Chullin 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

And from this, Reish Lakish raises the question:

what

is the law according to Torah law?

And these are the two sides of the uncertainty:

Perhaps the sanctity of the Mikdash is effective with regard to rendering its body disqualified, but not with regard to counting it as a first- or second-degree impurity. Or perhaps there is no difference.

And we conclude:

The question remains unresolved.

Mishna:

Our Mishna teaches the law of an animal in danger of dying.

An animal that is ill because its strength has weakened and it is inclined to die, since it has not suffered a blow to any of its organs that would cause its death, is permitted. For the Torah prohibited only something resembling the condition of an animal torn by a wild beast, since such an animal has suffered a blow that causes its death. [Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods, chapter 4, halakha 11].

An animal in danger of dying is permitted provided that it makes a convulsive movement, thereby giving us proof that it was alive during the time of slaughter. But if it did not make such a movement, it is known to us that its soul departed before the slaughter was completed, and one is flogged for eating it .

The tannaim disagreed concerning the details of the convulsive movement that is required.

The Mishna states:

One who slaughters

an animal in danger of dying, Rabban Gamliel

says:

It is not permitted

until it makes a convulsive movement with both its foreleg and its hind leg.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

There is no need for this; rather,

it is sufficient if it spurts

[a stream] and forcefully expels blood from the place of slaughter.

Rabbi Shimon said: One who slaughters at night

an animal in danger of dying and does not know whether it made a convulsive movement or not,

and the next morning he arose and found the walls

of the animal’s neck near the place of slaughter

filled with blood—

it is kosher,

because we see

that it spurted, and

that is sufficient

according to the measure of Rabbi Eliezer 320 .

And the Sages say:

The measure of Rabbi Eliezer is insufficient; rather, it is not permitted

until it makes a convulsive movement either with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or until it wags its tail,

and it is not necessary for it to make a convulsive movement with both its foreleg and its hind leg, as Rabban Gamliel maintains.

The same applies to a small animal and to a large animal

—this law and this disagreement between the tannaim apply to both. However, with regard to this detail there is a difference between them:

If a small animal extended its foreleg

at the completion of its slaughter

and did not retract it—

it is unfit,

because

this

action

is not

a convulsive movement that indicates life,

but

is the normal behavior of an animal at the time of

the departure of its soul alone,

whereas a large animal does not normally do this at the time of the departure of its soul .

When are these words spoken,

that a convulsive movement is required? In the case of an animal

that was presumed to be in danger of dying, but if it was presumed to be

healthy, even if it had none of all these signs—

it is kosher,

and we do not fear that it had been in danger of dying. The Gemara explains what the sign of an animal in danger of dying is.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: One who slaughters an animal in danger of dying—it is permitted if it makes a convulsive movement.

And we ask:

From where is it known that an animal in danger of dying is permitted?

[From where do we know that an animal in danger of dying is permitted?]

And we answer:

And from where would it enter your mind that it is forbidden?

[And why would it enter our minds that it is forbidden?] After all, it has no defect in its body, as a tereifa does.

And we explain the question: From where might one learn that an animal in danger of dying is forbidden?

As it is written: “This is the animal that you may eat

from among all the animals that are upon the earth” [Leviticus 11:2]. This implies that an animal that is

alive

with complete vitality—

eat it, and one that is not alive

with complete vitality—

do not eat it. But an animal in danger of dying is not alive

with complete vitality; rather, it is inclined to die. And we must find proof from the Torah that an animal in danger of dying is permitted, and then reject this straightforward exposition and expound the verse differently .

And we say: One can learn that an animal in danger of dying is permitted

from the fact that the Merciful One said: “Do not eat a neveila.” By inference, an animal in danger of dying is permitted; for if it should enter your mind that an animal in danger of dying is forbidden,

then with regard to every neveila, the prohibition would already apply before its death, when it was in danger of dying . Why, then, does the Torah need to prohibit a neveila?

Now that it is forbidden while alive, is it necessary to say that it is forbidden after death?

After all, there is no reason for the prohibition to disappear with death!

And we reject this:

Perhaps, this is

the prohibition of a neveila

is

the prohibition of

an animal in danger of dying,

and the prohibition of a neveila takes effect while the animal is alive, from the moment it becomes in danger of dying. We learn that it is subject to a prohibition of positive commandment from “This is the animal,” and to a prohibition of negative commandment from “Do not eat a neveila.”

And we say:

It should not enter your mind

[it should not enter your mind] that the prohibition of a neveila takes effect while it is alive,

as it is written: “And if an animal dies, from an animal that is yours to eat, one who touches its carcass

shall be impure until evening” [Leviticus 11:39]. This shows that

only after death does the Merciful One call it a neveila; while alive, He does not call it a neveila 326 ,

and the question returns: Why did the Torah prohibit a neveila after death if the prohibition had already taken effect while it was alive? It is thus proven that an animal in danger of dying is permitted, and that no prohibition against a neveila takes effect while it is alive.

And we reject this:

Perhaps I will always say to you: this is a neveila, this is

the same animal that had previously been forbidden by the prohibition of

an animal in danger of dying 327 ,

and the prohibition of a neveila takes effect only after death. As for your question, why is it necessary to prohibit it after death when it was already forbidden while alive, one can say:

While alive,

the animal was forbidden only

by

a prohibition

of a positive commandment,

and the Torah added

after death

a prohibition

by

a prohibition

of a negative commandment,

for which one is flogged.

And we say:

Rather,

there is proof that an animal in danger of dying is permitted

from the fact that the Merciful One said: “Do not eat a tereifa.” By inference, an animal in danger of dying is permitted; for if it should enter your mind that an animal in danger of dying

because of illness

is forbidden,

why did the Torah write the prohibition of a tereifa?

Now that an animal in danger of dying, which has no defect

in its body,

is forbidden, a tereifa,

which is destined to die because of a defect in its body,

is it necessary to say so?

And we reject this:

Perhaps, this is

the prohibition

of a tereifa, this is

the prohibition

of an animal in danger of dying,

and the term “tereifa” does not mean an animal that was torn by a wild beast and is consequently deficient; rather, “tereifa” refers to an animal whose mind and health have been disrupted by illness and it is an animal in danger of dying,

and

the Torah wrote the prohibition twice

so that one would violate it through a positive commandment

of “eat the living animal”

and a negative commandment

of “tereifa”!

And we say:

If so,

since an animal in danger of dying is subject to a prohibition of a negative commandment and not only a prohibition of a positive commandment, the question returns:

Why do I need the neveila that the Merciful One wrote? And once it is subject while alive to both a prohibition of a negative commandment and a positive commandment, is it necessary to say that it is forbidden after death?

What additional prohibition does the prohibition of a neveila provide? After all, one is flogged for a neveila on account of the prohibition of a tereifa!

And we reject this:

Perhaps, this is a neveila, this is

the same animal upon which there had been a prohibition

of a tereifa,

and the prohibition of a tereifa

is

precisely the prohibition

of an animal in danger of dying

329 , and

the Torah imposed greater severity with regard to a neveila,

so that one violates it through two prohibitions of negative commandments and a positive commandment,

and one is flogged with eighty lashes for a neveila!

And we say:

Rather, from here

one can learn that the prohibition of a neveila takes effect even upon something that was permitted before the prohibition took effect, when the animal was in danger of dying, and that the prohibition of a neveila did not come merely to add stringency.

It is written in the Torah:

“And the fat of a neveila and the fat of a tereifa may be used for any labor, but you shall not eat it”

[Leviticus 7:24]. And the Torah has already written: “You shall not eat any fat or any blood” [Leviticus 3:17].

And the master said: For what halakhic purpose?

[For the sake of which halakha] did the Torah repeat the prohibition of fat in the context of neveilot and tereifot? The answer is:

The Torah said: Let the prohibition of a neveila come and take effect upon the prohibition of fat,

and one who eats the fat of a neveila is flogged with eighty lashes; we do not say that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another. Similarly,

let the prohibition of a tereifa come and take effect upon the prohibition of fat.