Eruvin 48a — the Talmud in English

Therefore, if one came to draw water from it on a Festival,

it is necessary that in the middle of the pool there be, before the Festival,

have, in the middle of the reservoir, a partition made before the Festival to separate it

an iron partition to separate it!

And this may be explained in two ways:

A. Since the water would thereby not pass from here to there, the concern would be annulled at its root.

B. It is not necessary to annul the reality of the water’s passage; rather, a “partition” distinguishing between the water and the water is sufficient.

He laughed at it—

of Rabbi Hiyya—

Rabbi Yose bar Hanina.

And we explain:

What is the reason that

Rabbi Yose bar Hanina

if you say

this is the reason that he laughed:

Because

Rabbi Hiyya

taught it

—this law, that the water acquires—since it is ownerless—an abode

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri [

who holds: ownerless objects acquire an abode ]

stringently, and

if

he himself,

Rabbi Yose bar Hanina,

held in accordance with the Sages

and

leniently,

that ownerless objects do not acquire an abode?

This is impossible.

For:

and

why,

because he held

Rabbi Yose bar Hanina in accordance with the Sages

leniently, would one who teaches stringently laugh at him?!

Rather,

perhaps this is the reason that he laughed at it:

Because it was taught: Rivers that flow and springs that issue forth

since they are moving at the time of the onset of Shabbat, which is the time of acquiring the abode, they do not acquire an abode at all, and therefore

they are like the feet of any person

who filled from them [they may carry them wherever the one who filled may walk].

And since the water in the pool is moving at the onset of Shabbat, it did not acquire an abode; so why is an iron partition needed to separate it?!

This too cannot be so.

For:

perhaps the

water

was gathered

and standing in its place at the onset of Shabbat—Rabbi Hiyya is speaking of this—and it acquired an abode, and therefore he required a partition.

Rather, perhaps this is the reason that he laughed at it:

because

Rabbi Hiyya taught

the following:

it is necessary to have a partition of

“iron”

to separate it.

And

this is what was difficult to him:

What is different

about a partition of

reeds, that it does not

help? It must be because

in

a partition of reeds

the water enters them [

the water passes between one reed and the other ].

These words of the Gemara, too, may be explained in two ways:

A. Since the water passes through, the partition accomplished nothing whatsoever.

B. Since the water mixes, the name “partition” is annulled [similar to the passage of young goats, which annuls the name of a partition].

And if so, since Rabbi Hiyya himself was concerned about the mixing of the water, and therefore a partition of reeds is insufficient, Rabbi Hiyya’s enactment, by which he required an iron partition, was not effective.

For: a partition

of iron, too, the water enters

the water passes beneath the partition, since an ordinary “partition” is ten handbreadths high and does not reach the bottom of the pool; and even if it reaches the bottom of the pool, it is impossible that the water should not enter beneath it, [Rashi]. If so, even an iron partition will not help?!

This, too, cannot be explained as the reason that Rabbi Yose bar Hanina laughed at it.

For:

perhaps what Rabbi Hiyya said,

“it is necessary”

“to have

an iron partition,” meant that a complete partition was necessary, beneath which the water would not pass,

and

since even through an iron partition the water passes,

there is no remedy

for this pool. [

According to what Rashi wrote, that the expression “partition” implies only ten handbreadths, it must be said that the Gemara means: perhaps “partition” is not literal, but rather a complete iron sealing, beneath which the water does not pass ]

Rather,

the Gemara concludes, this is the reason that he laughed at it:

Rabbi Hiyya thought that a partition was needed that would stop the water completely, and it was regarding this that he laughed, for such a thing is not required,

because the Sages were lenient in the case of water.

And

as we say concerning that question

of Rabbi Tavla:

For Rabbi Tavla asked Rav: What is the status of a suspended partition—does it permit [carrying] in a ruin [

where it is usual for there to be suspended partitions, Rashi above, page 12a ]?

He said to him,

Rav:

A suspended partition permits only in the case of water,

for

the Sages were lenient in the case of water

but not in the case of a ruin!

Here, too, the words of the Gemara may be explained in two ways:

A. Now the Gemara teaches that it is not necessary to stop the flow of the water from here to there; rather, the Sages were lenient in the case of water, so that a “partition” is sufficient.

B. This is what it means: since we learned from Rav’s words that a suspended partition permits in the case of water [and not specifically with regard to techumim], it follows by itself that the fact that the water mixes beneath the partition does not annul the name of partition. And since even according to Rabbi Hiyya it is obvious that only the status of a “partition” is required, except that he was concerned that it would be annulled by the mixing of the water, he properly laughed at it, for we see that there is no concern for this.

We learned in the Mishna: One who was sleeping on the road and did not know that it had become dark has two thousand cubits in every direction; these are the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.

