Eruvin 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

We raised this difficulty:

And according to what initially entered our minds:

that Rav Yehuda stated his ruling about a מבוי that terminates in a plaza in accordance with Shmuel. But Rav did not prohibit carrying in a מבוי that terminates in a courtyard because of the absence of an eruv. Rather, whether the residents of the courtyard joined with the residents of the מבוי in an eruv, or whether they did not join, it is prohibited to carry in the מבוי, because it is considered like a מבוי מפולש.

On the contrary, it initially entered our minds that, according to Rav, the absence of an eruv is not an issue, and

whether they joined in an eruv,

and there is no reason to judge it prohibited because it appears like a מבוי מפולש,

or whether they did not join in an eruv—

even if there was no breach directly opposite it—

Rav and Shmuel disagree

with regard to it:

If so,

when they joined in an eruv,

when Rav prohibits carrying because it is a מבוי מפולש, while Rav Yehuda permits it in the name of Shmuel—

about what do they disagree?

And likewise,

when they did not join in an eruv,

when Shmuel prohibits carrying—and as it initially entered our minds above, Rav Yehuda specifically said “a מבוי that terminates in a plaza”; but if it terminates in a courtyard, Shmuel would prohibit carrying, because the residents of the courtyard prohibit the residents of the מבוי from carrying unless they joined with them in an eruv—while Rav permits it, as he prohibited carrying only because it is a מבוי מפולש—

about what do they disagree?

And we explain:

When they did not join in an eruv—

they disagree with regard to

the opening that

is visible from outside but level with the interior.

This concerns an opening whose side-posts are visible from outside but are not visible from inside: is it considered an opening from the interior side as well, or not?

According to Rav, it is considered an opening from the interior side as well. Therefore, the courtyard and the מבוי remain two domains, each of which can establish an eruv independently, and the residents of the courtyard do not prohibit the residents of the מבוי from carrying into the מבוי.

And Shmuel requires the residents of the מבוי to join in a single eruv with the residents of the courtyard, because according to Shmuel these side-posts are considered, with regard to the residents of the מבוי, as though they do not exist; consequently, it is one domain that requires one eruv.

When they joined in an eruv—

they disagree—

Rav prohibits carrying because it appears like a מבוי מפולש, while Shmuel permits it—

in accordance with the statement of Rav Yosef!

As Rav Yosef said:

They taught

that a מבוי terminating in a plaza does not require a further correction

only

when it

terminates in the middle of the plaza,

so that there is room to turn to either side, on both sides of the מבוי. In such a case, it does not appear like a מבוי מפולש, since the width of the plaza extends beyond the width of the מבוי on both sides, and it appears that the מבוי terminates in the plaza rather than continuing to the public domain opposite it; consequently, people will not come to permit carrying in a מבוי מפולש. [See illustration 1]

But

if the

מבוי terminates

at the

side of the plaza,

so that on one side the wall of the מבוי continues together with the wall of the plaza until the public domain—

it is prohibited

to carry in the מבוי, because it appears like a מבוי מפולש. [See illustration 2]

And now, Rav and Shmuel disagree in accordance with Rav Yosef!

Rav, who prohibits carrying—even according to what initially entered our minds—even when the מבוי terminates in the middle of the courtyard, does not agree with Rav Yosef, who considers it to “appear like a מבוי מפולש” only when the wall of the מבוי actually continues together with the wall of the plaza or courtyard. According to Rav, since one standing in the מבוי sees only the public domain directly opposite him, and since many people pass through it, carrying is prohibited.

And Shmuel, who permits carrying when the מבוי terminates in the middle of a plaza, agrees with Rav Yosef!

Rabba said: When I said

that if the מבוי

terminates in the middle of a plaza, it is permitted, I said this only

when

this one

—the courtyard adjacent to the public domain—

was breached not directly opposite that one

—not directly opposite the מבוי itself; rather, the breach was in the wall that was “opposite it,” i.e., opposite the מבוי, as Rav said: “And a courtyard was breached opposite it.” [See illustration 1]

But

if

this one was breached directly opposite that one,

literally,

it is prohibited,

even though the מבוי terminates in the middle of the plaza! [See illustration 2]

Rav Mesharsheya said: When I said

that a מבוי terminating in a plaza, where the plaza is breached into the public domain,

this one not directly opposite that one is permitted

to carry in it—

I said this only

in a

public plaza. [See illustration 3]

See drawing 3]

But

in a

private plaza,

it is prohibited to carry in the מבוי.

Because

at times the owner of the plaza may decide

to turn it into a place without residences,

and build houses

in the plaza, in the vacant area alongside the מבוי.

And it would then be

through the houses, whose walls would continue along the walls of the מבוי,

like a מבוי that terminates at the side of a plaza, and it would be prohibited

to carry in it, even when its breach into the public domain is not aligned directly opposite the מבוי. \-

And that is what we said! [See illustration 4]

But with regard to a public plaza, we are not concerned that the public might change the plaza’s original designation.

And we explain:

And from where do you say that there is a distinction between a public plaza and a private plaza?

As Ravin bar Rav Adda said in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak: There was an incident involving a certain מבוי, one side of which was the sea,

whose bank was ten handbreadths high and therefore constituted a partition,

and one side of which was a refuse heap,

ten handbreadths high, which therefore constituted a partition. One end was closed, as with other enclosed meva’ot, and the other end was open to the public domain [the text was emended according to Rashi]. Thus, this מבוי was now like an ordinary enclosed מבוי with three partitions. [See illustration 5]

And the incident came before Rabbi

to ask him whether this מבוי could be permitted by means of a side-post or a crossbeam at its end that was open to the public domain,

but he said neither that it was permitted nor that it was prohibited.

And we explain Rabbi’s ruling:

The reason that he

did not state a prohibition

was

that there are now

three

partitions,

and it is like an ordinary מבוי that is permitted by means of a side-post or crossbeam.

However,

a permission

also

he did not state,

because

we are concerned that the

the

refuse heap may be removed

and the partition will be lacking, or

the sea may deposit sediment,

of sand and stones alongside its bank, turning it into solid ground; people would then walk there, and it would become a public domain—Rabbi Ḥananel.

We raise a difficulty concerning Rabbi’s ruling, in order to prove that there is a distinction between a public and a private domain:

Are we concerned that the refuse heap may be removed?!

But we learned: A refuse heap

that is situated

in the public domain,

and it is

ten

handbreadths high, so that the area above it is a private domain,

from the

window

of the house

that is above it,

the refuse heap,

one may throw into it

the refuse

on Shabbat!

For one would be throwing from a private domain into a private domain, through the airspace of the public domain above ten handbreadths, which is a place exempt from liability—Tosafot—and it is permitted. [See illustration 1]

And now this is difficult for Rabbi: We see from this Mishna that we are not concerned that the refuse heap may be removed, in which case one would be throwing from a private domain into a public domain?!

Evidently,

in order that this not be difficult for Rabbi, we say:

Distinguish;

one must differentiate

between a public refuse heap—

like that in the case of the window, where we are not concerned that it may be removed—

and a private refuse heap—

like that in Rabbi’s case, where the refuse heap belonged to a private individual and we are concerned that it may be removed!

Here too,

with regard to a plaza,

distinguish;

one must differentiate

between a public plaza and a private plaza—

as we said!

And we ask:

And what

did the Sages

say

about that מבוי whose one side terminated at a refuse heap, in the generation of Rabbi?

He

said plainly,

Rav Yosef bar Avdimi: A tanna

taught in a beraita:

And the Sages prohibit.

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Sages.

Some say

that this is what

Rav Yosef bar Avdimi said: A tanna taught: And the Sages permit.

And this is what

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Sages—

who permit carrying!

Mareimar would establish partitions for

—he would make partitions—

for

the meva’ot of

Sura—

which terminated on one side at the sea and on the opposite side at the public domain—

with nets

—nets and fishing traps—so that they would serve as the partitions of the מבוי. [See illustration 2] He did not rely on the sea as a partition, because

Mareimar said:

We are concerned that the sea may deposit sediment. [The following discussion is explained according to the first approach above, on page 6, concerning the law of a bent מבוי. Later it will also be explained according to the approach of the “some explain” cited there.]

We are concerned that the sea might deposit sediment. [

The following teaching is explained according to the first approach above, on page 6, concerning the law of a crooked alley. Later it will also be explained according to the approach of “some explainers” mentioned there.]

There was a certain bent מבוי in Sura,

one of whose ends was open on the west to the public domain, and the מבוי bent [across a width of up to ten cubits] and continued southward, where it was open to another public domain.

The residents of the section of the מבוי that opened westward made a side-post or crossbeam at their opening to the public domain, while the residents of the section that opened southward made nothing at their opening to permit carrying in their section.

They rolled up a mat,

they rolled up a mat, and

placed it

standing while rolled up

there, at its bend,

of the מבוי. [See illustration 3]

Rav Ḥisda said:

What they did is not effective to permit carrying even in the half of the מבוי that opens westward.

Because

this—

is neither in accordance with Rav nor in accordance with Shmuel,

who disagreed above, on page 6a, concerning the manner of permitting a bent מבוי.

