Eruvin 72b — the Talmud in English

It was objected:

it is explained below against whom we raise the objection:

Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Sabar said:

from the expression “reasoning.” And he was called this on account of his sharpness:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning partitions that reach the ceiling, for which an eruv is required for each group and group.

Concerning what did they disagree? —

Concerning partitions that do not reach the ceiling.

For Beit Shammai say:

it is necessary to have

an eruv for each group and group.

And Beit Hillel say:

it is sufficient to have

one eruv for all of them.

And now we explain against which of the aforementioned amoraim there is a tiyuvta.

According to the one who says

that

the disagreement is concerning partitions that reach the ceiling —

there is

a tiyuvta

from this beraita, for it explicitly teaches in it that with regard to partitions that reach the ceiling, according to everyone there is a division of domains!

But

if

according to the one who says that the disagreement is concerning partitions that do not reach the ceiling —

there is

support

from this beraita, for it explicitly teaches in accordance with that one who says so!

According to that version which Rav Naḥman said,

that the

disagreement

is

concerning a mesipes,

but with partitions of ten [handbreadths], according to everyone there is a division of domains — there is

a tiyu vta.

For the beraita teaches that according to Beit Hillel even with partitions of ten [handbreadths] there is no division of domains, provided only that they do not reach the ceiling.

And it is uncertain to us:

According to that version which Rav Naḥman said

“Even concerning a mesipes there is a disagreement” —

shall we say that there is a tiyu vta

from the beraita?

For it is implied that only with partitions that do not reach the ceiling but are ten [handbreadths] high do Beit Shammai hold that there is a division of domains. But with a mesipes, no.

Or perhaps even with a mesipes Beit Shammai hold that there is a division of domains?

Rav Naḥman could say to you: They disagree concerning a partition, and the same law applies to a mesipes.

And the fact that they disagree concerning a partition —

is to inform you of the strength of Beit Hillel,

for they are lenient even concerning a partition, and hold that there is no division of domains.

And we raise a difficulty:

let them disagree concerning a mesipes,

and

to inform you of the strength of Beit Shammai,

that they are stringent even concerning a mesipes, holding that there is a division of domains?

And we answer:

the power of the lenient ruling is preferable

to make known to us!

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Sabar,

that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed specifically concerning partitions that do not reach the ceiling.

But with regard to those that reach the ceiling, Beit Hillel concede that there is a division of domains.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The Mishna also proves this precisely,

that with regard to partitions that reach the ceiling, Beit Hillel concede.

For it teaches

in the Mishna:

And they concede

Beit Hillel

when some of them are dwelling in rooms and upper chambers, that an eruv is required for each group and group.

What are “rooms,” and what are “upper chambers”?

If you say, “rooms”

means

actual rooms,

which means that initially the reception hall was built with the intention of dividing it into rooms,

and “upper chambers” —

actual upper chambers.

This

is obvious,

that there is a division of domains, and why do I need to be told this?!

Rather, is it not [referring to] something resembling rooms

and

something resembling upper chambers?

And what is it? —

Partitions that reach the ceiling.

That is to say: the reception hall was originally built to be a broad hall, and that is its principal use, but now those observing the Shabbat divided it temporarily.

Rather, since they made partitions that reach the ceiling, resembling rooms and upper chambers, according to everyone there is a division of domains.

And we conclude:

Learn from it.

A tanna taught

in a beraita: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree as to whether the domains are divided, as we have explained until now. Rather, according to everyone it is one domain, and they are comparable to five who collected their eruv [and as Beit Hillel hold, according to what we explained above].

However, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel themselves disagree concerning five who collected their eruv.

And therefore:

In what case is this statement said

that Beit Shammai hold that an eruv is required for each one and one —

when the members of the groups bring

the members of the groups

their eruv to another place

in that same courtyard, and place it in the house of the other members of the courtyard.

For this resembles five who collected their eruv and come to make an eruv with another courtyard, as Beit Shammai hold that each one of the five must place his eruv in the other courtyard.

And Beit Hillel hold: When five collected their eruv, one becomes an agent for all of them, and all of them do not need to place bread in the second courtyard.

But if the eruv

of the members of the courtyard

came to them

in the reception hall, even according to Beit Shammai these five do not need to place anything in the joint eruv, and therefore, according to

everyone —

one eruv is sufficient for all of them!

That is to say: Since the eruv came to the reception hall, all of them are exempt from contributing to the eruv, like the house in which the eruv is placed, which is exempt from contributing its share to the eruv [Ritba; and see there].

