Eruvin 101b (קא:) — the Talmud in English

unless he made a partition ten handbreadths high

in the public domain, and he is standing within it, in which case he may open it in the private domain. For he is standing in the private domain and opens it in the private domain [and it applies to the latter clause],

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

[And he disagrees with the Mishna above [98b], which states that a person may stand in the private domain and move an object in the public domain, and likewise conversely, and we do not decree lest he bring the object into his domain.]

They said to him

the Sages:

There was an incident in the market of fatteners

butchers

that was in Jerusalem, where they would lock

their shops on Shabbat, and the lock was above ten handbreadths,

and they would place the key in the window above the entrance,

although they themselves were standing in the market, which was a public domain,

Rabbi Yosei says: It was the market of wool merchants

sellers of wool

that it was!

[He did not come to disagree with the Sages, but only to state how the incident occurred, and not to rule on the halakha.]

Gemara:

We raise an objection:

But the Sages,

who responded to Rabbi Meir in the Mishna with the incident of the market that was in Jerusalem, did not respond properly!

For

Rabbi Meir said

“the public domain,”

where it is prohibited to stand there and open something in the private domain,

and they responded to him with a karmelit?!

For Jerusalem is not a public domain but a karmelit, so what proof is there from a karmelit concerning a public domain?

But a karmelit is different: Since the prohibition against transferring from the private domain into it is only rabbinic, consequently we do not decree that one may not stand in a karmelit and open something in the private domain, lest he bring the key to himself, as that would be a decree concerning a decree.

But in the public domain, it is possible that we do issue such a decree.

As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Had the doors of Jerusalem not been locked at night,

they

would have been liable for it on account of the public domain,

for there were six hundred thousand people in it, and its streets were open from gate to gate.

But since the gates of the city were locked at night, it is like one large courtyard even during the day, because it is not comparable to the camp of the wilderness, where there was an open road at all times. Nevertheless, one may not move objects within it by rabbinic decree, since they did not establish eruv ḥatzerot in it.

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said:

Here,

the statement concerns the period before breaches had been made in the wall of Jerusalem; at that time it had the status of a karmelit.

Here,

the statement concerns the market of fatteners in the Mishna, and it was

after breaches had been made

in the city wall, so that it had become a public domain. Nevertheless, they would lock the shops and place the key in the window above the entrance. Thus, the Sages properly responded to Rabbi Meir.

Rava said:

Jerusalem always has the status of a karmelit.

And

the latter clause

of the Mishna, in which the Sages said to Rabbi Meir, citing the market of fatteners—

we come to the gates of a garden,

where Rabbi Meir prohibits even in a garden whose status is that of a karmelit, so that a person may not stand within it and open something in the private domain, as will be explained below.

And concerning this the Sages responded to him with the incident of the market of fatteners, which also had the status of a karmelit, and where they acted permissively in this matter.

And this is what

Rabbi Meir said in the Mishna:

Likewise, he may not stand in the private domain and open something in a karmelit,

such as when he is standing in his courtyard and extends his hand through a hole or crack into the garden, which is a karmelit.

[For it is not a place of residence and is larger than two beit se’a, and the halakha is that a karpef larger than two beit se’a that was not enclosed for residential purposes may be used only within four cubits,] and he takes the key from there and opens the door from inside.

Likewise, he may not stand

in a karmelit and open something in the private domain,

such as when he is standing inside the garden and extends his hand upward, taking a key from a place ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, which is a private domain, and opening the lock, which too is above ten handbreadths.

Unless he made

within the garden

a partition ten handbreadths high,

and he is standing within it; he may then open the lock, which is above ten handbreadths, for his hand too is in the private domain, as the private domain extends up to the heavens,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

All this is due to a decree, lest he bring the key into the domain where he is standing. Rabbi Meir issues a decree even concerning transferring from a karmelit to the private domain, although the prohibition is only rabbinic.

They said to him

the Sages:

There was an incident in the market of fatteners that was in Jerusalem, where they would lock the shops and place the key in the window above the entrance.

Rabbi Yosei says: It was the market of wool merchants.

The Sages taught: With regard to the entrances of the gates of a garden—

when they have a gatehouse,

a small structure standing at the entrance to the garden, whose doorway serves as the entrance to the garden—

if the gatehouse stands

inside

the garden,

he opens and locks from inside.

And if it is

outside

the garden,

he opens and locks from outside.

That is, he opens the gatehouse wherever he is standing, since the person opening it is standing inside the gatehouse, which is a private domain, and the key and lock are there as well.

If they have a gatehouse

on either side—

he opens and locks here and there,

the two entrances of the two gatehouses.

If

they do not have

a gatehouse

either here or there,

but there is only a gate to the garden, adjacent to the public domain—

they are prohibited on both sides,

whether opening and locking from the public-domain side or from the garden side.

Because the lock is a private domain [as garden locks are generally ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide], whereas the person is standing in the public domain or in the garden, which is a karmelit.

And even if the key is lying on the lock and he does not take it from one domain to another, nevertheless we issue a decree lest he bring the key to himself, to the place where he is standing, thereby transferring it from the private domain to the public domain or to a karmelit.

And likewise, shops that open onto the public domain,

whose threshold has the status of a karmelit [since it is less than ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide], while the locks of shops are sometimes high and sometimes low.

Therefore,

when the lock is below ten

handbreadths, in which case it is a karmelit [because it projects four handbreadths from the door]—

he brings a key before Shabbat and places it on the threshold.

And

the next day, he opens and locks, and returns it to the threshold,

with the result that he moves it from the threshold to the lock above it through the airspace of the threshold, and back. Thus, throughout, he moves it only within a karmelit.

But when the lock is above ten

handbreadths, in which case it is a private domain—

he brings a key before Shabbat and places it on the lock.

That is, on top of the lock and not on the threshold, because then the next day he would not be able to move it from there to the lock, as that would be transferring from a karmelit to a private domain.

And

the next day, he opens and locks, and returns it

to its place on top of the lock, which is transferring from one private domain to another,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Even when the lock is above ten handbreadths, he brings a key before Shabbat and places it on the threshold.

And

the next day, he opens and locks, and returns it to its place.

For according to the Sages, the lock, although it is ten handbreadths high, is not a private domain; rather, it is a place exempt from the laws of domains, as will be explained below. Therefore, it is permitted to move from the threshold to the lock, as that is transferring from a karmelit to a place exempt from the laws of domains.

Alternatively, after locking, he returns the key

to the window above the entrance,

whose width is less than four handbreadths, so that it has the status of a place exempt from the laws of domains. Consequently, when he moves the key from the lock to the window, he moves it from one place exempt from the laws of domains to another.

However,

if the window is four

handbreadths

by four,

in which case it is a private domain,

it is prohibited

to return the key there,

because it is like transferring from one domain to another.

It is as though he transferred the key from the threshold, which is a karmelit, to the window, which is a private domain. Although he did not transfer it directly from the karmelit to the private domain, since he placed it down in the middle on the lock, which is a place exempt from the laws of domains, nevertheless the Sages prohibited doing so, as will be explained below.

We raise an objection:

From the fact that

the beraita says

“and likewise shops

that open onto the public domain”—

by inference, we are dealing with a threshold that is a karmelit,

as the shop’s threshold is a karmelit, similar to the gates of a garden mentioned immediately beforehand, where the garden is a karmelit.

The following difficulty now arises:

This lock—

what are its circumstances?

If it does not contain four

handbreadths by four handbreadths in width, then

it is a place exempt from the laws of domains

even when it is above ten handbreadths. Why, then, did Rabbi Meir prohibit moving the key from the threshold to the lock when the lock is above ten handbreadths? It is permitted to move from a karmelit to a place exempt from the laws of domains!

And if it does contain four

by four, it is a private domain.

