Eruvin 84b — the Talmud in English

And the tenth handbreadth—from every direction—in between them: both are forbidden to use it, for it is an opening for both of them.

ta shma

to support Rav:

1. A guzuztra—[two projections extending from the upper story on the seashore, with boards fixed from one projection to the other]—one may not draw water through it from the sea on Shabbat.

Because the guzuztra—which is very high and wide—is a private domain, whereas the sea is a karmelit. In order to permit drawing water from the sea to the guzuztra, they make a partition around the opening above the guzuztra, or attach a partition beneath it, and it hangs above the surface of the water.

For since they say, “gud achit mechitzata”—“extend the partition downward”—we regard it as though the partitions descend and close off down to the depths, and the water opposite the opening becomes a private domain. “

It is a leniency that the Sages were lenient with regard to water,” to rely on a suspended partition [as explained below, on page 87b].

b.

Two guzuztraot, one above the other,

and they are not aligned one opposite the other, but one is set apart from the other across the width of the wall by up to four handbreadths. And

they made

the people of the two guzuztraot, in partnership, a suspended partition

for

the

upper guzuztra, and they did not make

a suspended partition

for the lower one. [

See illustration]

And on a weekday [thus wrote the Ritva, and see Rashi].

As Rashi himself wrote according to the words of the Ritva, below, on page 88a, s.v. “Why”—the people of the lower one use the upper one in order to draw water [for they throw the bucket onto the partitions of the upper one, and it descends to the opening; they lower it, and draw it up].

Since the domain of both guzuztraot exercises control over the upper guzuztra—

both are forbidden

to use it on Shabbat by way of the upper one,

until they establish an eruv

the people of the two guzuztraot among themselves.

And now there is a difficulty for Shmuel, by way of a kal va-chomer:

If with regard to two guzuztraot, where the upper one uses the guzuztra only by lowering in order to draw water, while the lower one uses it both by throwing from its guzuztra and by lowering all the way to the water—and they do not give it to the upper one, since nevertheless the people of the two domains use the guzuztra with difficulty—

then where one uses it only by throwing and the other uses it only by lowering, and it is merely somewhat more convenient for one than for the other, is it not all the more so that they do not give it to the one for whom it is by lowering, since both use it with difficulty?

Said

in reply

Rav Adda bar Ahava:

The Mishna is speaking

of the people of the lower one coming

and ascending by ladders

by way of the upper one in order to draw water,

for, for both of them, it is by lowering; therefore they give it to both of them. [See illustration 1]

Abaye said:

He answered: The Mishna is speaking

of a case where the two

guzuztraot

are within ten [handbreadths] of one another [

meaning that there is no difference of ten handbreadths in height between them]. For we say that a third domain which is used conveniently by one and with difficulty by the other is given to the one for whom it is convenient only when the two domains exercising control over that third domain are separated by a height of ten. For example: a courtyard and an upper story, or two courtyards separated from one another by ten in the height of their ground levels, and the like. [See illustration 2]

But whenever the two domains are not separated by a height of ten, they always prohibit one another.

And the tanna said, “It is unnecessary”

:

It is unnecessary [to say that if] they made

a partition

for the lower one and did not make [one] for the upper one—

that they are forbidden

both on the lower one.

For even without the reason that when two domains are within ten one does not give a third domain to the one for whom its use is convenient, here both are forbidden on the lower one.

For since they are within

ten

of one another,

and they are also no farther apart from one another than four handbreadths, consequently their use of the lower one is equal [since there is no difference of ten handbreadths in the lowering required by these and by those], and therefore

they prohibit one another.

Rather, even if they made

a partition

for the upper one

and

did not make [one] for the lower one,

where their use of the upper one is not equal, for to one it is by lowering and to the other by partial throwing and lowering, and

you might have thought: Since for one it is convenient and for the other it is difficult, [

one finds it more convenient than the other]—

let it be given

to the one

for whom [

the upper one]

its use

is more

convenient, in accordance with Shmuel’s view.

and

it teaches us

that although ordinarily we give it to the one whose use is more convenient, as Shmuel says, here,

since they are within ten

the two domains

prohibit one another

in the third domain.

For in such a case there is no need for the reason of the manner of use at all; rather, they always prohibit one another.

And this law that we have stated—that two domains which are within ten prohibit one another with regard to a third domain, even if for one of them its use of the third domain is convenient and for the other its use is difficult—is

like that which Rav Nahman said in the name of Shmuel:

A roof

of a house

adjacent to the public domain,

which on one side bordered the public domain, while on its other sides it was surrounded by a courtyard or by a balcony beneath it [and ordinarily a roof is at least ten handbreadths high]—it is forbidden to carry from it to the balcony or to the courtyard.

Except when the owner of the roof reveals that he wishes to disconnect the roof from the public domain and use it for himself, and for this purpose he

must

place

a fixed ladder

from the upper story or from the courtyard to the roof, thereby demonstrating his wish to designate the roof for his own use.

And through this he can

permit it

to the roof, to carry from the roof to the upper story, or to the balcony or courtyard.

And the Gemara infers: Specifically if he places

a fixed ladder, there is no

[prohibition;] then the matter is considered as though the roof is used only together with the upper story and the courtyard.

But if he places

a temporary ladder,

which he can remove easily—

no,

the matter is not considered as though the roof is used only by him; rather, it is still connected also with the use of the people of the public domain. And it follows that the two domains exercise control over it.

And we raised a question concerning it:

What is the reason

that the roof is considered a place over which the public domain exercises control, when the people of the public domain have no use of the roof?

Is it not because, since “within ten

handbreadths

of one another”

they stand,

the domain of the balcony and the public domain—since the balcony was not ten handbreadths higher than the public domain—and it follows that the two domains, the balcony and the public domain, are within ten handbreadths of the third domain, the roof, and by virtue of this

they prohibit one another,

despite the fact that for the balcony use of it is convenient, at the opening, whereas the public domain has no use of the roof?

Rav Pappa challenged it: But perhaps

there is a use of the roof for the people of the public domain,

such as

that many people

rest their shoulders

[and] place

their caps

on it,

and a scarf,

the garment called a wrap, above their heads, in order to air them.

And it is never the case that the balcony is within ten handbreadths of the public domain, and the prohibition of carrying to the balcony is not because the two domains prohibit one another, but because the roof is used by the people of the public domain.

Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: