Eruvin 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

,

it is necessary

")

to have an iron partition in the middle of the pond from the eve of the Festival, separating it!

And this can be explained in two ways:

.a. Through this, the water will not pass from one side to the other, and the concern is eliminated at its source.

b. It is not necessary to prevent the passage of the water itself; rather, it suffices to have a “partition” separating one body of water from the other.

He laughed at it—

the statement of Rabbi Hiyya—

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina.

And we explain:

Why did

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina

If you say

this is the reason that he laughed:

Because

Because

Rabbi Hiyya taught

this law—that water, which is ownerless property, acquires a place of residence—

in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri [דסבר: חפצי הפקר קונין שביתה]who holds that ownerless objects acquire a place of residence,

[who holds that ownerless property acquires a resting place]

as a stringency, whereas

if

he,

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina,

held in accordance with the Rabbis

and

as a leniency,

that ownerless objects do not acquire a place of residence?

This is impossible.

For:

For

if

if, because

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina held in accordance with the Rabbis

as a leniency, would he laugh at one who teaches it as a stringency?!

Rather,

perhaps we should say that this is the reason he laughed at it:

Because it was taught in a baraita: Flowing rivers and issuing springs,

since they are moving at the onset of Shabbat, which is the time when a place of residence is acquired, do not acquire a place of residence at all; therefore:

they are like the feet of anyone who draws

who draws from them [he may carry the water anywhere that he himself may go].

And since the water in the pond was moving at the onset of Shabbat, it did not acquire a place of residence. Why, then, is an iron partition needed to separate it?!

This too is impossible.

For:

Perhaps the

water

perhaps Rabbi Hiyya is speaking of water that is collected

and remains in place at the onset of Shabbat; Rabbi Hiyya is discussing such water, which acquired a place of residence, and therefore he required a partition.

Rather,

perhaps we should say that this is the reason he laughed at it:

Because Rabbi Hiyya taught

Rabbi Hiyya:

It is necessary to have a partition of

“iron”

to separate it.

And

And this is what was difficult for him:

Why is

a partition of

reeds ineffective,

which must be because

with

with a reed partition

the water enters between them [עוברין המים]the water passes [between one reed and the other].

[the water passes between one reed and the next].

These words of the Gemara, too, can be explained in two ways:

.a. Since the water passes through, the partition accomplishes nothing.

b. Through the intermingling of the water, the designation “partition” is nullified [similar to the passage of young goats, which nullifies the designation of a partition].

And if so—if Rabbi Hiyya himself is concerned about the intermingling of the water, and for that reason a reed partition is insufficient—Rabbi Hiyya has not accomplished anything with his ordinance requiring an iron partition.

For: A partition

of iron also allows the water to enter between it,

the water passes beneath the partition, since an ordinary “partition” is ten handbreadths high and does not reach the bottom of the pond; and even if it reaches the bottom of the pond, it is impossible for water not to enter beneath it [Rashi]. If so, an iron partition will also be ineffective?!

This too cannot be explained as the reason that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina laughed at it.

For:

Perhaps

what Rabbi Hiyya said,

“It is necessary to have

an iron partition,” meant that a complete partition was required, beneath which the water would not pass,

and

and since even beneath an iron partition the water passes,

there is no remedy

for this pond. [לפי מה שכתב רש"י דלשון מחיצה משמע עשרה טפחים בלבד, צריך לומר בכוונת הגמרא: דאפשר "מחיצה" לאו דוקא, אלא סתימה גמורה של ברזל שאין עוברין המים תח תיה]According to what Rashi wrote—that the term “partition” indicates only a height of ten handbreadths—we must explain the Gemara’s intent as follows: Perhaps “partition” is not meant literally; rather, it means a complete iron seal beneath which the water does not pass.

