Eruvin 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

In matters of rabbinic ordinance -

for example, eruvin of boundaries - we rely on

the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency,

since even if he does not fulfill his agency, its prohibition is not severe.

And Rav Sheshet said: This one, too [a matter]

of Torah,

and this one, too [a matter]

of rabbinic ordinance - we rely on

the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this,

that even in a matter of Torah we rely on the presumption?

As we learned in a Mishna: Once the omer offering has been sacrificed -

from the day after the first day of Passover -

the new produce is permitted [the new grain that took root after the offering of the omer was brought the previous year, and which is now permitted for consumption through the sacrifice of the omer]

[the new produce that took root after the omer offering was brought the previous year, and that is now permitted for eating through the sacrifice of the omer]

immediately,

when it is brought as an offering.

And those who are far away from the Temple, who do not know whether the omer has already been sacrificed -

from the Temple, who do not know whether the omer has already been sacrificed,

are permitted to eat the new produce only

starting

from midday -

of the day after Passover -

and thereafter,

for at that point we rely on the priests [who are our agents for offering the omer], for they fulfill their agency and offer the omer [by midday. Tosafot].

And now we establish:

But the new produce,

from

is prohibited by Torah law,

for it is forbidden,

and it was taught: Those who are far away are permitted from midday onward.

What is the meaning of

is it not that the reason is

that

because

we rely on

the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency?

And Rav Naḥman - who disagrees -

who disagrees, would say to you:

There, the reason is as it was taught

in the Mishna in tractate Menaḥot:

“Because those who are far away know

those who are far away

that the court

of priests, which is responsible for the Temple service,

is not negligent regarding it,”

and they rely on the court, and not on an ordinary agent.

And some say: Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say

that in a matter of Torah we do not rely on the presumption concerning an agent:

From the fact that it taught -

regarding the new produce -

the reason

in the Mishna:

“Because they know that the court is not negligent regarding it.”

And we infer:

It is the court that is not negligent regarding it.

But an agent -

we are concerned lest he

be negligent regarding it,

and fail to fulfill his agency.

And Rav Sheshet would say to you:

the fact that regarding the new produce we require the reason “that the court is not negligent regarding it” is because

the court -

until midday

offers it, and is not negligent or late in doing so.

But an agent

in general is negligent regarding it and waits until

the entire day has passed,

but the day will not pass without his fulfilling his undertaking.

Again,

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say

that even in a matter of Torah we rely on the presumption?

As it was taught in a baraita:

A. A woman who has given birth must bring an offering when her days of purification are complete, which permits her to eat sacrificial food.

Her offering is a sheep for an olah and a young pigeon or turtledove for a sin offering. If she is poor, she brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons [and this is called a ken], one for an olah and one for a sin offering.

B. A woman experiencing a discharge must, after she has become pure from her ritual impurity, bring two turtledoves or two young pigeons, one for an olah and one for a sin offering, and she is then permitted to eat sacrificial food.

C. There was a box shaped like a shofar in the Temple, with “bird pairs” written on it. Those obligated to bring bird pairs would place money there [and would designate their names on it, Ritba], so that the priests would purchase bird pairs with it and offer them on behalf of their owners.

A woman who is obligated

to bring an offering

for childbirth or an

offering

for a discharge -

brings money and places it in the box,

and relies on the priests to purchase bird pairs with it and offer them that same day.

And she immerses [an additional immersion for sacrificial food, besides the immersion that purifies her from her ritual impurity],

[an additional immersion for sacrificial food, besides the immersion that purifies her from her ritual impurity],

and eats sacrificial food in the evening,

as by evening the priests have certainly offered her bird pair.

What is the reason

that the woman can rely on the priests?

Is it not because we say

“There is a presumption that an agent [the priests]

[the priests]

fulfills his agency”?

We see, then, that we rely on this presumption even in a matter of Torah law!

And Rav Naḥman

would say to you: From here one cannot prove that we rely on the presumption with regard to an ordinary agent.

For

there,

the reason is

as stated by Rav Shemaya:

For Rav Shemaya said: There is a presumption that the court of priests does not leave that place until all the money in the box has been exhausted.

It follows that we rely on the court, but we do not rely on an ordinary agent.

Again,

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say

that even in a matter of Torah we rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency?

As it was taught in a baraita: One who says to his fellow: “Go and pick figs for yourself from my fig tree,”

and did not specify how much he was giving him - the one who picks them

may eat them casually

without separating tithes, since they have not yet been designated for tithing, and casual eating of them is permitted.

And

if he wishes to eat them as a fixed meal [which is forbidden even before they have been designated for tithing] -

he must tithe them

as

definite produce,

since there is no basis for the doubt that perhaps the owner separated tithes for them from another place after he picked them, in order to permit them to him, because the owner does not know how many he picked.

But if the owner said to him:

“Fill this basket for yourself

(this one)

these

with figs from my fig tree,”

since the owner knows how many he will pick, there is concern that perhaps the owner assumes that the one picking relies on him to give him permitted produce, and therefore tithes them from another place.

Therefore:

he may eat them

as a

casual meal,

without tithing.

And

if he wishes to eat them as a fixed meal, he need not tithe them as definite produce, but

he tithes them

only

as demai.

That is, he treats their tithes as one does with produce purchased from an am ha-aretz: he separates tithes only because of the doubt, but does not give them to a priest or a Levite, since the tithes are not definite.

And he need not give them, because of the doubt, to a Levite or a poor person, since the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract property from another.

When is this said -

that one is concerned that they may be untithed produce? When the owner is

an am ha-aretz.

But in the case of a ḥaver,

he may rely on the assumption that they were certainly tithed, since the owner tithed them from another place, and therefore:

he may eat

even a fixed meal,

and need not tithe them; this is the statement of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel [Rabbi’s father]

[Rabbi’s father]

says: When is this said -

that they are not certainly untithed produce -

in the case of

the owner,

an am ha-aretz,

who is suspected of tithing from another place, even though it is not from produce located nearby [adjacent].

But in the case of a ḥaver,

he certainly did not tithe them from another place.

Therefore:

he may not eat

a fixed meal

until he tithes

the produce as definite produce.

And the reason is:

because ḥaverim are not suspected of separating tithes from produce that is not nearby.

Rabbi said: The words

more convincing

than the words of my father.

For

it is preferable that ḥaverim be suspected of separating tithes from produce that is not nearby.

That is, it is preferable that the ḥaverim violate the prohibition against separating from produce that is not nearby, in order to permit what was taken from them,

rather than feed amei ha-aretz [explained below]

[as will be explained below]

untithed produce!

And since this is so, we attribute it to the assumption that they certainly did so.

And now we establish that even in a matter of Torah law we say: The agent fulfills his agency:

For

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi disagree only

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi disagree as to whether one may rely on the ḥaver owner - “who is an agent concerning the tithe, charged with tithing what he gives and not feeding prohibited produce to an am ha-aretz,” Rashi [see also Ritba] -

only because one Master holds: They are suspected,

meaning that they are obligated to separate tithes from produce that is not nearby.

And the other Master holds: They are not suspected,

meaning that they are forbidden to separate tithes from produce that is not nearby, and therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that one cannot rely on the agent.

But everyone -

and even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, were it not for the fact that they are not suspected - holds that we say:

An agent fulfills his agency,

and we rely on it even with regard to a tithe mandated by Torah law.

And Rav Naḥman

would say to you that from here one cannot prove this with regard to an ordinary agent:

For

there,

we rely on the ḥaver owner

in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a [so called after his place].

[so called after his place of residence].

For Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: It is presumed of a ḥaver that he does not allow something unprepared to leave his possession.

And since it is his produce, the responsibility rests upon him, and he is concerned about the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind.

But an ordinary agent who accepted the task from another is not concerned about placing a stumbling block before the blind, for one may say that the agent assumes that the sender does not rely on him, [Rashi; see also Ritba].

The Master said: When is this said? In the case of

an owner who is

an am ha-aretz; but in the case of

an owner who is

a ḥaver -

the one who picked them may eat,

the one who picked them

and need not tithe them; this is the statement of Rabbi.

And we ask:

This

owner

who is an am ha-aretz and says to him

“Go and fill [a basket] for yourself” -

to whom

does he say this?

If you say that he says -

“Go and fill [a basket] for yourself” -

to his fellow am ha-aretz,

this is difficult, for the first clause teaches: “And

he tithes them as demai.”

But would an am ha-aretz

obey

you when you tell him to tithe because of a doubt?!

He trusts his fellow am ha-aretz, who says that he certainly tithed the produce, more than he would heed us when we tell him to tithe it.

Rather,

you are compelled to say that here we are dealing

with

an owner

who is an am ha-aretz and says to a ḥaver:

“Go and fill [a basket] for yourself!” And if so, this is difficult:

say the latter clause,

in which Rabbi says:

“My words appear more convincing than the words of my father,”

for

it is preferable

that

ḥaverim be suspected of separating tithes from produce that is not nearby, and not feed untithed produce to amei ha-aretz.

And since you said that the one who picked the produce is a ḥaver -

“What are amei ha-aretz doing there?!”

He said

in explanation,

Ravina: The first clause

of the baraita - that is, the teaching that says: When is this said, that one must tithe them as demai? “In the case of an am ha-aretz” - refers

to an am ha-aretz who says to a ḥaver

“Go and fill this basket,” and it is uncertain whether the am ha-aretz tithed them.

The latter clause

of the baraita - that is, the teaching that says: But “in the case of a ḥaver,” he may eat and need not tithe, because the ḥaver certainly tithed them, even though they were not nearby, so as not to cause the one who picked them to sin - refers

to a ḥaver who says to an am ha-aretz:

“Fill this basket!” For we attribute it to the assumption that the ḥaver certainly tithed them so as not to cause the one who picked them, who is an am ha-aretz, to sin. And this is as Rabbi said: “And they should not feed untithed produce to amei ha-aretz.”

Rather, we are not discussing the am ha-aretz himself, who need not tithe; rather, we are dealing with

another ḥaver who hears

the ḥaver owner telling the am ha-aretz to pick the produce, and the am ha-aretz gave the ḥaver permission to pick it in his place [Ritba].