And we inquire concerning this:

In accordance with whom does this that was taught apply:

Five who collected their eruv —

when they bring their eruv to another place,

when they come to make an eruv by placing an eruv in another courtyard —

one eruv is sufficient for all of them,

and they do not all need to participate in the eruv placed in another courtyard.

In accordance with whom?

In accordance with Beit Hillel.

And as we said.

And there are those who say: In what case is this statement said

that Beit Hillel hold that one eruv is sufficient for all of them —

when the

eruv came to them

in the reception hall. For in such a case, with five who collected their eruv, one eruv is sufficient for all of them [and Beit Shammai hold: Even with five who collected their eruv, an eruv is required for each one and one, and here too it is no different].

But if they were bringing their eruv to another place,

even with five who collected [their eruv], an eruv is required for each one and one, and likewise here, with five who spent the Shabbat in the reception hall —

an eruv is required for each one and one.

And according to this version of the ikkha de-amrei:

In accordance with whom does this that was taught apply: Five who collected their eruv; when they bring their eruv to another place, one eruv is sufficient for all of them?

In accordance with whom? —

In accordance with neither one!

For according to everyone, in such a case an eruv is required for each one and one, as we said.

Mishna:

A courtyard in which there are separate houses for a father and his sons, and for other residents, and

the brothers who would eat at their father’s table but sleep in their houses

that open into the courtyard — they are like separate residents, since they are separate in their sleeping, in separate houses, and

an eruv is required for each one and one of the brothers.

Therefore, if one of them forgot and did not make an eruv,

he renders it prohibited for all of them.

And if he comes to permit it for them —

he nullifies

for them

his domain.

When is this so? When they bring their eruv to another place [in the Gemara it will be explained whether this means to another courtyard or within the same courtyard].

[The Gemara will explain whether this means to another courtyard or to another place in the same courtyard].

But if the eruv came to them, or if there are no other residents with them

in the courtyard, but only the father and his sons —

they do not need to make an eruv,

and the reason for the Mishna will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Below, at the end of this page, we say that a person renders a courtyard prohibited only if he has in it a place of residence. And the amoraim there disagree as to what is called a place of residence.

Rav said: The place of eating, where he eats; and Shmuel said: The place of sleeping.

And from what we say here in the Mishna, that the brothers eat together with their father, but they are separate in their sleeping, in their separate houses, when they bring an eruv to another place each one and one must contribute an eruv,

learn from it

that

the place of sleeping

which is separate for the brothers — is the

factor

that determines their residence. And therefore each one is obligated to contribute a separate eruv!

And we reject this: Nothing can be learned from here. Since these brothers indeed also eat in their separate houses, and not in their father’s house.

And as for that which it teaches, “who would eat at their father’s table” —

it was taught with regard to those receiving an allowance [that their father gives them the expenses for the food that they eat in their houses],

[meaning that their father provides them with the expenses for the food that they eat in their own homes],

it was taught.

The Sages taught: One who has

a “gatehouse” [a small house made before the gate of the courtyard, and everyone uses it as a shortcut], or

[a small house built before the gate of the courtyard, which everyone uses as a passageway], or

a portico [a passageway before the houses],

[a passageway in front of the houses], or

and

a balcony [before the entrances of the upper chambers, and they all ascend through there — Rashi, Yoma 11b]

in his fellow’s courtyard —

even though they dwell there [Tosafot],

this person does not render it prohibited for him

from carrying out from his house into the courtyard, since these places are not considered a residence.

But one who has in his fellow’s courtyard

a hay house, a cattle house, a wood house, and a storehouse —

this person renders it prohibited for him,

for they are considered use of residence.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He renders it prohibited only [on account of] a place of residence

a human dwelling

alone.

Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Ben Nappaḥa, who had five

houses in five

courtyards [Meiri]

[Meiri]

in Usha

and he did not dwell in all of them, but used them for hay and wood [Meiri].

And the incident came before the Sages, and they said: He renders it prohibited only on account of a residence alone.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this: Is it possible that

“a residence” enters your mind!?

That is to say: After all, a gatehouse—even if he dwelled there—does not render it prohibited [Meiri]?!

And we answer:

Rather, say: “a place of residence.”

That is to say: It is fit for residence, and he also actually dwells there. For even if he had many houses in many courtyards, he renders it prohibited only in that residence in which he dwells [Meiri].

That is to say: a place fit for residence in which he also actually lives. Thus, even if he had many houses in many courtyards, he renders prohibited only the one residence in which he lives [Meiri].

What is

where is

the place of residence?