Chullin 95a (צה.) — the Talmud in English

If you had made peace with me,

had there been peace between us,

who would not have given

I would have given you

from a fattened ox that I had slaughtered,

that I slaughtered

yesterday.

He said to him:

Despite your not having given me—

eat from the choicest of the choice!

He said to him: From where did you get it?

Where did you get it?

He said to him: So-and-so, a gentile, bought it

from you,

and gave me a piece. He said to him: I slaughtered two,

I slaughtered two,

and that one

that you ate—

was tereifa!

Rabbi said: Because of this fool, who acted improperly

by selling tereifa meat to a gentile [as this took place in a location where announcements were made, and for some reason no announcement was made, although there had been tereifa meat that day; therefore, on that day it was forbidden to sell meat to a gentile, lest a Jew purchase it from him, since no announcement had been made that day],

shall we prohibit all the butcher shops?!

There is no reason to prohibit purchasing meat from the other shops, including those belonging to gentiles [apart from the shop of that gentile who had the tereifa meat], as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

Rabbi follows his own reasoning, as he said:

If there were

butcher shops,

the shops in the city that sold meat,

and the butchers—

Jews,

meaning that the slaughterers [who also sold the meat to the shops] were Jewish, since gentiles do not slaughter, then

meat found in the possession of a gentile

in a gentile’s shop

is permitted!

Since this meat was certainly slaughtered by a Jew, there is no concern that it may be tereifa, as the butchers would not sell tereifa meat to a gentile on a day when no announcement had been made. Even now, although this butcher acted improperly and sold tereifa meat to a gentile, the presumption of kashrut of all the shops has not been undermined on account of this.

Some say: Rabbi said: Because of this fool, who intended to cause his fellow distress, shall we prohibit all the butcher shops?!

There is no reason to believe him that tereifa meat had in fact occurred in his possession the previous day. He said this only to distress his fellow. Therefore, it is permitted to purchase meat in the city, since no announcement had been made that day concerning tereifa meat.

We inquire concerning this:

The reason

that Rabbi permitted it was that

he intended only to cause his fellow distress. Otherwise,

would it have been

forbidden

to purchase meat from all the shops?!

But it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi says:

If there were

butcher shops and Jewish butchers—

meat found in the possession of a gentile is permitted!

Since all the shops have a presumption of kashrut, why should we prohibit them because of one shop belonging to that gentile who purchased tereifa meat?

And we answer:

Here it is different, as a prohibition was established!

Tereifa meat was sold to one shop, and there is concern that this butcher sold meat to many shops.

Rav said: Meat

that is kosher—

once it has gone out of sight,

having been left for even one moment without supervision,

is forbidden!

Perhaps the meat was exchanged, and this meat is different meat and is not kosher.

The Gemara raises an objection: Rabbi says: If there were butcher shops and Jewish butchers—

meat found in the possession of a gentile is permitted!

But this meat went out of sight of a Jew, and nevertheless it is permitted.

And we answer:

Meat found in the possession of a gentile is different!

The concern applies only to meat that was not guarded at all, as we are concerned that ravens may have come and exchanged it for meat from another place. But when it is guarded in the possession of a gentile, there is no such concern [and there is likewise no concern on account of the gentile himself, as explained above].

Come and hear:

As it was taught in a baraita:

Nine shops, all of which sell slaughtered meat, and one sells meat of an animal carcass, and one took meat from one of them but does not know from which one he took it—

his uncertainty renders it forbidden!

That is, the meat is forbidden due to the uncertainty, because we do not follow the majority since he took the meat from a shop, which is a place of fixed status. And we have the principle: “Anything fixed is considered as half and half”; that is, even when there is a majority and a minority, we treat the matter as though it were half and half.

But if it is found

with the meat lying in the street, and we do not know from which shop it came,

follow the majority!

Since this person did not take the meat from a place of fixed status, we say: “Anything that separates is presumed to have separated from the majority,” and the meat is permitted.

It follows that meat found in the street, despite having gone out of sight, is permitted—and this is difficult for Rav?

And we answer:

Here too

the case

is one in which it was found in the possession of a gentile!

The gentile took the meat from one of the shops, but we do not know from which shop [and we follow the majority, since the uncertainty arose for us only after the meat was already in the gentile’s possession, and not in the shop, which is a place of fixed status].

Come and hear:

As we learned in the Mishna: A city inhabited by gentiles and Jews, and one

found meat in it—

follow the majority of butchers!

If the majority of the slaughterers in the city are Jews, the meat is kosher.

If one found meat

cooked—

follow the majority of meat-eaters!

If the majority of those who eat meat are gentiles, the meat is forbidden. Even if the majority of the slaughterers are Jews and we know that the animal was properly slaughtered, nevertheless, since the meat is cooked, there is an additional concern of gentile cooking. Since the majority of meat-eaters are gentiles, there is a majority-based presumption that the gentile cooked it.

It follows that it is permitted to eat meat found in the street, even though it had gone out of sight?

And if you would say

as an answer, that

here too

the case

is one in which it was found in the possession of a gentile,

that cannot be said.

For it says

“cooked”—

“follow the majority of meat-eaters”!

And if the case is not that it was found in the street, but that it was found in a person’s possession, this is difficult: Why should we follow the majority?

Let us see: If a gentile is holding it,

he certainly cooked it, and it is forbidden.

If a Jew is holding it,

it is permitted. Rather, clearly the Mishna is speaking of meat found in the city street, and nevertheless it is permitted when the majority of the butchers are Jews?!

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here? With a case where one stands and watches it!

The finder saw the meat fall from someone’s hand, but does not know whether that person was Jewish or a gentile. From the moment it fell, the finder did not take his eyes off the meat, so this is not meat that went out of sight [even if the person who lost it was a gentile, it is not considered meat that went out of sight as long as the meat remains with him, as explained above].

Come and hear:

As we learned in the Mishna: Meat that is

found in the provinces,

in all the cities of Eretz Yisrael [and not in Jerusalem, where the law is different], if it was cut into

limbs,

they have the presumption of being

animal carcasses!

For it is customary to cut a carcass into limbs and throw it into the garbage.

But if the meat was cut into

pieces

small ones—

they are permitted,

as a person would take the trouble to cut meat into pieces only when it is kosher meat fit to eat [and the case is one where the majority of the slaughterers in the city are Jews].

It follows that found meat is permitted, even though it had gone out of sight?

And if you would say

that

here too

the case

is one where he stands and watches it,

then with regard to what it teaches:

“limbs”—

“animal carcasses,”

it is difficult:

Why?!

The finder saw that the limbs fell from a person’s hand and were not intentionally discarded, so there is no concern that they are carcasses.

Necessarily, then, the case is one where the finder did not see the meat at the time it fell, and nevertheless it is permitted when found cut into pieces. This proves that we are not concerned on account of meat that went out of sight?!

And we answer:

Is that the reason?!

The entire difficulty applies

only to Rav,

who said that meat that went out of sight is forbidden.

It was stated concerning it—

concerning the Mishna, which teaches that “pieces are permitted”:

Rav said: They are permitted with regard to the prohibition of animal carcass,

meaning that they do not impart impurity as an animal carcass does, and one is not flogged for eating them on account of the prohibition against eating an animal carcass. But they are nevertheless forbidden to eat because they went out of sight. In any event, since the uncertainty is only whether the meat was exchanged, their status is not that of an actual animal carcass [whereas meat found as limbs is certainly an animal carcass in every respect].

And Levi said: They are permitted

even

for eating.

And this statement of Rav,

that he forbids meat that went out of sight,

was not stated explicitly, but was inferred from a general statement.

From an incident that occurred, it was possible to infer that this was Rav’s opinion.