And the Sages say: he has only four

cubits.

Rabbi Eliezer says: and he is in their midst.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He may go in whichever direction he wishes.

And we challenge: But

Rabbi Yehuda,

who said that the four cubits are at his sides, and he chooses for himself four cubits in whichever direction he wishes,

is the first Tanna,

the Sages who said: he has only four cubits—for even according to their view this is so. In what do they disagree?!

Rabbi

explained

Rava

that this is what they disagree about:

The Sages, who said: he has only four cubits, meant four cubits in every direction, similar to the measure of two thousand cubits—which Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri stated, and with which they disagreed—which are given to him in every direction [according to Tosafot]. Thus, he may walk within a square area of eight cubits by eight cubits.

And this measure of

eight by eight

is what

distinguishes between them—between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda—for according to Rabbi Yehuda he may never walk except within those four cubits that he chose.

This measure of eight by eight is the distinction between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda, for according to Rabbi Yehuda he may walk only within the four cubits that he chose.

It was also taught so:

One who went outside the techum has

eight by eight

cubits,

the words of Rabbi Meir. And these are precisely the words of the Sages in our Mishna.

And these are precisely the words of the Sages in our Mishna.

And

Rava

said

further, in explanation of the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages:

The disagreement

between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda is only concerning the measure of four cubits that one who went outside the techum has: if he wishes

to walk, they disagree about how far he may walk.

They disagree only about that.

But if he wishes

if he wishes

to carry

objects in the place where he is situated outside the city—which is a karmelit [Ritva], and carrying them four cubits in it involves the prohibition of “carrying four cubits”—

everyone

both the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda agree:

Four cubits [

seemingly not specifically, for carrying exactly four cubits involves “carrying four cubits”; rather, the meaning is up to four cubits, but not including four cubits ]

no!

He is permitted to carry [and if he wishes, he carries once in this direction and returns, and once in that direction and returns].

But

more

than four cubits—for example, if the object is standing at his one side at the end of four cubits, and he comes to carry it eight cubits, to the end of his four cubits on his other side—

he may not

carry it, even though he has not taken it outside the square area of eight cubits by eight cubits surrounding him.

The following discussion, which deals with the matter of “four cubits,” was explained by the Gaon Yaakov as dealing only with the law of four cubits concerning techumim, and not with the law of carrying four cubits in the public domain. However, see in the Beit Yosef and the Bach, section 349, who cited this sugya concerning carrying four cubits in the public domain.

And these four cubits

within which one who went outside his techum is permitted to walk,

where is it written

in the Torah?

And the Gemara explains the source of this law:

As it was taught:

It is written, for Moses said to those men who had gone out from the people to gather outside the techum [Tur, cited in the Mishna Berura]:

“Remain, each man beneath

himself; let no man leave his place on the seventh day,” and the Sages expounded it:

“Remain”—you who went outside the techum—in your place, which is

like

the measure of

beneath himself

of a person, as will be explained. “Let no man leave”—those who did not go outside the techum—from his place to outside the techum, [Biur Halakha]. [

And how much

is the measure of

beneath himself? ]

Four cubits, for:

A.

His body

when lying occupies a place of

three cubits.

B.

And one cubit

additional

in order that he can

he can

stretch out his hands and his legs.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

A.

His body

when lying occupies a place of

three cubits.

B.

And one cubit

additional

so that,

if he wishes, he may

take [

while he is lying ]

an object

lying

beneath his feet [

behind his feet ], and

place

that same object

beneath his head [

behind his head ].

And we explain:

What

is

between them—between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda—with regard to the law?

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the halakha?

What is between them: four cubits

that the Sages stated concerning techumim,

exactly measured [

“compressed”; see above, 4a ] are they, measuring the six handbreadths of each cubit with fingers pressed together; or is one permitted to walk four spacious cubits [“spread out,”] measuring its six handbreadths with fingers having space between them, [explained according to the Gaon Yaakov].

The view of Rabbi Yehuda: he has only four exactly measured cubits, corresponding to the measure of his body, which is three exactly measured cubits, and the measure needed for taking an object, which is one exactly measured cubit.

The view of Rabbi Meir: he has four spacious cubits, for the measure of stretching out his hands and legs is more than a cubit, and the measure of his body together with the measure of stretching out his hands and legs amounts to four spacious cubits.

Rav Mesharsheya said to his son: When you enter before Rav Pappa, ask him [

when you enter before Rav Pappa, ask him the following question ]:

The four cubits that they said

the Sages concerning techumim—how are they measured?

Is it:

by his own cubit [

by the cubit of the hand of the one who went outside his techum ]

we give him

to walk, and he is permitted to walk four times the measure of his own cubit, according to what it is; thus, the walking measure of a large person in his body is not equal to that of a dwarf in his body. [However, one who is a dwarf with regard to his cubit but is an average person in his body is measured by an average cubit, as below.]

Or by the cubit of the hand of an average person—whose measure is six handbreadths—which is used to measure for every person; and according to the measure of four cubits

using the cubit of an average person—whose measure is six handbreadths—for everyone, and as the measure of four cubits

by the sacred cubit

that was in the Temple

we give him

to walk? For we learned that in the Temple, at the eastern gate, in the place called Shushan the Capital, there were two measuring rods, each one cubit long, with which they measured cubits in the Temple, and those average cubits were like the cubit of Moses.

Rabbi Mesharsheya added and said to his son, to conduct the discussion with Rav Pappa by way of either possibility:

If he says [

he will say ]

to you

Rav Pappa in his answer to your question:

We give him sacred cubits.

Answer him: If so, a person as large as

Og, king of Bashan,

who went outside his techum,

what will become of him,

and will he not move from his place?!

And the Gemara’s astonishment may be explained in two ways:

A. It follows the view of those who say that the four cubits allotted to one who goes outside the techum include the place of his body; if so, this giant would be unable to move even by a hairsbreadth.

B. It follows the view of those who say that four cubits are measured for him in addition to the place of his body, for in the end the measure of his movement would be small, and it does not seem that he should be forbidden to move.

And

if

he says to you

Rav Pappa in his answer:

By his own cubit

of the one who went outside his techum

we give him.

Say to him [

answer him ]: If so,

why did he not teach it

also concerning this law of four cubits

along with [

together with ] the other measures that the Sages measured according to a person, such as one who drinks a cheekful on Yom Kippur, concerning which they said in the Mishna:

There are

measures dependent on the person,

which

the Sages said are to be measured:

everything according to what he is as a person—for if he is a dwarf, his measure is not equal to that of a large person—and in that Mishna the measures that are measured in this manner were specified, whereas four cubits for one who goes outside the techum were not taught there; and if these four cubits, too, are measured by his own cubits, why was this also not taught in that Mishna?!

for if he is a dwarf, his measure is not equal to that of a large person. The measures calculated in this manner are listed in that Mishna, whereas the four cubits of one who went outside the limit are not taught there. If these four cubits, too, are measured according to his own cubits, why was this not also taught in that Mishna?!

When

the son of Rav Mesharsheya

came before Rav Pappa,

he conducted the entire discussion as his father had instructed him.

Rav Pappa said to him:

A.

If we were to examine all of this

with such analyses as yours everywhere in the Talmud, we would not know how to answer them, and therefore

we would not have taught

anything at all. This teaches you: do not analyze so much!

B. Nevertheless, in our matter I have an answer:

We always give him his own cubit

to walk,

and what is difficult for you, why did he not teach

this law of four cubits

along with “there are measures”

“everything according to what he is as a person”—it is not a difficulty, because

it is not uniform for him, that is: since they do not measure for every person by his own cubit, therefore he did not teach it, for the tanna teaches only those measures that are measured for every person according to what he is as a person.

that is, since every person is not measured according to his own cubit, the tanna did not teach it there. The tanna teaches only those measures that are calculated for every person according to his individual size.

Because there is [

for there is ] an average person in the measure of his body but

a dwarf in his limbs, that is: his cubit is small and is not proportionate to the measure of his body; therefore he is not measured by his own cubit but by the cubit of an average person, and since it is insufficient to give his average body a walking measure measured according to his small cubit,

We learned in the Mishna:

If there were

those who went outside the techum

two, part

of the four

cubits of this one

within [part of] the cubits of the other, they may bring and eat in the middle, etc.

If there were three, and the middle one was included between them, he [the middle one] is permitted with them, and they are permitted with him, while the two outer ones are forbidden with one another.

Rabbi Shimon said: To what may this be compared? To three courtyards that are open to one another and open to the public domain: if two made an eruv with the middle one, it is permitted with them, and they are permitted with it, while the two outer ones are forbidden with one another.

And we explain:

Why does

Rabbi Shimon

need to say “To what may this be compared”, that is: what is the point for Rabbi Shimon in stating this analogy [Ritva]?!

—that is, what purpose does Rabbi Shimon’s analogy serve? [Ritva]

And the Gemara explains:

Because Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagreed concerning those three courtyards:

The view of the Sages: although according to the strict law it is permitted with them and they are permitted with it, the Sages issued a decree and forbade it, lest the residents of the outer courtyards come to carry from one outer courtyard to the other.

The view of Rabbi Shimon: they are not concerned about this.

