Eruvin 92a (צב.) — the Talmud in English

Who said that Rabbi Yohanan said this:

that courtyards are one domain, even when they made an eruv [as above, page 91a]?

But Rabbi Yohanan said

as a general principle:

The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

And

did we not

learn in the Mishna: If a wall between two courtyards is ten

handbreadths high and

four

handbreadths wide, they

may establish

the courtyards

two

eruvin, but they may not carry from one to the other.

And they may not establish

one eruv

to permit carrying even from one to the other.

And if

there were on top of it—

of this wall, which was four handbreadths wide—

produce:

These

people in one courtyard

go up from here and eat.

And these

in the other courtyard

go up from here and eat.

And

provided that they do not lower

the produce

below,

because the wall is jointly owned by the two courtyards, whereas the courtyards themselves are each a separate domain.

The difficulty now is: If the courtyards are one domain, why is it prohibited to lower something from the wall—which is [like] a courtyard—to the courtyard below it?!

You must therefore say that the case is one in which each courtyard established an eruv separately. Consequently, it is prohibited to lower something from the wall to the courtyard, as we decree lest one carry utensils that had rested in the houses up onto the wall, or lest one bring into the houses produce that had rested on the wall [according to Rabbenu Yehonatan, above, page 24a of the pages of the Rif].

We thus see from the unattributed Mishna that when each courtyard established an eruv for itself, we decree [against this], and it is prohibited to carry from one courtyard to the other even utensils that had rested in that courtyard, contrary to Rabbi Yohanan?!

And we reject this: Rabbi Yohanan, who does not issue such a decree, explains the Mishna as follows:

What does “

provided that they do not lower

below” mean?

Below, into the houses

in the courtyards. Since it is prohibited to bring something from a shared courtyard into the houses when the residents of the two courtyards did not establish a joint eruv.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

But Rabbi Hiyya taught

in a

beraita: “Provided that one may not be standing in his place”

on the floor of the courtyard

and eating

from the produce brought to him from the top of the wall,

but

not

standing in his place

and

eating.

This proves that it is prohibited to lower [the produce] even into the courtyard itself!

He said to him,

Rav Ashi to Ravina:

But

if

Rabbi did not teach

this Mishna in the form in which Rabbi Hiyya taught it in our Mishna [and he certainly did not agree with him; for had he agreed with him, he would have explained it accordingly—Ritva], then

Rabbi Hiyya,

Rabbi’s student—

from where did he derive

this interpretation?!

Rather, in fact, the interpretation of the Mishna—for Rabbi Yohanan and for Shmuel—is as we explained it: “provided that they do not lower it below”—into the houses!

It was stated:

There are two courtyards and one ruin

[which is not open to the public domain and is itself permitted for carrying]

between them.

If it happened that

one

of the courtyards

established an eruv

for itself, and utensils from the houses are commonly found in that courtyard,

while

the other

one

of the courtyards

did not establish an eruv

for itself, and utensils from the houses are not commonly found there:

Rav Huna said: They assign it—

the ruin between the two courtyards—

to the one that did not establish an eruv.

That is, carrying to the ruin and from it to the courtyard that did not establish an eruv is permitted.

The reason is that a courtyard and a ruin are one domain. However, if utensils from the houses are commonly found in the courtyard, Rav Huna holds like Rav that carrying from one domain to another is prohibited by rabbinic decree.

Therefore, the courtyard that did not establish an eruv, in which there are no utensils from the houses, is permitted for carrying to and from the ruin.

But the courtyard that established an eruv, in which there are utensils from the houses, is not assigned the ruin, since carrying to and from the ruin is prohibited for it, due to the decree concerning the carrying of utensils from the houses.

And Hiyya bar Rav said,

in the name of his father,

Rav:

The ruin is assigned

even to the

courtyard

that established an eruv.

Hiyya bar Rav explains that Rav meant to say:

And both are prohibited!

For we decree that if they carry from the courtyard that did not establish an eruv to the ruin, perhaps they will also carry to it from the courtyard that did establish an eruv.

Hiyya bar Rav proves that this was indeed Rav’s intention, to prohibit both:

And if

[you were to say]

that

my father intended to say

“both are permitted,”

including the courtyard that established an eruv, then you must say that we do not issue any decree lest they carry even utensils from the houses.

If so, the difficulty is:

Why

does Rav hold, regarding two adjacent courtyards in which utensils from the houses are commonly found, that

the courtyard that did not establish an eruv may not be assigned to the courtyard that established an eruv?

