Eruvin 72b (עב:) — the Talmud in English

Meitivи

explained below: to whom is the objection directed]:

Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Sabar said

from the term sevara, reasoning. He was called this because of his sharpness]:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning partitions that reach the ceiling, as they require an eruv for each group and each group.

What is the subject of their disagreement—

concerning partitions that do not reach the ceiling.

As Beit Shammai say:

one requires

an eruv for each group and each group.

And Beit Hillel say:

it is sufficient to have

one eruv for all of them.

And now we explain with regard to which of the amoraim mentioned above there is a tiyuvta.

According to the one who says

that

the disagreement is concerning partitions that reach the ceiling—

there is

a tiyuvta

from this beraita, as it explicitly teaches that when the partitions reach the ceiling, according to everyone there is a division of domains!

But

if

the one who says that the disagreement is concerning partitions that do not reach the ceiling—

there is

support

from this beraita, as it explicitly teaches in accordance with that opinion!

According to the version that Rav Naḥman said that

the

disagreement

is

with regard to a railing partition,

but with regard to partitions of ten handbreadths, according to everyone there is a division of domains—there is

a tiyuvta.

For the beraita explicitly teaches that according to Beit Hillel, even with partitions of ten handbreadths there is no division of domains, provided that they do not reach the ceiling.

And we are uncertain:

according to the version that Rav Naḥman said

“the disagreement applies even to a railing partition,”

should we say that there is a tiyuvta

from the beraita?

For it implies that it is only with regard to partitions that do not reach the ceiling but are ten handbreadths high that Beit Shammai maintain that there is a division of domains. But with regard to a railing partition, no.

Or perhaps even with regard to a railing partition Beit Shammai maintain that there is a division of domains?

Rav Naḥman could have said to you: They disagree with regard to a partition, and the same law applies to a railing partition.

And the fact that they disagree with regard to a partition—

is to demonstrate the force of Beit Hillel,

who are lenient even with regard to a partition and maintain that there is no division of domains.

And we raise a difficulty:

Let them disagree with regard to a railing partition,

and

thereby demonstrate the force of Beit Shammai,

who are stringent even with regard to a railing partition, maintaining that there is a division of domains?

And we answer:

It is preferable to make known the force of the lenient ruling,

rather than the force of the stringent ruling!

Rav Naḥman said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Sabar,

that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed specifically with regard to partitions that do not reach the ceiling.

But when they reach the ceiling, Beit Hillel agree that there is a division of domains.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The Mishna also precisely indicates

that when the partitions reach the ceiling, Beit Hillel agree.

As it teaches

in the Mishna:

And Beit Hillel concede

that

when some of them are residing in rooms and upper chambers, they require an eruv for each group and each group.

What are these “rooms,” and what are these “upper chambers”?

If you say that “rooms”

means

actual rooms,

meaning that the reception hall was initially built with the intention of dividing it into rooms,

and “upper chambers” means

actual upper chambers—

This

is obvious,

that there is a division of domains; why, then, was this needed to be taught?!

Rather, is it not referring to something resembling rooms

and

something resembling upper chambers?

And what is that?—

Partitions that reach the ceiling.

That is to say: The reception hall was originally built to be a broad hall, and that was its primary use, but now those observing Shabbat divided it temporarily according to their needs.

Rather, because they made partitions reaching the ceiling that resembled rooms and upper chambers, according to everyone there is a division of domains.

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

The tanna

in the beraita: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree about whether the domains are divided, as we have explained until now. Rather, according to everyone it is one domain, and they are comparable to five people who collected their eruv [as Beit Hillel maintain, according to what we explained above].

Nevertheless, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel actually disagree with regard to five people who collected their eruv.

Therefore:

When is this statement applicable,

that Beit Shammai maintain that there must be an eruv for each individual?—

When they take

the eruv of the groups

to another place

in that same courtyard, and place it in the house of the other residents of the courtyard.

For this is comparable to five people who collected their eruv and come to establish an eruv with another courtyard. Beit Shammai maintain that each of the five must place his eruv in the other courtyard.

And Beit Hillel maintain: When five people collected their eruv, one becomes an agent for all of them, and they do not all need to place bread in the second courtyard.

But if the eruv

of the residents of the courtyard

came to them

in the reception hall, even according to Beit Shammai these five do not need to contribute anything to the communal eruv. Therefore,

according to everyone—

one eruv suffices for all of them!

