Gittin 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

When the court appoints an agent

in place of an agent who came from overseas: must the agent be appointed specifically

in his presence

of the first agent,

or

perhaps even

not in his presence?

The matter was subsequently resolved

by Rava:

The court may appoint an agent

both in his presence and not in his presence.

And likewise,

they sent word from there [from Eretz Yisrael]:

from the Land of Israel]:

both in his presence and not in his presence.

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who

gave his wife a get, and

said: If I do not come by thirty days, let this be a get!

That is, he made the divorce conditional, stipulating that it would take effect only if he did not return to this city within thirty days; and if he returned, the divorce would be nullified.

He went away from there, and

came

back toward the end of the stated period. He reached the vicinity of the city, but could not enter it, because

the ferry passage was interrupted [the water crossing prevented him, as the ferry was on the other side of the river and he could not cross].

the water crossing separated him from the city: the ferry was on the other side of the river, and he could not cross].

He said to them

from his place on the other side of the river, to the people of the city:

See that I have come, see that I have come [see that I have come]!

“See that I have come; see that I have come!”]

He intended to say: The condition I stipulated has been nullified, for I have come; therefore, the get is not a get.

Shmuel said:

His condition was not fulfilled, and the divorce took effect properly and was not nullified. Since he did not enter the city,

this is not called coming [this is not considered coming to the city]; that is, although he did not come because of circumstances beyond his control, ultimately he did not come.

The reason is either that “there is no coercion with regard to gittin,” meaning that a claim of coercion is never effective with regard to conditions in a get,

and even if the condition of the divorce was fulfilled through coercion, the divorce takes effect; or, even according to the opinion that “there is coercion with regard to gittin,” since this is a common type of coercion, he should have stipulated this condition in advance.

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who said to her

at the time he delivered the get:

If I do not appease her by thirty days [if I do not appease my wife by thirty days],

if I do not appease my wife within thirty days]

let this be a get

from now.

He went and tried to appease her

with words, and made extensive efforts to win her over,

but she was not appeased.

Rav Yosef said:

The divorce takes effect, for

did he give her a tarkav of dinars [did he give her three kav of dinars]

did he give her three kav measures of dinars]

and

nevertheless

she was not appeased!?

But he did not give her this amount, and it is not significant that he tried to appease her, for his condition included appeasing her even with something substantial, until she would be appeased by him. It follows that the condition was fulfilled: if he did not appease her, the divorce would take effect.

Some say

that this is what

Rav Yosef said: Does she require a tarkav of dinars to be given to her!?

He appeased her, but she was not appeased [does he have to give her a tarkav of dinars!? He appeased her with what was necessary, but she was not appeased].

does he really have to give her a basketful of dinars? He appeased her in the manner required, but she did not consent].

That is, since he was prevented from fulfilling his condition, as he did not have so much money, the divorce cannot take effect through a condition fulfilled under coercion.

The Gemara explains:

This —

the latter formulation —

is in accordance with the one who says “

there is coercion with regard to gittin.”

This — the first formulation —

is in accordance with the one who says “

there is no coercion with regard to gittin.”

In connection with the Mishna taught earlier, 28a: “If one brings a get and leaves him an elderly or ill person, he gives it to her on the presumption that he is alive,” the following two Mishnayot were taught here.

Mishna:

One who lends money to a priest, a Levite, or a poor person,

on the condition

that he will separate on their account from their portions,

that is, if he stipulated with them that he would repay his debt from the teruma, first tithe, or poor tithe that he was destined to separate, so that instead of giving them to the recipients, he would take them for himself as repayment of the debt. He

separates on their account

and takes the gifts for himself,

on the presumption that they are [the borrowers]

the borrowers]

alive, and he need not be concerned that perhaps the priest or Levite has died, or

perhaps

the poor person has become wealthy,

with the result that he would be robbing the tribe or the poor, and would also fail to fulfill the mitzva of giving.

And if

they die,

the borrowers, the lender

must obtain permission from the heirs

to continue doing so, since their father’s debt is not incumbent upon them to repay. Therefore, he must obtain their permission if they want their father’s debt to be received through these gifts; and if they give him permission, he may keep the gifts for himself.

And

if he lent to them in the presence of a court,

and the borrowers die,

he need not obtain permission from the heirs,

because the court has the authority to impose this debt upon the entire tribe and all the poor, since it is an enactment for the benefit of all, so that money will be available for them to borrow.

Gemara:

The Gemara is puzzled by the statement explained in the Mishna, that he may stipulate to take his gifts as repayment of his debt,

and

it implies:

even though they have not yet come into his possession [even though the gifts have not yet come into the borrowers’ possession] and he returns them to the lender —

even though the gifts have not yet come into the borrowers’ possession] and they return them to the lender—

How is it possible for the person who separates the gifts to take them for himself without any giving at all!? The gifts still belong not to the borrowers, but to the entire tribe and all the poor; how can they give them to their lender!? Furthermore, how has the lender fulfilled the mitzva of giving as long as he has not given his gifts!?

Rav said: The

borrowers who were

acquaintances of the priesthood and Levites

are the subject of our Mishna.

That is: the borrowers were acquaintances of the lender, and the lender was accustomed to giving his gifts only to them. Since it was clear that the lender would give his gifts to them, the others had already withdrawn their minds from the gifts, so it was as though the gifts had come into the possession of these people.

And Shmuel said:

Our Mishna deals with a case in which the lender

conferred ownership

of the gifts upon

them [the Levites]

to the Levites]

through others

after he separated them; and afterward the lender takes them for himself.

Ulla said: Whose opinion is this —

our Mishna —

It is Rabbi Yosei’s, who says

in several places:

The Sages made

one who does not acquire

like one who acquires.

That is: because of the enactment, the Sages granted acquisition even to one who is not fit to acquire. Here too, because of the enactment that people would be found to lend to them, they instituted that the priest, Levite, and poor person would acquire the gifts; therefore, the lender may take them as repayment of his debt.

That is: Because of the enactment, the Sages granted acquisition even to one who is not legally fit to acquire. Here too, because of the enactment that people should be found who would lend to them, they enacted that the priest, Levite, and poor person acquire the gifts. Therefore, the lender may take them as repayment of his debt.

And the Gemara explains:

all of them

[Shmuel and Ulla]

did not interpret it according to Rav

to explain our Mishna, because

“those who are his regular recipients

of the gifts of priesthood and Levite gifts”

is not taught

in our Mishna, indicating that he may designate the gifts even when the Levites are not his regular recipients.

And all of them [Rav and Ulla]

did not state it according to Shmuel

to explain our Mishna, because

“by conferring ownership upon them

through another”

is not taught

in our Mishna.

All of them [Rav and Shmuel]

also did not state it according to Ulla,

because

we do not establish

[the Mishna in accordance with the view of a lone authority].

The Sages taught:

a. One who gives money to a merchant on the condition that he will sell him his produce when it grows may not stipulate that he will give him the produce at its current price, because of the prohibition of interest. For perhaps the price of the produce at the time of delivery will be higher than its price at the time of the agreement, in which case the one who advanced the money will profit from the difference in return for the money he advanced to the merchant; and this is a prohibition of interest by rabbinic decree.

b. If “the market price has been established,” he may stipulate according to today’s price. He may even stipulate that if the price at the time of delivery is lower than the current price, he will receive it at the lower price.

b. One who lends money to another, and the Sabbatical Year arrives: the debt is canceled at the end of the Sabbatical Year, and this is called “the remission of monetary debts.”

One who lends money to a priest, a Levite, or a poor person, in order to designate for them from their portion, designates for them on the presumption that they are alive,

as explained in our Mishna.

And he stipulates with them according to the lower market price,

as the Gemara will explain below—

and it does not involve interest,

even though he advanced his money before the market price had been established.

