Gittin 18a — the Talmud in English

He said to him,

he asked

Ravina to Rava: He wrote it

the bill of divorce with a date,

and placed it

and left it

in his pocket

in his pocket,

for if they reconcile, they will reconcile

for if they reconcile from the quarrels between them, he will not divorce her,

what

is the status of this bill of divorce? Is it fit to give her, or not?

For if you say that such a bill of divorce is fit, then a husband could cover up for his wife: he could write a bill of divorce and keep the bill of divorce in his possession, and if she commits adultery, he could give her the bill of divorce, and she would say that she was divorced from the time of the writing.

He said to him

Rava: Such a case is not common, and there is no concern for it, because

a person does not bring misfortune upon himself in advance.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

In all

the bills of divorce that come from overseas territories, which are written in Nisan and do not arrive

and do not arrive from overseas territories

until Tishrei, what did the Sages accomplish with their enactment?

For he can cover up for her if she commits adultery between Nisan and Tishrei.

He said to him

Rav Ashi:

Those

bills of divorce

have publicity,

for they were written on one day but delivered on another day, and they know the day of delivery, so he cannot cover up for her.

It was stated: From when does one count for a bill of divorce,

for a woman who was divorced by a bill of divorce, the three months of “discernment” that the Sages established, that a woman should not marry a second husband אלא only after three months have passed from the day she was divorced or widowed from her first husband, so that we will know to whom a child born after the divorce or the death of her first husband belongs, whether to the first husband or to the second husband. And for this reason they enacted that a woman should always wait before marrying a second husband until three months have passed.

And the amoraim disagreed: from when must a divorcee count the three months of discernment—from the time of the writing of the bill of divorce, or from the time of its delivery, which is the time of the divorce?

Rav said: From the time of delivery

of the bill of divorce.

And Shmuel said: From the time of writing

of the bill of divorce.

And Shmuel’s reason is that, since from the writing of the bill of divorce it is forbidden for him to be secluded with her—for if he is secluded with her, the bill of divorce becomes invalid [because of a “stale bill of divorce”]—if so, it is certainly the case that he was not secluded with her after the time of the writing of the bill of divorce; therefore she may count three months from the time of the writing of the bill of divorce.

And Rav does not disagree with this reasoning; rather, he disagreed with Shmuel because of a decree, as explained below.

Rav Natan bar Hoshaya raised an objection to Shmuel:

According to you, that from the time of writing the woman may count the three months of discernment, if so,

people will say: two women in one half

of one husband, and both were divorced on the same day, but for one of them he wrote the bill of divorce before the divorce, and it follows that

this one

will be

forbidden

until three months pass, while for one he wrote the bill of divorce a month before the divorce,

and

it follows that

this one

will be

permitted

after two months—and this is something about which people will wonder.

Abaye said to him:

People will not wonder about this, because

this one

who is forbidden until three months,

the date of her bill of divorce proves her case,

for the bill of divorce was written at the time of the divorce, and she must wait three months from then.

And this one

for whom the bill of divorce was written a month before the divorce,

the date of her bill of divorce proves her case

when the bill of divorce was written, and from that time she waits three months. Therefore, after two months she will be permitted.

It was taught in accordance with Rav, and it was taught in accordance with Shmuel.

It was taught in accordance with Rav: One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and the agent was delayed on the road for three months,

even so,

when the bill of divorce reached her hand, she must wait three months

from the time of the divorce.

And for a

“stale bill of divorce” —

there is no concern, for we did not

see that he

was secluded with her

and there is no concern lest he had intercourse with her.

And here it is explained that Rav, who holds that one counts from the time of the divorce and not from the time of the writing of the bill of divorce, does not do so because of the concern lest her husband had intercourse with her before the divorce, for it was explained in the beraita that we are not concerned lest he had intercourse with her. And necessarily, the reason Rav invalidated it is as Rav Natan bar Hoshaya said to Rabba: two women of one man who were divorced on the same day, and the time of the writing of their bills of divorce was different; it follows that one will wait two months and the other three -

and this is a perplexing matter. Therefore Rav held that one always counts from the divorce.

It was taught in accordance with Shmuel: One who deposits a bill of divorce for his wife

with a third party,

and said

the husband to the third party:

Do not give it to her except after three months! When he gave it to her

the bill of divorce,

she is permitted to marry immediately,

and she need not wait another three months of discernment, for the months of discernment are counted from the time of the writing of the bill of divorce.

And for a stale bill of divorce, there is no concern, for he was not secluded with her.

Rav Kahana, Rav Pappi, and Rav Ashi practiced

the requirement of three months of discernment

from the time of writing,

in accordance with Shmuel.

Rav Pappi and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua practiced

the three months

from the time of delivery

in accordance with Rav.

And the halakha is: from the time of writing,

in accordance with Shmuel.

It was stated—

In the seventh year, the mitzva of shemitta applies to working the land, and the mitzva of remission of debts, in which monetary debts are remitted.

And the Sages disagreed as to which debts are remitted in the seventh year:

There is one who holds [in tractate Sheviit 10:1] that only debts of a loan are remitted, but not debts from a storekeeper’s credit, or a hired laborer’s wages, and the like.

And there is one who holds that every debt is remitted in the seventh year.

A debt created through the obligation of a court, called “an act of the court,” according to everyone is not remitted. Therefore, the marriage settlement debt that the husband owes his wife when he divorces her, according to everyone is not remitted, because it is “an act of the court.”

