Eruvin 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

And the tenth handbreadth—from every direction—is in between; both are prohibited from using it, since for both of them it is accessed through an opening.

Ta shma

to support Rav:

A. A gezuztra—[two projections extending from the upper story at the edge of the sea, with boards fixed from one projection to the other]—one may not draw water through it from the sea on Shabbat.

Since the gezuztra—which is high and quite broad—is a private domain, while the sea is a karmelit. In order to permit drawing water from the sea into the gezuztra, one makes a partition around the opening above the gezuztra, or attaches a partition beneath it, suspended above the surface of the water,

for when they say, “gud achit mechitzata”—“extend the partition downward”—we regard it as though the partitions descend and close off the area all the way to the depths, and the water opposite the opening becomes a private domain. "

It is a leniency with which the Sages were lenient regarding water," relying on a suspended partition [as explained below, on page 87b].

B.

Two gezuztraot, one above the other,

and they are not aligned one opposite the other, but one is offset from the other across the width of the wall by four handbreadths. And

the people of

the two gezuztraot jointly made a suspended partition

for

the

upper gezuztra, but they did not make

a suspended partition

for the lower one. [

See illustration.]

And on weekdays [this is how the Ritva wrote it; see Rashi.

And Rashi himself wrote, in accordance with the words of the Ritva, below, on page 88a, s.v. “Why”: they use the lower one by way of the upper one in order to draw water [for they throw the bucket onto the partitions of the upper one, and it descends to the opening; they lower it, then draw it up].

Since the domains of both gezuztraot exercise control over the upper gezuztra—

both are prohibited

from using the upper one on Shabbat

until they establish an eruv

the people of the two gezuztraot among themselves.

Now this presents a difficulty for Shmuel, by way of a kal va-chomer:

If, in the case of two gezuztraot, where the upper one uses the gezuztra only by lowering in order to draw water, while the lower one uses it both by throwing from its own gezuztra and by lowering all the way to the water, it is not given to the upper one, since nevertheless the people of both domains use the gezuztra with difficulty,

then where one uses it only by throwing and the other only by lowering, and it is merely somewhat more convenient for one than for the other, is it not all the more so that it is not given to the one who uses it by lowering, since both use it with difficulty?

Said

in response

Rav Adda bar Ahava:

The Mishna is referring

to a case where the people of the lower one come

and ascend by ladders

through the upper one in order to draw water,

for for both of them it is accessed by lowering, and therefore it is given to both of them. [See illustration 1.]

Abaye said:

He answered: The Mishna is referring

to a case where the two gezuztraot are situated

within ten handbreadths of one another,

within ten of each other [

that there is not a height difference of ten handbreadths between them]. For we say that a third domain that is used conveniently by one and with difficulty by the other is given to the one who uses it conveniently only when the two domains exercising control over that third domain are separated in height by ten handbreadths. For example: a courtyard and an upper story, or two courtyards separated from one another by ten handbreadths in the height of their ground levels, and the like. [See illustration 2.]

But whenever the two domains are not separated in height by ten handbreadths, they always prohibit one another from using it.

The tanna stated this by way of “It is not necessary”

the following:

It is not necessary to say that if they made

a partition

for the lower one but did not make one for the upper one—

that both are prohibited

from using the lower one.

For even without the rationale that when two domains are within ten handbreadths of one another, a third domain is not given to the one who uses it more conveniently, here both are prohibited from using the lower one.

For since they are situated within

within

ten handbreadths of one another,

and they are also not farther apart from one another than four handbreadths, their use of the lower one is automatically equal [since there is no difference of ten handbreadths in the lowering required by either of them], and therefore

they prohibit one another.

Rather, even if they made

a partition

for the upper one

and

did not make one for the lower one,

their use of the upper one is not equal, since for one it is accessed by lowering, while for the other it is accessed by a partial act of throwing together with lowering. And

you might have thought: Since for one it is convenient and for the other it is difficult [

it is more convenient for one than for the other]—

let it be given

it should be given

to the one [

the upper one]

whose use

is more

convenient,

and this would accord with Shmuel’s view.

It teaches us

that although ordinarily we give it to the one whose use is more convenient, in accordance with Shmuel, here,

since the two domains are situated within ten handbreadths of one another,

the two domains—

they prohibit one another

from using the third domain.

For in such a case, there is no need to consider the convenience of use at all; rather, they always prohibit one another.

And this law that we stated—that two domains situated within ten handbreadths of one another prohibit one another from using a third domain, even if for one of them use of the third domain is convenient while for the other it is difficult—is

like that which Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel:

A roof

of a house

adjacent to the public domain,

where on one side it bordered the public domain, while on its other sides it was surrounded by a courtyard or a balcony below it [and ordinarily a roof is at least ten handbreadths high]—it is prohibited to carry from it to the balcony or to the courtyard.

Except when the owner of the roof makes it known that he wishes to separate the roof from the public domain and use it for himself, and for this purpose he

needs

to place

a fixed ladder

from the upper story or from the courtyard to the roof, thereby demonstrating his intention to designate the roof for his own use.

And by doing this he can

permit it

the roof, so that one may carry from the roof to the upper story, the balcony, or the courtyard.

And the Gemara infers: Specifically, if he places

a fixed ladder, it is not

then considered that the roof is used only together with the upper story and the courtyard.

But if he places

a temporary ladder,

which he can easily remove—

it is not

considered that the roof belongs exclusively to him; rather, it remains connected also to the use of the people of the public domain. It follows that both domains exercise control over it.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is the reason

that the roof is considered a place over which the public domain exercises control, given that the people of the public domain do not use the roof?

Is it not because, since the balcony and the public domain are “within ten

handbreadths

of one another,”

they are situated

the balcony was not ten handbreadths higher than the public domain, and it follows that the two domains—the balcony and the public domain—are within ten handbreadths of the third domain, the roof, and because of this

they prohibit one another,

even though use of the roof is convenient for the balcony, through an opening, whereas the public domain has no use of the roof.

Rav Pappa challenged this: But perhaps

the people of the public domain do use the roof,

for

example,

many people rest

place

on it their hats

their hats,

and their shawls

the garment called a scarf that they place over their heads, in order to air them.

And thus the balcony is never within ten handbreadths of the public domain, and the prohibition against carrying to the balcony is not because the two domains prohibit one another, but because the roof is also used by the people of the public domain.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: