Eruvin 32a — the Talmud in English

For matters of the Scribes -

such as techum eruvin - we rely on

“the presumption that an agent carries out his agency”,

since even if he does not carry out his agency, its prohibition is not severe.

And Rav Sheshet said: This one as well [

of Torah law ]

and this one as well [

the words of the Scribes ] - we rely on

the presumption that an agent carries out his agency.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say it

that even for a matter of Torah law we rely on the presumption?

As we learned: Once the omer has been brought -

from the day after the first day of Passover -

the new grain is permitted [

the new produce that took root after the bringing of the omer offering in the previous year, and is now permitted for eating through the offering of the omer ]

immediately

when it is brought as an offering.

And those who are distant

from the Temple, who do not know whether the omer has already been brought -

are permitted

to eat the new grain only beginning

from midday -

of the day after Passover -

and onward,

for then we rely on the priests [who are our agents for bringing the omer], for they carry out their agency and bring it, the omer [by midday. Tosafot].

And now we prove:

But the new grain

is

of Torah law

in that it is forbidden,

and it teaches: Those who are distant are permitted from midday and onward.

What,

is it not

that the reason is

because

we rely on

the presumption that an agent carries out his agency?

And Rav Nahman -

who disagrees - said to you:

There, as the reason is taught

in the Mishna in Menahot:

“Because they know

those who are distant

that the court

of priests, which is responsible for the Temple service,

is not negligent concerning it,”

and they rely on the court, and not on an ordinary agent.

And there are those who say: Rav Nahman said: From where do I say it

that for a matter of Torah law we do not rely on the presumption concerning an agent:

From what it teaches -

concerning the new grain -

the reason

in the Mishna:

“Because they know that the court is not negligent concerning it.”

And we infer:

It is the court that is not negligent concerning it.

But an agent -

we are concerned lest

he be negligent concerning it,

and not carry out his agency.

And Rav Sheshet would say to you:

The fact that we require, concerning the new grain, the reason “that the court is not negligent concerning it,” is because

the court -

until half the day

brings it, and is not negligent and delays it.

But an agent

in general is negligent concerning it, and waits until

the entire day

has elapsed, but the day will not pass over him before he fulfills his promise.

Again,

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say it,

that even for a matter of Torah law we rely on the presumption?

As it was taught:

A woman who has given birth must bring an offering when the days of her purity have been completed, which permits her to eat sacrificial food.

And her offering is: a lamb for an elevation-offering and a dove or a turtledove for a sin-offering. And if she is poor, she brings two turtledoves or two young doves [and it is called a nest], one for an elevation-offering and one for a sin-offering.

A woman who has had a discharge must, after she has become pure from her impurity, bring two turtledoves or two young doves, one for an elevation-offering and one for a sin-offering, and she is permitted to eat sacrificial food.

There was a chest shaped like a shofar in the Temple, and “Nests” was written upon it. There those who were obligated to bring nests would place money [and would indicate there the names of their owners, Ritba], so that the priests would purchase nests with it and offer them on behalf of their owners.

A woman who has upon her

an obligation to bring an offering

of childbirth or

an offering

of a discharge -

brings money and places it in the chest,

and relies on the priests to offer nests with it on that very day.

And immerses [

an additional immersion for sacrificial food, besides the immersion that purifies her from her impurity ],

and eats sacrificial food in the evening,

for by evening the priests have certainly offered her nest.

What is the reason

that the woman can rely on the priests?

Is it not because we say

“There is a presumption: an agent [

the priests ]

carries out his agency”?

Behold, we see that we rely on this presumption even for a matter of Torah law!

And Rav Nahman

would say to you: From here there is no proof that we rely on the presumption concerning an ordinary agent.

For

there

the reason is

in accordance with Rav Shemaya:

For Rav Shemaya said: There is a presumption that the court of priests does not rise from there until all the money in the chest has been exhausted.

And it follows that we rely on the court, but we do not rely on an ordinary agent.

Again,

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say it

that even for a matter of Torah law we rely on the presumption that an agent carries out his agency?

As it was taught: One who says to his fellow: Go and gather figs for yourself from my fig tree,

and he did not set for him a measure of how much he gives him - this gatherer

eats from them casually

without tithing, for they have not yet been designated for tithes, and casual eating of them is permitted.

And

if he comes to eat from them as a fixed meal [which is forbidden to eat even before they have been designated for tithing] -

he tithes them

as

certain produce,

for there is no doubt here to say: Perhaps the owner of the house separated tithes for them from another place after he gathered them, in order to permit them to him, since the owner of the house does not know how much he gathered.

But if the owner of the house said to him:

Fill for yourself this basket

(this) [

this ]

figs from my fig tree,

since it is known to the owner of the house how much he will gather, there is concern lest the owner of the house, fearing that the gatherer relies on him to give him something permitted, separated tithes for them from another place.

And therefore:

He eats from them

a

casual meal,

without tithing.