And the Sabbatical Year does not cancel it,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason.

And if he comes to retract,

the lender

cannot retract,

as it proceeds to explain.

If the owners despaired

of the debt, then

one may no longer designate for them,

that is: if he lent money to a priest on the condition that he would take his teruma from that year, and the lender saw that the priest’s fields had been blighted and despaired of collecting his debt, and then his fields were restored, he may not take the teruma and tithe against his debt,

because one may not designate

teruma and tithe for oneself

against

the

lost debt.

The Master said

in the beraita:

“He stipulates with them according to the lower market price.”

It initially entered our minds that the beraita comes to teach that the lender may stipulate with the borrowers that he will receive the teruma at its current price even if the price rises; and, conversely, if the price of the teruma falls, he will receive it at the lower price. Therefore we ask:

But

is it obvious

that this is so? Wherever making such an agreement is permitted, he may stipulate according to the current price, and if the price falls he will receive it at the lower price. Since, in essence, making the agreement concerning the teruma does not involve interest, he may also stipulate with him according to the lower price!?

And we answer: The beraita does not come to permit him to stipulate with him according to the lower price. Rather,

this teaches us: although he did not stipulate

with the borrowers according to the lower price,

it is considered as though he stipulated

so explicitly

with him.

We learned in the beraita:

“And it does not involve interest.”

And we explain:

What is the reason?

After all, this involves advancing money, which is prohibited as rabbinic interest!?

Since when he does not have

teruma from his field—for example, when his fields were blighted—

he does not give him

the borrower [the borrower does not repay him with other money in payment of the debt], therefore

when he does have

teruma

also

produce in his field,

it does not involve interest,

because he is exposed to a possible loss, in that his fields may be blighted, and in such a case it is not prohibited as interest.

We learned in the beraita:

“And the Sabbatical Year does not cancel it.”

And the Gemara explains the reason: because

we cannot apply to it the phrase

“he may not press him,”

since he cannot demand anything from him; rather, he takes only his teruma.

We learned in the beraita:

“And if he comes to retract, he cannot retract.”

Rav Pappa said:

They taught

—that he cannot retract—

only where the homeowner deals with the priest,

that is: the lender cannot retract and say, “I do not want to take teruma in payment of my debt; rather, pay me my debt.”

But where the priest deals with the homeowner, if he wishes to retract,

that is: if the priest says to the homeowner, “I do not want you to take teruma in payment of your debt; rather, take your money,” then he

may retract.

d.

This

we learned:

If he gave him

the purchaser to the seller

money, but did not yet take possession of

the

produce

from him, he

may retract, because “money does not effect acquisition.” Likewise, this priest may retract, because although the lender gave money for the teruma, the lender has still not taken possession of it.

because “money does not effect acquisition.” This priest may likewise retract, because although the lender gave money for the teruma, the lender still had not taken possession of it.

We learned in the beraita:

“If the owners despaired, one may not designate for them, because one may not designate against the lost.”

The Gemara asks:

Is this not obvious!?

And we answer:

It is necessary in a case where they had begun to grow

—the grain had already risen in the stalk, and then it dried up and he despaired. There is a novel point here, because

it might enter your mind to say that the recovery is significant,

for once the grain has risen in the stalk, even if it dries out, it can recover, and it is uncommon for it to be completely ruined; therefore this would not be a fully effective despair.

It teaches us

that it is considered despair, and he has forfeited his debt.

It was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One who lends money to a priest or a Levite through the court, and they die,

he

designates for them on the presumption that it belongs to that tribe.

And

one who lends

to a poor person through the court, and he dies,

the poor person, the lender

designates for him on the presumption that it belongs to the poor of Israel.

Rabbi Aḥai says: On the presumption that it belongs to the poor of the world.

The Gemara interrupts the quotation of the beraita in order to explain it:

What is the difference between them,

between the first tanna and Rabbi Aḥai?