Eruvin 68a — the Talmud in English

What is the sprinkling

that

is a rabbinic prohibition, and

even so

it does not override Shabbat

even in a place involving a mitzva—for example, a person impure through contact with a corpse whose seventh day falls on the eve of Passover that falls on Shabbat: it is forbidden to sprinkle [the purification water] on him, even though, as a practical consequence, the Passover offering will be postponed, as we learned in Tractate Pesachim.

Even instructing a gentile is a rabbinic prohibition, and it does not override

Shabbat even in a place involving a mitzva. And how do we permit instructing a gentile in order to fulfill the mitzva of circumcision?!

He said

in astonishment

to him

Rav Yosef:

And

when

you do not distinguish between a rabbinic prohibition that involves an action

such as sprinkling,

and a rabbinic prohibition that involves no action

such as instructing a gentile?!

It is certainly different, and instructing a gentile, which involves no action but merely an instruction [Ritva], overrides Shabbat in a place involving a mitzva.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye:

And is it possible that

an alley in which there are two great men such as the Sages

[you and Rabba, who reside in it],

should have neither an eruv nor a partnership

as we said above, that they did not make an eruv and did not make a partnership?!

Abaye said to him

to Rabba bar Rav Hanan: And

what shall we do

[what can we do]?!

The master

[Rabba],

it is not his way

[it is not befitting his honor] to go around to the residents of the alley and collect the partnership contribution!

I am occupied with my study

[I am occupied with my learning]!

They

[the other residents of the alley]

do not pay attention

[they do not care]!

And if I were to grant them bread in the basket

[that is to say: there would be no need to collect from the residents of the alley; rather, I should grant them a share in the bread in my basket], this is not possible for me.

Since, if they were to ask it of me

[if one of the residents of the alley were to ask me for his share in the alley in order to eat it]

and it were not possible

for me to waive what is mine [every Shabbat, thus wrote Rashi] and

to give it to them—

the partnership is nullified.

For it turns out that I have no intention of giving them a share in the partnership.

For it was taught: If one of the residents of an alley requested wine or oil

from the partnership

and they did not give it to him—

the partnership is nullified.

Rabba bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye:

And let the master grant them

[“the master” refers to Abaye—Ritva] for the purpose of the partnership in the alley [Tosafot; and this is also implied by Rashi],

a quarter-log of vinegar

[a quarter of a log of vinegar]

in a barrel

which is something about which one is not particular [and it contains food for two meals, the measure required for a partnership, by dipping—Ritva]. Let us place the barrel in the courtyard and rely upon the quarter-log of vinegar in it for the entire year?!

He said to him—

the Ritva, in the name of some books:

It was taught: One may not establish a partnership with a storehouse

[with something that is stored away, such as a barrel]. For “there is no retroactive determination” to say which quarter-log within it is designated for the partnership; therefore, when he takes from the barrel, it may be said that he took from the portion of the partnership.

And we raise an objection:

But it was taught: One may establish a partnership

with a storehouse?!

Rav Oshaya said: It is not difficult.

This

teaching, that says one may not establish a partnership with a storehouse,

is the opinion of Beit Shammai

who hold that there is no retroactive determination, as the Gemara explains and proceeds.

And

this

teaching, which says that one may establish a partnership,

is the opinion of Beit Hillel

who hold that there is retroactive determination.

For we learned:

If there was a corpse in a house, and vessels were found within the space of the doorway, within the thickness of the threshold, they become impure through the tent impurity of the corpse. And even though there is a closed door separating them from the room, they become impure because they are located in a place through which “the impurity will ultimately emerge” by way of the doorway.

And this matter has no reason; rather, it is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai!

If there

was a corpse in a house, and it had

for the house

many doorways

and all of them were closed—the vessels found in the doorways

all of them,

and even the vessels found in windows that are only one handbreadth by one handbreadth,

are impure.

For we do not know through which doorway he will take out the corpse, and therefore all of them are certainly impure, because it is not evident through which doorway he will take out the corpse; therefore all of them are considered a place through which the impurity will ultimately emerge.

If one of them was opened

of the doorways, and its size was four handbreadths by four handbreadths or more, then

it

is a

doorway of impurity,

for all the vessels located in this doorway become impure.

And

if

all of them,

the vessels located in the other doorways,

are pure.

For certainly he will take it out through that open doorway.

And likewise if he

intended to take it out

the corpse

through one of them

[the doorways].

Or

if he intended to take it out

through a window that has four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths—

it saves

that doorway upon which he intended

from all the other doorways.

However, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed concerning them:

Beit Shammai say: And this is when he intended,

or the doorway was opened—

before the corpse dies.

For then the other doorways are completely pure.

But if it was opened or he intended concerning the doorway after the corpse died, there is a distinction between intention and opening:

If no doorway was opened, but he merely intended concerning a doorway in his thoughts, then since the impurity descended upon all the doorways when the corpse died, the impurity does not depart from them.

And even if they bring new vessels to those doorways after the intention concerning a specific doorway, they are impure.

But if one doorway was opened, then from that point onward—since he performed an action of opening—the impurity departs from the other doorways.

But the vessels that had been there before the doorway was opened are impure.

And Beit Hillel say: Even

if he intended or it was opened

after the corpse dies,

we say, “there is retroactive determination.” And the matter is established retroactively, that at the time of the corpse’s death his intention was that the corpse would be taken out through this doorway.

And it turns out that impurity never descended upon the other doorways.

Therefore, only that doorway is impure, while the others are completely pure.

We see, then, that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree concerning retroactive determination.

There was a certain infant whose hot water was spilled,

the hot water that had been prepared for washing the infant before the circumcision.

Rava said to them: Let us ask his mother whether she needs it

[let us ask his mother whether she needs hot water heated for her in order to drink]. And we maintain that a woman after childbirth, after seven days from the birth, although one does not desecrate Shabbat for her [even if she says, “I need it”], Shabbat is desecrated for her through a gentile.

And

let them heat for him

hot water for the infant through a

gentile, along with his mother,

by placing in the vessel more than the mother needs, for the sake of the infant.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rav Mesharsheya to Rava:

But we see

his mother

that she

is eating dates!

It follows that she does not need hot water at all, but is eating cold food.

And how can we tell a gentile to heat hot water for her when she does not need it?!

He said to him

Rava said to Rav Mesharsheya: The woman after childbirth indeed needs to drink hot water. And as for what we see, that she is eating cold things,

say: it is merely confusion that has seized her

[she is overwhelmed by the severity of the illness and does not know what she is eating—Rabbeinu Yonatan].

There was a certain infant whose hot water was spilled,

and there was hot water in another courtyard, in Rava’s house, and there was a doorway between the courtyards, but they had not made an eruv.

Rava said to them: Clear away my vessels from the men’s house to the women’s house,

[clear my vessels from the house of the men, which is open to the courtyard, to the inner women’s house, which is not open to the courtyard].

And I will go and sit there

[and go and sit in the inner women’s house],

and I will renounce to them

[to the residents of the second courtyard]

this courtyard

of mine, and they will be able to carry the hot water from my courtyard to their courtyard! [See the illustration on the following page]

And Rava had to transfer his vessels to the inner rooms that were not open to his courtyard, because once he renounced his authority to the residents of the other courtyard, he was forbidden to take anything out from his house into the courtyard, since it had become theirs, and because of the decree lest he come to take it out [Ritva], he asked that his vessels be cleared away from the rooms open to the courtyard.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Ravina to Rava: But did not Shmuel say: There is no renunciation of authority from one courtyard to another

[as we said above, folio 66b]?!

He said to him

Rava:

I hold in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan.

For he said—

above, folio 66b—

there is renunciation of

authority even

from one courtyard to another,

even when they do not prohibit one another, as in this case.

Ravina said to Rava:

And if the master does not hold in accordance with Shmuel,