Eruvin 74b (עד:) — the Talmud in English

After Shmuel's death,

Rav Anan came,

Rav's son, and

cast it [i.e., threw it] as a lehi, because there were not two houses in a single courtyard, whereas we require two courtyards containing two houses, in accordance with Rav!

threw] a side-post at the entrance of the alleyway, because there were not two houses in one courtyard, whereas we require two courtyards containing two houses, in accordance with Rav’s opinion!

Ivut said,

and he expressed surprise at him: Is it conceivable that

the mavoi in which I reside, and for which I came relying on the authority of Mar Shmuel [and I come by virtue of Shmuel's permission]—

[and I come by virtue of Shmuel’s permission]—

Rav Anan bar Rav

[Shmuel's disputant]—

should cast it away from

[like minan, meaning: should he cast the lehi away from us]?! And from this incident one can resolve our question:

Conclude from it—

since Shmuel permitted it to Ivut—

he did not accept it from him,

and he continued to disagree with Rav until his death, maintaining that a courtyard and a house suffice, and certainly that is so here.

And we reject this:

Actually, I can tell you that he accepted it from him,

and he conceded to Rav.

But here,

in this mavoi, Shmuel permitted it because in that mavoi there was a synagogue in the second courtyard, which contained one house.

And when Shmuel permitted it to him,

the attendant

[of the synagogue]

was the one who ate bread at his home and slept in the synagogue

[he ate at home and spent the night in the synagogue].

Therefore Shmuel permitted it to him, for there was a house here, as well as a synagogue in the second courtyard. But when Rav Anan cast the lehi, the attendant was no longer sleeping there.

And Ivut bar Ihi,

who understood that it was still permitted even though there was no attendant,

because

he maintained: the place where one eats determines

[it is the place where one eats that determines, not the place where one sleeps; it was as though no person resided in the synagogue, so it did not join with the two houses, and it necessarily followed that he did not require it at all].

But

in truth,

Shmuel follows his own reasoning,

as he said above, on page 73a, that

the place where one sleeps determines,

and this is considered two courtyards and two houses opening into it. Now that there was no attendant, it was forbidden to carry in the mavoi.

The following sugya is explained in accordance with what appears from the words of the Ritva. It seems that he explains Rashi's words in this manner as well.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A mavoi, one side of which

has

one

courtyard of a

gentile

opening into the mavoi [and below it will be explained that there were two houses there],

and one side

of the mavoi has two courtyards belonging to two

Jews, one of whose courtyards opens into the mavoi, while the courtyard of the other does not open into the mavoi [and they emerge from it into the public domain through an entrance of their own, not by way of the mavoi]. There is a window between these two courtyards, four by four handbreadths, which ordinarily allows the courtyards to be joined in an eruv with one another. Nevertheless, since a gentile is located on one side of the mavoi—

—

one may not join it in an eruv

the mavoi with the courtyards

by means of windows

[relying on the windows]

to permit it

to carry from the courtyard that has no entrance into the mavoi, using the utensils that spent Shabbat there,

through the entrances

of the second courtyard

into the mavoi,

and the Gemara explains the reason shortly. [See diagram 1]

The same law applies if there are “entrances” between the courtyards!

Rather, he stated the usual case, since it is not customary to make entrances between one house and another.

He said,

Abaye asked

Rav Yosef:

Did

Rav say

this law

even with regard to a courtyard,

where one side has a gentile's house opening into the courtyard, and the other side has a Jew's house opening into the courtyard? There are additional houses in that courtyard, and all the houses on this side open into one another through windows, but the other houses do not open into the courtyard. Did Rav also say in this case that they may not make an eruv in order to carry from house to house, so as to take objects out into the courtyard through the house that opens into the courtyard? [See diagram 2]

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said to Abaye:

Yes,

even in a courtyard they may not make an eruv.

And we explain:

If he had not said—

what then?!

That is, what reason would there be to say that this law applies in a mavoi but not in a courtyard, such that it would be necessary to ascertain whether this law was also stated with regard to a courtyard? After all, what difference is there between a mavoi and a courtyard?!

And we explain: Had Rav not explicitly stated it with regard to a courtyard as well,

I would have said

that it was a particular law applying to a mavoi.

And

Rav's reason is that he maintains that a mavoi is not permitted by means of a lehi or a kora until there are

two

houses

in each courtyard,

and

two

courtyards opening into the mavoi.

That is, the essential reason for the prohibition is that the mavoi cannot be permitted by means of a lehi and a kora, since the gentile's courtyard is not considered a residence and does not join with the others to constitute a mavoi.

And among the Jewish courtyards there are not two courtyards opening into the mavoi. But had the gentile joined them, there would indeed be two courtyards opening into the mavoi. We further explain: How could I have said that Rav's reason is that we require a mavoi into which houses and courtyards open, when Rav already stated this once above, on page 74a?

Why do I need two teachings?!

It is necessary.

For if one derived it from that

above,