Eruvin 88a (פח.) — the Talmud in English

And therefore Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya permitted them, because

ordinary

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the people of Tiberias—

who were craftsmen—when they rose early,

like those who

rose early in order

not to neglect even a moment of their work, and the dew in the tree does not render the produce susceptible to impurity.

c.

And they may dry themselves with a towel—

what is this referring to?

As it was taught in a beraita: A person may dry himself with a towel

after bathing his body

and place it in a window

adjacent to the wall of the bathhouse [Rashi, Shabbat 147b], and we are not concerned that he might wring it out.

But he may not carry it in his hand to his house, lest he forget and wring it out.

And he may not hand it to the bath attendants

[balנים]—

because they are suspected of that matter

[wringing].

Rabbi Shimon says: He may even carry it in his hand into his house,

and we are not concerned that he might forget and wring it out.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: They taught

in our Mishna—that a suspended partition permits drawing water from a balcony extending over water—

only

for the purpose of

filling

water from the sea into the balcony, since the area of water between the partitions thereby becomes a private domain.

But to pour

water from the balcony through the hole into the water beneath it

is prohibited,

because the river carries the wastewater beyond the area opposite the balcony’s partitions, and it follows that it is carried by his force from a private domain into a karmelit [Ritva].

Rav Shizvi objected to him: What difference is there between this and a pit

[a cavity] discussed below in the Mishna, which states that in a courtyard less than four cubits by four cubits, one may not pour water into it on Shabbat, since the water flows into the adjacent public domain, unless it contains a pit capable of holding two se’a of water—the amount of a person’s wastewater for one day—which is capable of preventing the water from flowing into the public domain. And it is taught concerning this below in a beraita: Even if the pit was filled before Shabbat, it is permitted to pour water into it.

We see, then, that it is permitted to pour, even though the water flows into the public domain!

And we answer:

These

wastewaters that one pours into the courtyard—in most cases

are absorbed

[they are absorbed where they fall], since he pours them with that intention. And if they flow into the public domain, they flow out against his will, and he does not intend this.

And since this is an unintended act, even when it is a case of “it is inevitable” [that they will flow out], it is permitted, because they did not prohibit the transfer by “his force” [when he does not pour directly into the public domain, but the water flows there only by his force] in the case of an unintended act.

But

these

waters of the balcony

are not absorbed

ever beneath the balcony, and it is impossible for them to remain there at all.

Some say:

This is what

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

Do not say that it is only permitted to fill

water into the balcony,

but

to

pour

water from the balcony

is prohibited. Rather, pouring is also permitted!

Rav Shizvi

objected to this

and said: It is obvious!

For

this is the same as a pit

that was filled before Shabbat, into which it is permitted to pour?!

And this is how we answer:

Lest you say

that only there do we permit it, since

these

waters of the courtyard

are absorbed.

But

these

waters of the balcony,

are not absorbed, and therefore it should not be permitted.

and therefore we might not permit it.

It teaches us

that, on the contrary, this case is preferable to that one. For there, at least, a pit is required, since he wants the water to flow into the courtyard so that it will not soil his courtyard. But here, he does not care at all whether the water flows outside, and therefore it is permitted to pour it, and a pit is not required even initially.

We learned in the Mishna:

(And likewise,

two balconies,

one above the other: If a partition was made for the upper one but not for the lower one, both are prohibited until they establish an eruv:

Rav Huna said that Rav said: They taught this only when

the balcony was

adjacent

to the other balcony along the wall, within four handbreadths [as explained in the Mishna].

But when they are separated

from one another by four handbreadths or more,

the upper one is permitted,

and the lower one does not prohibit it, as he proceeds to explain the reason [Rav’s statement above in the Gemara, page 85a, was mentioned; see there].

And we explain:

And Rav,

who requires the balconies here to be adjacent, follows

his own reasoning

[above, page 85].

