Eruvin 73b — the Talmud in English

b.

And if they made a partnership in the lane—

they are permitted here and here,

both in the lane and in the courtyards.

And the Gemara explains that this is what it is saying: If they also made a partnership in the lane—they are permitted here and here.

c.

They made an eruv in the courtyards and made a partnership in the lane, and one of the members of a courtyard forgot and did not make an eruv,

but he had a share in the partnership—

they are permitted here and here,

as the Gemara explains it.

d. One forgot,

from among the members of the lane, and did not make a partnership,

but he had a share in the eruv—

they are permitted in the courtyards

because all the members of the courtyards participated in their eruv,

and they are forbidden in the lane

because all of them did not participate in its permitting.

And the Mishna comes to teach us

that the lane in relation to the courtyards

is

like a courtyard in relation to the houses.

For one might have said: Since the basis of the decree not to carry from one private domain to the other private domain is so that they should not come to err and carry from a private domain to a public domain,

if so, it is possible that this concern exists only when one carries from a private domain to a private domain resembling a “public domain.” For example, carrying from the house, which is a “private” domain, to the courtyard, which resembles a “public” domain.

But a courtyard and a lane, both of which are a private domain of “many,” one might have said that it is permitted to carry from one to the other.

Therefore it teaches us that it is forbidden, and a partnership of lanes is required.

Gemara:

Above, on page 71a, we learned a beraita, containing a dispute whether one must also make an eruv of courtyards, to permit carrying from one courtyard to another, and also a partnership of lanes, as Rabbi Meir holds; or whether one must act according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that either one makes an eruv or one makes a partnership.

And now we are engaged in explaining our Mishna, in whose first clause it teaches: They made an eruv in the courtyards but did not make a partnership in the lane—they are permitted in the courtyards and forbidden in the lane, because one may not rely on the eruv of the courtyards in a place where a partnership of lanes is required.

This

is according to whom?—

It is Rabbi Meir, who says: We require an eruv

of courtyards

and we also require

also

a partnership

of lanes.

And if so,

say the middle clause,

which teaches:

And if they made a partnership in the lane—

they are permitted here and here.

Both in the courtyards and in the lane.

And it might enter your mind that they made a partnership only in the lane, and nevertheless they are permitted to carry also in the courtyards, because we rely on a partnership in place of an eruv.

But

here we have arrived at the Rabbis, who say: With one

with either a partnership or an eruv,

it suffices,

it is enough!

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

For in the middle clause it does not teach that a partnership of lanes alone permits carrying in the courtyards.

Rather—

“And if they also made a partnership”

in the lane, in addition to the eruv of the courtyards that they made,

it is saying.

And therefore they are permitted here and here, because they made both of them.

And we still challenge that the entire Mishna does not accord with one tanna:

Say

the first clause of

the final clause

of the Mishna:

They made an eruv in the courtyards and made a partnership in the lane, and one of the members of a courtyard forgot and did not make an eruv

together with the members of his courtyard, to permit his courtyard, but he participated in the partnership of the lane —

they are permitted here and here.

This final clause,

what are its circumstances?

If he did not renounce

his domain, and they are permitted in the courtyard because they rely on the partnership—

why are they permitted

to carry in the courtyard, according to Rabbi Meir, with whom the Mishna accords, as we said? But one may not rely on a partnership in a place where an eruv is required.

Rather, it is obvious that he renounced

his domain to them, and they are permitted in the courtyard because of the renunciation, and in the lane because of the partnership; and it accords well with Rabbi Meir.

But it is difficult:

say the final clause

of the final clause, which teaches:

One of the members of the lane forgot and did not participate

[participate]—

they are permitted in the courtyards and forbidden in the lane.

And if

you establish the first clause of the final clause as referring to one who

renounced

his domain, then here too it must be speaking of one who renounced his domain, and

why are they forbidden in the lane?

And if you would say, Rabbi Meir holds

that the Mishna accords with him—that

there is no renunciation of domain in a lane,

the final clause of the final clause is satisfactorily explained.

But it was taught

[above, page 68b]: There was an incident involving a Sadducee who lived with Rabban Gamliel in a lane in Jerusalem. And Rabban Gamliel permitted carrying, saying:

For the gentile has renounced for you

the gentile’s

domain.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

We see that, according to Rabbi Meir, renunciation of domain in a lane is effective.

Rather, it is obvious

that the final clause of the final clause is why they are forbidden in the lane: because

he did not renounce

his domain to them.

And since the final clause

of the final clause is speaking of one who did not renounce his domain,

the first clause

of the final clause—concerning one who forgot and did not make an eruv—

also

is speaking

of one who did not renounce

his domain, and nevertheless it teaches that they are permitted here and here.

And necessarily, it is because we rely on the partnership in place of the eruv. If so, the first clause of the final clause accords with the Rabbis.

And now it is difficult:

the first clause

of the first clause of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Meir, and therefore they are not permitted in the lane even though they made an eruv in the courtyard, because we require both, as we said!

And the final clause

of the final clause of the Mishna necessarily also accords with

Rabbi Meir,

for it teaches that if one forgot and did not participate in the lane, they are permitted in the courtyards because they made an eruv, and forbidden in the lane because one may not rely on an eruv in place of a partnership; and this too is according to Rabbi Meir.

But the

middle clause,

the first clause of the final clause—according to

the Rabbis?!

And we answer:

The entire Mishna is according to Rabbi Meir.

And that which is difficult for you concerning the middle clause [the first clause of the final clause], which teaches: One of the members of a courtyard forgot and did not make an eruv; they are permitted here and here—for necessarily its reason is that we rely on a partnership in place of an eruv, and it is not according to Rabbi Meir—

it is not difficult, for

what is the reason Rabbi Meir says that we require an eruv and require a partnership,

and we do not rely on a partnership alone? In order

that the teaching of the eruv should not be forgotten by the children

[as we said above, on page 71b, this reason for Rabbi Meir].

But here,

in the Mishna,

since the majority

of the courtyard

made an eruv,

and only one is the one who forgot and did not make an eruv,

the teaching

of eruv will not be forgotten by them.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Rav did not teach

in our Mishna five courtyards

“open to one another”

and open to the lane. Rather, it is speaking of a case in which there was no entrance between the courtyards.

And that which it teaches, “They made an eruv in the courtyards,” is not as we explained it above, that the courtyards also made an eruv among themselves; rather, each courtyard made an eruv for itself alone. For they cannot make an eruv with one another, since there is no entrance between them.

And Rav Kahana likewise said: Rav did not teach “open to one another.”

Some say: Rav Kahana himself did not teach “open to one another.”

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason that he did not teach “open to one another”?

Because

he holds

that in courtyards open to one another, it is impossible to participate in a partnership of lanes at all.

Because

every partnership

of lanes

in which they do not bring in and take out

the shared food

through entrances in the lane,

that is to say: if, when they collect from each courtyard its share in the partnership of the lane in order to place it in one of the courtyards in the lane, they did not transfer the food of each of the courtyards through the courtyard’s entrance into the lane, and from the lane into the courtyard in which they place the partnership, but transferred it from courtyard to courtyard through an entrance between the courtyards—

it is not called a partnership

of lanes!

And since this is so, if there are complete entrances between the courtyards, we are concerned lest he transfer the partnership of the lanes through these entrances, and not through the lane at all.

And therefore, with courtyards open to one another, one cannot teach, “They made a partnership in the lane.”

He challenged him

from the Mishna above, on page 71a:

A homeowner

among the members of the lane

who was a partner with his neighbors

in the lane—for an ordinary partnership, and not for the partnership of lanes—

for this one with wine and for that one with wine—

they do not need to make an eruv

[to participate in the lane], for we rely on their partnership!

And it is difficult: They did not transfer it through the lane, so how is it effective?!

And we answer:

There

it is speaking

of his taking out

the barrel from his house

and bringing it in

[and bringing it in] through all the courtyards, and from there to the lane, and from there to one of the courtyards of the lane; except that he did all this not for the purpose of a partnership.

And we likewise raise an objection from the following Mishna, which teaches:

How does one participate in a lane?

He places his barrel and says: This is for all the members of the lane.

And apparently it implies that it is effective, even though he did not collect from them and did not transfer the barrel through the lane!

And we reject this:

There too, he took it out

having taken the barrel from the courtyard into the lane

and brought it in,

after granting them a share in it, he returned it to the courtyard.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan challenges this: If so—

that one must transfer the partnership of the lane through all the courtyards—if

one granted

one of the members of the lane

to him,

to one of them,

a piece of bread in his basket,

and did not collect it from him, is it

likewise not a partnership,

since it was not in the courtyard of the one acquiring it, and it did not come to him by way of the lane?

This certainly does not seem reasonable to say [Ritva]!

And if you would say

to distinguish by reasoning and say that

likewise

it is not a partnership—

But Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Members of a group who were reclining

on the eve of Shabbat at one person’s house, who had invited them to eat from his own food [Tosafot],

and the day became sanctified over them—

the bread that was on the table,

which was placed there for all of them, as though all of them had acquired it [Tosafot]—

they rely on it on account of an eruv.

And some say, on account of a partnership.

And

he explained

Rabba:

And

they do not disagree.

Here, when they were reclining in a house,

concerning this we say: They rely on it on account of an eruv, for an eruv must specifically be in a house and not in a courtyard.

Here, when they were reclining in a courtyard,

concerning this we say: They rely on it on account of a partnership, for it is permitted to place the partnership in a courtyard.

But an eruv, which is on account of dwelling, since a courtyard is not fit to be a dwelling, one may place it only in a house in the courtyard.

We see at any rate from here that it is not necessary to bring the partnership from the courtyards through the lane. For it is impossible to say that he took it out and brought it in now, since it teaches, “and the day became sanctified over them.” And this implies that there was no time for that [Ritva].

And one also cannot say that from the outset the bread of the homeowner came from their courtyards by way of the lane to the homeowner’s courtyard. For this is not effective, since it still did not belong to all of them [Tosafot].

And on the basis of this difficulty, we retract what we explained concerning the reason Rav did not teach in the Mishna, “and open to one another,” namely, that the partnership is not effective in such a case.

And we say:

Rather, Rav’s reason

is:

for Rav holds

Rav:

There is no lane

[which the Sages forbade—in every lane open to a public domain—to carry an object in it more than four cubits, or to carry into it, since it resembles a public domain]

that is permitted by a side-post and a beam

alone [and not by posts, like a courtyard open to a public domain],