If so, the difficulty arises: How could

the Sages say in this case, “Even when the lock is above ten handbreadths, he brings a key before Shabbat and places it on the threshold; the next day he opens and locks with it and returns it to the threshold or to the window above the entrance”?!

How is it permitted to move the key from the threshold to the lock,

when he is transferring from a karmelit to a private domain?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Actually, the lock does not have a thickness

of

four

by four handbreadths.

However,

it does have

enough room

to carve,

meaning that there is sufficient space in the thickness of the door to carve out a section there parallel to the head of the lock

and complete it to four

handbreadths.

And this is the dispute

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

For Rabbi Meir holds: We carve out to complete!

We view the door as though it had been carved out until it reached four handbreadths, and the lock is therefore a private domain; consequently, it is prohibited to move the key from the threshold to the lock.

But the Sages hold: We do not carve out to complete!

Rather, they consider the lock as it is, and it is a place exempt from the laws of domains. Therefore, it is permitted to move from the threshold to the lock.

Rav Beיבי bar Abaye said: Learn three things from this baraita:

a.

Learn from Rabbi Meir that

we

carve out to complete.

b.

And learn from it: Rabbi Meir retracted his position concerning the gates of a garden.

In the first clause of the beraita, concerning the gates of a garden, it is explained that Rabbi Meir prohibits standing in one domain and opening something in another domain, even when it concerns two domains between which transferring is prohibited only rabbinically. For even in that case we issue a decree lest he bring the key from the place where he is opening to the place where he is standing.

Whereas in the latter clause it is explained that he does not issue a decree on account of rabbinic transfer.

For when the lock is above ten handbreadths, he permits opening it even though the person is standing on the threshold, which is a karmelit. He does not issue a decree lest he bring the key from the lock, which is a private domain, to himself in the karmelit. Since the prohibition against transferring from a private domain to a karmelit is only rabbinic, we do not issue a decree concerning a decree.

c.

And learn from it, from the Sages,

who prohibit returning the key to a window that contains four handbreadths:

The statement of Rav Dimi is established.

For when Rav Dimi came, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated: A place that does not contain four by four

handbreadths—

it is permitted

both

for members of the public

domain

and

both

for members of the private domain to place their burdens upon it.

To set down their loads upon it, since it is permitted to transfer from the public domain or from the private domain to a place exempt from the laws of domains.

Provided that they do not exchange

by transferring an object from one domain to another through a place exempt from the laws of domains, even when they placed it down in the middle in a place exempt from the laws of domains, as a decree lest they come to transfer directly from one domain to another without placing it down in the middle.

Therefore, the Sages prohibit taking a key from the threshold, which is a karmelit, opening and locking with it, and afterward returning it to a window measuring four handbreadths, which is a private domain, even though the key was placed down in the middle of the way, inside the lock, which is a place exempt from the laws of domains.

Mishna:

A bolt

which is a bar inserted into a hole in the threshold to lock the door,

whose head has a glostera,

which is thick and large at its end like a pomegranate, and thereby has the status of a utensil, since it is fit for pounding pepper—

nevertheless,

Rabbi Eliezer prohibits

locking the door with it on Shabbat unless it is tied and hanging from the door.

For if it is not tied and hanging from the door, locking with it appears like building.

And Rabbi Yosei permits.

Since it has the status of a utensil, locking with it does not appear like building.

Rabbi Eliezer said: There was an incident involving a

synagogue

in Tiberias, where they practiced permissiveness

with regard to a bolt with a glostera, using it to lock the door on Shabbat.

Until Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and prohibited it for them!

And this is proof of my statement.

Rabbi Yosei says:

The incident was the reverse:

They practiced prohibition there, and Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and permitted it for them!

Gemara:

And we explain the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosei:

When the bolt is removed

the bolt

by means of its attachment,

when the bolt is tied and hanging from the door by a strong cord, so that it can be moved by means of that cord and the cord will not break—

everyone agrees

that it is permitted to lock with it, since, being firmly tied and hanging, it is evident that it is designated for locking the door, and it does not appear like building.