And we explain Rav Ḥisda’s ruling:

Because

according to Rav, who says that its law

of a bent מבוי

is like

that it were

open at both ends,

and one must place at its bend the same device that one places in a מבוי מפולש—

it requires a tzurat hapetaḥ!

As is the law of a מבוי מפולש [above, page 6], and placing a rolled-up mat at its bend is not effective!

And

according to Shmuel

also,

who says that its law

of a bent מבוי

is like

an enclosed

and it does not require a tzurat hapetaḥ at its bend, nevertheless the מבוי is not permitted by a single side-post [and not even that section between the bend and the opening where the side-post was placed] until a second side-post is placed at the second opening or at the bend of the מבוי.

And in this מבוי, where they placed a mat at its bend rather than a side-post, it is not effective.

Because

this applies

when a side-post is effective in it, when they placed

a proper side-post

there; only then is it effective.

But this

rolled-up mat is not considered even a side-post.

Since the wind blows

against it,

and casts it down

—

it is nothing.

And

nevertheless,

if he drove a peg into it and attached it

—if he drove a peg [Rabbi Ḥananel] into the mat and attached it to the wall of the מבוי—then

he attached it,

and the wind will no longer cast it down, and it is properly effective.

The essential subject: Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said in the name of Rav:

A מבוי that was breached in its entirety into a courtyard, and the courtyard was breached opposite it—

the courtyard is permitted and the מבוי is prohibited.

And we explained above, in the conclusion, that the reason the מבוי is prohibited is that the residents of the מבוי did not join with the residents of the courtyard in an eruv. The מבוי is considered one domain with the courtyard, since the wall between them was breached, and the side-posts of the partition have, with regard to the מבוי, the status of “visible from outside but level with the interior”; therefore, it is prohibited.

But the courtyard, in which the side-posts of the partition are visible from inside, is permitted, and its residents may establish an eruv independently.

And we raise an objection to this:

Rabba bar Ulla said to Rav Beivi bar Abaye: Rabbi!

What is Rav teaching us?

Is this

not our Mishna?!

As we learned:

A small courtyard,

a narrow one,

that was breached

in its entirety

into a

courtyard,

large,

a broad one adjacent to it—the

large courtyard is permitted

to carry within it once its residents establish an eruv of courtyards independently.

And the small one is prohibited

until its residents establish an eruv together with the large courtyard.

And the reason is:

because it is like the opening of the large courtyard.

And as we said, because the side-posts of the small courtyard are “visible from outside but level with the interior,” they are not considered an “opening” with regard to it, and it must join in an eruv with the large courtyard, since it is subordinate to it.

But the large courtyard, whose side-posts are also visible from inside, has a breach that is considered an “opening” with regard to it. Therefore, it need not join in an eruv with the small courtyard, because it is an independent domain! And now this is difficult: What is Rav teaching us with regard to a מבוי that was breached into a courtyard?!

Rav Beivi bar Abaye said

to Rabba bar Ulla: Rav comes to teach us his principal novel point concerning the courtyard: that it is permitted to carry within it, a ruling that cannot be learned from the Mishna.

Because

if it were only from there—

the Mishna concerning the small courtyard—

I would have said: This applies only where the public does not pass through it,

and therefore they do not nullify the status of its partitions.

But where the public passes through it,

as in Rav’s statement, which concerns a courtyard that was also breached into the public domain, so that many people pass from one public domain to another through the courtyard and the מבוי,

I would say

that the two partitions were nullified because of the public’s passage through the מבוי, and

even the courtyard too

would be prohibited for carrying, since it has no partitions.

Rav therefore teaches us that it is permitted to carry in the courtyard!

And we raise an objection:

But

what you said—that Rav comes to teach us that the public’s passage does not nullify the status of a partition—

we also learned

this, so what is Rav teaching us?

As it is taught in a beraita:

A courtyard

surrounded by partitions and containing two openings,

through which the public enters by this one,

through the first opening,

and exits through that one,

through the second opening—

it is

a public domain with regard to

the laws of uncertain

impurity,

as we maintain that in a public domain, an uncertainty is pure [whereas in a private domain, an uncertainty is impure];

and

it is

a private domain with regard to

the laws of

Shabbat.

Evidently, we do not say that it is not a private domain with regard to Shabbat because the public comes and nullifies the partitions. And this is difficult: What is Rav teaching us? And we answer:

If it were only from there,

in the beraita,

I would have said: This applies only

where we do not say that the public comes and nullifies the partitions—when the two openings are

not directly opposite one another,

not opposite one another,