Eruvin 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

There was that minority area

enclosed for residential use,

is nullified with regard to the majority

that was not enclosed for residential use,

and it becomes

this

kर्पף

an enclosure

larger than a beit se'a

that was not enclosed for residential use,

and it is prohibited?!

Rather, if it was stated—

this statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua—

it was stated as follows [

and Rav Huna follows the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon]:

From what we say, “If most of it was planted, it is prohibited,” one may infer:

this minority [

if a minority of the karkaf was planted]

is permitted!

And concerning this

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

We said

that when a minority was planted it is permitted

only when it is not— -

the planted minority—

a beit se'a,

which is an area insufficiently significant to be distinguished from the rest of the enclosure, and insufficiently significant to be designated a karkaf in its own right. Therefore, it does not prohibit “the courtyard” that was breached into it.

But

if the planted minority was

exactly a beit se'a,

it is significant enough to receive its own designation, and is called a karkaf that was not enclosed for residential use. Therefore

it is prohibited

to carry throughout the entire enclosure, since the part enclosed for residential use is a “courtyard,” while the part not enclosed for residential use is a karkaf; and when a courtyard and a karkaf are breached into one another, it is prohibited to carry in both of them. [

And all the more so it is prohibited if it was larger than a beit se'a, since it is considered breached into a karmelit.]

In accordance with whose opinion? In accordance with the Rabbis,

who maintain that a courtyard and a karkaf are two different types of domains, and it is prohibited to carry from one to the other. Consequently, when they are “breached” into one another, each one is a domain that has been completely breached into a place prohibited to it, and it is prohibited to carry in them at all.

And Rav Yirmeya of Difti taught—

this statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua—he did not come to be stringent concerning a beit se'a exactly and prohibit it, but rather

he was stating a leniency

[and Rav Huna follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon], and this is what he said:

this minority is permitted:

And concerning this

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

We said only

that the planted minority was

exactly a beit se'a

[and all the more so if it was less than a beit se'a], in which case it is permitted to carry throughout the entire area. Although they are two domains [since part of it is a courtyard and part of it is a karkaf], nevertheless it is permitted, because a courtyard and a karkaf are one domain.

But

if the planted minority was

larger than a beit se'a,

since that minority constitutes an enclosure larger than a beit se'a that was not enclosed for residential use, whose status is that of a karmelit,

it is prohibited

to carry throughout the entire enclosure, since the other part was breached into a karmelit, and it is prohibited to carry there.

And

in accordance with whose opinion

do we permit carrying when the planted section is not larger than a beit se'a?

In accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains that a courtyard and a karkaf are one domain.

We learned above:

If most of it was planted,

of the karkaf,

it is like a courtyard, and it is permitted:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Avimi:

This statement, that planting does not nullify the designation of an enclosure for residential use,

applies when the trees were planted in rows

so that the planting of the trees formed orderly rows, making it pleasant to sit there; it is still a place of residence.

And Rav Naḥman said: Even when they were not planted in rows.

Mar Yehuda happened to come to the house of Rav Huna bar Yehuda and saw [

he saw]

those

karkafot larger than a beit se'a—which had initially been enclosed for residential use, and afterward trees had been planted in them—

that were not planted in rows, and

even so

they were carrying within them.

He said to him,

Mar Yehuda said to Rav Huna bar Yehuda: Is it so that

the Master does not accept the ruling of Avimi—

as a question—for he said that if the trees were not planted in rows, the residential designation of the karkafot is nullified, and they become karkafot larger than a beit se'a that were not enclosed for residential use?!

He said to him,

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Mar Yehuda:

I

hold in accordance with Rav Naḥman

above,

as I understand it,

for he said: Even when they were not planted in rows.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: In the case of a karkaf larger than a beit se'a that was not enclosed for residential use,

and afterward a dwelling was opened into it—since we maintain that it is prohibited to carry there [unless a dwelling was first opened into it, before the enclosure was made, and afterward it was enclosed]—

what does one do

to rectify it, so that it will be considered like “a dwelling was opened first and it was enclosed afterward”?

1.

He makes

in the karkaf—in the partitions enclosing the karkaf—

a breach larger than ten

cubits, since at this width the breach is no longer designated an “entrance”; rather, it is considered a breach that nullifies the partitions.

2.

And he encloses it

the karkaf again,

and restores it,

reducing the breach until it stands

at ten

cubits בלבד, since from that point the karkaf has an “entrance” rather than a breach.

And

then

it is permitted

to carry there, since this is like one who enclosed the karkaf after opening a dwelling into it.

They raised a dilemma:

If he

made

in the enclosure a breach of

one cubit

only, so that the partitions were not yet nullified,

and enclosed

that

one cubit,

and

again

made a breach of one cubit

more, adjacent to the first cubit,

and enclosed it,

until they completed

by means of several breaches

a

breach

larger than ten

cubits—but there was never one single breach in the partition larger than ten cubits at once. Likewise, when he enclosed it, he did not close a single breach larger than ten cubits—

what is the ruling?

Perhaps we say: Since he never made a breach larger than ten cubits at one time, the original enclosure, which was not made for any dwelling, was never nullified.

Or perhaps, since if he had not enclosed the breaches, they would have combined to form a breach larger than ten cubits, the original enclosure would have been nullified.

And it follows that by enclosing each breach separately, he thereby ensured that there would not be a breach larger than ten cubits, and the matter is considered a new enclosure made for residential use?

He said to him [

it is unknown who said this—the Ya'avetz]:

Is this not what we learned: Every wooden vessel

of

householders [

that is not intended for sale],

their measure

for purifying them from their impurity if they become perforated, thereby removing their designation as a “vessel,” is

like pomegranates,

when they have been perforated enough for the pomegranates inside them to fall through?

But if they were perforated less than this, householders customarily put them away for use with pomegranates; therefore their designation as a “vessel” is not nullified.

And Ḥizkiya raised the dilemma: If it was perforated

the vessel, with a small hole

large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and it was perforated again

next to the place he had sealed,

large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it,

and it was perforated again

until they completed a hole large enough for a pomegranate to emerge, what is the ruling?

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Ḥizkiya:

to Ḥizkiya:

My teacher, you taught us

the Mishna concerning a

sandal!

As we learned [

in the version of the manuscript]:

A sandal

that became impure through the midras of a man with a flux, which imparts impurity to people and vessels—if one of its straps was severed, it remains impure with midras impurity until both straps are severed, at which point it is no longer fit for midras.

If one of its straps was severed and he repaired it, it remains impure with midras impurity,

since even if he had not repaired it, it would remain impure with midras impurity, as we said.

If

the

second

strap was severed—after he repaired the first—

and he repaired it, it is pure

from midras impurity,

since in any event both of its straps had been severed after it became impure.

But it remains impure

with the impurity of

contact with midras [

like a vessel that touched something that became impure through the midras of a man with a flux], because with regard to this impurity it is still a “vessel,” since it is fit for another use; and it contracted this impurity at the moment when the strap separated from it, and the impurity was not nullified.

And you will say [

you, Ḥizkiya]

concerning

the explanation:

What is the difference

that when the

first

strap alone was severed, it remains impure, because

we

say:

there remains

still a

second

strap that was not severed?

When the

second

strap was severed—after he repaired the first—

also

let us say:

there remains

a

first

repaired strap, and the sandal lacks only one strap?!

And you told us concerning it: New aspects have come here, meaning: These are not new straps from the sandal that the man with a flux wore, and they purified it from the first impurity, since this is not the original sandal. Since that is so, Rabbi Yoḥanan resolved the dilemma for Ḥizkiya:

with regard to a vessel that was perforated and then perforated again, it can likewise be said

here too

that

new aspects

of the vessel

have come here,

and this is not the same vessel that became impure.

And

he applied to him

Ḥizkiya applied to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

“There is no human being here” [

this one—Rabbi Yoḥanan—is not a human being, but an angel!

Some say:

This is what he applied to him:

“This is the sort of human being”

this is a great person!

In any event, the dilemma raised concerning one who breached the enclosure, sealed it, and then breached it and sealed it again is likewise resolved: Here too, new aspects of the enclosure have come here, and it is considered a new enclosure made after a dwelling was opened into it; therefore it is permitted to carry there!

Rav Kahana said: A rear courtyard behind houses [

an open area behind the house, where ordinary household activities are not performed as in a courtyard—Mishna Berura], into which the house does not open, is considered an enclosure not made for residential use. If the enclosure was larger than a beit se'a,

one may carry there only within four cubits.

And Rav Naḥman said: If he opened into it [

the rear courtyard]

an entrance

from the house adjoining the courtyard,

it is permitted to carry

throughout all of it,

since the

entrance

from the house

permits it,

and renders it like an area enclosed for residential use.

And we said this

that the entrance permits it

only when he opened

the entrance from the house

and afterward enclosed

the courtyard,

but if he enclosed

the courtyard

and afterward opened it, no.

As we said above, an enclosure made in this manner is not considered an enclosure made for residential use.

And we questioned this:

“He opened it first and afterward enclosed it”—it is obvious,

so what is Rav Naḥman teaching us?!

And we answer:

It is necessary where there was

in the courtyard—that is, before the courtyard was enclosed, there was in that place

a threshing floor [

a granary].

Lest you say

that even opening it first and enclosing it afterward is ineffective, because the entrance was not made with the intention of enclosing a courtyard there; rather,

with the intention of a threshing floor [

so that he could leave his house for the threshing floor]

he made it

the entrance,

it teaches us

that ordinarily it is understood to have been opened into the courtyard.

A karkaf larger than a beit se'a that was enclosed for residential use and became filled with water,

water collected in a depression in the courtyard [Tosafot], ten handbreadths deep,

the Rabbis initially thought

at first

to say:

Water in a karkaf

is like

the planting of

seeds,

for we said above that they nullify the designation of an enclosure for residential use in the place where they are planted—

and

therefore

it is prohibited

to carry throughout it if most of the karkaf became filled with water, as we said above concerning “if most of it was planted” [Keren Ora, and in accordance with Tosafot’s second interpretation].

Rav Abba said to them

(his father)

(the brother)

(of Rav)

(Rava)

the son of Rav Mesharsheya: This is what we say in the name of Rava: Water

is not like the planting of seeds; rather,

it is like trees

of trees

that it resembles—

which do not nullify an enclosure made for residential use, as we said above—

and

therefore

it is permitted

to carry in it.