Chullin 96a (צו.) — the Talmud in English

Rava said: At first I would say

that

a distinguishing mark is preferable to visual recognition,

for identification by means of a distinguishing mark is more certain than identification by visual recognition. And the proof is

that we return lost property on the basis of a distinguishing mark!

but we do not return it on the basis of visual recognition. Now that I have heard these teachings,

which permitted the prohibition to be overridden on the basis of visual recognition alone,

I say: Visual recognition is preferable!

[And the reason that we do not return lost property on the basis of visual recognition is that we suspect that he is lying.]

For if you do not say so,

that it is possible to rely on visual recognition,

how is a blind man permitted to have relations with his wife? And how are people permitted to have relations with their wives at night?

For they do not fear that perhaps this is not his wife.

Rather,

it is necessarily

through recognition of the voice,

as he recognizes her voice.

Here too,

it is possible to rely

on visual recognition.

Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharsheya, said: Know

that visual recognition is preferable to distinguishing marks:

For if two witnesses came

—two witnesses—

and said: So-and-so, who has this distinguishing mark and this distinguishing mark, killed a person,

as we do not recognize the murderer but know his distinguishing marks,

we do not execute him

on the basis of the distinguishing marks.

But if they said: We have visual recognition of him,

as we recognize him,

we execute him!

Rav Ashi said: Know! For if a person said to his agent: Call out

—go and call out—

to so-and-so, who has this distinguishing mark and this distinguishing mark! He may or may not recognize him.

Thus, the agent is not certain who is intended.

But if he has visual recognition of him, when he sees him,

the agent sees that man, immediately

he recognizes him,

as he is the man whom he must call.

Mishna:

One who removes the gid ha-nasheh

from the thigh

must remove all of it,

probing after it and removing its roots.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He need not probe after it; rather, he cuts only what is above the hip socket

in order to fulfill the mitzva of removing it.

One who eats an olive-bulk of the gid ha-nasheh receives forty lashes

for violating the prohibition against eating the gid ha-nasheh.

If he ate it

—the entire tendon—

and it does not contain an olive-bulk, he is liable

for lashes, because when the gid ha-nasheh is whole, it is a beriyya, an entity for which one is liable even for consuming any amount.

If he ate

from both gid ha-nasheh tendons,

from this one

on the right thigh

an olive-bulk, and from this one

on the left thigh

an olive-bulk, he receives eighty lashes,

two sets of lashes, since he violated the prohibition of the gid ha-nasheh twice.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He receives only forty lashes.

That is, only one set of lashes, because Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the prohibition of the gid ha-nasheh applies only to the right thigh.

Gemara:

Bar Piyoli

[a person's name]

was standing before Shmuel and was removing the tendon from the thigh,

removing the gid ha-nasheh from the thigh.

He was cutting it only superficially,

cutting only from above and not probing after it.

Shmuel said to him

—Shmuel said to him—:

Cut further into it!

Go down and cut out the roots of the tendon as well, those within the hip socket.

Now, had I not seen you,

had I not been present at the time,

you would have caused me to eat forbidden food,

you would have caused me to transgress the prohibition of the gid ha-nasheh.

Bar Piyoli was terrified

by Shmuel's reprimand,

and the knife fell from his hand! He said to him

—Shmuel said to him—:

Do not be terrified!

For you too did not act improperly, because whoever

instructed you

to do this

instructed you in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!

who maintains that it is unnecessary to probe after the gid ha-nasheh. Whereas I maintain the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Rav Sheshet said: That which Bar Piyoli removed

—that part of the gid ha-nasheh that he removed—was forbidden

by Torah law according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we raise an objection:

By inference,

you learn from this that what he

left

and did not remove is forbidden

by rabbinic law according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The difficulty now is:

Rather,

whoever

instructed him

not to remove more than that part of the tendon,

in accordance with whose opinion did he instruct him?!

After all, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the remaining part is forbidden by rabbinic law.

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: That which Bar Piyoli removed

was forbidden

by Torah law

[according to both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda—based on Tosafot].

And that which he left

was forbidden

by rabbinic law according to Rabbi Meir.

For according to Rabbi Meir, the obligation to probe after it is only rabbinic.

But according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is permitted even by rabbinic law!

We learned in the Mishna:

One who eats from the gid ha-nasheh

an olive-bulk receives forty lashes.

Shmuel said: The Torah prohibited only

that part of the tendon

that

is found

on the hip socket alone,

but not what extends from it beyond the hip socket.

As it is stated: “on the hip socket.”

Rav Pappa said:

Shmuel's statement is

subject to a dispute between tannaim!

As it was taught in a beraita:

If he ate it

—the entire gid ha-nasheh—

and it does not contain an olive-bulk, he is liable

for lashes.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He is not liable

unless it contains an olive-bulk.

And we inquire:

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

And we answer: Because they maintain that a whole gid ha-nasheh

is a “beriyya,”

an entity for which one is liable for consuming any amount.