Eruvin 94a — the Talmud in English

A. Utensils that spent the onset of Shabbat in a courtyard may be carried in both courtyards, even if the wall was breached while it was still day, since the courtyard was not breached toward a place that is forbidden to it. For Shmuel follows his own reasoning, that even if each courtyard made an eruv for itself, it is permitted to carry utensils that spent the onset of Shabbat in a courtyard from one courtyard to another.

B. As for household utensils, since during part of Shabbat [before the wall fell] it was permitted to carry them in each courtyard separately, we say: Since it was permitted at the onset of Shabbat, it remains permitted.

And therefore:

this one

that is in one courtyard

may carry

them

until the foundation of the partition. That is to say: until the place where the partition had originally stood—as it had been permitted at the beginning of Shabbat.

And

this one

also

that is in the other courtyard

may carry until the foundation of the partition.

If the wall was breached while it was still day, and one comes to take something out from the house into the courtyard, it is forbidden even according to Shmuel, since once the two courtyards have been breached into one another, it is comparable to a single courtyard that did not make an eruv.

And we explain:

And this statement of Rav—

was not stated explicitly

as a formal statement.

Rather, by inference

from the incident that occurred

it was stated

[we learned it]:

For Rav and Shmuel were sitting

on Shabbat

in that courtyard

that had made an eruv between itself and itself, but had not made an eruv with its fellow courtyard.

The wall fell

[the partition]

that was between them

[that was between the two courtyards].

Shmuel said to them: Take a cloak, spread it

[an expression related to “wall”]

over it!

Take a cloak and spread it between the two courtyards, so that it will serve as a partition for them [and he explains this below].

Rav turned his face away from them

[Rav turned his face away, that is, he was displeased], for he held that it was forbidden to carry in the courtyard the cloak with which it had been provided.

Shmuel said to them: If Father is particular

[this is Rav’s name],

take his belt from him

[take Rav’s belt]

and tie it with it

[tie the partition with it].

Thus we see that Rav’s view does not agree that one may carry in the courtyard, as we said.

And we raise a difficulty:

But according to Shmuel, why do I need this

partition that he said should be made?

Did he not say: This one may carry until the foundation of the partition

that had been there before it fell, and

this one may carry until the foundation of the partition,

and the partition itself is entirely unnecessary?!

And we explain:

Shmuel made

a partition

merely for modesty!

merely for privacy!

And now we raise a difficulty:

And Rav—who turned his face away and said nothing—

if he holds that it is forbidden

to carry with it,

let him say to them

[perhaps it should read: “to him,” namely, to the residents of the courtyard] explicitly?!

And we answer:

It was Shmuel’s

[his place]

domain

. “In the place of a great man, a person should not instruct others in practice, even to be stringent, since he is not greater than he.”

And we ask:

If so, for what reason did Rav turn his face

away

from them,

since they were acting according to the law, following their master?

And we answer: In order

that people should not say

that Rav too

holds like Shmuel

.

Mishna:

A courtyard

that was enclosed by partitions on its four sides,

which was breached toward the public domain

adjacent to it, and the breach extended along the entire width of that side.

Or the breach was more than ten cubits.

Then

one who brings

an object

from within it

[from the courtyard breached toward the public domain, which is considered like it]

into the private domain

or

brings an object

from the private domain into it—

is liable,

because this courtyard has the status of the public domain, and he has thus taken from one domain to another—

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Gemara explains this.

And the Sages say:

One who brings

from it into the public domain

or into the private domain,

or from the public domain

or the private domain

into it—

is exempt,

but it is forbidden,

because it is like a karmelit.

And the Gemara will explain what they are saying and over what they disagree.

Gemara:

It enters our mind that the reason of Rabbi Eliezer, who considers the courtyard in which a wall was breached to be like the public domain, as though it too were the public domain, despite the fact that it is still enclosed by three complete partitions, is that this concerns a place where the public would regularly carry on their activities. Therefore this courtyard is considered the “holes of the public domain” [like a wall adjacent to the public domain that contains holes. Rashi above, page 87b], which are like the public domain where their use is convenient.

In any event, we ask:

And Rabbi Eliezer—

how does he give this courtyard the status of the public domain?

Is it because

it was breached

on one of its sides

toward the public domain, it thereby becomes

for that reason

the public domain?!

But it is not a place of the public, and any place that is not made available to the public, even if it is a complete thoroughfare, does not have the status of the public domain [Ritva. See also Tosafot].

And we answer:

No,

indeed this courtyard is properly made available to the public.

And

Rabbi Eliezer follows his own reasoning, as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: When the public selected a path for themselves,

even though it did not belong to them—

what they selected, they selected!

And we ask:

Is that so?

How is it possible to say as you have said, that the public may select for themselves a path that does not belong to them?

But Rav Giddel said that Rav said

in explaining this beraita:

And this is when a path that they had

had

in

the north or in the south of

that field

was lost to them. Only then do we say that if they selected another path for themselves in place of the path that was lost to them, what they selected is theirs.

But to take a path that is not theirs, certainly we do not say so!

And if you would say

that Rabbi Eliezer also did not say that the entire courtyard should be the public domain,

rather,

here too we are dealing with a case, for example, in which a path was lost to them

to the public

in that courtyard. And, for example, the place where the partition had originally stood was forgotten, and the members of the public domain dispute with the owner of the courtyard where the first partition’s place was, since it is not now recognizable, while the owner of the courtyard says that they are walking inside their partition.

And since the owner of the courtyard has no proof, whereas they have in the courtyard “financial standing,” a monetary connection, for it is uncertain, if they selected a path for themselves, they acquired it, since they are the public. [Ritva in his understanding of Rashi.]

If so, only that place where the partition was breached, concerning which the members of the public domain claim rights of passage, has the status of the public domain, since the public now passes through it and it is a place made available to them [this interpretation will be further explained below].

It is impossible to say this. For

Rabbi Hanina said:

Only within the courtyard,

until the place of the partition—

only there is

a dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer, with the Sages holding that it is not the public domain but a karmelit.

But the place of the breached partition itself—even according to the Sages—is the public domain.

And since this is so, it necessarily follows that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that even inside the courtyard it is the public domain. Thus the difficulty returns to its place: how do the public have a right inside the courtyard?

And we answer: It can properly be said that Rabbi Eliezer speaks only of the place of the breached partition. And

say

this

:

Concerning the place of the partition—it is

the

dispute

of the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer whether it is the public domain.

And according to what has now been said, that only the place of the partition is the public domain according to Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara retracts the assumption that the breach extended along its entire width [or was more than ten cubits] and that the place of the breach was enclosed by three partitions.

Rather, what are we dealing with here? With a case in which at the two ends of the breach, to the right and left of the thickness of the partition that had been there, nothing at all remained of the two partitions on its sides. And this entire place of the breached partition is not within the remaining partitions [the wording of Tosafot].

Therefore, the place of the breach of the partition has the status of a complete public domain, since this place is not enclosed by partitions at all.

And we do not arrive at this because of the holes of the public domain.

And if you wish, say:

This is how the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages should be explained:

We are speaking of the place of the partition, as we said, that the entire place was breached, and it has no partitions at all.

However, this courtyard did not contain a complete thoroughfare for the public that they had taken without the owner’s permission. Rather, the public would sometimes walk there with the owner’s permission. Therefore, the place of the breached partition has the status of the “sides of the public domain.”

And Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages

in the sides of the public domain,

such as this,

disagree:

For Rabbi Eliezer holds: The sides of the public domain—

are like the public domain.

And the Sages hold: The sides of the public domain—

are not like the public domain.

And we ask:

Let Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree

in the ordinary sides of the public domain,

where stakes and large stones are set close to the walls of courtyards situated beside the public domain, so that the walls will not be damaged by the wagons passing through the public domain.

And the place between them and the wall is called “the sides of the public domain.”

And we answer:

If they had disagreed about the ordinary sides of the public domain, we would have said

that

when the Sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer

and hold that it is not the public domain—

that applies only where there are posts

[those stakes and stones adjacent to the public domain], since, because there is a separation between the public domain and the sides of the public domain, the people of the public domain do not enter there directly.

But where there are no posts,

as in the case of our Mishna—

say that they agree with him

with Rabbi Eliezer that it is the public domain.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that the Sages disagree in every circumstance.

And the Gemara is astonished at what we explained [both according to the first formulation and according to the second formulation], that Rabbi Eliezer disagreed only concerning the place of the partition:

But “a courtyard that was breached toward the public domain—one who brings

from it

into the private domain, or from the private domain into it, is liable,”

he says

Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna. This implies that according to Rabbi Eliezer the entire courtyard is the public domain, and not only the place of the partition?!

And we answer:

Since the Sages said

“from it

into the public domain, or from the public domain into it, he is exempt,”

he too said “from it.”

And “from it” that Rabbi Eliezer said means: from the place of the partition [Gaon Yaakov].

We raise another difficulty concerning the wording in which the Sages said, “from it” into the private domain, or from the private domain “into it,” he is exempt:

And the Sages—what is the meaning of their wording?

But

Rabbi Eliezer said

that

the sides of the public domain—

that is, the place of the partition—is the public domain,

and

if so, how

did they answer him

[the Sages] that one who throws

from it

is exempt but it is forbidden? Rabbi Eliezer did not speak at all about the “inside” of the courtyard.

—the Sages

And we answer, according to the second formulation:

This is what the Sages say to Rabbi Eliezer: Do you not concede to us that where one carries from the inside of the courtyard into the public domain, and from the public domain into its inside, he is exempt because it is a karmelit?!

And the Ritva explained in the name of Tosafot: “Do you not concede that the inside of the entire courtyard, which is very far from the public domain, is not considered the public domain, even if no partitions remained there at all, analogous to this partition that was breached [but is a karmelit, since it has no partitions]?”

And if so,

the sides of the public domain

are likewise no different.

If so,

And we explain:

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who distinguishes between them, holds:

There,

inside the courtyard,

the public do not tread upon it.

But here,

at the place of the partition,

the public do tread upon it,

and this too is included in the public domain.

Mishna:

A courtyard that was breached

on Shabbat

toward the public domain

[the early authorities did not have “the public domain” in the Mishna, and this also appears to be Rashi’s version; however, Rashi explains that it was breached toward the public domain]

from two of its sides,

in such a manner that had it been breached in this way before Shabbat—as the Gemara explains it—it would have been forbidden to carry in it four cubits.

And likewise a house whose two sides were breached,

as the Gemara explains.

And likewise an alleyway—

in which it is forbidden to carry without the correction of a side-post or a crossbeam, as was explained at the beginning of the tractate—

whose

crossbeam or side-post

was removed

on Shabbat

from its crossbeam or side-post

[Rashi’s version, and so it is in the Gemara]—

are permitted on that Shabbat,

because we say: “Since it was permitted at the onset of Shabbat, it remains permitted!”

And they are forbidden for the future,

on the following Shabbat,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei says: If they are permitted

for that Shabbat—

they are permitted for the future.

And if they are forbidden for the future—

they are forbidden on that Shabbat!

That is to say: Just as they are forbidden for the future, so are they forbidden today.

That is: Just as they are forbidden in the future, so too they are forbidden today.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A courtyard that was breached toward the public domain from two of its sides:

And we ask: It implies that because it was breached from two of its sides, it is fit to become forbidden.

If it was breached from only one side, it is permitted, even for the future.

With what are we dealing? If you say

that a breach was made in it

in

a width of up to

ten

cubits—

what is different

about its being breached

from one side,

so that it does not become forbidden, because

he says

[as in: we say]

“it is an entrance,”

and it is considered as though it had not been breached.

But even if it was breached

from two sides, up to ten cubits on each side, one opposite the other,

also

let us say

“it is an entrance,”

it

and let it be permitted, for a courtyard does not become forbidden when it has two entrances!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that our Mishna is speaking of a case in which it was breached

by more than ten

cubits.

cubits.

and let it be permitted, since a courtyard does not become forbidden when it has two entrances!

Rather, perhaps you will say that our Mishna is dealing with a case in which it was breached

by more than ten

cubits.

This too is difficult, for

if so, even

if breached

from one side

alone

as well

the courtyard should be forbidden.

He said

he explains

Rav: always,

that a breach was made in it

to a

width of up to

ten

cubits.