[According to Rashi, who explains that the word “partition” indicates only a height of ten handbreadths, one must say that the Gemara means that perhaps “partition” is not meant literally, but rather a complete iron barrier beneath which the water cannot pass]

Rather,

the Gemara concludes that this is the reason he laughed at it:

Rabbi Hiyya thought that a partition was needed to stop the water completely, and he laughed at this, because that is not required,

because the Sages were lenient with regard to water. Rabbi Hiyya held that a partition was required to stop the water completely, and he laughed at this, since such a partition is not required.

And

And as we say with regard to the following question

of Rabbi Tavla:

Rabbi Tavla asked Rav: With regard to a suspended partition, may it render it permitted in a ruin [שדרך להיות בה מחיצות תלויות, רש"י לעיל דף יב].where suspended partitions are commonly found [Rashi above, 12a]?

[where suspended partitions are common, Rashi above, page 12a]?

He said to him,

Rav:

A suspended partition renders it permitted only with regard to water,

because

the Sages were lenient with regard to water

and not with regard to a ruin!

Here, too, the words of the Gemara can be explained in two ways:

a. The Gemara is now teaching that it is not necessary to interrupt the flow of water from here to there. Rather, the Sages were lenient with regard to water, so that a “partition” suffices.

b. This is what it means: Since we learned from Rav’s words that a suspended partition renders it permitted with regard to water [and not specifically in the context of Shabbat limits], it follows that the fact that water mixes beneath the partition does not nullify its designation as a partition. And since even according to Rabbi Hiyya it is obvious that only the legal status of a “partition” is required, and his concern was merely that this status would be nullified by the intermingling of the water, he properly laughed at it, since we see that there is no concern for this.

We learned in the Mishna: One who was sleeping on the road and did not know that darkness had fallen has two thousand cubits in every direction; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

And the Sages say: He has only four

cubits.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He is situated in their middle.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He may walk in whichever direction he wishes.

And we raise an objection:

Rabbi Yehuda,

who said that the four cubits are at his sides, and he may choose four cubits in whichever direction he wishes,

is identical to the first tanna,

the Sages who said that he has only four cubits, since according to their opinion as well this is the case. In what, then, do they disagree?!

Rava

explained

that this is the nature of their dispute:

They disagree over the following:

The Sages, who said that he has only four cubits, meant four cubits in each direction, analogous to the measure of two thousand cubits that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri stated, and over which they disagree with him: They grant him those four cubits in every direction [according to Tosafot]. Thus, he may walk within a square measuring eight cubits by eight cubits.

And this measure of

eight by eight

is what

distinguishes between them,

between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda, since according to Rabbi Yehuda he may never walk beyond the four cubits that he chose.

It was taught likewise in a baraita:

One who went outside the Shabbat limit has

eight by eight

cubits,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And these are precisely the words of the Sages in our Mishna.

And

further

Rava

said in explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages:

The dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda concerns only the measure of four cubits granted to one who went outside the Shabbat limit; if he wishes

to walk,

they disagree as to how far he may walk.

However,

if he wishes

to carry

objects in the place where he is located outside the city, which is a karmelit [Ritva], and carrying them four cubits there involves the prohibition of “carrying four cubits,”

everyone agrees

both the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda:

[seemingly, this is not precise, since carrying exactly four cubits involves the prohibition of “carrying four cubits”; rather, the meaning is up to, but not including, four cubits]

No!

He is permitted to carry it [and if he wishes, he may carry it once in this direction and bring it back, and once in that direction and bring it back].

However,

more

than four cubits—for example, if the object is at one side of him, at the end of four cubits, and he wishes to carry it eight cubits to the end of the four cubits on his other side—

he may not

carry it, even though he has not taken it outside the square of eight cubits by eight cubits surrounding him.

The following discussion, which deals with the matter of “four cubits,” was explained by the Gaon Yaakov as concerning only the law of four cubits with regard to Shabbat limits, and not the law of carrying four cubits in the public domain. However, see the Beit Yosef and the Bach, section 349, who cited this discussion with regard to carrying four cubits in the public domain.

