Eruvin 99a — the Talmud in English

He thought: Since the latter clause is Rabbi Meir:

since in the Mishna below, with regard to a key, the view of Rabbi Meir is mentioned —

the first clause,

that is, our Mishna,

also Rabbi Meir

is.

It is not so!

Rather,

the latter clause

indeed

is Rabbi Meir,

but

the first clause—

the Rabbis

is.

We learned in the Mishna:

provided that he does not carry outside

four cubits.

And we inferred:

that

if

he carried

the object outside four cubits,

he is liable for a sin-offering,

even though the carrying of the four cubits did not take place entirely in the public domain, but rather passed through a exempt place.

For the person is standing on the roof, and he raises the object to him, which is above ten handbreadths from the ground of the public domain, and is therefore an exempt place. And so he carries it until the end of the four cubits. Nevertheless, he is liable, because the definition of the labor of carrying four cubits in the public domain is: lifting and placing in the public domain, when the distance between them is four cubits.

Let us say that it supports Rava.

For Rava said: One who carries an object

in the public domain

from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits, and carries it “through above him”,

when he holds it above his head, which is above ten handbreadths—

is liable,

despite the fact that the carrying passed through an exempt place.

And we reject this: there is no proof here for Rava:

Does it teach

in the Mishna

that if he carried it, he is liable for a sin-offering?

Perhaps, if he carried it—

he is exempt, but it is prohibited,

by rabbinic decree, because of a decree lest he carry the entire distance below ten handbreadths. But there is indeed no liability for a sin-offering here, since he carried it through an exempt place.

There are those who say:

We infer from the Mishna:

that if he carried it—

he is exempt, but it is prohibited.

Let us say that this is a refutation of Rava.

For Rava said: One who carries from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits and carries it through above him is liable?

And we answer:

Does it teach

“if he carried it, he is exempt, but it is prohibited”?

Perhaps, if he carried it, he is liable for a sin-offering,

as Rava maintains.

We learned in the Mishna:

A person may not stand in a private domain

and urinate in the public domain.

Rav Yosef said: If he urinated or spit

from a private domain into the public domain—

he is liable for a sin-offering.

Rif wrote that this applies according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose. But according to Rabbi Shimon, he is exempt, since he has no need to benefit from the spittle after he has spat it out. It is like one who carries out a corpse in order to bury it, for which one is exempt because it is a labor not needed for its own purpose, according to Rabbi Shimon, in tractate Shabbat 93b.

We raised an objection concerning this: And why is he liable?

But we require lifting and placing from a place of four

handbreadths, for in order to be liable, the lifting of the object [and likewise its placing] must be from upon [or upon] a place whose area is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths, which is an important place,

and there is none,

for a person’s mouth and the opening of his organ do not have such a measure?

And we answer:

His intention—

makes it a place for him!

The fact that he needs to urinate and spit causes this carrying to have the status of important carrying, even though the lifting was from a place of less than four handbreadths.

And there is proof for this:

For if you do not say so,

that sometimes we say that his intention makes it a place, raise an objection from

that which Rava said:

If he threw

an object four cubits in the public domain

and it came to rest in a dog’s mouth, or in the mouth of a furnace,

which was burned by the flame before it had time to come to rest inside the furnace—

he is liable for a sin-offering.

And concerning this there is a difficulty: Why is he liable?

But we require placing upon a place of four, and there is none!

For in a dog’s mouth and in a flame there is no such measure?

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that we say:

his intention,

that he intends that it come to rest in the dog’s mouth and in the mouth of the furnace—

makes it a place

of importance. For he himself has rendered this place important.

Here too: intention makes it a place.

Rava raised a question:

A person who

is

standing

in a private domain, and his organ’s opening

is

in the public domain,

and he urinated—

what is

the law as to whether he is liable?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: Is it that

we follow the lifting,

after the place from which the urine is lifted, namely the cavity of his body, which is in the private domain, and it follows that he carried out from a private domain into the public domain, and he is liable?

Or

perhaps

we follow the exit,

from the place where it exits the body, namely the opening of his organ, which is in the public domain, and there is no carrying out from a private domain into the public domain, and he is exempt?

And we conclude:

It shall stand unresolved!

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, one may not spit. Rabbi Judah says:

Even once his spittle has become detached in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits until he spits.

We raised an objection concerning this: Did Rabbi Judah say that as soon as the spittle becomes detached from his mouth,

even though he has not manipulated it,

meaning that he has not moved the spittle around inside his mouth, it is considered detached, and he transgresses by carrying it on Shabbat from one domain to another?

But we learned

in tractate Kelim:

If he was eating a fig cake,

pressed and stuck-together figs of teruma,

with impure hands,

which he had not washed in water [and the Sages decreed concerning them that they should have the status of “second-degree impurity” and disqualify the teruma if he does not wash his hands].

And he brought

the person eating the fig cake of teruma

his hand into his mouth to remove the piece,

a piece of wood or stone that was in his mouth, and his impure hand touched the fig cake of teruma.

Rabbi Meir declares the fig cake impure,

even though the fig cake never came into contact with water or other liquids [and food does not receive impurity until it has received “preparation,” meaning that liquids have come upon it beforehand].