For Rav said: A person does not prohibit a place for another,

when the person’s use of that place is

by means of

throwing

through the air

over a distance of four handbreadths.

Rabba said that Rabbi Ḥiyya said. And Rav Yosef

said

that Rabbi Oshaya said:

There is theft on Shabbat, and a ruin is returned to its owners,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And it initially understood that this means as follows:

a. “There is theft on Shabbat”: If a person has a ruin adjacent to his house, and the owners of the ruin do not use it very much, while the homeowner regularly uses the ruin during the week, then, “since the owners do not use it very much, this person [the homeowner] acquires it through his theft, like other thieves, and it becomes his domain” [the wording of Rashi].

Therefore, he prohibits the owner of the ruin from using the ruin on Shabbat until they establish an eruv.

And the homeowner is likewise prohibited from using it on Shabbat, since the owner of the ruin prohibits him from doing so.

b. “And a ruin is returned to its owners”: This means, on the contrary, that the homeowner does not prohibit the owner of the ruin, since “because of the prohibition of Shabbat [perhaps it should read: the prohibition of ‘returning,’ namely, the prohibition of theft], he returns it to its owners; he must return it, and it is not acquired by him, and it is prohibited for him [by the law of theft—Gaon Yaakov] to use it” [the wording of Rashi].

Therefore, he does not prohibit his fellow, the owner of the ruin, and the owner of the ruin need not establish an eruv with the homeowner in order to use it [based on Gaon Yaakov].

Therefore, we raise a difficulty:

This itself is contradictory

within the statement itself:

On the one hand,

you said: “There is theft on Shabbat.”

Apparently, he acquires it,

the homeowner, and he prohibits its use until they establish an eruv.

But on the other hand, you said:

“And a ruin is returned to its owners.”

Apparently, he does not acquire it,

the homeowner, and he does not prohibit its use?!

And we answer:

This is what it means: There is a “law of

returning

theft” on Shabbat.

How so?

The ruin returns

the stolen property

to its owners.

And this teaches that he does not prohibit use of the ruin.

Rabba said: We raise an objection to this teaching

that one who uses stolen property does not prohibit its use, from our Mishna:

For we learned:

(And likewise,

two balconies, one above the other,

if they made a hole and a partition for the upper one but did not make them for the lower one, both are prohibited until they establish an eruv!

And if you say that “there is a law of theft on Shabbat,”

why are they prohibited?

That is to say: Why does the lower one prohibit the upper one? The lower one uses it during the week unlawfully, since it belongs to the residents of the upper one.

Rather, we see that nevertheless the lower one prohibits the upper one, since it regularly uses it; and this contradicts the teaching?!

Rav Sheshet

answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they made

the residents of the lower balcony and the residents of the upper balcony

the partition

on the upper balcony

in partnership,

and the lower one is using the upper one lawfully.

And we question this:

If so,

since there is no theft on Shabbat and one does not prohibit use through theft, and here we are dealing with a partition made in partnership, why did we learn: “They made one for the upper balcony but did not make one for the lower one, both are prohibited,” which implies that if they also made one for the lower balcony, the lower one would not prohibit the upper one?!

For this works well if the case involves a partition not made in partnership and there is a law of theft on Shabbat: When they did not make one for the lower balcony, it is prohibited because there is a law of theft on Shabbat. But when they made one for the lower balcony, they no longer wish to steal from the upper residents, and they have withdrawn.

But according to you, who said that they prohibit one another because of their partnership in the upper balcony,

even when they made one for the lower balcony,

why would they not prohibit use of the upper balcony? [Explained according to the Ritva.]

And we answer:

Once they made one for the lower balcony,

the lower one openly revealed

its

intention, that I,

the lower one,

have no interest in being with you

[the residents of the upper balcony],

and I do not desire it,

and the lower one thereby removed itself from the upper one. “For this partition is made only for the purpose of permitting use on Shabbat” [Rashi].

Mishna:

A courtyard that is less than four cubits by four cubits,

adjacent to the public domain,

one may not pour water into it on Shabbat,

as we decree that perhaps he will pour all his wastewater there.

For it is customary to pour wastewater into the courtyard adjacent to one’s house. Since the wastewater is abundant, he does not want it to remain in his courtyard, as it becomes sludge and mud, and he finds this unpleasant; everyone is particular that his courtyard be clean, and he wants the water to flow beyond his courtyard.

If it flows outside, his intention has been fulfilled [Mishna Berura], and in such a case we decree that one might come to throw an object from a private domain into the public domain [based on Rashi in the Gemara and Gaon Yaakov’s understanding of Rashi].

Unless they made a pit for it

[a cavity]

capable of holding two se’a

of water [and any cavity that is half a cubit by half a cubit and three-fifths of a cubit high holds two se’a—Rema].

Then, when he pours into the courtyard, he is not concerned that the water will flow outside, since it can descend and remain in the cavity, and his courtyard will not become soiled.

Therefore, even if it flows outside, this is not considered carrying from a private domain into a public domain [Mishna Berura].

But if the courtyard was larger than this measure, it is permitted without a pit. The pit must be capable of holding two se’a

from the hole downward.

That is to say, its empty space must hold two se’a, apart from the space occupied by the covering of the pit.

This pit may be made

outside

the courtyard—in the public domain—and adjacent to it, with the mouth of the pit inside the courtyard [Biur Halakha, see there],

or inside,

in the courtyard itself.

However, if

he made it

outside

in the public domain,

he must vault over

[cover; see an example of this in the Ritva] its mouth with boards. This causes the pit to become a “neutral domain,” since that area is removed from public use.

But if he made the pit

inside

the courtyard,

he need not vault over it,

since it stands in a private domain.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: A covered channel

[a trench made to convey the wastewater of the courtyard into the public domain]

that is vaulted over

[covered] for a length of

four

cubits

[by four cubits, according to Rashi in the Gemara]

in the public domain—

one may pour into it

from the channel

water on Shabbat.

Since the Sages measured that, in this amount of space, all the wastewater that a person ordinarily pours in one day is absorbed in that channel, which is a neutral domain, and does not flow outside into the public domain itself.

And the Sages say: Even a roof or courtyard

that is

one hundred cubits

long, with a channel extending along its entire length [Ritva],

one may not pour onto the mouth of the channel,

even at its beginning, which is one hundred cubits distant from the public domain; and the Gemara explains the reason.

But he may pour onto the roof

or into the courtyard,

and the water descends

on its own

into the channel.

The courtyard and the portico

[the corridor in front of the house] adjacent to it

combine for the

measure of

four cubits,

to permit pouring even without a pit, as the Gemara explains.

Two galleries

[upper apartments] standing

opposite one another—

with a courtyard less than four cubits wide between them, into which they pour their wastewater—

some of them

[the residents of one of the galleries]

made a pit

in the courtyard adjacent to their gallery,

and some of them did not make a pit:

Those who made a pit—

are permitted

to pour into the courtyard.

Those who did not make a pit—

are prohibited,

and the Gemara explains this.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A courtyard that is less than four cubits by four cubits, one may not pour water into it on Shabbat:

And it implies that if the courtyard was four cubits by four cubits, one may pour water into it on Shabbat.

And we inquire:

What is the reason?

Rabba said: Because a person is likely to use

for his needs

two se’a of water every day,

and a person is likely to pour this amount into the courtyard after using it for his needs.

Therefore,

in a courtyard four cubits

wide, a person does not intend for the water to leave his courtyard; rather,

a person wants to sprinkle it

[to moisten the courtyard’s soil with water] so that dust will not rise [the Mishna is referring to the summer, as stated below]. Since this is so, even if he pours it and the water flows out of the courtyard into the public domain, his intention has not been fulfilled, and it is permitted.