Eruvin 37b (לז:) — the Talmud in English

Rather: either at the time of

the

owners’ designation:

when they say at that time: “This one I am taking as an offering and this one I am taking as a sin-offering,”

or when the priest performs

the rites upon the altar, one as a sin-offering and one as an offering.

But if they took them without specifying and afterward the owners designated them, the designation does not take effect upon them, and the priest may alter their designation [and in Tractate Yoma Rav Ḥisda derives this from a verse].

Yet still

we wonder: Is it so that

Rabbi Yosei holds that there is no retroactive clarification

as is implied by the beraita concerning one who purchases wine?!

A ḥaver may not sell to an am ha-aretz who is suspected of neglecting tithes produce that has not been tithed. Even if it is not definite tevel, but rather demai—produce purchased from an am ha-aretz that the Sages required one to tithe—it is forbidden for a ḥaver to sell it to an am ha-aretz.

And it was taught in a beraita: If an am ha-aretz said to a ḥaver

who was going to the marketplace to buy from another am ha-aretz:

“Buy

also

one bundle of vegetables for me, or one loaf of bread,”

just as you are buying for yourself,

and the ḥaver went and bought two bundles or two loaves, one for himself and one for the am ha-aretz, but did not specify which was for himself and which was for the am ha-aretz.

And it is established for us that a ḥaver may not sell to an am ha-aretz who is suspected of neglecting tithes produce that has not been tithed. This bundle, for example, is rabbinically obligated in tithes, since it was purchased from an am ha-aretz.

Nevertheless, when the ḥaver gives one of the bundles to the am ha-aretz, we do not say: Perhaps this is the ḥaver’s bundle, in which case he is giving his own untithed produce to the am ha-aretz [and takes the second bundle in exchange], and would therefore have to tithe it first.

Rather,

he need not tithe it!

This is because we say that there is retroactive clarification, and it is clarified that the one he gives to his fellow originally belonged to his fellow,

the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

But the Sages say: He must tithe it!

For there is no retroactive clarification, and it may be said that the one he gives to the am ha-aretz was his own, and now he sells it to the am ha-aretz and takes the other bundle—the one belonging to the am ha-aretz—in exchange.

We see, then, that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is retroactive clarification, contrary to what Rabbi Yosei said in the beraita concerning the two logs?!

The Gemara answers:

Reverse

the opinions in the beraita concerning the am ha-aretz: Rabbi Yosei said the statement attributed to the Sages, and the Sages said the statement attributed to Rabbi Yosei. In fact, Rabbi Yosei holds that there is no retroactive clarification.

The Gemara still wonders:

Come and hear: One who says: “The second tithe that I have in my house is redeemed onto the sela that will come up in my hand from the purse,” Rabbi Yosei says: It is redeemed,

and when the sela comes into his hand, we say that there is retroactive clarification, and this is the sela onto which he redeemed the second tithe.

For if there is no retroactive clarification, his statement accomplishes nothing. Rather, we say that this sela that has now come into his hand was not originally the one onto which he intended to redeem it, and “it turns out that he is eating second tithe without redemption” .

We see, then, that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is retroactive clarification, and this presents a difficulty against the beraita concerning the two logs?! The Gemara answers:

Reverse

the statement of Rabbi Yosei himself,

and say: Rabbi Yosei says: He did not redeem it,

since he holds that there is no retroactive clarification.

The Gemara wonders about the resolutions given above, in which we reverse the opinions because of the contradiction posed by the beraita concerning the two logs:

What did you see that led you to reverse two texts because of one what did you see that led you to reverse two beraitot on the basis of one beraita?

what justification is there for reversing two beraitot because of one beraita]?

Reverse one

beraita—the one concerning the two logs—and say that Rabbi Yosei permits drinking on the basis of retroactive clarification—

because of the two

beraitot mentioned above, which demonstrate that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is retroactive clarification?!

The Gemara answers:

That

beraita concerning the redemption of second tithe

was certainly taught in the reverse order,

for it must be reversed from within the beraita itself.

As the latter clause teaches

of that beraita:

“And Rabbi Yosei concedes, in the case of one who says: ‘The tithe that I have in my house shall be redeemed onto a new sela that will come up in my hand from the purse,’ that he has redeemed it” and the Gemara will explain this shortly.

[the Gemara will explain this shortly].

And

from the fact that here it says

in the latter clause:

“that he has redeemed it,”

by inference, there

in the first clause:

“he did not redeem it,”

as we reversed Rabbi Yosei’s statement.