For it was prepared by the spittle in his mouth, whose status is that of a liquid.

And Rabbi Yose declares it pure.

For in his view, as long as the spittle has not left the mouth, it is not considered a liquid; rather, it is like the person’s body, and it cannot effect preparation.

Rabbi Judah says:

If he

manipulated it

in the spittle in order to bring it outside—

the fig cake is impure,

for since the spittle is destined to be spit from the mouth, it is considered a liquid and effects preparation.

But if he

did not manipulate it—

the fig cake is pure,

for it is still not considered a liquid.

It follows that according to Rabbi Judah, specifically when he has manipulated it is the spittle considered detached from the body, whereas in our Mishna Rabbi Judah does not distinguish between whether he manipulated it and whether he did not manipulate it?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: The position has been reversed!

Rabbi Judah changed his position, having retracted his statement. [And it was explained in tractate Kelim that even if he did not manipulate it, it is impure].

Reish Lakish said: Actually, do not reverse it.

And with ordinary spittle Rabbi Judah indeed holds that specifically when he has manipulated it is it considered a liquid.

But here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing?—

With phlegm,

mucus that emerges from the body through coughing, which is considered a liquid even if he has not manipulated it.

And we challenge this:

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Judah says: Phlegm, once detached—

he may not walk four cubits until he spits.

What, is it not

that “phlegm, once detached” are two matters? And this is what it is saying:

Phlegm, and likewise

spittle, once detached.

Thus, with spittle too detachment suffices according to Rabbi Judah, even though he has not manipulated it?

And we answer:

No!

Rather, it is one matter. And this is what Rabbi Judah is saying:

Phlegm, once detached.

And we still challenge this:

But it was explicitly taught

there:

Rabbi Judah says: Phlegm that has become detached, and likewise his spittle that has become detached—

he may not walk four cubits until he spits.

Thus, it teaches two matters?

And we conclude:

Rather, it is clearer as we answered initially,

that the position has been reversed.

Reish Lakish said: Phlegm,

one who coughed and brought up mucus

in the presence of his teacher—

is liable for death

at the hands of Heaven.

As it is stated,

in Proverbs, where the Torah speaks concerning itself:

“All those who hate Me—

love death.”

For those who cause hatred of the Torah are liable for death.

Do not read: “Those who hate Me,”

those who hate Me,

but rather: “Those who cause Me to be hated,”

those who cause Me to be hated by others, who profane the honor of the Torah through the ugliness of their traits, by doing things that make them repulsive in the presence of one who is greater than they are.

And we challenge this:

But he is completely compelled,

for the cough comes upon him against his will, and why is he liable for it by death?

And we answer:

We are speaking of phlegm and spitting.

For regarding the spitting, he is not compelled; rather, he should have moved away from his teacher and spit the mucus there, or swallowed it into his garment.

Mishna:

A person may not stand in a private domain and drink

in the public domain, by extending his neck into the public domain and drinking there through a vessel.

And likewise, he may not stand

in the public domain and drink in a private domain,

because of a decree lest he bring the vessel from which he is drinking, from the domain in which he is drinking to the domain in which he is standing.

Unless he brings his head and the greater part of his body into the place where he is drinking.

And likewise in a winepress,

in which grapes are trodden to make wine. And it will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We raised an objection concerning this:

The first clause,

according to

the Rabbis, and

whereas

the latter clause—

is Rabbi Meir

?

For the previous Mishna, which permitted one to stand in one domain and handle an object in another domain, without issuing a decree lest he bring the object into the domain in which he is located, follows the Rabbis. Whereas our Mishna, which prohibits drinking in another domain because of a decree, follows Rabbi Meir.

And we find that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disputed this below in the Mishna [101a] with regard to a key.

Rashi explains that it is impossible to say that the drinking in our Mishna is prohibited because of carrying out from one domain to another, as in the case of urinating and spitting. For in the case of urinating and spitting, he lifts from one domain and places in another domain, whereas in the case of drinking, his neck is in the same domain in which he is drinking, and the water comes to rest immediately inside his mouth; it follows that the lifting and the placing took place in the same domain.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosef said:

[This is speaking] of objects that he needs,

and

therefore our Mishna—

is the view of everyone.

For the liquids that a person drinks are also needed by him, and a decree must be issued concerning them lest he bring them from the domain in which he is drinking to the domain in which he is standing.

They raised a question before them: What is the law concerning a karmelit?

Is it permitted to stand in a karmelit and drink in a private domain or in the public domain?

Abaye said:

It is—

it is! Just as it is prohibited to stand in the public domain and drink in a private domain, or the reverse, so it is prohibited to stand in a karmelit and drink in a private domain or in the public domain.

Rava said:

There is no prohibition in a karmelit.

For

it itself is a decree,

for the transfer itself from a private domain or from the public domain to a karmelit is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, a decree lest one transfer from a private domain to the public domain;

and shall we arise and issue a decree

that one may not drink in a karmelit, on account of bringing the vessel there from another domain, which is

a decree for the sake of a decree?

Abaye said: From where do I say it,

that it is prohibited even in a karmelit?