But when the husband began to pay her marriage settlement, meaning that he had already paid her part of the marriage settlement, the remaining debt became an ordinary loan debt, which is remitted in the seventh year.

And in this the amoraim disagreed:

from when is the marriage settlement

considered an ordinary loan debt, and

is remitted?

Rav said: When she blemishes it

when she began to collect her marriage settlement,

and

also

converts it into a loan

establishes the remainder of the marriage-settlement debt as a loan—only then is the marriage settlement considered an ordinary loan debt, and is remitted in the seventh year.

And Shmuel said: If she blemished it

she began to collect the marriage settlement

, even though she did not convert it into a loan

she did not establish the remainder as a loan debt—it is sufficient that from now the remaining marriage-settlement debt is considered an ordinary loan debt, and is remitted in the seventh year,

or

converted it into a loan,

she established the marriage settlement as a loan debt,

even though she did not blemish it

she did not begin to collect it; it is sufficient to consider the marriage-settlement debt a loan debt that is remitted in the seventh year.

It was taught in accordance with Rav.

It was taught in accordance with Shmuel.

It was taught in accordance with Rav:

As it was taught:

From when is the marriage settlement remitted?—

When she blemishes it and converts it into a loan.

But if

she blemished it but did not convert it into a loan,

or

converted it into a loan but did not blemish it—

it is not remitted until she blemishes it and converts it into a loan.

And it is explicit in accordance with Rav that two conditions are needed for the marriage settlement to be considered a loan debt and to be remitted:

a.

That she begin to collect the marriage settlement.

b.

That she establish the remainder as a loan debt.

It was taught in accordance with Shmuel:

As it was taught: a person’s payment obligation when he

rapes

a woman, or a payment obligation of

a fine,

of a man who falsely gives his wife a bad name, saying that she committed adultery,

and

the payment obligation of

seduction

a man who seduced a virgin girl,

and

the obligation of

a woman’s marriage settlement—

if he converted them into a loan

if he established them as a loan debt, from now they are considered a loan debt, and

they are remitted.

But if not,

if he did not convert them into a loan,

they are not remitted.

And it is explicit in this beraita in accordance with Shmuel, that establishing it as a debt alone is sufficient to make the marriage-settlement payment obligation a loan debt, and it is remitted.

And now the Gemara explains what “converts it into a loan” means:

From when are they “converted into a loan”?

How does one establish the marriage-settlement debt as a loan debt?

From the time of standing before the court.

From the time the woman claims the marriage settlement in court, the marriage settlement is considered an ordinary loan debt, because her claim is considered as though she established the marriage-settlement debt as an ordinary loan debt.

Shmuel said: A marriage settlement—

is comparable to an act of the court!

Because this debt does not depend on a person’s desire to undertake it; rather, the court obligates every man who married a woman to undertake a marriage-settlement debt.

And the practical consequence of this being an “act of the court” debt is:

What,

like

an act of the court,

it does not matter if

they are written during the day and signed at night,

even though the night following the day is another date, this is not an “early document,” since the judgment was issued during the day, publicity had already gone out, and therefore it does not matter if the signing was on the night after it.

So too a marriage settlement,

which is considered an act of the court,

is written during the day and signed at night,

and there is no invalidity here of an early document.

And the Gemara brings an incident that occurred, showing that this is how they practiced in actual halakhic practice:

The marriage settlement of Rabbi Hiyya bar Rav was written during the day and signed at night.

Rav was there, and he said nothing to them—

and he did not invalidate the marriage settlement under the law of an early document of our Mishna.

And we raise an objection:

Let us say

Rav

holds in accordance with Shmuel,

that a marriage settlement, since it is an act of the court, does not have the defect of an “early document.”

And we reject this: This is no proof that Rav held in accordance with Shmuel. For perhaps Rav always disagrees with Shmuel, and holds that an early marriage settlement—written during the day and signed at night—is invalid.

And the reason Rav did not protest against them is

that they were occupied with that matter,

and from the writing during the day until the signing at night they spoke about the matter of the marriage settlement. And the witnesses had been ready to sign it. Only in such a case, when the witnesses were ready to sign and were delayed because they were speaking about the matter of the marriage settlement, there is publicity already from the time of the writing, and the marriage-settlement document is valid.

As it was taught, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok said: They taught only

in our Mishna that a document written during the day and signed at night is invalid

when they are not occupied with that matter

from the time of writing the marriage settlement until signing it.

But when they are occupied with that matter,

from the writing, and therefore the signing was postponed until night, the document is

valid,

because there is publicity from the time of the writing.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon declares valid

a bill of divorce written during the day and signed at night.

Rava said: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason? He holds: Since he gave

the husband

his attention to divorcing her, he no longer has the produce

from her usufruct property, and automatically there is no concern at all with such a bill of divorce, because the woman will collect from the husband or from the purchasers the produce from the time of the writing, and this is indeed her law.

And concerning the concern lest he cover up for her, the Gemara explained above that Rabbi Shimon does not hold of this concern.

Reish Lakish said:

Rabbi Shimon declared valid

a bill of divorce written during the day and signed at night

only immediately

that it was written during the day and signed at night.

But from here until ten days,

when it was written on one day and signed after ten days,

not

did Rabbi Shimon declare it valid, and he agrees with the Rabbis.