Chullin 77b — the Talmud in English

If for the impurity of carcasses

Rabbi Yitzhak bar Nafha had this matter in doubt: surely we have also learned this law

.

And now the Gemara explains where we learned these laws:

The impurity of food

the hide does not become impure,

as it was taught in a beraita: The hide and the shilya do not become impure with the impurity of food.

A hide that one boiled, and a shilya about which one formed the intention

[to eat it]—become impure with the impurity of food.

And if so, it is explicit that a hide that one boiled receives impurity.

And the Gemara brings the beraita in which the law of the impurity of carcasses is explained:

The impurity of carcasses, too, we have learned,

for we learned concerning what is stated: “Everyone who touches its carcass”

—“its carcass,” but not its hide

of it.

And not its bones

of it,

and not its sinews, nor its horns, nor its hooves.

Rather, only the flesh of the carcass is what imparts impurity.

And

concerning this

Rabba bar Rav Hanna

said: These expositions and exclusions

were necessary

were stated

only

only for the case

when one made them tzikei kedeira.

For one cooked them extensively with spices, and they are close to food and resemble meat. And concerning this the Torah innovated that they do not receive impurity, since it might have been thought that their law is like that of meat and they receive impurity. But concerning hide that one cooked ordinarily and not in this manner, there is no reason to say that it should receive impurity; therefore the exclusion was stated only concerning this. It follows from these beraitot that a hide that one boiled extensively receives the impurity of food but not the impurity of carcasses. And again one must understand: what was Rabbi Yitzhak bar Nafha’s doubt?

The Gemara explains:

In fact,

his doubt is concerning

the impurity of food. And

although we learned in the beraita that through extensive cooking it receives impurity,

the hide of a donkey is different, for it is repulsive.

And because of this there is a doubt concerning the matter whether its law is like that of every hide that was cooked and it will receive the impurity of food, or whether because of its repulsiveness it does not receive impurity.

We learned in our Mishna:

The shilya that emerged

partially is forbidden to eat.

Rabbi Elazar said:

This prohibition of the shilya

was stated

concerning it

only

when

there is no fetus with it

in the part that remained inside the animal, but only the dissolved matter of the fetus was found there. Therefore, there is concern lest the head of the fetus was located in the part of the shilya that emerged outside, and the fetus is considered born, and the shilya is forbidden.

But

if

there is a fetus with it

inside the shilya that remained in the animal’s body, and its head and most of its body are recognizable in it, then it was not born, and it is included in what is inside the animal, and it is permitted to eat.

And

we do not concern ourselves with

the possibility that in this animal there was

another fetus

in addition to the one found inside the shilya, and that this is the one that emerged together with part of the shilya outside, and because of this it became forbidden. Rather, we do not concern ourselves with this, and the shilya found inside the animal is permitted.

And Rabbi Yohanan

disagreed and

said: Whether

if

there is no fetus with it

in what remained inside,

or whether there is a fetus with it—

we are concerned about another fetus

and the shilya is forbidden.

The Gemara objects:

Is that so!

How can the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan be established in this manner?

But Rabbi Yirmeya said: Rabbi Elazar stated his view stringently.

Yet according to the dispute presented here, Rabbi Elazar is lenient in comparison with Rabbi Yohanan. For Rabbi Yohanan forbids the shilya whether there is a fetus in it or whether there is not, whereas Rabbi Elazar permits it when there is a fetus in it.

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated in this manner

so this tradition was stated:

Rabbi Elazar said: It was stated

that the shilya is forbidden to eat in every case, even if there is a fetus inside it,

only when it is not attached

the shilya

to

the fetus inside. For in this case there is concern lest the fetus belonging to this shilya already emerged, and the shilya is forbidden because birth occurred in it [that is, through the fetus that was in it, and consequently it too is forbidden], whereas the fetus found inside the animal has had its shilya emerge. And the shilya currently found there is that of the fetus that already emerged, as stated. Therefore Rabbi Elazar forbids.

But

if

the shilya is attached

the shilya

to the fetus, we do not concern ourselves with another fetus

that was there. For the connection between the fetus and the shilya proves that they belong to one another, and consequently there was no birth here.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: We have nothing

to forbid the shilya

except

when the

shilya is without a fetus.

For then there is concern lest the fetus already emerged outside and birth occurred.

But, if there is a fetus with it

inside the mother’s body,

whether

if it

is attached

to the fetus,

or whether it is not attached to the fetus—

we do not concern ourselves with another fetus.

Whenever the shilya and the fetus are found inside the mother’s body, we assume that they belong to one another, and there is no reason to forbid it.

And this is what Rabbi Yirmeya said: Rabbi Elazar stated it stringently

in his dispute with Rabbi Yohanan. And as the dispute is presented here, Rabbi Yohanan is stringent and holds that in every case in which the shilya is not attached to the fetus, it must be forbidden, whether it is found together with it inside the mother or not.

