Chullin 134a — the Talmud in English

And he raises an objection:

a priest who sold an animal to an Israelite and said to him: I am selling you the animal

on condition that the gifts are mine, he gives

the Israelite gives the gifts

to any priest whom he wishes,

and he is not obligated to give specifically to the selling priest.

We see that the Israelite is obligated with regard to the gifts!

And we answer: one who says

“on condition”

that the gifts are mine

—

says

“excluding”

the gifts

—are you raising [an objection]!?

They are not alike.

“Excluding”

is an expression of

retention

—the priest retained the gifts for himself and did not sell them to the Israelite—and therefore the purchaser is exempt . But the expression

“on condition” does not imply retention

but rather a condition: the priest sold him the entire animal, on condition that the Israelite would afterward give him the gifts. And this he does not have the power to stipulate, for the gifts do not belong to him, but to the entire tribe of priests.

And he raises an objection

from another beraita against this beraita:

For it was taught: The priest said to the Israelite

“on condition that the gifts are mine”—

the gifts are his!

And not as the beraita above, that with “on condition” the Israelite gives them to any priest whom he wishes?

And we answer:

In this they disagree

the two beraitot:

one master

the author of the second beraita

holds

that the expression

“on condition” is retention,

and therefore the gifts belong to the priest, since he retained them for himself and did not sell them;

and one master

the author of the first beraita

holds

that the expression

“on condition” is not retention

but rather a condition, and since he cannot stipulate concerning this, the Israelite gives them to any priest whom he wishes .

We learned in our Mishna:

“He said to him: Sell me the innards, etc.”

Rav said: They taught

that if he purchased them from him by weight, the purchaser gives the gifts to a priest and then demands them from the slaughterer,

only

where

the purchaser weighed

them

for himself,

because since the slaughterer did not touch the gifts, he is not a litigant of the priest. Therefore the purchaser gives them to the priest [and he will then claim from the slaughterer, for it was incumbent upon the slaughterer to give the gifts].

But

if

a slaughterer weighed them for]]

the purchaser,

the law

is also

with]]

the slaughterer,

for the priest may claim from whichever of them he wishes; and if he claims from the slaughterer, it is incumbent upon the slaughterer to check whether the gifts are still extant, so that he may give them to the priest .

And Rav Asi said: Even

if

a slaughterer weighed them for]]

the purchaser,

the law is with him]]—

with the purchaser alone .

Shall we say that they disagree concerning [the ruling of] Rav Hisda

Rav and Rav Asi,

as Rav Hisda said: If a person steals

an object from his fellow

and the owners did not despair

of finding it,

and

another person

came and ate it,

that stolen object,

if [the owner] wishes

the owner

from this one,

from the first robber,

he collects

his stolen object.

If he wishes

the owner

from this one,

from the second robber [who ate it],

he collects.

Since the second ate it before despair, he too is considered a robber, for before despair, wherever the object is, it is in the domain of its master.

One master,

Rav,

has

this

of Rav Hisda,

and therefore he holds that here too the priest may take [the gifts] from whichever of them he wishes;

and one master,

Rav Asi,

does not have Rav Hisda’s [ruling].

Therefore he holds that he takes specifically from the purchaser.

And we reject this:

No!

Ordinarily, concerning robbery, where the robber acquires the stolen object through the act of robbery with regard to the obligation of payment,

everyone has Rav Hisda’s [ruling],

for since the first one acquired it through the act of robbery, the owner can claim from him.

But here,

concerning gifts,

with regard to priestly gifts,

if

they can be stolen,

they

disagree:

Do we say that in the case of priestly gifts as well, he acquired them through his robbery and became obligated to give them to a priest? Or perhaps, when they are extant, the obligation to give them rests upon the person in whose possession they are; and if so, the first one, with whom they are no longer present, did not become a robber with regard to them.

One master—

Rav—

holds

that they

can be stolen,

and therefore he can claim also from the slaughterer.

And one master—

Rav Asi—

holds

that they

cannot be stolen,

and therefore he can claim only from the purchaser, since now the gifts are in his possession.

There are those who teach this teaching

of the dispute between Rav and Rav Asi

independently,

and not concerning the Mishna, with the wording “They taught”; and this is how they taught it:

Rav said: Priestly gifts can be stolen,

and therefore the priest can litigate with the slaughterer.

And Rav Asi said: Priestly gifts cannot be stolen,

and therefore the priest’s claim is with the purchaser alone .

Mishna:

A convert who converted, and had a cow.

If

it was slaughtered

the cow

before he converted, he is exempt

from the gifts. But if it was slaughtered

after he converted—

he is liable. 7 .

And if it was

uncertain

whether it was slaughtered before he converted or afterward —

he is exempt, for one who seeks to extract from his fellow—

upon him

to bring

the proof!

And here the koen is the one seeking to extract from his fellow, and upon him is to bring proof that it was slaughtered after he converted.

Gemara:

When Rav Dimi came, he said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan: We learned

here in the Mishna:

uncertain—

he is exempt!

Apparently

in

an uncertainty

concerning the gifts of the koanim, we proceed

leniently.

And he raises a contradiction:

We learned concerning leket: The grain in

the ant-holes within the standing grain

that is found before the reapers, and they have not yet reached that place to reap ,

these are—

the grain found in the holes—

the property of the owner.

For the law of leket applies only to what falls during reaping, whereas in this place they have not yet reaped at all.

And

the ant-holes

that are after the reapers,

where they have already reaped in that place, the upper

wheat

in the hole—

belongs to the poor,

for it may be said that it fell at the time of reaping and is leket.

And

the

lower wheat

at the bottom of the hole—

belongs to the owner,

for we say that before reaping the ants brought it there.

Rabbi Meir says: It all belongs to the poor!

Even those kernels of wheat at the bottom of the hole,

which are uncertain leket—

are leket!

We see that Rabbi Meir holds concerning the gifts to the poor that in an uncertainty we proceed stringently, so that one is liable to give them; and if so, the same applies to the gifts of the koanim. And the anonymous Mishna is Rabbi Meir; if so, this is difficult against our Mishna!? [And Tosafot explained that the question is also from the Rabbis] , .

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

Do not vex me!

For I do not teach in that beraita “the words of Rabbi Meir,” but rather

I teach it in the singular,

that a single individual said it in the name of Rabbi Meir.

For it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Uncertain leket—

is leket. Uncertain shikheha—

is shikheha. Uncertain peah—

is peah.

And if so, the beraita is an individual opinion, and it is not difficult against the Mishna.

He said to him

Resh Lakish: Even

if you teach it only in the wording of

one fool whose name is

ben Tadal,

even so it will be difficult for you.

But he stated the reason

the tannay gave for his statement! If so, what difference does it make who said it? There is a reason here!?

For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: What

is this

that is written, “Justify the poor and the needy,”

by what shall you justify the poor and the needy?

If you say, in judgments,

that when the poor person stands in judgment against a wealthy person, you should favor the poor person,

and

this is not so, for

is it not written, “Nor shall you favor the poor in his dispute”?

Rather,

the verse says this:

Give justice from what is yours—

and give it to him!

And therefore, here too, concerning uncertain gifts to the poor, give it to him even though it is uncertain .

Rava said:

Gifts to the poor are not comparable to gifts of the koanim. For

here,

in the gifts of the koanim, where there is

a cow—

it stands with a presumption of exemption,

for it stood with the status of a gentile, who was exempt, before he converted. But this is not so with

standing grain

of the gifts to the poor—

it stands with a presumption of liability,

for it has always been in the possession of an Israelite and stands ready to become liable .

Abaye said to him: But

with regard to the obligation of ḥalla of a

dough

we say that if it

was made

the dough

before he converted—

he is exempt from ḥalla; after he converted—

he is obligated,

and in a

case of uncertainty

also

he is obligated!

And even though with regard to the obligation of ḥalla, the kneading of the dough determines: if an Israelite kneaded it, it is obligated, and if a gentile kneaded it, it is exempt; and here it stands with the presumption of a gentile, and nevertheless it is obligated!?

He said to him:

They are not comparable. Ḥalla is

a doubtful prohibition

for there is indeed the sin of death in it if he did not separate it, and therefore we follow

the stringent side.

This is not so with regard to the priestly gifts of the cow, in which there is no sanctity, and therefore there applies to them only

a monetary uncertainty

whether he wishes to give them to a priest or not, and therefore in its case we follow

the lenient side 15 .

For Rav Ḥisda said, and likewise Rav Ḥiyya taught: Eight uncertainties were stated with regard to a convert,

in

four

of them we follow

the obligation, and

in

four

of them we follow

the exemption.

And these are:

The offering

of a woman after childbirth belonging to

his wife,

where it is uncertain whether she gave birth before he converted, in which case she is exempt, or after he converted, in which case she is obligated; this is a doubtful prohibition, because she is forbidden to eat sacrificial food until she brings her atonement-offering, and one who lacks atonement is liable to karet for eating sacrificial food.

And ḥalla

as we said above, that it is a doubtful prohibition because one is liable to death.

And the firstborn of an impure animal,

that is, the firstborn donkey, in accordance with the one who says that it is forbidden to derive benefit from it until he redeems it [but after he separates a lamb for its redemption, it is a monetary uncertainty, for sanctity does not rest upon the lamb, and the one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the proof].

And the firstborn of a pure animal

with regard to slaughtering it outside [the Temple courtyard]—it is a doubtful liability of karet for slaughtering sacrificial animals outside [the permitted place]; rather, he must wait until it becomes blemished, and then it has only monetary status. In all these cases we follow

the obligation 16 .