Eruvin 12b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here?

That the wall was not breached completely. Rather,

it has

still

remnants

[remnants of the height of the wall] that are ten high, except that the sea covered them; therefore, there is a prohibition only to fill it.

Rav Yehuda said:

There is no private domain by Torah law unless it has four partitions. [This is how we initially thought to explain the words of Rabbi Yehuda.] Therefore:

A mevo in which they did not establish a partnership

[The expression “in which they did not establish a partnership” will be explained below,] which has three partitions, is not a private domain if they did not rectify the mevo at all!

And if they

rectified it

[rectified the mevo]

with a lehi,

which is effective by virtue of a partition,

one who throws into it

from a public domain

is liable.

For through the lehi the mevo becomes enclosed by four partitions, which is a private domain by Torah law.

For this is the law of a private domain according to the Torah: if it has three complete partitions, and in addition a lehi partition, which is considered an “incomplete partition,” it is a private domain. Ritba.

But if they

rectified it with a kora,

which cannot serve as a partition, but only by reason of recognition—

one who throws

from a public domain

into it

of the mevo—

is exempt.

For this mevo has only three partitions!

Rav Sheshet raised an objection to it

with a double objection:

The first objection:

That which Rav Yehuda said: a mevo “in which they did not establish a partnership,” implies:

The reason is that they did not establish a partnership in it: “partnerships of mevo’ot”

[which the Sages instituted in order to permit carrying from a house in a courtyard to a mevo shared by several courtyards, even if it was enclosed by four complete partitions] is why a kora is not effective.

But

if

they established a partnership in it

the inhabitants of the mevo together through “partnerships of mevo’ot”—

even if they rectified it with a kora, he is likewise liable

one who throws into it.

And concerning this Rav Sheshet raised an objection to it:

And does this loaf

with which the inhabitants of the mevo “establish a partnership”

make it

a

private domain

when they established a partnership in it,

or

a

public domain

when they did not establish a partnership in it?!

The second objection:

And

further,

it was taught in a beraita: courtyards belonging to many,

to which many houses open: the inhabitants of the houses prohibit one another, for they cannot take things out from the houses into the courtyard without an eruv among them.

And mevo’ot that are not open through,

but are closed on three sides:

whether they established an eruv

in the courtyards

or whether they did not establish an eruv,

whether they established a partnership in the mevo’ot or whether they did not establish a partnership,

one who throws into them is liable.

And now this is difficult for Rav Yehuda.

Since this beraita speaks even of a case in which they did not establish a partnership in it, and states it without qualification, and does not distinguish between rectifying it with a lehi and rectifying it with a kora, for in every case one who throws into it is liable, you must necessarily learn one of two things:

Either both a lehi and a kora are effective by virtue of a partition;

or three partitions suffice by Torah law, and the beraita speaks even of a case in which they did not rectify it at all. [Based on Ritba and Gaon Yaakov.]

And therefore we explain Rav Yehuda in another manner:

In fact, Rav Yehuda holds that three partitions suffice for it to be a private domain by Torah law.

And

rather, if it was stated, this is how it was stated:

Rav Yehuda said: a mevo that is not fit for a partnership,

which even after he installed the lehi or the kora in it—which are mentioned further in the beraita—is still not fit and rectified so as to permit it through a partnership of mevo’ot, since it is open through and is not permitted by a lehi and a kora alone, but also requires a form of a doorway at one of its openings that opens through to the public domain [as above, page 6b]: [see illustration] 1]

Thus, if

they rectified it with a lehi

at one of its openings [and did not also rectify it with a form of a doorway at its second opening]—

one who throws into it

from a public domain

is liable.

For a lehi is by virtue of a partition, and it follows that the mevo has three partitions!

But if

they rectified it with a kora

[and did not also make a form of a doorway at its second opening,] for it is effective only by reason of recognition—

one who throws into it

from a public domain—

is exempt!

[The explanation of the language of the Gemara has been elucidated based on Gaon Yaakov; see Ritba.]

And we explain it:

thus, evidently he holds

Rav Yehuda

that a lehi is by virtue of a partition, and a kora is by reason of recognition!

And Rabba likewise said: a lehi is by virtue of a partition, and a kora is by reason of recognition.

And Rava said: both this one

a kora,

and this one

a lehi,

are by reason of recognition.

Rabbi Yaakov bar Abba raised an objection to Rava: one who throws into a mevo, if it has a lehi—

he is liable. If it does not have a lehi—

he is exempt.

Thus, evidently a lehi is by virtue of a partition?!

And we answer:

this is what it says:

if the mevo has the “permission” of a lehi, that

it needs only a lehi—

since it is closed on three sides—

one who throws into it is liable.