The Gemara brings proof:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rabbi Elazar:

A woman

who miscarries a kind of

fetus having the form of a

domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird, with a shilya together with them,

the law is:

when it is attached

the shilya

to them, we do not concern ourselves with

the possibility that there was

another fetus

that had the complete form of a human being, which dissolved and emerged with this shilya. In this case there is no “birth,” and the woman does not become impure with the impurity of a woman who has given birth, since any birth in which the fetus born does not have the form of a human being is not a birth, and the woman who gives birth is not impure on its account. But if the shilya

is not attached to them,

to the fetuses having the form of a living creature mentioned here, and there is concern lest in this shilya there was a fetus that was a complete human being, on account of which the woman must be rendered impure by the law of a woman who has given birth,

I impose upon her

upon the woman who gave birth

the stringency of two births:

A. The stringency of a woman who gives birth to a human female, who sits fourteen days as days of impurity, because

I say

there is concern

lest the shafir dissolved [

fetus]

of this shilya

and is no longer present before us, and it was a human female; therefore she sits fourteen days according to the law of a woman who gives birth to a female.

B. They impose upon her also another stringency on account of the form of the living creature that was there [below we shall explain what this stringency is], even though no additional shilya was found there besides the existing shilya, concerning which we are concerned that a human fetus was present. If so, apparently it is difficult to say that the shilya found there is that of a human being, and if so, it is demonstrated that only a living creature was there. One may say

perhaps the shilya of the shafir dissolved

the fetus having the form of a living creature. And it is entirely possible that a human fetus and an animal fetus were there.

Therefore they impose upon this woman two stringencies: the stringency of a woman who gives birth to a human female, as stated; and in addition, she does not have pure days according to the law of a woman who gives birth to a human being [for after the completion of her days of impurity following birth, the law is that for all forty days during which she sees blood after giving birth to a male, this blood is pure; and likewise, for all eighty days during which she sees blood after giving birth to a female, the blood is pure]. Rather, every blood that she sees after her days of impurity is also impure, because we are concerned that there was no additional fetus there, but only the animal fetus. Therefore she does not have days of purity.

It is proven from these words of the beraita in accordance with the view of Rabbi Elazar: only when the fetus is not attached to the shilya are we concerned that another fetus was present. But when the fetus is attached to the shilya, we are not concerned; and we impose the stringency of two fetuses.

We learned in our Mishna: An animal

that gives birth for the first time and miscarries

a shilya—one casts it to the dogs.

The Gemara inquires: Why do we not concern ourselves with the sanctity of the firstborn in this shilya?

Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said:

We arrive at the conclusion that the minority of fetuses born as “firstborns” are indeed sacred with the sanctity of the firstborn, according to the following calculation:

a.

Most animals

that give birth for the first time

give birth to something that is sacred with firstborn sanctity

if it is male.

And

if

a minority of animals

that give birth for the first time to a male give birth to

something that is not sacred with firstborn sanctity. And what is it?

How is it possible that it is male and is not sanctified with firstborn sanctity?

A nidmeh.

For example, a ewe giving birth for the first time that gives birth to a fetus resembling a goat; or, conversely, a goat that gives birth to something resembling a lamb. And a nidmeh is not sacred with firstborn sanctity. This is derived from what is written: “But the firstborn of an ox”—until it is itself an ox and its firstborn is an ox. But if the fetus is not precisely an ox, it is not sacred with firstborn sanctity.

b.

And all females that give birth,

indeed

give birth to half males and half females.

And if so,

combine the minority of the nidmeh

mentioned, namely, that a minority of males are disqualified from firstborn sanctity because they are a nidmeh,

with the half of females

among all newborns,

and they become

it follows that the

males

who are sacred with firstborn sanctity are

a minority.

Therefore we do not concern ourselves with firstborn sanctity in this shilya, and we cast it to the dogs.

We learned in our Mishna:

And

if the afterbirth that emerges was

among consecrated animals, it must be buried.

What is the reason

what is the reason for the distinction between the afterbirth of a firstborn animal and the afterbirth of consecrated animals

? The majority is fit to be consecrated

since every offspring born from consecrated animals, whether male or female, is consecrated like them. Only a nidmeh, an animal resembling another species, is not consecrated. And it follows that the overwhelming majority of the offspring of consecrated animals are consecrated, and for that reason they must be buried.

We learned in our Mishna:

And it must not be buried

this afterbirth at a crossroads.

Abaye and Rava both said: Anything that has a medicinal effect

such as a drink, a drug, or an incantation over the wound

does not come under the category of the ways of the Amorite

and is permitted.

But if

it has no medicinal effect

and it is not done for an apparent medical treatment needed for the illness, but rather as a charm, such as here, where it is buried at a crossroads

it does come under the category of the ways of the Amorite

and is forbidden! Because it resembles divination, and the Torah prohibited it on account of “and you shall not act according to their practices.” The Gemara asks: Is anything that has no medical purpose forbidden

?

But it was taught in a beraita: If a tree sheds its fruit, one paints it with sikra

one applies red coloring to it

, and loads it with stones.

And the Gemara proves:

Granted

that this matter, namely that he

loads it with stones,

is done

in order that ![](pamud.bmp "

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we weaken its strength,

in order to weaken it. For the shedding of its fruit results from its being overly vigorous. And if we weaken its strength and diminish its vigor, it will not shed its fruit. If so, it is a natural matter and among the methods of treating trees, and it is not among the ways of the Amorite.