And these four cubits

that one who went outside his limit is permitted to walk,

where are they written

in the Torah?

The Gemara explains the source of this law:

As it was taught in a baraita:

It is written, concerning what Moses said to those people who had gone out from the people to gather outside the limit [Tur, cited in the Mishna Berura]:

“Let each man remain in his place

let no man go out from his place on the seventh day.” And the Sages expounded it:

“Remain”—you who went outside the limit—in your place, which is

like

equivalent to the measure of

“beneath him”

of a person, as will be explained. “Let no man go out”—those who did not go outside the limit—from his place to outside the limit [Biur Halakha].

And how much

is the measure of

“beneath him”?

Four cubits, since:

.

his body

when lying down occupies a space of

three cubits.

.

And one cubit

is added

so that

he can

stretch out his hands and feet.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

.

His body

when lying down occupies a space of

three cubits.

.

And one cubit

is added

so that if

so that, if he wishes,

he may take [כשהוא שוכב] [while lying down]

[while lying down]

an object

that is placed

beneath his feet [אחרי רגליו] [behind his feet],

[behind his feet],

and place

that object

beneath his head [אחרי ראשו] [behind his head].

[behind his head].

And we explain:

What

is

between them—

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the halakha?

The difference between them concerns the four cubits

that the Sages stated with regard to Shabbat limits:

are they exact [עצבות, ראה לעיל ד, א] [see above, 4a], with each cubit measured as six handbreadths, the fingers pressed together; or is one permitted to walk four generously measured cubits [with the fingers spread apart], with each cubit measured as six handbreadths whose fingers have space between them [as explained according to the Gaon Yaakov].

[narrow cubits, with each cubit measured as six handbreadths whose fingers are pressed together], or may one walk four spacious cubits [with the six handbreadths measured with space between the fingers] [as explained according to the Gaon Yaakov]?

Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that he has only four exact cubits: the measure of his body is three exact cubits, and the measure needed to take an object is one exact cubit.

Rabbi Meir’s opinion is that he has four generously measured cubits, because the measure required to stretch out his hands and feet is more than one cubit, and the measure of his body together with the measure required to stretch out his hands and feet amounts to four generously measured cubits.

Rav Mesharsheya said to his son: When you enter before Rav Pappa, ask him [כשתכנס אצל רב פפא, שאל ממנו את השאלה הבאה] [when you enter before Rav Pappa, ask him the following question]:

[when you go to Rav Pappa, ask him the following question]:

The four cubits that the Sages stated

with regard to Shabbat limits—how are they measured?

Is it:

By his own cubit [באמת ידו של היוצא מתחומו] [the cubit of the person who went outside his limit]

[the cubit of the person who went outside his limit] that

that we grant him,

to walk, allowing him to walk four times the measure of his own cubit, whatever its size? It would then follow that the walking measure of a large person would not equal that of a dwarf. [However, if a person has a small cubit but an average-sized body, his measure is calculated using an average cubit, as stated below.]

Or

using the cubit of an average person—whose measure is six handbreadths—for everyone, and as the measure of four cubits

by the sacred cubit

that was used in the Temple

that we grant him

to walk? For we learned that in the Temple, at the eastern gate, in the place called Shushan the Capital, there were two measuring rods, each one cubit long, with which cubits were measured in the Temple; and those average cubits were like the cubit of Moses.

Rav Mesharsheya added and instructed his son to debate Rav Pappa in either event:

If [יאמר] [he says]

[he answers]

to you

Rav Pappa in response to your question:

We grant him sacred cubits.

answer him: If so, what will happen to a man as large as

Og, king of Bashan,

a gigantic man who went outside his limit,

what will become of him

—will he truly be unable to move from his place?!

