Chullin 77b (עז:) — the Talmud in English

If it is referring to the ritual impurity of carcasses

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Nappaḥa was uncertain: Surely we have already learned even this ruling

in a Mishna.

The Gemara now explains where these laws were taught:

The ritual impurity of food:

the hide does not become impure,

as it was taught in a beraita: The hide and the placenta do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food.

A hide that one cooked thoroughly, and a placenta about which one formed the intention

to eat them become impure with the ritual impurity of food.

Thus, it is explicit that a hide that one cooked thoroughly can become impure.

The Gemara cites the beraita in which the law of the ritual impurity of carcasses is explained:

The ritual impurity of carcasses, too, we have already learned,

as we learned concerning the verse “Anyone who touches its carcass”

—its carcass, but not

its hide.

And not

its bones,

and not its sinews, nor its horns, nor its hooves.

Rather, only the meat of the carcass conveys impurity.

And

concerning this,

Rabba bar Rav Ḥana said:

These expositions and exclusions

were necessary

and were stated

only

for the case

where one made them tzikei kedera.

That is, one cooked them extensively with spices, so that they are close to being food and resemble meat. In that case, the Torah innovated that they do not become impure, since one might have thought that their status is like that of meat and that they do become impure. But regarding a hide cooked in an ordinary manner, not in this fashion, there would be no reason to say that it becomes impure; therefore, the exclusion was stated only with regard to this case. It follows from these beraitot that a hide cooked extensively acquires the ritual impurity of food, but not the ritual impurity of carcasses. Once again, then, one must understand what Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Nappaḥa was uncertain about.

The Gemara explains:

Actually,

his uncertainty concerns

the ritual impurity of food. And

although we learned in the beraita that when it is cooked extensively it becomes impure,

the hide of a donkey is different, since it is repulsive.

Therefore, there is uncertainty whether its status is like that of any hide that was cooked and it becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food, or whether, because it is repulsive, it does not become impure.

We learned in our Mishna:

A placenta that emerged

partially is prohibited for consumption.

Rabbi Elazar said:

This prohibition of the placenta

was stated

concerning it

only

when

there is no fetus with it

in the portion that remains inside the animal, but only the disintegrated remains of a fetus are found there. Therefore, there is concern that the head of the fetus was located in the portion of the placenta that emerged, in which case the fetus is considered born and the placenta is prohibited.

But

if

there is a fetus with it

inside the placenta that remains in the animal’s body, and its head and the majority of its body are discernible in it, then it was not born; it is included among what is inside the animal and is permitted for consumption.

And

we do not suspect

that this animal had

another fetus

in addition to the one found inside the placenta, such that one would have to suspect that this was the fetus that emerged together with the portion of the placenta and that the placenta was thereby prohibited. Rather, we do not suspect this, and the placenta found inside the animal is permitted.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan

disagreed and

said: Whether

there

is no fetus with it

in what remains inside,

or whether there is a fetus with it—

we suspect another fetus,

and the placenta is prohibited.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Is that so?

How can the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan be understood in this manner?

But Rabbi Yirmeya said: Rabbi Elazar stated his opinion as a stringency.

Yet according to the dispute presented here, Rabbi Elazar is lenient in comparison with Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan prohibits the placenta whether there is a fetus in it or there is not, whereas Rabbi Elazar permits it when there is a fetus in it.

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows:

This tradition was transmitted in the following manner:

Rabbi Elazar said: It was taught

that the placenta is prohibited for consumption in every case, even if there is a fetus inside it,

only when it is not attached

to

the

fetus inside. In this case, one must suspect that the fetus belonging to this placenta already emerged, and the placenta is prohibited because birth occurred through it [that is, through the fetus that had been in it, and consequently it too is prohibited]. As for the fetus found inside the animal, its placenta already emerged. The placenta now found there is the placenta of the fetus that had already emerged, as stated. Therefore, Rabbi Elazar prohibits it.

But

if the placenta

is attached

to

the fetus, we do not suspect another fetus

that had been there. For the connection between the fetus and the placenta proves that they belong to one another, and consequently no birth occurred here.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We have no basis

for prohibiting the placenta

except

when the

placenta is found without a fetus.

Then there is concern that the fetus already emerged and that birth occurred.

But if there is a fetus with it

inside the mother’s body,

whether

it

is attached

to

the fetus or whether it is not attached to the fetus—

we do not suspect another fetus.

Whenever the placenta and the fetus are found inside the mother’s body, we assume that they belong to one another, and there is no basis for prohibiting them.

And this is what Rabbi Yirmeya said: Rabbi Elazar stated his opinion as a stringency

in his dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan. As the dispute is presented here, Rabbi Yoḥanan is stringent and holds that whenever the placenta is not attached to the fetus, it must be prohibited, whether or not the fetus is found with it inside the mother.