That is: The residents of the courtyard that established an eruv are prohibited from carrying to the other courtyard, which did not establish an eruv [and the same applies to one that did establish an eruv], because of the decree lest they carry utensils from the houses from one courtyard to the other.

And if you say that Rav held, in the case of the ruin, that both are permitted, why did he prohibit it in the case of adjacent courtyards? According to your interpretation, Rav issued no decree! Rather, it is necessarily the case that in the matter of the ruin as well, Rav said that both are prohibited.

And we reject Hiyya bar Rav’s interpretation of Rav’s words:

In fact, I can say that Rav intended to permit both, and even the courtyard that established an eruv is permitted to carry to the ruin.

Although, in the ordinary case of two courtyards, if one courtyard established an eruv it is prohibited to carry to the courtyard that did not establish an eruv, here it is different, because even the courtyard that established an eruv is permitted to carry to the ruin.

And the reason is:

There,

in the ordinary case of two adjacent courtyards,

since the utensils of the houses are guarded

[the utensils of the houses are kept in the courtyard; Rashi’s wording somewhat indicates that the words “of the houses” should be omitted]

in the courtyard

to which one carries, since that courtyard is suitable for guarding utensils and people customarily bring many utensils into it—

it may happen

that they will err and

carry out

the utensils from the houses to the other courtyard as well [according to the implication of Rashi; the Ritva cites another explanation].

But

here, in the ruin—

which is the case under discussion, in which it is prohibited to carry to it from the courtyard—

since utensils from the courtyard are not guarded in the ruin,

and it is not customary to bring many utensils into the ruin, even if they bring utensils into it,

it will not happen

that they will err and

carry out

the utensils from the houses to the ruin as well.

Some say

as follows:

Hiyya bar Rav said

in the name of Rav: The ruin is assigned

even to the

courtyard

that established an eruv.

Hiyya bar Rav explains it:

And both are permitted!

And if you say

that

both are prohibited

was Rav’s intention, and you can prove this as follows:

Since

Rav holds, in the ordinary case,

that the courtyard that did not establish an eruv may not be assigned to the courtyard that established an eruv, then he holds that we issue a decree, and the courtyard that established an eruv is prohibited. Therefore, since Rav equated the laws of the two courtyards, he must have meant that the other courtyard is also prohibited.

This is not so.

It is not so.

For only

there,

in the ordinary case of a courtyard, did Rav issue a decree,

since utensils from the houses are guarded in the courtyard.

Therefore,

the Sages did not permit carrying in them

because

it may lead to carrying out

the utensils from the houses to the other courtyard.

But in the ruin they are not guarded

there, and therefore we issue no decree.

Mishna:

A. Roofs or courtyards belonging to two people, with a partition between them—even if there is a breach in the partition—the owner of the roof or the owner of the courtyard may carry from his house to his roof or courtyard, and the other person does not prohibit this for him.

When does this apply? When this breach has the status of a “gateway,” meaning that it is less than ten cubits wide and there are gippufin [something resembling doorposts] on the sides of the breach.

But if there are no gippufin on the sides of the breach, or if it is ten cubits or wider, the place of the breach is not considered a “gateway,” but rather a “breach.” Therefore, it is prohibited to carry from the house to the roof or courtyard.

The reason is that once the two domains have been breached into one another, “all of them are like dwellings of a single domain” [see Rashi, page 76b, s.v. “more than this”]. Therefore, one who carries from the house to the roof or courtyard is like one who carries from his own house to a roof and courtyard jointly belonging to him and his fellow. It is prohibited to carry from one’s private domain to a shared domain until the residents of the shared domain establish an eruv among themselves.

This law applies even according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon at the beginning of our chapter, who hold that roofs are one domain.

For according to them as well, roofs are considered one domain only with regard to permitting the carrying of an object from one roof to another. But carrying an object from one’s house to his fellow’s roof is prohibited according to all opinions until they establish an eruv.

Therefore, if it happened that one’s roof was breached into his fellow’s roof, it is prohibited to carry from his house even to his own roof, since the breach causes his roof to be considered as though it were shared by him and his fellow.

B.

A large roof

[a wide one]

adjacent to a

roof

that is small

[narrow], with the large roof extending beyond the small one on both sides—even though they are breached into one another—

the large one is permitted

to have things carried to it from the house!

This is because we apply to the walls of the wide house that extend beyond the narrow house the principle of “extend and raise the partition,” and they become gippufin for the “breach” from the large roof to the small one. Its breach to the small roof is therefore not considered a breach, but a gateway.

But the small roof, which has no gippufin toward the large roof, has a full breach on one side toward the large roof, and this is considered a breach.

Therefore,

the small one is prohibited

from having things carried to it from the house.

[At the end of the Mishna it will be explained why the gippufin of the large roof do not also cause the small roof to be considered as having gippufin, even though they are outside it.]

As for why we do not apply to the house wall between the two roofs the principle “extend and raise the partition,” so that the roofs would not be breached into one another—Rav and Shmuel disputed this above, page 89b.

According to Rav: Because it is a partition that is not discernible to those standing on the roof, and therefore we do not apply “extend and raise” to it.

According to Shmuel: Because it is a trampled partition. The case is one in which there are residents on each roof who pass from one to the other, trampling upon and nullifying the imaginary partition created by “extend and raise.”

C. Likewise,

a large courtyard

[a wide one]

that was breached into a small one

[a narrow one], with the breach extending across the entire width of the small courtyard, while the partition of the large courtyard remains extended beyond the small one on both sides—

the large one is permitted

to have things carried to it from the house [and if it is a courtyard belonging to many people, this is permitted only if they established an eruv], since gippufin remain on its sides.

But the small one is prohibited,

since, with regard to the small one, whose gippufin did not remain, this is a “breach,” and the residents of the large courtyard prohibit the residents of the small courtyard from carrying, because, with regard to the small courtyard, their courtyard is a shared courtyard with the large one, since the small courtyard is breached in its entirety into the large courtyard.

Therefore, the small one is prohibited—

because it is like the gateway of the large one!

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna the laws of adjacent roofs and courtyards, each law separately.

And we raised a difficulty:

Why must

the tanna of the Mishna

teach two

laws, repeating the laws of a roof and a courtyard, when he could have taught them briefly as a single general rule? And we answer:

According to Rav—

who generally holds that one does not apply “extend and raise” to partitions that are not discernible—the reason it teaches both is to teach that

a roof is analogous to a courtyard.

Just as a courtyard

is speaking of a case in which

the partition is discernible, so too a roof

does not permit carrying on the large roof unless

the partition is discernible, meaning that the partitions surrounding the roof are discernible to those standing on the roof, since the roof does not extend beyond the width of the house below.

But if its partitions are not discernible, carrying throughout it is prohibited even within four cubits, since it is a domain without partitions—namely, a karmelit—because, according to Rav, it is impossible to apply “extend and raise.”

And

according to Shmuel—who disputes this generally and holds that one does apply “extend and raise” even to partitions that are not discernible—the reason it teaches both a roof and a courtyard is to teach that

a roof is analogous to a courtyard.

Just as a courtyard

is speaking of a case

that many people trample upon it

as they pass between one courtyard and the other,

so too a roof

—the reason the small roof is not permitted by the house partitions separating one house from the other is that

many people trample upon it,

and therefore it is not a partition separating the roofs.

Rabba, Rabbi Zeira, and Rabba bar Rav Hanan were sitting.

And Abaye was sitting with them.

And they sat and said: We can learn from the Mishna

which states: Because the small courtyard is like the gateway of the large one. Evidently, the entire small courtyard is treated as one gateway of the large one [Rashi]:

The residents

of the

large

courtyard are considered as though they “rule”

over the small one,

drawing it toward themselves.

But the residents of the small courtyard do not “rule”

over the large one. Rather, we consider the entire small courtyard as though it were within the large courtyard, just as a gateway is part of the large one; we do not consider the large courtyard as though it were within the small one.

How—in what matter does this principle find expression?

With regard to kilayim.

For if it happened that one planted

grapevines in the

courtyard

large

[and he is permitted to keep a distance of four cubits from the grapevines within the large courtyard and sow grain, and this does not constitute kilayim]—

he is prohibited

from

sowing the small one

with grain when it is breached in the manner described in our Mishna, if there are not four cubits from the place where the grapevines were planted to the gateway of the large courtyard, even though there are four cubits to the place where the grain is sown [Ritva].

And if he sowed

without keeping four cubits from the gateway of the large courtyard, the

seeds

of the grain are

prohibited

because of kilayei hakerem! For, with regard to the small courtyard in which the seeds are located, the matter is considered as though they had been sown as kilayim together with the grapevines in the large courtyard.