The Gemara’s astonishment can be explained in two ways:

a. It follows the opinion that the four cubits granted to one who went outside the limit include the space occupied by his body. If so, this giant would be unable to move even the slightest amount.

b. It follows the opinion that four cubits are measured for him in addition to the space occupied by his body. Even so, the distance he could move would ultimately be very small, and it does not seem reasonable that he should be prohibited from moving.

And if

But if

Rav Pappa says to you

in his response:

By the cubit of the person himself

who went outside his limit

we grant him.

Say to him [השיבהו] [reply to him]:

If so,

why did the tanna not teach this

also with regard to this law of four cubits

along with [יחד עם] [together with]

the other measures that the Sages calibrated according to the individual, such as one who drinks a cheekful on Yom Kippur, concerning which the Mishna says:

There are

measures dependent on the individual

that

the Sages said are to be measured:

everything depends on the person,

for if he is a dwarf, his measure is not equal to that of a large person. The measures calculated in this manner are listed in that Mishna, whereas the four cubits of one who went outside the limit are not taught there. If these four cubits, too, are measured according to his own cubits, why was this not also taught in that Mishna?!

When

the son of Rav Mesharsheya

came before Rav Pappa,

he debated all these points as his father had instructed him.

Rav Pappa said to him:

.

If we were to be so exacting

with these kinds of inferences of yours throughout the Talmud, we would not know how to resolve them, and consequently

we would not have taught

them at all. This teaches you not to be so exacting!

b. Nevertheless, in the present matter I have an answer:

Actually, we grant him his own cubit

to walk,

and as for what is difficult for you—why did the tanna not teach

this law of four cubits

together with “there are measures that they stated

that everything depends on the person”—this is not a difficulty, because

it is not an absolute rule for him;

that is, since every person is not measured according to his own cubit, the tanna did not teach it there. The tanna teaches only those measures that are calculated for every person according to his individual size.

Because there is [שהרי יש] [for there is]

[for example,] an average person in bodily stature who is

a person who is average in the measure of his body but dwarfish in his limbs, that is, his cubit is small and not proportionate to the measure of his body. He is measured according to the cubit of an average person, since it would not suffice to grant his average-sized body a walking measure calculated according to his small cubit.

We learned in the Mishna:

If there were

those who went outside the limit

two, and part

of the

four cubits of one

was within [part of] the four cubits of the other, they may bring food and eat in the middle, etc.

If there were three, and the middle one’s area was encompassed by those of the two others, he [the middle one] is permitted to be with them, and they are permitted to be with him, but the two outer ones are prohibited to be with one another.

Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? To three courtyards that open into one another and open into the public domain: If two of them made an eiruv with the middle courtyard, it is permitted with them and they are permitted with it, but the two outer courtyards are prohibited to one another.

And we explain:

Why does

Rabbi Shimon

need to say, “To what is this comparable”,

that is, what purpose does Rabbi Shimon’s analogy serve [Ritva]?

The Gemara explains:

Because Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree with regard to those three courtyards:

The opinion of the Sages is that although, by the letter of the law, the middle courtyard is permitted with them and they are permitted with it, the Sages decreed that it is prohibited, lest the residents of the outer courtyards come to carry from one outer courtyard to the other.

The opinion of Rabbi Shimon is that we are not concerned about this.

And Rabbi Shimon’s words in our Mishna were stated as proof of his position:

For even in the case discussed in our Mishna, involving three people, with the middle one encompassed between the other two—such as when the distance between the two outer people is eight cubits, and the outer people marked off their four cubits side by side, while the middle person’s four cubits overlap those of his companions: two cubits overlap those of the person standing to his right, and two cubits overlap those of the person standing to his left—even though, according to the strict law, the middle person is permitted to move together with each of the outer people within those two cubits that he shares with each of them, there is concern lest the outer people come to carry their objects from the particular place of residence established for each of them to the place of residence established for his fellow.