The Gemara now explains the latter clause of the beraita:

This new sela

onto which he redeems the tithe—

what are the circumstances?

If there are

in the purse

two

or

three

new sela coins, and necessarily the reason is

that there is retroactive clarification,

the difficulty is: But

this is the same as the first case [the form of the first clause], where we say that since there is no retroactive clarification he did not redeem it; why, then, did you say in the latter clause that he redeemed it on the basis of retroactive clarification?

[the case at the beginning], in which we say that since there is no retroactive clarification, the redemption does not take effect. Why, then, did you say at the end that he redeemed it on the basis of retroactive clarification?

Rather,

say in explanation:

There is not

in the purse

but one

coin, and the redemption takes effect, “since there is no other coin there, the matter is recognizable” [Rashi].

This too presents a difficulty:

What

is the meaning of what the beraita says concerning a new sela, “that it

will come up”

in my hand from the purse? Since there is no other new coin in the purse, while it is still inside the purse he can redeem the tithe onto it fully [Ritva]?!

The Gemara explains: The case indeed concerns a purse containing only one coin, and that is why the redemption takes effect. And the fact that it teaches “will come up” is only because

since the first clause taught: “will come up,” it taught

in the

latter clause as well: “will come up” .

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Who is this tanna [who is the tanna] of the beraita cited shortly, whose words demonstrate that he holds

[who is the tanna] of the beraita that we are about to cite, whose words prove that he holds

that even in rabbinic matters he does not accept retroactive clarification?

That is, Rava was astonished at this novel ruling?!

As it was taught in a beraita: If one said to five people: “I am establishing an eruv for on behalf of

[for]

whichever of you I wish,”

so that if

I wished

before he set out that the eruv should be for him and on his behalf,

he may go,

but if

I did not wish, he may not go.

The law concerning the eruv is as follows: If he

decided while it was still day,

so that it is found that at the time the eruv was acquired it was already clarified for whom he was acquiring it,

his eruv is valid

for the one he chose.

But if he decided

after nightfall,

we do not say that it has been clarified that at the time the eruv was acquired he had intended it for this person. Rather,

his eruv is invalid,

as perhaps during twilight he had not intended it for him.

We see that even with regard to the rabbinic laws of תחומין, we do not rely on retroactive clarification. Who, then, is this tanna?!

Rav Naḥman was silent

and

did not say

to Rava

anything at all!

The Gemara wonders about Rav Naḥman:

He should have said

to Rava that this tanna of the beraita

is the tanna of the school of Ayo—that is, Rabbi Yehuda—for he indeed holds that with regard to eruvei teḥumin we do not rely on retroactive clarification?!

[Translation continues?]

And we answer: Rav Naḥman

had not heard

the beraita of the school of Iyo .

Rav Yosef said: Is it possible that the

Is it so that the

tannaitic sages

who dispute this matter, whether one relies on retroactive clarification in a rabbinic law,

have been removed from the world [

you are overlooking them]?!

It is a dispute between tannaitic sages

who disagree about this!

As it was taught in a beraita:

One who placed his eruv at the end of two thousand cubits, in a place where it would remain protected for a long time, and said:

“I am establishing an eruv for all the Shabbatot of the year,”

that is, for any one of the Shabbatot of the year [Meiri], so that

if I wish

the eruv to take effect for that Shabbat,

I will go

outside the travel limit on the strength of the eruv. But if

I do not wish to go, I will not go,

but will remain like the residents of my city.

The rule of the eruv is as follows: If he

decided during the day,

and at the time the eruv took effect it became clear that the eruv took effect, everyone agrees that

his eruv is valid.

But if he decided only

after nightfall,

after the time when the eruv took effect:

Rabbi Shimon says: His eruv is valid,

because there is retroactive clarification; during twilight, this was indeed his intention.

But the Sages say: His eruv is not valid, because there is no retroactive clarification .

because there is no retroactive clarification .

Rav Yosef concludes his statement: Surely the following difficulty arises:

We have heard that Rabbi Shimon does not accept retroactive clarification

in the beraita about the two logs, and

there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon?!

Rather,

it is unavoidable that we must

reverse

the statements of Rabbi Shimon and the Sages. It was Rabbi Shimon who said that the eruv is invalid, since he does not accept retroactive clarification even in a rabbinic law, while the Sages disagreed with him.

We have now found a tanna known by name who does not accept retroactive clarification even in a rabbinic law, and we have also found that someone disputes him. [This explanation follows Tosafot and Ritva; see the Gaon Yaakov.]

We ask:

What difficulty is there

from one statement of Rabbi Shimon to another?

Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon does not accept retroactive clarification—

as he says in the beraita about the two logs—this applies

to Torah law. But in a rabbinic law, he does accept it?!

And we answer:

Rav Yosef holds

[the Bach and Maharshal do not have

Rav Yosef in their version]:

Whoever accepts retroactive clarification accepts it both in Torah law and in rabbinic law.

And whoever does not accept retroactive clarification does not accept it either in Torah law or in rabbinic law

—there is no retroactive clarification .

Rava said

in answer to the difficulty raised from Rabbi Shimon’s ruling concerning the two logs of wine against Rabbi Shimon’s ruling concerning an eruv for the entire year:

The reason Rabbi Shimon prohibited drinking in the beraita about the two logs is not that he holds that there is no retroactive clarification. Rather, he holds that there is retroactive clarification, but

the case there is different

with regard to the separation of two logs of wine,

because

since the Torah calls teruma “the first” [as it is written: “You shall give him the first part of your grain, wine, and oil”],

we require the first portion whose remainder is recognizable—

“so that the teruma is distinct from what remains when he designates it, so that it is seen as the first portion, while the rest is seen as what remains” [Rashi]. Therefore, the teruma does not take effect in the case of the two logs, because at the time of designation it is impossible to know which is the teruma and which is what remains; this is not a first portion whose remainder is recognizable.

He said

to him in surprise,

Abaye: “If so,”

if, according to what you said, the reason Rabbi Shimon does not consider it teruma is that the remainder is not recognizable at the time of designation, and even though it becomes recognizable later, it is not teruma:

If two pomegranates of untithed produce were before him, and he said: ‘If rain falls today, this one shall be teruma for that one; and if rain does not fall today, this one shall be

[the other one]

teruma for that one,’

would

here too

we say that since it is impossible to know at the time of designation which one is the teruma and which one is the remainder,

whether rain falls

or not

whether it does not fall,

we should say

that his statement accomplishes nothing?!

And if you would say

that this is indeed so,

even here,

and it is not teruma,

but we learned

that it is teruma.

As we learned: One who said:

“The teruma of this heap and

also

its tithes

shall be

within it” [

in its middle].

Or if there was before him a heap of second tithe

and

he said:

“The tithe of the tithe of this heap shall be within it.”

Rabbi Shimon

himself

says: “He has designated it by name” [

the teruma has taken effect].

Even though it is not known which of the produce in the middle is the teruma, and the remainder is not recognizable at the time of designation.

And we answer:

The case there is different, because there are

remnants

around

the heap whose status is recognizable: they are not teruma, since they are not in its middle, and that is sufficient.

And if you wish, say

another answer to the difficulty raised from Rabbi Shimon’s prohibition in the case of the two logs—because he supposedly holds that there is no retroactive clarification—against Rabbi Shimon’s ruling concerning an eruv for the entire year.

In fact, Rabbi Shimon holds that there is retroactive clarification. The reason he prohibited drinking in the case of the two logs is not that he does not accept retroactive clarification once the teruma is separated. Rather, the Sages prohibited it as a rabbinic precaution,

as the reason is taught

at the end of that beraita, where it says:

“They said to him”

[Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, who disagreed with Rabbi Meir in the beraita about the two logs]

to Rabbi Meir,

who permits drinking in that beraita:

“Do you not concede

that one must be concerned

lest the vessel burst,

and he will not separate the teruma even afterward,

with the result that he has retroactively been drinking untithed produce?”

“For granted, when he separates it later, one can say that the portion that now reaches the priest was clarified retroactively; it had belonged to him from the beginning, even while it was in the vessel, from the time of designation, and he drank ordinary produce.

But if the vessel bursts and the teruma is never clarified from it, what retroactive clarification can be said to exist? Even ultimately, it never became fit to be teruma” [Rashi].

He said to them: “When it bursts”—

then we will consider the matter and prohibit it.

That is, we are not concerned about this possibility, since it is uncommon; after all, if he wishes, he can give it to a watchman to guard it so that it will not burst.

And we explain:

And according to what we initially thought,

that the reason Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit it is that it would be teruma whose remainder is not recognizable [and likewise, according to what we initially thought above, that Rabbi Shimon’s reason is that there is no retroactive clarification, Tosafot], if so,

what are they saying to him

[Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon to Rabbi Meir]? That is not their reason?!

And we explain:

This is what they said to him: “According to our view,

it is forbidden, because

we require the first portion whose remainder is recognizable [

or because there is no retroactive clarification].

But

according to your view,

since you do not accept this reason, …