And

if he comes to eat them as a fixed meal, he need not tithe them as certain produce, but

he tithes them

only as

demai.

That is, he treats his tithes as one who purchases from an am haaretz, tithing them only because of doubt, but he does not give them to a priest or a Levite, since the tithes are not certain.

And he need not give them, because of doubt, to a Levite or a poor person, since the one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof.

When are these matters said -

that he is concerned lest they are untithed produce - when the owner of the house is

an am haaretz.

But when he is a chaver,

he relies on the assumption that they are certainly tithed, for the owner of the house tithed them from another place, and therefore:

He eats

even a fixed meal,

and he need not tithe them; these are the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel [

Rabbi’s father ]

says: When are these matters said -

that they are not certainly untithed produce -

with

the owner of the house

an am haaretz,

who is suspected of tithing from another place, even though it is not from the adjoining produce [the produce nearby].

But when he is a chaver,

he certainly did not tithe them from another place.

And therefore:

He does not eat

a fixed meal

until he tithes

the produce as certain produce.

And the reason is:

Because chaverim are not suspected of contributing from produce that is not adjoining.

Rabbi said: The words of

more

than the words of Father

appear correct.

For

it is preferable that chaverim be suspected of contributing from produce that is not adjoining,

rather than feed the ammei haaretz [

he explains it below ]

untithed produce!

And since this is so, we attribute to them that they certainly did so.

And now we prove that even for a matter of Torah law we say that an agent carries out his agency:

For

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi disagree only up to this point,

whether one may rely on the owner of the house who is a chaver - “that he is an agent concerning the tithe, which is imposed upon him to tithe what he gives, and he should not feed a prohibition to an am haaretz,” Rashi [and see Ritba] -

but one master holds: They were suspected,

that is, they are obligated to separate from produce that is not adjoining.

And one master holds: They were not suspected,

that is, they are forbidden to separate from produce that is not adjoining, and therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that there is no basis to rely on an agent.

But everyone

even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, if not for the fact that they were not suspected - holds that we say:

An agent carries out his agency,

and we rely upon it even concerning a tithe of Torah law.

And Rav Nahman

would say to you that from here there is no proof concerning an ordinary agent:

For

there,

for this reason we rely on the owner of the house who is a chaver,

in accordance with Rabbi Hanina of Huzal [

named after his place ].

For Rabbi Hanina of Huzal said: There is a presumption concerning a chaver that he does not remove something that is not prepared from his possession.

And since it is his produce, the matter is imposed upon him, and he is concerned about “before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.”

But an ordinary agent, who accepted the agency upon himself from his fellow, is not concerned about “before the blind,” for it may be said that the agent holds that the sender does not rely on him, [Rashi. And see Ritba].

The master said: When are these matters said? With

an owner of the house who is

an am haaretz, but with

an owner of the house who is

a chaver -

he eats

the produce gathered

and he need not tithe it; these are the words of Rabbi.

And we object:

This

owner of the house

an am haaretz, who says to him

“Go and fill for yourself” -

to whom

did he say this?

If you say that he said -

“Go and fill for yourself” -

to his fellow who is an am haaretz,

it is difficult, for it teaches at the beginning: “And

he tithes them as demai.”

But would an am haaretz

obey

you when you tell him to tithe because of doubt?!

Indeed, he believes his fellow am haaretz more, that he certainly tithed it, than he would heed us when we tell him to tithe it.

Rather,

you are forced to say that this deals

with

an owner of the house who is

an am haaretz, who says to a chaver:

“Go and fill for yourself!” And if so, it is difficult:

Say the latter clause,

where Rabbi says:

“The words of Rabbi appear preferable to the words of Father,”

for

it is preferable

that

the chaverim be suspected of contributing from produce that is not adjoining, and that they not feed “the ammei haaretz” untithed produce.

And since you have said that the gatherer is a chaver -

“What is an am haaretz doing there?!”

He said

explaining,

Ravina: The beginning

of the beraita, that is, the teaching that says: When are these matters said - that he must tithe them as demai - “with an am haaretz,” means

with an am haaretz who said to a chaver

“Go and fill this basket,” for it is uncertain whether the am haaretz tithed them or not.

The latter clause

of the beraita, that is, the teaching that says, but with “a chaver” he eats and need not tithe, because the chaver certainly tithed them, even though it was not from adjoining produce, so as not to cause the gatherer to stumble - deals

with a chaver who said to an am haaretz:

“Fill this basket!” For we attribute to him that the chaver certainly tithed them so as not to cause the gatherer, who is an am haaretz, to stumble. And as Rabbi said: So that “the ammei haaretz” should not eat untithed produce.

Rather, we are not discussing the am haaretz himself, that he need not tithe; rather, it deals with

another chaver who hears

the owner of the house who is a chaver when he says to the am haaretz to gather, and the am haaretz gave the chaver permission to gather in his place [Ritba],