Eruvin 99a (צט.) — the Talmud in English

He held: Since the latter clause is Rabbi Meir—

since Rabbi Meir’s opinion is mentioned in the following Mishna with regard to a key —

the first clause,

that is, our Mishna,

is also Rabbi Meir

—

Rashi. Tosafot raised an objection to him in the chapter beginning Hu, that that Mishna is too far removed and is not connected with our Mishna. They explain that the reference is to the latter clause of the Mishna, which teaches: “And similarly, one may not spit,” and Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with this. The unnamed disputant of Rabbi Yehuda is Rabbi Meir. That is not so!

Rather,

the latter clause

indeed

is Rabbi Meir,

but

the first clause—

the Rabbis

—is.

We learned in the Mishna:

provided that he does not carry it outside

four cubits.

And we inferred:

this implies

that if

he carried

the object beyond four cubits,

he is liable to bring a sin-offering,

even though the transfer of the four cubits was not entirely in the public domain, but passed through a makom patur, a place exempt from the laws of carrying.

For the person is standing on a roof, and he raises the object to himself, above ten handbreadths from the ground of the public domain, which is a makom patur. He then transfers it in this manner until the end of the four cubits. Nevertheless, he is liable, because the definition of the labor of transferring four cubits in the public domain is: removing the object and placing it in the public domain, with a distance of four cubits between them. Rashi. Tosafot raised an objection above, on 98a, in the chapter beginning Veha’amar, asking: Where is it stated in the Mishna that he is speaking of one who is standing on a roof? The Mishna merely teaches, without qualification, “a private domain.” Therefore, they explain that here he is standing in one place and does not move from his place, but transfers the object four cubits from one side to the other through his body. One might have thought that opposite his body it is considered placement, and he would not be liable to bring a sin-offering. Therefore, the Gemara cites Rava’s ruling, which also concerns such a case, as explained above, on 98a, in the note.

Let us say that this supports Rava.

For Rava said: One who transfers an object

in the public domain

from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits, and transfers it “over him”—

when he holds it above his head, which is above ten handbreadths—

is liable,

despite the fact that the transfer passed through a makom patur.

And we reject this proof, as follows:

Does the Mishna teach

that

if he carried it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering?

Perhaps, if he carried it—

he is exempt, but it is prohibited,

by rabbinic decree, due to a concern that he might transfer the object entirely below ten handbreadths. But there is indeed no liability to bring a sin-offering here, since he transferred it through a makom patur.

Some say:

We infer from the Mishna:

this implies that if he carried it—

he is exempt, but it is prohibited.

Let us say that this constitutes a refutation of Rava.

For Rava said: One who transfers an object from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits and transfers it over him is liable?

And we answer:

Does the Mishna teach

“if he carried it, he is exempt, but it is prohibited”?

Perhaps, if he carried it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering,

in accordance with Rava’s opinion.

We learned in the Mishna:

A person may not stand in a private domain

and urinate in the public domain.

Rav Yosef said: If he urinated or spat

from a private domain into the public domain,

he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rif wrote that this applies according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose. But according to Rabbi Shimon, he is exempt, since he has no need to benefit from the spittle after he has spat it out. It is like one who carries out a corpse in order to bury it, for which one is exempt because it is a labor not needed for its own purpose, according to Rabbi Shimon, in tractate Shabbat 93b.

We inquire concerning this: Why is he liable?

But we require removal and placement from a defined area of four handbreadths,

for in order to be liable, the object must be removed from, and placed upon, an area whose surface is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths, which is considered a significant area,

and here there is none,

because a person’s mouth and the opening of his organ do not have such dimensions?

And we answer:

His intention

renders it an area!

The fact that he needs to urinate and spit causes this transfer to be considered a significant act of carrying, even though the removal was from an area smaller than four handbreadths.

And there is proof of this:

For if you do not say this,

that at times we say that one’s intention renders something an area, a difficulty arises from

what Rava said:

If one threw

an object four cubits in the public domain

and it came to rest in a dog’s mouth or in the mouth of a furnace,

which was consumed by the flame before it had time to come to rest inside the furnace,

he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

And concerning this it is difficult: Why is he liable?

But we require placement upon an area of four handbreadths, and there is none!

A dog’s mouth and a flame do not have such dimensions.