The Gemara cites a proof:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar:

A woman

who miscarries something resembling

a fetus that has the form of

an animal, a wild animal, or a bird, with a placenta accompanying them,

the law is as follows:

When the placenta is attached

to them,

we do not suspect

that there was

another fetus

that had the complete form of a human being, that disintegrated and emerged with this placenta. In this case there is no “birth,” and the woman does not become impure with the impurity of a woman who has given birth. For any birth in which the fetus born does not have the form of a human being is not considered birth, and the woman who gives birth does not become impure on its account. But if the placenta

is not attached to them,

the fetuses with the forms of animals mentioned here, and there is concern that this placenta contained a fetus that was a complete human being, on account of which the woman should become impure by the law of a woman who has given birth,

I impose upon her

upon the woman who gave birth

the stringency of two births:

1. The stringency of a woman who gives birth to a human female, who observes two weeks of impurity, because

I say

there is concern

that a formed fetus disintegrated

[a fetus]

of this placenta

and is no longer present before us; it was a human female, and therefore she observes two weeks, as required for a woman who gives birth to a female.

2. They impose upon her the additional stringency resulting from the form of an animal that was present there [below we will explain what this stringency is]. This is so even though no additional placenta was found besides the existing placenta, concerning which we suspect that it contained a human fetus. Apparently, it should be difficult to say that the placenta found is that of a human being; if so, it would be established that only an animal was present. One may say

perhaps the placenta of the formed fetus disintegrated

whose form was that of an animal. It is entirely possible that both a human fetus and an animal fetus were present.

Therefore, two stringencies are imposed upon this woman. First, the stringency of a woman who gave birth to a human female, as stated. In addition, she does not receive the days of purity prescribed for a woman who gave birth to a human being [after the completion of the days of impurity following childbirth, the law is that for forty days after giving birth to a male, any blood she sees is pure; likewise, for eighty days after giving birth to a female, the blood is pure]. Rather, any blood she sees after her days of impurity is also impure, because we suspect that there was no additional fetus, but only the animal fetus. Therefore, she does not receive days of purity.

It is evident from this beraita that it accords with Rabbi Elazar’s opinion: Only when the fetus is not attached to the placenta do we suspect that another fetus was present. But when the fetus is attached to the placenta, we do not suspect this, and we impose the stringencies of two births.

We learned in our Mishna: An animal

that gives birth for the first time and miscarries

a placenta—one must cast it to the dogs.

The Gemara clarifies: Why do we not suspect that this placenta possesses the sanctity of a firstborn?

Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said:

We derive that only a minority of offspring born to first-time mothers are actually sanctified with firstborn sanctity, according to the following calculation:

1.

Most animals

that give birth for the first time

give birth to something that is subject to firstborn sanctity

if it is male.

And

if

a minority of animals

that give birth for the first time to a male give birth to

something that is not subject to firstborn sanctity. And what is that?

How can it be that it is male and is not sanctified with firstborn sanctity?

An offspring of a different form.

For example, a ewe giving birth for the first time gives birth to offspring resembling a goat, or conversely, a goat gives birth to something resembling a lamb; an offspring of a different form is not sanctified with firstborn sanctity. This is derived from the verse “But the firstborn of an ox,” indicating that it must itself be an ox and its firstborn must be an ox. If the offspring is not precisely an ox, it is not sanctified with firstborn sanctity.

2.

And all animals that give birth

indeed

give birth to half males and half females.

Accordingly,

combine the minority of “an offspring of a different form”

mentioned above—that is, the minority of males disqualified from firstborn sanctity because they are “an offspring of a different form”—

with the half that are females

among all offspring,

and they become

the result that the

males

that are sanctified with firstborn sanctity are

a minority.

Therefore, we do not suspect that this placenta possesses firstborn sanctity, and we cast it to the dogs.

We learned in our Mishna:

And

if the placenta that emerged was

from consecrated animals, it must be buried.

What is the reason

for the distinction between the placenta of a firstborn animal and the placenta of a consecrated animal?

The majority are fit to be consecrated.

Since every offspring born from consecrated animals, whether male or female, is consecrated like them. Only a nidmeh, an offspring resembling a different species, is not consecrated. It follows that the overwhelming majority of offspring of consecrated animals are consecrated, and therefore they must be buried.

We learned in our Mishna:

And one may not bury it

this placenta at a crossroads.

Abaye and Rava both say: Anything that has medicinal value

such as a potion, a drug, or an incantation over a wound,

does not fall under the ways of the Amorites

and is permitted.

But if

it has no medicinal value

and it is not performed as a visible treatment for the illness for the sake of healing it, but rather as a segula, as in this case, where it is buried at a crossroads,

it does fall under the ways of the Amorites

and is prohibited! Because it resembles divination, and the Torah prohibited it under the verse, “And you shall not act according to their practices.”

The Gemara asks: Is it the case that anything that has no therapeutic function is prohibited?

But it was taught in a beraita: If a tree sheds its fruit, one marks it with red paint

he applies red color to it,

and loads it with stones.

And the Gemara proves:

Granted

that this act of

loading it with stones

is performed

so that

its strength will be weakened,

in order to weaken it. For the shedding of its fruit results from its excessive strength. If its strength is diminished and its vitality reduced, it will not shed its fruit. If so, this is a natural matter and one of the treatments for trees, and it is not one of the ways of the Amorites.