning the writing, namely, that the get was written

lishmah,

in accordance with Rabbah’s view.

And Rava

will answer this proof that in truth

it is the law

that it should teach,

indeed, the tanna should have sufficed with the agent’s saying, “before me it was signed,” without testimony concerning the writing.

Rather, if so,

if he did not mention the writing,

it would come to be exchanged—

people would err and exchange between the agent’s authentication here, with regard to a get,

and

the authentication of

ordinary documents—

and they would think that those too could be authenticated

by one witness,

and two would not be necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to say also, “before me it was written.”

And Rabbah

will argue against this:

Are they comparable?—

Are these comparable to one another [the authentication of the get by means of the agent and the authentication of other documents by means of two witnesses]? For there are three differences between them: A.

There,

with regard to the authentication of documents, the witnesses say:

We know—

we know that these are the signatures of the witnesses whom we recognize [even though these witnesses were not present at the time of the loan]! Whereas

here,

with regard to a get, the agent must say

“before me”

it was written and “before me” it was signed; it is not sufficient that he recognizes the signatures.

B.

There,

with regard to the authentication of other documents,

a woman is not deemed credible—

she is not deemed credible to authenticate the signatures of witnesses, but

here,

here, with regard to a get,

a woman is deemed credible—

a woman is deemed credible to serve as an agent to bring a get to another woman and to say, “before me it was written and before me it was signed.” C.

There,

with regard to the authentication of other documents,

the interested party,

the owner of the document, who brings it in order to collect by means of it,

is not deemed credible,

he is not deemed credible to authenticate it, since he has an interest in the matter and is suspected of lying. Whereas

here, the interested party is deemed credible.

If the husband gave the get to his wife outside the Land of Israel and said to her: You are not divorced by this get, but only when you arrive at a court in the Land of Israel—she thereby becomes the husband’s agent of conveyance for her own sake. And when she arrives at the court, she must say, “before me it was written and before me it was signed.” She is then divorced by means of the get [below, page 23b].

And Rava answers against the first difference:

Is it so here—

is it so here, with regard to a get—

when they say, “we know,”

are they not deemed credible? [Rashi’s version: “When he says, ‘I know,’ who is not deemed credible?”]—Would it enter one’s mind to say that here, with regard to a get, the agent’s statement would not be effective if he said: I know that this get was signed by the witnesses So-and-so and So-and-so, whom I recognize? For according to him, the reason for the statement is authentication, and there is no difference at all between “before me it was written” and “I know.”

And since when they say, “we know,”—

that if the agent says, “I know”—

they are deemed credible—

he is deemed credible—

it would come to be exchanged with the authentication of ordinary documents—

people would err and think that the signatures of witnesses on other documents too could be authenticated

by one witness

alone. And for this reason, Rava argues, they obligate the agent to say also, “before me it was written,” in order to distinguish between the authentication of a get and the authentication of other documents.

Now the Gemara seeks to determine who is the tanna of our Mishna who holds that both the writing and the signing must be “lishmah.”