Rather,

it must be that we say:

His intention,

as he intends that the object come to rest in the dog’s mouth or in the mouth of the furnace,

renders it an area

of significance, since he himself assigned significance to that place.

And Tosafot wrote in the chapter beginning Machshavto that this is so specifically when he benefits more from that place than from another place—for example, in the mouth of a dog, because he wants the dog to eat it, or in the mouth of a furnace, because he wants it to burn there. The same applies to one who urinates or spits, who benefits from removing it from that place. But if he throws an object onto poles or the like, even if he specifically wants it to come to rest there, we do not say that his intention renders it an area. Here too: Intention renders it an area.

Rava raised a dilemma:

A person who

is

standing

in a private domain, while his organ

is

in the public domain,

and he urinates—

what is

his liability?

The sides of the dilemma are as follows: Do

we follow the removal,

the place from which the urine is removed, namely, the cavity of his body, which is in a private domain? If so, he has carried from a private domain into a public domain and is liable?

Or

perhaps

we follow the point of exit,

the place where the urine leaves the body, namely, the opening of his organ, which is in the public domain. If so, there is no transfer from a private domain into a public domain, and he is exempt?

And we conclude:

Teyku! The question remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, one may not spit. Rabbi Yehuda says:

Even once his spittle has been detached in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits until he spits it out.

We inquire concerning this: Did Rabbi Yehuda say that as soon as the spittle has become detached from his mouth,

even though he has not manipulated it,

that is, he has not moved the spittle around inside his mouth, it is considered detached, and he violates the prohibition of transferring it from one domain to another on Shabbat?

But we learned

in tractate Kelim:

If one was eating a fig cake

of crushed and stuck-together figs of teruma

with impure hands,

hands that he had not washed with water—and the Sages decreed that they have the status of second-degree ritual impurity and would invalidate teruma if he did not wash his hands—

and he inserted

the hand with which he was eating the teruma fig cake

into his mouth to remove the splinter,

a piece of wood or stone that was in his mouth, and his impure hand touched the teruma fig cake.

Rashi. Tosafot wrote in the chapter beginning Haya that the case may even involve non-sacred food, since the hands have second-degree ritual impurity and render the spittle, which is a liquid, first-degree ritual impurity, and it then renders the fig cake impure. Even non-sacred food can have second-degree ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir renders the fig cake impure,

even though the fig cake had never come into contact with water or any other liquid—and food does not contract ritual impurity until it has first undergone hekhshēr, meaning that liquid has previously come upon it.

For it had undergone hekhshēr through the spittle in his mouth, which has the status of a liquid.

And Rabbi Yosei declares it pure.

In his view, as long as the spittle has not left the mouth, it is not considered a liquid; rather, it is like part of the person’s body and cannot effect hekhshēr.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he

manipulated it

in his mouth in order to expel it—

the fig cake is impure,

because once the spittle is intended to be expelled from the mouth, it is considered a liquid and can effect hekhshēr.

But if he

did not manipulate it—

the fig cake is pure,

because the spittle is still not considered a liquid.

Thus, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the spittle is considered detached from the body specifically when he has manipulated it, whereas in our Mishna Rabbi Yehuda does not distinguish between whether he manipulated it and whether he did not?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: The positions have been reversed!

Rabbi Yehuda reversed his position and retracted his earlier statement. [As explained in tractate Kelim, even when he has not manipulated it, it is impure.]

This is implied by the conclusion below, which establishes that the original answer is the more satisfactory one. Reish Lakish said: Do not reverse the positions.

With regard to ordinary spittle, Rabbi Yehuda indeed holds that it is considered a liquid only when he has manipulated it.

Here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing?

With phlegm,

the mucus expelled from the body through coughing, which is considered a liquid even if he has not manipulated it.

And we challenge this:

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Phlegm that has become detached—

he may not walk four cubits until he spits it out.

Does this not mean that “phlegm and it became detached” are two separate matters? And this is what it is saying:

Phlegm, and likewise

Phlegm, and likewise

spittle that has become detached.

Thus, with regard to spittle as well, detachment alone is sufficient according to Rabbi Yehuda, even though he has not manipulated it?

For if “became detached” referred to the phlegm, it should have said: “Phlegm that became detached.” Furthermore, ordinary phlegm is detached, so it would not have been necessary to say “and became detached.” Torah Chaim. And we answer:

No!

Rather, it is a single expression. And this is what Rabbi Yehuda is saying:

Phlegm that has become detached.

The challenge nevertheless remains:

But it was explicitly taught

as follows:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Phlegm that has become detached, and likewise his spittle that has become detached—

he may not walk four cubits until he spits it out.

It clearly teaches two separate matters.

And we conclude:

Rather, it is clear as we answered initially,

that the positions have been reversed.

Reish Lakish said: One who coughs up phlegm,

that is, one who coughs and expels mucus,

in the presence of his teacher—

is liable to death

at the hands of Heaven.

As it is stated

in Proverbs, where the Torah speaks about itself:

“All who hate Me

love death.”

That is, those who cause hatred of God are liable to death.

Do not read, “those who hate Me,”

those who hate Me,

but rather, “those who cause Me to be hated,”

those who cause others to hate Me by desecrating the honor of the Torah through their reprehensible character traits, doing things that make them repulsive in the eyes of those greater than they.

And we challenge this:

But he is compelled,

since the coughing comes upon him involuntarily; why should he be liable to death for it?

And we answer:

We are speaking of coughing up phlegm and spitting.

He is not compelled with regard to the spitting; rather, he should have moved away from his teacher and spat the mucus there, or swallowed it into his garment.

Mishna:

A person may not stand in a private domain and drink

in the public domain by extending his neck into the public domain and drinking there from a vessel.

Likewise, he may not stand

in the public domain and drink in a private domain,

due to a decree lest he bring the vessel from the domain where he is drinking to the domain in which he is standing.

Unless he inserts his head and the majority of his body into the place where he is drinking.

And likewise in a winepress,

where grapes are trodden in order to make wine. This will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We inquire concerning this:

The first clause,

according to

the Rabbis, and the

whereas

the latter clause—

is Rabbi Meir

?

The previous Mishna, which permits one to stand in one domain and handle an object in another domain, without issuing a decree lest he bring the object into the domain in which he is located, follows the opinion of the Rabbis. Whereas our Mishna, which prohibits drinking in another domain due to such a decree, follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

And we find that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir dispute this matter below, in the Mishna [101a], with regard to a key.

The Maharsha raised a difficulty: Above, the Gemara concludes that the latter clause is Rabbi Meir and the first clause is the Rabbis. According to Rashi there, this is understandable, since this is said specifically with regard to Mishnayot that are far removed from one another, and not with regard to adjacent Mishnayot. But according to Tosafot there, who maintain that even within a single Mishna we establish the first clause according to the Rabbis and the latter clause according to Rabbi Meir, what is the difficulty here? He answers that above there is no legal contradiction between the latter clause and the first clause; rather, the first clause was stated by the Rabbis and the latter clause by Rabbi Meir. Here, however, the Mishnayot contradict one another with regard to the law. Rashi explains that it is impossible to say that drinking in our Mishna is prohibited because of carrying from one domain to another, as in the case of urinating and spitting. In the case of urinating and spitting, he removes the substance from one domain and places it in another. This is not so in the case of drinking, since his neck is in the same domain in which he is drinking, and the water comes to rest immediately in his mouth; consequently, the removal and the placement both took place in the same domain.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said:

We are dealing with objects that he needs;

and

therefore, our Mishna

is according to everyone,

for even the Rabbis agree that it is prohibited to stand in one domain and handle objects in another domain when he needs those objects, since there is greater concern that he will bring them to himself. The drinks that a person is consuming are also needed by him, and therefore a decree must be issued lest he bring them from the domain where he is drinking to the domain in which he is standing.

They raised a dilemma before them: What is the status of a karmelit?

Is it permitted to stand in a karmelit and drink in a private domain or in a public domain?

Abaye said:

It is the same!

Just as it is prohibited to stand in the public domain and drink in a private domain, or the reverse, so too it is prohibited to stand in a karmelit and drink in a private domain or in a public domain.

Rava said:

There is no prohibition in the case of a karmelit.

For

it itself is a decree:

The transfer of an object from a private domain or a public domain into a karmelit is itself prohibited only by rabbinic decree, as a safeguard lest one transfer an object from a private domain into a public domain.

And shall we arise and issue a decree

prohibiting drinking in a karmelit due to bringing the vessel there from another domain, which is

a decree safeguarding a decree?

Abaye said: From where do I say this,

that it is prohibited even in a karmelit?