And since, in the case of our Mishna, everyone agrees that the middle person is permitted together with each of them, and they do not prohibit it on account of this decree,

this is what he is saying:

and Rabbi Shimon proved

to the Rabbis:

Now [

and behold, ]

to what is this analogous? To three courtyards that are open to one another and open to the public domain,

and if so:

What is different there—

with regard to three courtyards—

that you disagree [

with me and prohibit, ]

and what is different here—

with regard to three people—

that you do not disagree [

that you do not disagree and prohibit, ] and you agree that there is no concern about this decree?!

And

we explain the reasoning of the

Rabbis,

who disagree with regard to the courtyards—and prohibited, but do not disagree with regard to those who go beyond the Shabbat boundary—and permitted:

There—

with regard to three courtyards—there is reason for concern lest the residents of the outer courtyards come to carry from one outer courtyard to the other through the middle courtyard, since

the residents are numerous [

there are many residents in the courtyards, ] and not all of them will know to take care not to carry.

Here—

with regard to three people who went beyond the Shabbat boundary—

the residents are not numerous [

there are not many residents, ] meaning: the case involves only individual people, and the outer people can take care not to carry from the place of residence established for one person to the place of residence established for his fellow.

We learned in the Mishna: To what is this analogous? To three courtyards that are open to one another and open to the public domain; if two of them established an eruv with the middle one, the middle one is permitted with them, and they are permitted with it,

and the two outer courtyards

are prohibited with one another:

When two courtyards wish to establish an eruv with one another, the residents of one courtyard collect an eruv from all the residents, and place it in one of the houses in the other courtyard. Through this, the residents of the two courtyards are considered as though they all lived in the same house in which they placed the eruv, and as though there were no separate residences here at all, but rather that they all relied on one table [Ritva]; and the entire domain of the courtyards, including their houses, is considered as though it were designated for that house, since they all live in that house [Rashi, below 49a].

Consequently, one who carries from any house in the two courtyards—to the courtyards or to the houses within them—is not carrying from one person’s domain to another’s domain, but is carrying within the same domain.

It might have been thought: The residents of each outer courtyard collected an eruv from all the residents of the courtyard and placed it in a house in the middle courtyard, [for presumably, since they all established an eruv with the middle courtyard, they placed their eruv there, as is the usual practice with ordinary courtyard eruvin: when people come to establish an eruv, they place everyone’s eruv in one of the houses, Ritva]; and through this, the residents of one outer courtyard are considered as though they lived in the house in the middle courtyard, and they are permitted to carry from one to the other; and the residents of the second outer courtyard did the same.

And therefore we ask:

But why

are the two outer courtyards prohibited with one another?!

But

since the outer courtyards established an eruv with the middle courtyard,

by placing their eruv in a house in the middle courtyard, the residents of all the courtyards became as though they lived in the house in the middle courtyard, and

they became

all the courtyards like

one

courtyard designated for that house, and even the outer courtyards should be permitted with one another.

Rav Yehuda said

in answer:

Our Mishna is speaking not of a case in which the outer courtyards established an eruv with the middle courtyard by each outer courtyard placing its eruv in the middle courtyard. Rather, this is how they established the eruv:

For example,

the residents of the middle courtyard collected two eruvin from the residents of the courtyard, and

the middle courtyard placed its eruv

one

in

a house in

this courtyard, and its eruv

second

in

a house in

this courtyard;

consequently, not all the courtyards were designated for one house. Rather, one outer courtyard and the middle courtyard were designated for the house in one outer courtyard, while the second outer courtyard and the middle courtyard were designated for the house in the second outer courtyard.

Therefore, it is permitted to carry from the middle courtyard to either outer courtyard, since they constitute one domain; but it is prohibited to carry from one outer courtyard to the other, since they constitute two domains.

And Rav Sheshet said

in answer:

Even if you say

that the outer courtyards established an eruv with the middle courtyard by

placing

the residents of the outer courtyards

their eruv in the middle courtyard,

the two outer courtyards did not become one domain, as our Mishna is speaking of: