Eruvin 44a (מד.) — the Talmud in English

or perhaps the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

and this was the question that he asked Rav Naḥman.

b.

Or perhaps,

if there had been enough people to make a partition extending all the way to the actual תחום, Rav Ḥisda would not have been uncertain, as it would have been obvious to him that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel; rather,

we are dealing with a case in which there were not enough men,

[because there were not enough people to make a partition extending all the way to the actual תחום,] and with the number of people available it was only possible to make a partition extending to within two cubits of the תחום. And we learned in the Mishna below [page 52b]: One who went outside the תחום, even by one cubit, may not enter beyond his four cubits; Rabbi Eliezer says: He may enter two [if he went two [cubits] outside the תחום, he may enter the city’s תחום and be regarded as one of the city’s residents [and the reason for this will be explained below, page 45a]; but if he went three cubits outside the תחום, he may not enter]. Consequently, according to Rabbi Eliezer, it would suffice for Rav Neḥemya to walk within the partition formed by the people as far as two cubits, and from there he could enter the city’s תחום by virtue of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion; but according to the Rabbis, he could enter only if he had a partition extending all the way to the actual תחום.

And

since this is so, it may be said that

it was this that Rav Ḥisda was asking

Rav Naḥman:

Does the halakha follow Rabbi Eliezer, or does the halakha not follow Rabbi Eliezer?

And this was the question that he asked Rav Naḥman.

And we resolve it:

It is obvious that we are dealing with a case in which there were not enough men,

and his uncertainty was whether the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer.

For if it enters your mind that we are dealing with a case in which there were enough men,

and his uncertainty was whether the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel or not, then

what could Rav Ḥisda be asking him

Rav Naḥman?!

For

Rav said

above, on page 42b:

The halakha follows Rabban Gamliel with regard to a pen, a courtyard, and a ship!

Rather, certainly we are dealing with a case in which there were not enough men, and he was asking about Rabbi Eliezer.

This is also precise,

as we explained: the partition formed by the people extends only to a point near the תחום.

d.

Indeed,

he said to him

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Ḥisda: “Make a partition of people for him”

and

he may enter.”

What does “he may enter”

[mean? That is to say: Why did Rav Naḥman add the words “and he may enter”?] Is it

not

to indicate that Rav Naḥman meant as follows: Make a partition of people for him, and within it he may come as far as the point near the תחום; “and he may enter” the city’s תחום from that point even

without a partition?!

And now we return to the substance of Rav Naḥman’s words:

He raised an objection to him

again,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak to Rava,

concerning the statement of Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov, who permitted making a partition on Shabbat, from what we learned:

If a wall of a sukka fell

on a Festival,

one may not place there

in place of the wall

a person, an animal, or utensils, and

even

one may not stand up a bed in order to spread a sheet over it

in place of the wall, even though it appears only as though he intends to clear the sukka,

because one may not make a temporary tent initially

[that is, a new tent, rather than an addition to an existing tent]

on a Festival, and needless to say, on Shabbat,

and the prohibition against making a tent includes making a partition.

And since this is so, how did Rav Naḥman permit making a partition on Shabbat [Ritva]?!

He said to him,

Rava said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

You are citing this baraita to me

[you derive from this baraita that it is prohibited to make a partition on a Festival or on Shabbat],

but I will cite this baraita to you,

which indicates that it is permitted to make a partition on a Festival or on Shabbat [Ritva].

For we learned in a baraita:

A person may make his fellow a wall

of a sukka

so that he may eat, drink, and sleep

in the sukka [for the principal fulfillment of the mitzva of sukka is through these three activities, Rashi],

and he may stand up the bed and spread a sheet over it so that the sun will not fall upon the dead or upon the food,

so it is evident that it is permitted to make a partition.

And the Gemara challenges this: If so,

these are difficult

these two baraitot

against each other,

as one baraita implies that it is permitted to make a partition, while the other baraita implies that it is prohibited?!

And we answer:

There is no difficulty

between these baraitot. Everyone agrees that it is prohibited to make a partition; however, the baraitot disagree with regard to a temporary partition.

This

baraita—the one that permits it—

is Rabbi Eliezer,

who permits a temporary partition.

And

this

baraita—the one that prohibits it—

is the Rabbis,

who prohibit even making a temporary partition. [According to the Ritva’s explanation, the Gemara’s present assumption is that the baraitot disagree with regard to a temporary partition. According to Rashi’s method below, it is possible that they disagree with regard to every partition.]

As we learned:

Through their windows, when people wished to close them, they would close them with a piece of wood placed over the opening of the window, which was called a “window stopper”; and we learned in the Mishna:

With regard to a window stopper: Rabbi Eliezer says: When it is tied

to the window before the window is closed with it

and

it is also

hanging,

and is not dragged along the ground, as the rope with which it is tied does not reach the ground,

one may stop the window with it, but if not, one may not stop the window with it,

even though this is only a temporary partition, as he will eventually open it again.

And the Rabbis say: In either case, one may stop the window with it,

since it is only a temporary partition. Thus, Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to making a temporary partition on Shabbat. And we challenge this:

But it was stated concerning it

that Mishna:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone agrees that one may not make

even

a temporary tent initially on a Festival, and needless to say, on Shabbat.

They disagreed

Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis

only with regard to adding—

for example, a window stopper, which is merely an addition to an existing partition—

as Rabbi Eliezer says: One may not add on a Festival, and needless to say, on Shabbat; and the Rabbis say: One may add on Shabbat, and needless to say, on a Festival.

And since this is so, it is impossible to say that the baraita permitting one to make his fellow a wall of a sukka and to stand up the bed follows the Rabbis, since even the Rabbis permitted only adding to a partition, not making a new partition; and the contradiction between the baraitot still remains?!

Rather—

because of this difficulty—we explain the two baraitot

as having no difficulty

in a different manner. That is, both baraitot hold that it is permitted to make a temporary partition on Shabbat and on a Festival; however, it is prohibited to make the wall of a sukka that renders the sukka fit, and the two baraitot disagree as to whether a person may be made fit to serve as a wall of a sukka [this was explained according to the implication of Rashi; below, in the note, it will be explained that this interpretation is very difficult].

This

baraita, which disqualifies a person from serving as a wall of a sukka,

is in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

and therefore it is permitted to place a person in the position of the wall.

And

this

baraita, which qualifies a person to serve as a wall of a sukka,

is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

.

As it is taught in a baraita: If one made an animal a wall of a sukka, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit, and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit.

And since this is so, the contradiction between the baraitot is resolved:

Rabbi Meir, who disqualifies it there,

an animal,

apparently holds that it is not a partition,

and therefore

here it is permitted

to place a person as the wall of a sukka [according to the Gemara’s present reasoning, a person and an animal are equivalent in this regard],

as he is doing nothing.

And Rabbi Yehuda, who deems it fit there,

an animal,

apparently holds that it is a partition,

and therefore

here it is prohibited

to place a person or an animal, and all the more so utensils, as the wall of a sukka.

And we wonder about this:

Can you really understand it

that it is possible to explain that the reason the baraita permits making one’s fellow a wall of a sukka and standing up the bed is that the baraita follows Rabbi Meir, who disqualifies an animal as a wall of a sukka?!

But

when can you say that you heard Rabbi Meir

disqualify

an animal

because we are concerned that it might run away? But

a person [“A person may make his fellow a wall of a sukka”], who has the awareness to remain standing,

and utensils [“And he may stand up the bed and spread a sheet over it”],

did you hear him say

that they are unfit to serve as a wall of a sukka?!

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty with this resolution:

Rabbi Meir—

according to whose opinion we are saying that an animal, and likewise a person, who are unfit for a sukka may be placed as a wall of a sukka without this involving the prohibition of making a partition—

in accordance with whose opinion is this?

If it is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

in the baraita concerning the window stopper?

But

adding

to a temporary partition

he also prohibits,

and all the more so he prohibits making a temporary partition initially, even when the sukka is not rendered fit through it.

Rather, it is in accordance with the Rabbis,

who permit stopping the window because it is a temporary partition.

This too is impossible, since

perhaps the Rabbis said that one may add,

to a temporary partition, as with the window stopper, but

initially,

as in placing a wall for a sukka,

did they say so?!

Rather,

this is how the contradiction between the baraitot should be resolved:

Both this and that follow the Rabbis

[in the baraita concerning the window stopper], who prohibit making a temporary partition initially but permit adding to one.

And as for utensils and food,

[that in one baraita it is taught: “And one may not stand up the bed in order to spread a sheet over it,” while in the other baraita it is taught: “And he may stand up the bed and spread a sheet over it,”]

there is no difficulty:

This

baraita, which prohibits it, is speaking

of the third wall

that fell [for with two walls it is not called a tent, but when he makes a third wall, it is a tent; and the Rabbis agree that one may not make a temporary tent initially, Rashi].

And

this

baraita, which permits it, is speaking of a case in which he places the bed

in

the

place of the fourth wall,

since, as the tent exists even without this wall, this is merely an addition, and it is permitted.

This is also precise,

as the baraita that prohibits placing the bed is speaking of placing it as the third wall,

as it teaches: “If its wall fell”

he may not place it, implying a wall through which the sukka is rendered fit, namely, the third wall, since the fourth wall is not necessary for the sukka’s fitness, as three walls suffice;

learn from this.