Chullin 141b (קמא:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Zeira said to him:

And have I not

told you

that

any baraita that was not taught in the academy of

Rabbi Hiyya and in the academy of Rabbi Oshaya,

who arranged the baraitot and examined the words of each tanna, to teach them exactly as he had said,

is erroneous, and one may not raise a difficulty from it in the beit-midrash?!

This baraita, too, was not taught in the academies of Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi Oshaya. If so, it may be erroneous and was not taught in this manner, but rather:

“It is not included in the category of forty lashes,” was taught!

And this is because Rabbi Yehuda concedes that one is lashed for a negative commandment whose fulfillment is preceded by a positive commandment.

Come and hear: Rabbi Oshaya and Rabbi Hiyya taught:

It is written concerning forgotten produce:

“You shall not return

to take it,”

and

he violated the negative commandment, returned, and took the forgotten produce. And similarly, concerning pe’a, it is written:

“You shall not finish

the corner of your field,”

and

he

finished

the corner of his field—

they are included in the category of forty lashes,

even though they are connected to a positive commandment, as it is written concerning them, “You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger”—

the words of Rabbi Yehuda. This proves

that

the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that he holds that one is lashed for a negative commandment whose fulfillment is connected to a positive commandment!

The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is not lashed for a negative commandment whose fulfillment is connected to a positive commandment, but

there the reason

that Rabbi Yehuda says one is lashed is

that he holds

that the verse “You shall

leave

from the outset,

and this is the Torah’s intent: “You shall not return” and “You shall not finish”; rather, “You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger.” Thus, there is no negative commandment whose fulfillment is connected to a positive commandment; the verse is merely explaining the manner in which the mitzva is to be performed.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear:

It is written concerning the Paschal offering:

“You shall not leave over any of it until morning, etc.;

and whatever is left over, etc.,

you shall burn in fire.” The verse came to add a positive commandment after a negative commandment, to tell you that one is not lashed for it—the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

This proves that according to him, one is not lashed for a negative commandment whose fulfillment is connected to a positive commandment!

Learn from this

that

the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion

in the case of sending away the mother bird, for which one is lashed, is

because he holds that “send away” is understood as referring to the outset!

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

Rav Idi said to Rav Ashi: The Mishna also precisely indicates

that the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that “send away” is understood as referring to the outset.

As it teaches: “One who takes the mother with the young, Rabbi Yehuda says: He is lashed and does not send her away.” And if it enters your mind

that

the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion

is that he believes

one is lashed for a negative commandment whose fulfillment is connected to a positive commandment,

and not because “send away” is understood as referring to the outset, then the verse’s intent would be “send away” after taking her. If so,

it should have said: “He is lashed and sends her away”!

And

we reject this:

Perhaps this is what the Mishna is saying:

In truth, he is still obligated to send her away, because “send away” is understood as referring to after taking her. Nevertheless,

he is not exempt until they have administered lashes to him.

The Gemara asks:

How far must he send her away

if he transgressed and took her in his hand?

Rav Yehuda said: Until she leaves his possession,

even though he can return and seize her again, it is permitted.

With what does he send her away,

how should he act for it to be considered sending her away?

Rav Huna said:

Even if he plucked her wing so that she could not fly and then sent her away, since she can walk

on her legs

two or three steps, this is considered sending her away.

Rav Yehuda said:

He must send her away

with her wings [

specifically, with her wings], so that she can fly in her usual manner. Therefore, it is prohibited to pluck her wing and send her away.

The Gemara explains their reasons:

Rav Huna said “on her legs,” as it is written: “Sending forth the foot of the ox and the donkey.”

This indicates that sending forth by foot is considered sending away.

Rav Yehuda said “with her wings,” because

the bird’s legs

are its wings,

for the bird’s primary movement from place to place is accomplished by its wings, and not by its legs.

There was a certain person who cut off the wing of the mother bird

and

sent her away, and afterward seized her. Rav Yehuda flogged

[lashed]

him.

And

he said to him: Go, let her wing grow

[wait for it until her wing grows],

and send her away!

The Gemara asks:

In accordance with whom

did Rav Yehuda state this ruling?

If it is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

then according to him,

“He is lashed and does not send her away.”

Why, then, did he tell him to send her away?

If it is in accordance with the Rabbis,

they

say: “He sends her away and is not lashed.”

If so, why did Rav Yehuda flog him?

The Gemara answers:

Actually, it is in accordance with the Rabbis, and

he flogged him only with

rabbinic makkat mardut,

for one is flogged as admonition, so that he will not transgress again. It has no fixed measure. He flogged him, but by Torah law he is not liable for lashes.

There was a certain man who came before Rava. He said to him: “A tima”

[a species of kosher bird]

what is

its status with regard to sending away the mother bird?

Rava said

to himself: Surely

this man does not know that a kosher bird requires sending away,

and what is his doubt?!

He said to him,

to the man who asked:

Perhaps there is only one egg

[one egg]

that is lying

[it was lying in the nest], and your doubt is whether in such a case you are obligated in the mitzva of sending away. The reason for exemption would be that the verse says “fledglings or eggs,” in the plural.

Rava said to him

:

I know this

to answer

you,

for

it is stated in the Mishna.

As we learned:

“If there is only one fledgling or one egg”—

he is obligated to send her away! He sent her away,

the man who had asked, to that bird.

And Rava returned to her

[brought her back]

a trap

[a snare]—

and seized her.

The Gemara asks: How could Rava do this?

Let us be concerned for suspicion,

lest the one who sent her away say that Rava had required him to send her away so that he himself could return and seize her?!

The Gemara answers:

It was as one hand.

That is, Rava spread the trap from a distance, so that the one who sent her away did not see him seize her.

The Sages taught: The pigeons of a dovecote and the pigeons of an upper story require sending away. And they are prohibited on account of robbery—

for the sake of the ways of peace 6 .

before they fell into his courtyard, so that he is obligated to send away the mother but has not yet acquired them. The Gemara asks:

The Gemara asks:

If the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina is indeed so—that a person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge—here one finds “when it happens,”

excluding an already prepared case,

for this case, too, is considered “prepared,” since the dovecote and upper story acquired the nest for him without his knowledge?!

Rav said: In the case of an egg, once most of it has emerged

from the body of its mother,

he becomes obligated in sending it away, but it is not acquired

by him

until it falls into his courtyard

[that is, the dovecote or upper story].

And when it teaches that they require sending away,

it means when he finds them

before they fall into his courtyard,

when he is obligated in sending them away but has not yet acquired them.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if the case is one in which the egg has not yet emerged,

why are they prohibited on account of robbery,

even for the sake of the ways of peace? They are still part of the mother’s body, and while the egg is inside the mother there is no prohibition whatsoever against taking it, since, as it is not accessible to be seized, the owner of the dovecote does not have it in mind and does not quarrel with the person who takes it?!

The Gemara answers that what they said—that they are “prohibited on account of robbery”—refers even

to their mother,

for although full-fledged robbery does not apply to her, as stated above, she is prohibited on account of the ways of peace.

And if you wish, say instead: Actually,

“prohibited on account of robbery” refers only

to the egg,

and the reason is that

once most of the egg has emerged,

the owner’s mind

of the dovecote

is upon it

to take it. Even though his courtyard has not yet acquired it, it is prohibited for the sake of the ways of peace. But there is no prohibition, even for the sake of the ways of peace, concerning the mother.

And now that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is prohibited to acquire the eggs

while

the mother is crouching over them, as it is stated: “You shall send away the mother,” and afterward, “You may take the young for yourself.” Even you may say that although

the case is one in which the egg

fell into his courtyard,

as long as the mother has not risen from above them, the courtyard has not acquired them for him and they are not considered a prepared case. For

wherever he himself can acquire—

his courtyard also acquires

for him.

But wherever he himself cannot acquire,

such as in this case, where he cannot acquire the eggs while the mother is crouching over them,

his courtyard also does not acquire them for him,

and therefore they require sending away.

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so, why are they forbidden

only

because of the ways of peace? If he sent it away

to its mother—for the courtyard of the owner of the dovecote immediately acquired it for him, and

it is outright robbery

to take the eggs. And

if he did not send it away

—how could he take the eggs before sending away the mother? After all,

he needs to send it away

, as Rav Yehuda stated!

The Gemara answers: This is referring

to a minor,

who is not obligated to send it away; in such a case, taking them is forbidden because of the ways of peace.

The Gemara raises an objection: Is

a minor subject to the ways of peace

? Is the prohibition in the Mishna stated with regard to a minor, that he may not take them because of the ways of peace?

The Gemara explains:

This is what it is saying: The minor’s father is obligated to return them to him

to the owner of the dovecote—

because of the ways of peace.

Levi bar Simon transferred ownership

of

the produce of his dovecote,

the fledglings and the eggs,

to Rav Yehuda.

He came before Shmuel

[and below the Gemara explains why he came before him].

He said to him: Go, strike the nest

[strike the nest], so that

they will rise up

—the fledglings, out of fear of you—

and acquire them 11 .

And the Gemara explains:

For what purpose,

for what need did he tell him to raise them?

If it was in order to acquire them,

so that Levi bar Simon could not retract, why did Rav Yehuda consult Shmuel about how he should acquire them?

Let Levi bar Simon acquire them for him

Levi bar Simon

through a

kinyan

sudar?!