That is to say: Since the eruv came to the reception hall, they are all exempt from contributing to the eruv, in accordance with the law that the residents of the house in which the eruv is placed are exempt from contributing their share to the eruv [Ritba; see there].

We inquire about this:

In accordance with whose opinion is that which was taught:

Five people who collected their eruv—

when they take their eruv to another place,

when they come to establish an eruv by placing it in another courtyard—

one eruv suffices for all of them,

and they do not all need to participate in the eruv placed in the other courtyard.

In accordance with whose opinion?

In accordance with Beit Hillel,

as we said.

And there are those who say: When is this statement applicable,

that Beit Hillel maintain that one eruv suffices for all of them?—

When the

eruv came to them

in the reception hall. For in such a case, when five people collected their eruv, one eruv suffices for all of them [whereas Beit Shammai maintain that even with five people who collected their eruv, there must be an eruv for each individual; and here, too, it is no different].

But if they were taking their eruv to another place,

even with five people who collected their eruv, there must be an eruv for each individual; and likewise here, with five people who observed Shabbat in the reception hall—

there must be an eruv for each individual.

And according to this second version:

In accordance with whose opinion is that which was taught: Five people who collected their eruv, when they take their eruv to another place, one eruv suffices for all of them?

In accordance with whose opinion?—

It is in accordance with no one!

For according to everyone, in such a case there must be an eruv for each individual, as we said.

Mishna:

A courtyard that contains separate houses belonging to a father and his sons, and to other residents, and

the brothers who ate at their father’s table but slept in their own houses

that open into the courtyard are considered separate residents, since they are separate in their sleeping arrangements, in separate houses, and

require an eruv for each one of the brothers.

Therefore, if one of them forgot and did not establish an eruv,

he renders the entire courtyard forbidden.

And if he wishes to permit it for them, he

relinquishes

to them

his domain.

When does this apply? When they take the eruv to another place [

the Gemara will explain whether this means to another courtyard or to another place in the same courtyard].

But if the eruv came to them, or if there were no other residents with them

in the courtyard, but only the father and his sons—

they do not need to establish an eruv,

and the reason for the Mishna will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Later, at the end of this page, it is stated that a person renders a courtyard forbidden only if he has a place of residence there. The amoraim there disagree about what is considered a place of residence.

Rav said: The place where he eats, and Shmuel said: The place where he sleeps.

And since it is stated here in the Mishna that the brothers eat together at their father’s table, but are separate in their sleeping arrangements in their separate houses, and when they take the eruv to another place each one must contribute an eruv—

Conclude from it

that

the place where they sleep,

which is separate for the brothers, is

the determining factor

that establishes their residence. Therefore, each one must contribute a separate eruv!

And we reject this: Nothing can be inferred from here. These brothers in fact also eat in their separate houses, and not in their father’s house.

And that which it teaches, “who ate at their father’s table,”—

was stated with regard to recipients of an allowance [

whose father gives them the expenses for the food that they eat in their own homes],

and that is what it means.

The Sages taught: One who has

a “gatehouse” [

a small house built before the gate of the courtyard, which everyone uses as a shortcut], or

a colonnade [

a passageway in front of the houses],

or a balcony [

in front of the entrances to the upper chambers, through which everyone ascends—Rashi, Yoma 11b]

in the courtyard of another—

even if he resides there [Tosafot],

he does not render it forbidden for him

to carry from his house into the courtyard, since these places are not considered a dwelling.

But one who has in another person’s courtyard

a hay house, a cattle house, a woodshed, or a storehouse—

he renders it forbidden for him,

as these are considered uses characteristic of a dwelling.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He renders it forbidden only on account of a dwelling place,

a place where a person lives,

alone.

Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Ben Nefaha, who had five

houses in five

courtyards [

Meiri]

in Usha,

but he did not reside in any of them; rather, he used them for hay and wood [Meiri].

And the incident came before the Sages, and they said: He renders forbidden only a dwelling house.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this: Is it possible that

“a dwelling house” occurred to you!?

That is to say: A gatehouse, even if he resided there, does he not render the courtyard forbidden [Meiri]?!

And we answer:

Rather, say: a place of residence.

That is to say: It is fit for residence, and he also actually dwells there. For even if he had many houses in many courtyards, he renders it prohibited only in that residence in which he dwells [Meiri].

That is to say: A place suitable for dwelling, in which he also actually resides. Thus, even if he had many houses in many courtyards, he renders forbidden only the dwelling in which he resides [Meiri].

What

is the location of

the place of residence?