And Rabbi Shimon’s words in our Mishna were stated as proof of his view:

For even in the case discussed in our Mishna—three people whose four-cubit areas overlap, with the middle person situated between the other two—for example, when the distance between the two outer people is eight cubits, and the outer people each established their four-cubit areas side by side, so that the middle person’s four cubits overlap with those of the others—two cubits overlap with the person standing to his right and two cubits with the person standing to his left—even though, strictly speaking, the middle person is permitted to use the two cubits that he shares with each of them, there is concern that the outer people might come to carry their objects from the place assigned exclusively to each of them to the place assigned to the other.

Since, in the case of our Mishna, everyone agrees that the middle person is permitted to use the area of each of the others, and they do not prohibit this because of that preventive decree,

this is what Rabbi Shimon was saying:

And he demonstrated

to the Sages:

Now, [

and behold,]

this may be compared to three courtyards that open into one another and also open onto the public domain,

and if so:

What is different there—

in the case of the three courtyards—

that you disagree [

you disagree with me] and prohibit,

and what is different here—

in the case of the three people—

that you do not disagree [

you do not disagree and prohibit], and you agree that there is no concern about this preventive decree?!

And

we explain the reasoning of

the Sages, who disagreed in the case of the courtyards and prohibited, but did not disagree in the case of people who went beyond the boundary and permitted:

who disagree with regard to the courtyards—and prohibited, but do not disagree with regard to those who go beyond the Shabbat boundary—and permitted:

There—

in the case of the three courtyards—there is reason to be concerned that the residents of the outer courtyards might come to carry from one outer courtyard to the other through the middle courtyard, since

there are many residents [

the courtyards have many residents], and not all of them will know to be careful not to carry.

Here—

in the case of the three people who went beyond the boundary—

there are not many residents [

there are not many residents]. In other words, the case concerns only individuals, and the outer people can take care not to carry from the place assigned to one person to the place assigned to the other.

We learned in the Mishna: “To what may this be compared? To three courtyards that open into one another and also open onto the public domain. If two of them established a joining with the middle courtyard, the middle courtyard is permitted with them, and they are permitted with it,”

but the two outer courtyards

are prohibited from using one another:

When two courtyards wish to establish a joining with one another, the residents of one courtyard collect a joining from all the residents and place it in one of the houses in the other courtyard. As a result, the residents of the two courtyards are considered as though they all live in the same house where the joining was placed, as though there were no separate dwellings here at all, but rather they all rely on one table [Ritva], and the entire domain of the courtyards, including their houses, is considered as though it were designated for that house, since they all live in that house [Rashi, below 49a].

It follows that one who carries from any house in the two courtyards to the courtyards or to the houses within them is not carrying from one person’s domain to another’s domain; rather, he is carrying within the same domain.

The initial assumption is that the residents of each outer courtyard collected a joining from all the residents of that courtyard and placed it in a house in the middle courtyard [for, presumably, since everyone established a joining with the middle courtyard, they placed their joinings in the middle courtyard, as is the usual practice when residents of courtyards establish a joining: they place everyone’s joining in one of the houses, Ritva]. As a result, the residents of one outer courtyard are considered as though they lived in a house in the middle courtyard, and they were permitted to carry from one to the other; and the residents of the second outer courtyard did the same.

Therefore we ask:

Why

are the two outer courtyards prohibited from using one another?!

But

since the outer courtyards established a joining with the middle courtyard,

by placing their joining in a house in the middle courtyard, all the residents of the courtyards became as though they lived in the house in the middle courtyard, and

they thereby became

all the courtyards

one

courtyard designated for that house, and even the outer courtyards should be permitted to use one another.

Rav Yehuda said

in resolution of the difficulty:

Our Mishna is speaking not of a joining between the outer courtyards and the middle courtyard formed by each outer courtyard placing its joining in the middle courtyard. Rather, this is how they established the joining:

For example,

the residents of the middle courtyard collected two joinings from the residents of the courtyard, and

the middle courtyard placed its joining

one

in

a house in

this

courtyard, and its second joining

in

a house in

this

courtyard. It follows that all the courtyards were not designated for one house. Rather, one outer courtyard and the middle courtyard were designated for a house in one outer courtyard, while the second outer courtyard and the middle courtyard were designated for a house in the second outer courtyard.

Therefore, it is permitted to carry from the middle courtyard to either outer courtyard, since they constitute one domain; but it is prohibited to carry from one outer courtyard to the other, since they are two domains.

And Rav Sheshet said

in resolution of the difficulty:

You may even say

that the joining between the outer courtyards and the middle courtyard was formed by

the residents of

the outer courtyards

placing their joinings in the middle courtyard.

Nevertheless, the two outer courtyards did not become one domain, for our Mishna is speaking as follows: