Eruvin 94a (צד.) — the Talmud in English

A. Utensils that spent Shabbat in a courtyard may be carried throughout both courtyards, even if the wall was breached before Shabbat, since the courtyard was not breached toward a place that is forbidden to it. This is because Shmuel follows his own reasoning: even if each courtyard made an eruv separately, utensils that spent Shabbat in a courtyard may be carried from one courtyard to the other.

B. As for household utensils, since at some point during Shabbat [before the wall fell] they were permitted to be carried within each courtyard separately, we say: Once Shabbat permitted it, it remains permitted.

Therefore:

this

one that is in one courtyard

may carry

them

up to the base of the partition.

That is, up to the place where the partition had originally stood—just as it was permitted at the onset of Shabbat.

And

also

this

one that is in the other courtyard

may carry up to the base of the partition.

If the wall was breached before Shabbat, and one comes to take something from the house into the courtyard, it is forbidden even according to Shmuel, since once the two courtyards were breached into one another, this courtyard is comparable to a courtyard without an eruv.

And we explain:

and this statement of Rav—

was not explicitly stated

as a formal dictum.

Rather, it was inferred

from the incident that occurred;

it was stated [

we learned it]:

For Rav and Shmuel were sitting

on Shabbat

in that courtyard

which had made an eruv for itself but had not made an eruv with the other courtyard.

The wall fell [

the partition]

between them [

between the two courtyards].

Shmuel said to them: Take a cloak and draw it [

a term related to “wall”]

across it!

Take a cloak and spread it between the two courtyards to serve as a partition for them [as the Gemara explains shortly].

Rav turned his face away from them [

Rav turned his face away, meaning that he objected], since he thought that it was forbidden to carry in the courtyard the cloak with which the partition had been made.

Shmuel said to them: If Father objects [

this was Rav’s name],

take his belt [

take Rav’s belt]

and tie it to it [

tie the partition with it].

Thus we see that Rav did not agree that one may carry in the courtyard, as we stated.

And we ask:

But according to Shmuel, why do I need this

partition that he instructed them to make?

He said: This one may carry up to the base of the partition

that stood before it fell,

and this one may carry up to the base of the partition,

so the partition itself is entirely unnecessary!

And we explain:

Shmuel made

the partition

merely for privacy!

Now we ask:

And Rav—

who turned his face away but said nothing—

if he holds that it is forbidden

to carry with it,

let him say to them [

perhaps the text should read: “to him,” meaning to the members of the courtyard] explicitly!

And we answer:

His place [

his locality]

belonged to Shmuel. “In the locality of a great man, a person should not instruct others through action, even to be stringent, since he is not greater than him” [Ritva; see further there].

And we ask:

And we ask:

If so, why did Rav turn

his face

away, since they were acting properly according to their master?

And we answer: In order

not

to let people say

that Rav too

held like Shmuel.

Mishna:

A courtyard

that was enclosed by partitions on all four sides

that was breached toward the public domain

adjacent to it, and the breach extended across the entire width of that side,

or the breach was more than ten cubits.

Then

one who brings

an object

from it [

from the courtyard breached toward the public domain, which is considered equivalent to it]

into the private domain,

or

brings an object

from the private domain into it—

is liable,

because this courtyard has the status of the public domain, and he has therefore carried from one domain to another—

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara explains his statement.

And the Sages say:

One who brings

from it into the public domain

or into the private domain,

or from the public domain

or the private domain

into it—

is exempt,

but it is forbidden,

because it is like a karmelit.

The Gemara will explain what they are saying and on what they disagree.

Gemara:

The initial assumption is that Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for considering a courtyard whose wall was breached to be like the public domain, even though it is still enclosed by three complete partitions, is that this was a place where the public regularly carried on their activities. Therefore, this courtyard is considered one of the “recesses of the public domain” [like a wall adjacent to the public domain that contains cavities; Rashi above, page 87b], which are treated like the public domain when their use is convenient.

Nevertheless, we ask:

But Rabbi Eliezer—

how can he give this courtyard the status of the public domain?

Is it that

because it was breached

on one of its sides

toward the public domain, it thereby becomes

for that reason

the public domain?!

But it is not a place belonging to the public, and any place that is not designated for public use, even if it is a completely unobstructed thoroughfare, does not have the status of the public domain [Ritva; see also Tosafot].

And we answer:

No,

indeed this courtyard is properly designated for public use.

And

Rabbi Eliezer follows his own reasoning, as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: If the public selected a path for themselves,

even though it did not belong to them—

what they selected, they selected!

And we ask:

Is that so?

How is it possible to say, as you have said, that the public may select for themselves a path that does not belong to them?

But Rav Giddel said that Rav said

in explanation of this beraita:

And this is only when they had lost a path

that had belonged to them

in

the north or south of

that field.

Only then do we say that if they selected another path in place of the path they had lost, they have selected it.

But we certainly do not say that they may take a path that does not belong to them!

And if you would say

that Rabbi Eliezer likewise did not say that the entire courtyard is the public domain,

rather,

here too, we are dealing with a case in which they had lost

the public

a path in that courtyard.

For example, the place where the partition had originally stood was forgotten, and the members of the public domain dispute with the courtyard’s owner where the first partition had been, since it is no longer recognizable; the owner says that they are walking inside the boundary of his partition.

Since the courtyard’s owner has no proof, while they have a “monetary claim” in the courtyard—a financial connection, since the matter is uncertain—if they selected a path for themselves, they acquired it, since they are the public. [Ritva in his understanding of Rashi.]

If so, only the place where the partition was breached, concerning which the members of the public domain claim rights of passage, has the status of the public domain, since many people now pass through it and it is a place designated for their use [this formulation will be explained further below].

This cannot be said. For

Rabbi Hanina said:

Only within the courtyard,

up to the place of the partition—

only there is there

a dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer, with the Sages holding that it is not the public domain but a karmelit.

But the place of the breached partition itself is the public domain even according to the Sages.

Since this is so, Rabbi Eliezer must necessarily disagree and hold that even inside the courtyard it is the public domain. The question therefore returns to its place: How do the public have rights within the courtyard?

And we answer: It can indeed be said that Rabbi Eliezer is speaking only about the place of the breached partition. And

say

this:

Concerning the place of the partition—

there is

a dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer as to whether it is the public domain.

According to what has now been said—that only the place of the partition is the public domain according to Rabbi Eliezer—the Gemara retracts its assumption that the breach extended across its entire width [or was more than ten cubits] and that the place of the breach was enclosed by three partitions.

Rather, what are we dealing with here? A case in which, at both ends of the breach, to the right and left of the thickness of the former partition, none of the two adjoining partitions remained at all. Thus, the entire place of this breached partition is outside the remaining partitions [the wording of Tosafot].

Therefore, the place of the breach has the status of the full-fledged public domain, since this place is not enclosed by partitions at all.

And we do not arrive at this conclusion on account of the recesses of the public domain.

Alternatively,

this is how the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages may be explained:

They are speaking about the place of the partition, as we said: that entire place was breached and has no partitions at all.

However, this courtyard had not been a full-fledged public thoroughfare that the public had appropriated without the owner’s permission. Rather, people sometimes walked there with the courtyard owner’s permission. Therefore, the place of the breached partition has the status of the “sides of the public domain.”

And Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages—

with regard to the sides of the public domain,

in a case such as this,

disagree:

Rabbi Eliezer holds: The sides of the public domain—

are treated like the public domain.

And the Rabbis hold: The sides of the public domain—

are not treated like the public domain.

And we ask:

Let Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree

with regard to

the ordinary sides of the public domain,

where stakes and large stones are placed alongside the walls of courtyards adjacent to the public domain, so that the walls will not be damaged by wagons passing through the public domain.

The place between these objects and the wall is called “the sides of the public domain.”

And we answer:

If they had disagreed with regard to the ordinary sides of the public domain, we would have said

that

when the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer,

holding that it is not the public domain,

that applies only where there are stakes [

those stakes and stones adjacent to the public domain], since the separation between the public domain and its sides prevents people from entering there directly.

But where there are no stakes,

as in the case of our Mishna,

say that they agree with him

that it is the public domain.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that the Sages disagree in every circumstance.

The Gemara is astonished at what we explained [according to both the first and the second formulations], namely, that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees only with regard to the place of the partition:

But the Mishna says: “A courtyard that was breached toward the public domain—one who brings

from it

from within it

into the private domain, or from the private domain into it, is liable,”

he said

this in the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer. This implies that according to Rabbi Eliezer the entire courtyard is the public domain, and not only the place of the partition?!

And we answer:

Since the Rabbis said

“from within it

into the public domain, or from the public domain into it, he is exempt,”

he too said “from within it.”

And “from within it,” as Rabbi Eliezer said, means from within the place of the partition [Gaon Ya'akov].

We raise another difficulty concerning the wording in which the Sages said, “from within it” into the private domain, or from the private domain “into it,” he is exempt:

And the Rabbis—

what is the meaning of their wording?

For

Rabbi Eliezer said that

the

sides of the public domain—

that is, the place of the partition—have the status of the public domain,

and

if so, how did they

answer

him,

they themselves [

the Sages], that one who throws

from within it

is exempt but it is forbidden? Rabbi Eliezer was not speaking at all about the “inside” of the courtyard.

And we answer, according to the second formulation:

This is what the Sages say to Rabbi Eliezer: Do you not concede to us that when one carries from within the courtyard into the public domain, or from the public domain into it, he is exempt because it is a karmelit?!

Ritva explained in the name of Tosafot: “Do you not concede that the interior of the entire courtyard, which is far from the public domain, is not considered the public domain, even if no partitions remained there at all, just like this breached partition [but is a karmelit, since it has no partitions]?”

And if so,

the sides

of the public domain

are no different either.

inside the courtyard,

And we explain:

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who distinguishes between them, holds:

There,

inside the courtyard,

the public does not tread there.

But

here,

at the place of the partition,

the public does tread there,

and this too is included in the public domain.

Mishna:

A courtyard that was breached

on Shabbat

toward the public domain [the early authorities did not have “the public domain” in the Mishna, and this also appears to be Rashi’s version, although Rashi explains it as having been breached toward the public domain]

on two of its sides,

in such a manner that if it had been breached in this way before Shabbat—as the Gemara explains—it would have become forbidden to carry within it four cubits.

And likewise a house whose two sides were breached,

as the Gemara explains.

And likewise a mavoi—

in which it is forbidden to carry without a corrective feature, a side-post or crossbeam, as explained at the beginning of the tractate—

whose

crossbeam or side-post

was removed

on Shabbat

[Rashi’s version, and this is also the version in the Gemara]—

are permitted on that Shabbat,

because we say: “Once Shabbat permitted it, it remains permitted!”

But they are forbidden thereafter,

on the following Shabbat,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei says: If they are permitted

on

that Shabbat—

they are permitted thereafter.

And if they are forbidden thereafter—

they are forbidden on that Shabbat as well!

That is: Just as they are forbidden thereafter, so are they forbidden today.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A courtyard that was breached toward the public domain on two of its sides:

And we ask: This implies that because it was breached on two of its sides, it is fit to become forbidden.

But if it was breached on only one side, it is permitted, even thereafter.

What are we dealing with?

If you say

that a breach was made in it

to

a width of up to

ten

cubits—

what is the difference

if it was breached

on one side, so that it does not become forbidden, because

it is said

“it is an entrance”

—

and it is considered as though it had not been breached.

But even if it was breached

on two sides,

up to ten cubits on each side, opposite one another,

also

let us say

that

“it is an entrance”

itself,

and let it be permitted, since a courtyard does not become forbidden when it has two entrances!

Rather, perhaps you will say that our Mishna is dealing with a case in which it was breached

by more than ten

cubits.

This too is difficult, for

if so, even

if it was breached

on one side

alone,

too

the courtyard should be prohibited.

He said:

He explains:

in fact,

that a breach was made in it

of

a width of up to

ten

cubits.