And even though it does not have a lehi, since three partitions constitute a private domain by Torah law!

But if it does not have the “permission” of a lehi, so that the mevo needs

a lehi and something else—

for it is open through and also requires a form of a doorway—

one who throws into it is exempt.

And even if he made a lehi for it.

For the lehi itself neither adds nor detracts, since it is only recognition, and the law depends on whether the mevo is closed or open through.

He raised an objection to him

to Rava, who said that even a lehi is by reason of recognition:

Moreover, Rabbi Yehuda said: one who has two houses on the two sides of a public domain—

he makes a lehi here

on one side of one of the houses,

and a lehi here

on the other side of that same house, and the public domain is found to be enclosed, and it is permitted to carry from house to house [Rashi above, page 6b].

Or

he places on both sides

a kora here and a kora here, and he carries and gives in the middle.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda:

One does not make a public domain into an eruv through this!

Thus, evidently a lehi is by virtue of a partition. For without the lehi there are not even three partitions, and necessarily the lehi is effective by virtue of a partition!

And we reject this: if

there

there is no proof.

For there Rabbi Yehuda follows his own position, that

Rabbi Yehuda holds that

it is sufficient for a private domain to have

two partitions by Torah law

and three partitions are not required.

Rather, by rabbinic law it is possible to carry only when he makes recognition here and recognition here.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: a mevo whose

measure of

length

is

equal to its width

[The direction of one’s entry into the mevo is the beginning of the “length” of the mevo, and what is not the direction of one’s entry is the “width” of the mevo. Mishna Berura],

is not permitted by a lehi of any size,

but rather requires a strip four handbreadths wide, like a courtyard. [And if its width is greater than its length, see “Studies”].

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: a mevo whose length is equal to its width—

is not permitted by a kora one handbreadth wide,

but rather requires a strip four handbreadths wide, like a courtyard.

Rabbi Zeira said

concerning these statements of Rav Yehuda and Rav Hiyya bar Ashi, in order to support them:

how well aligned are the teachings of the elders

[How aligned and similar to one another are the teachings of the elders, Rashi in the fragments of the Rif].

Since

this mevo

has its length equal to its width—

it is

according to the law of a

courtyard.

And a courtyard is not permitted by a lehi and a kora, but rather by a strip of four.

Rabbi Zeira said: if something is difficult to me

in the teaching of Rav Yehuda,

this is difficult to me:

How did Rav Yehuda say that because it has the law of a courtyard, which requires a “strip,” it is not permitted by a lehi of any size!

And after all,

let this lehi

itself

be like a strip of any amount, and let it be permitted

[for Rabbi Zeira holds that the measure of the width of a strip is any amount, like a lehi]?!

And we reject Rabbi Zeira’s objection:

it escaped him

Rabbi Zeira,

that which Rabbi Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: the strips of a courtyard must have

a width of

four

handbreadths.

Rav Nahman said: we have received

a tradition from our ancestors, and so is the practice from our teachers [Rashi above, page 5a]:

which is a mevo that is permitted by a lehi and a kora?

a.

Any one whose length is greater than its width.

b.

And houses and courtyards,

two courtyards, and one house opening onto each courtyard [so Rashi explained here, but below, page 74a, and in Shabbat 131a, Rashi explained: two houses for each courtyard, and this is also the view of most of the early authorities]

open into it.

And which is the courtyard that is not permitted by a lehi and a kora, but rather by a strip of four?

Any one that

is

square!

And we are astonished at this: is it specifically

a square one, yes,

it requires a strip of four, whereas a

round one does not

require a strip of four?!

And is it because it is round that it is permitted by a lehi of any size?!

And we explain it: “square” does not come to exclude “round.”

Rather,

this is what it says: if its length

of the courtyard is

greater than its width

and it is not “square,”

it is a mevo.

And for a mevo, a lehi and a kora suffice

for it.

And if it does not

have its length greater than its width—

it is a courtyard.

And how much

must the length of a courtyard be greater than its width, so that it leaves the law of a courtyard and becomes permitted according to the law of a mevo with a lehi?

Shmuel thought to say:

since it is a courtyard, it does not leave its law—which requires a strip of four—

until there is

in its length

twice its width!

Rav said to him: this is what my beloved said

[my uncle] [that is, Rabbi Hiyya, who was Rav’s paternal uncle and maternal uncle]:

Even

if its length is greater

by any amount

than its width—it is permitted by a lehi and a kora!

We learned in the Mishna:

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael, one student said

before Rabbi Akiva: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning a mevo that is less than four cubits, that it is permitted either by a lehi or by a kora.