Chullin 99a — the Talmud in English

And we raised it:

And let us derive from it,

from the flesh of the ram, which is not forbidden [although, by Torah law, taste as substance in consecrated offerings is forbidden by Torah law], to permit also the taste of other prohibitions of consecrated offerings, such as notar and pigul, when they imparted taste in sixty or one hundred.

And we answer:

The Torah revealed concerning the sin-offering, “Whatever touches its flesh”

that is, any flesh of a consecrated offering that absorbs from the taste of the sin-offering by touching it],

“shall become consecrated,” \-

to be

according to the laws of its eating

like it!

For if

the sin-offering was

invalid—

it shall become invalid

also the animal that absorbed from the sin-offering.

And if

the sin-offering was

valid—

the animal that absorbed from the sin-offering shall eat

the animal that absorbed from the sin-offering

according to the stricter [law] among them,

of the sin-offering. That is, if the absorption was in the flesh of a zevach shelamim, it is forbidden for non-priests to eat it, and it must be eaten for one day and one night, according to the law of eating a sin-offering! And from here we learned to forbid taste as substance in consecrated offerings.

And we raise an objection:

What have you seen that we derive from that one

of the sin-offering, that taste as substance in consecrated offerings is not nullified by the majority?

Let us derive from this one

of the cooked foreleg, that taste in consecrated offerings is nullified by a majority of sixty or one hundred?

And we answer:

It is a novelty

that was introduced with the cooked foreleg, for initially one cooks the foreleg together with the ram and nullifies the prohibition by the majority; this is something that one may not do with other prohibitions, for one does not initially nullify a prohibition by a majority, but only permits [it] where the prohibition fell into a majority of permitted matter unintentionally.

And we do not derive from a novelty!

And we raise an objection:

If so, with regard to one hundred and sixty,

which you derive from the cooked foreleg in order to be stringent with unconsecrated matter,

we should likewise not derive [it],

for the cooked foreleg is a novelty.

the Tosafot here, and likewise the Rashba in Torat HaBayit 4a] hold that even according to Rabbi Yohanan, taste as substance is from the Torah, but one is not flogged on account of it. One must examine Rashi’s view: Does he intend to say that taste is considered nothing, and therefore is permitted by Torah law, because it does not constitute actual substance of a prohibition, and therefore, except in places where the Torah explicitly increased [the law] to say that taste is forbidden [such as with a nazir and with consecrated offerings], there is no basis for forbidding the taste? Or perhaps, according to Rashi as well, the taste itself is actual substance of a prohibition, but since the forbidden taste became mixed with the permitted matter, the forbidden taste was nullified by the majority of the permitted matter, and the fact that one senses the taste when eating the permitted matter is not considered “the prohibition being recognized” by itself. And whenever a prohibition is mixed with a majority of permitted matter, the prohibition is nullified by the majority. And Rabbeinu Akiva Eiger in Derush le-Shabbat ha-Gadol, section 8, at the end of Derush ve-Chiddush le-Chullin], wrote that at the foundation of this question the Rashba and the Ran disagree in our sugya. And Rashi explains the reasoning of the one who says that taste as substance is not of Torah authority: we make the nullification of taste like nullifications of Torah prohibitions by a majority, as it is written, “After the majority to incline.” And it follows that he explains that the taste is [nullified] on account of nullification by a majority. Whereas from the language of the Tosafot it follows that even if the taste increases over the matter into which it was absorbed, the taste is not forbidden according to the one who says that taste as substance is not of Torah authority. And we answer:

Are we deriving leniently

from the cooked foreleg? Behold,

we are deriving stringently! For by Torah law,

with unconsecrated matter, one

is nullified by a majority,

whereas we are stringent that it should not be nullified until sixty or one hundred.

Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi Ravina said: It is necessary only

for what we say, “This is a permitted matter that comes from within a prohibited matter,” concerning the cooked foreleg,

but for the place of the cut,

where they cut the foreleg from the flesh of the ram.

For when one says “the place of the cut” generally,

in every case of a prohibited and a permitted matter joined together, where the prohibited matter is cut away from the permitted matter [such as when a fetus extended its hand, and it became forbidden, and they cut off the hand; and such as a dangling limb, which is cut off]

the place of the cut itself is forbidden,

the place of the cut itself,

but

if

here,

the place of the cut of the foreleg from the ram—

is permitted!

Rav Dimi sat and stated this teaching

of Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak, that nullification by a majority is in one hundred and not in sixty.

Abaye said to him: And

is it that

all prohibitions of the Torah

are nullified by a majority

in one hundred!?

But we learned: Why [

like “with what”]

did they say: Anyone who leavens

with teruma [that is, anyone who leavens unconsecrated dough with teruma leaven],

and

so too he

seasons

an unconsecrated pot with teruma spices,

and

so too he

mixes [produce],

who cooks unconsecrated produce and teruma together—they applied to them

stringency?

When the mixture was

a kind and its own kind!

And likewise at times they applied

leniency

and at times

stringency—

in a mixture of

a kind and a kind unlike it.

And the latter clause teaches:

To be lenient and to be stringent

as we said, and likewise

a kind and a kind unlike it—

How so?

Split beans

of teruma

that were cooked with the lentils

of unconsecrated matter—

if there is in them,

in the teruma split beans,

enough to impart taste

in the lentils, then

whether there is in them,

in the lentils,

to raise

the teruma split beans

in one hundred and one, whether there is not in them enough to raise them in one hundred and one—

it is forbidden!

Here we have learned stringency twice!

And if

there is not in them enough to impart taste,

then

whether there is enough in them to raise them in one hundred and one, or there is not enough in them to raise them in one hundred and one—

it is permitted!

Here we have learned leniency twice!

For when we require a measure for nullification, that is when there is imparting of taste; but when there is no imparting of taste, we do not require one hundred of permitted matter in order to nullify it.

And that with regard to teruma we require one to one hundred in order to nullify it refers to when the teruma itself is mixed with the permitted matter, but not when only the taste of the teruma is found in the mixture.

And now Abaye proves: What the tanna said in our Mishna, that where it does not impart taste, even “there is not enough in them to raise them in one hundred and one,” it is nevertheless nullified.

Rather, by what

is its measure of nullification?

Is it not—

in sixty!