Chullin 134a (קלד.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

A kohein who sold an animal to an Israelite and said to him: “I hereby sell you the animal”

on the condition that the gifts are mine,” he gives

the gifts

to any kohein he wishes,

and he is not obligated to give them specifically to the selling kohein.

We see that the Israelite is obligated to give the gifts!

And we resolve: One who says

“on the condition

that the gifts are mine”

is

saying

“excluding

the gifts”

that you raise this objection!?

They are not comparable.

“Excluding”

is an expression of

retention: the kohein retained the gifts for himself and did not sell them to the Israelite, and therefore the purchaser is exempt .

This is unlike the expression

“on the condition,” which does not indicate retention

but rather a stipulation: the kohein sold him the entire animal on the condition that the Israelite subsequently give him the gifts. He has no power to make such a stipulation, since the gifts do not belong to him, but to the entire tribe of kohanim.

And we raise an objection

from another beraita against this beraita:

As it was taught in a beraita: If the kohein said to the Israelite,

“on the condition that the gifts are mine”—

the gifts are his!

This is contrary to the earlier beraita, which states that when he says “on the condition,” the Israelite gives the gifts to whichever kohein he wishes?

And we resolve:

The two beraitot disagree

with one another.

One master—

the author of the second beraita—

holds

that the expression

“on the condition” is retention,

and therefore the gifts belong to the kohein, since he retained them for himself and did not sell them.

And one master—

the author of the first beraita—

holds

that the expression

“on the condition” is not retention

but rather a stipulation; and since he cannot stipulate concerning this matter, the Israelite gives the gifts to whichever kohein he wishes .

We learned in our Mishna:

“If he said to him: Sell me the innards, etc.”

Rav said: They taught

that when the purchaser bought them from him by weight, the purchaser gives the gifts to the kohein and then brings a claim against the slaughterer,

only

where

the purchaser weighed

them

for himself,

because since the slaughterer did not touch the gifts, he is not a litigant with regard to the kohein. Therefore, the purchaser gives them to the kohein [and he then brings a claim against the slaughterer, since the obligation to give the gifts rested upon the slaughterer].

But

if

the slaughterer weighed them for

the purchaser,

the claim lies

also

against

the slaughterer,

for the kohein may bring a claim against whichever of them he wishes. If he brings a claim against the slaughterer, it is incumbent upon the slaughterer to ascertain whether the gifts are still intact and give them to the kohein .

And Rav Asi said: Even

if

the slaughterer weighed them for

the purchaser,

the claim lies with him—

with the purchaser alone .

Shall we say that they disagree concerning Rav Chisda’s ruling,

Rav and Rav Asi,

as Rav Chisda said: If a person steals

an object from another person

and the owners have not despaired

of finding it,

and

another person

comes and eats it,

that stolen object,

if

the owners wish,

from this one,

the first thief,

they collect

the value of their stolen property.

If

the owners wish,

from this one,

the second thief [who ate it],

they collect.

Since the second person ate it before the owners despaired, he too is considered a thief, for before despair, wherever the object is, it remains in the possession of its owners.

One master,

Rav,

holds

this

ruling of Rav Chisda,

and therefore he maintains that here too the kohein may take the gifts from whichever of them he wishes.

And one master,

Rav Asi,

does not hold Rav Chisda’s ruling.

Therefore, he maintains that the kohein takes the gifts specifically from the purchaser.

And we reject this:

No!

In general, with regard to theft, where the thief acquires the stolen object through the act of theft insofar as liability for payment is concerned,

everyone accepts Rav Chisda’s ruling,

because once the first thief acquired it through the act of theft, the owners may bring a claim against him.

But here,

with regard to the gifts,

with regard to priestly gifts,

whether

they can be stolen

or not

is the matter over which they disagree:

Do we say that priestly gifts too are acquired by the thief through the act of theft, and he thereby becomes obligated to give them to a kohein? Or perhaps, when they remain intact, the obligation to give them rests upon whoever possesses them; and if so, the first person, who no longer possesses them, does not become a thief with regard to them.

One master—

Rav—

holds

that they

can be stolen,

and therefore the kohein may bring a claim against the slaughterer as well.

And one master—

Rav Asi—

holds

that they

cannot be stolen,

and therefore the kohein may bring a claim only against the purchaser, since the gifts are now in his possession.

There are those who teach this statement

concerning the dispute between Rav and Rav Asi

independently,

and not in connection with our Mishna using the expression “They taught.” This is how they taught it:

Rav said: Priest­ly gifts can be stolen,

and therefore the kohein may litigate with the slaughterer.

And Rav Asi said: Priestly gifts cannot be stolen,

and therefore the kohein’s claim is only against the purchaser .

Mishna:

A convert who converted, and he had a cow.

If

it was slaughtered

the cow

before he converted, he is exempt

from the gifts. But if it was slaughtered

after he converted—

he is liable. 7 .

And if there was

a doubt

whether it was slaughtered before he converted or afterward —

he is exempt, for the one who seeks to take from his fellow—

upon him

to bring

the proof!

Here, the kohen is the one seeking to take from his fellow, and it is upon him to prove that it was slaughtered after he converted.

Gemara:

When Rav Dimi came, he said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan: We learned

here, in the Mishna:

A doubt—

he is exempt!

Apparently,

with regard to

a doubt

concerning the priestly gifts, we follow the lenient side,

and rule leniently.

And he raised a contradiction:

We learned with regard to leket: Produce found in

the ant holes within the standing grain

that is before the reapers, while they have not yet reached that place to reap ,

these—

the produce found in the holes—

belong to the owner.

The law of leket applies only to that which falls during reaping, whereas in this place they have not yet reaped at all.

And

the ant holes

that are after the reapers,

where they have already reaped wheat in that place: the upper grains

above

in the hole—

belong to the poor,

as we can say that they fell during reaping and are leket.

And

the

lower

grains at the bottom of the hole—

belong to the owner,

as we say that the ants brought them there before the reaping.

Rabbi Meir says: All of it belongs to the poor!

Even those grains at the bottom of the hole,

for doubtful leket—

is leket!

We see that Rabbi Meir holds, with regard to gifts to the poor, that in a case of doubt one rules stringently, so that one is obligated to give them; if so, the same should apply to priestly gifts. And the anonymous Mishna is Rabbi Meir’s, so this contradicts our Mishna!? [Tosafot explained that the question is also from the Rabbis] , .

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

Do not vex me!

I do not teach in that beraita “the statement of Rabbi Meir”; rather,

I teach it in the singular,

meaning that an individual stated it in the name of Rabbi Meir.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Doubtful leket—

is leket. Doubtful shikheha—

is shikheha. Doubtful pe'a—

is pe'a.

If so, the beraita is the view of an individual, and there is no difficulty against our Mishna.

Reish Lakish said to him:

Even

if you teach it only in the name of

some fool named

Ben Tadal,

it would nevertheless pose a difficulty for you.

For he stated the rationale

for his teaching! If so, what difference does it make who stated it? There is a rationale for it.

For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: What

is the meaning of

that which is written, “Vindicate the poor and the orphan”?

How are you to vindicate the poor and the orphan?

If we say, in judgment,

that when the poor man comes to judgment against a wealthy man, you should vindicate the poor man,

but

that cannot be so, for

is it not written, “And do not favor the poor in his dispute”?

Rather,

this is what the verse is saying:

Make justice from your own—

and give it to him!

Accordingly, here too, in the case of doubtful gifts to the poor, give it to him even though it is a doubt .

Rava said:

Gifts to the poor are not comparable to priestly gifts. For

here,

in the case of priestly gifts,

the cow

stands with a presumption of exemption,

since it had been presumed to belong to a gentile, who was exempt, before he converted. This is not so with regard to

standing grain

of gifts to the poor: it

stands with a presumption of obligation,

since it had always been in the possession of a Jew and was destined to become obligated .

Abaye said to him: But

with regard to the obligation of challah for

dough,

we say that if the dough

was made

the dough

before he converted—

he is exempt from challah; once he converted—

he is obligated,

and in a

case of uncertainty

also

he is obligated!

And although with regard to the obligation of challah, the kneading of the dough determines its status: If an Israelite kneaded it, it is obligated, and if a gentile kneaded it, it is exempt—and here it has the presumptive status of belonging to a gentile, and nevertheless it is obligated!?

He said to him:

They are not comparable. Challah is

a case of uncertain prohibition

for it entails the sin of death if he does not separate it; therefore, we follow the stringent approach,

and rule stringently.

This is not so with regard to the gifts of the priesthood from an animal, which have no sanctity; therefore, they involve only

a case of uncertain monetary liability

as to whether he is required to give them to a priest or not, and therefore we follow

the lenient approach 15 .

For Rav Ḥisda said, and Rav Ḥiyya likewise taught: Eight cases of uncertainty were stated concerning a convert,

in

four

of them we follow

the obligation, and in

four

of them

we follow

the exemption.

And these are:

The offering

of a woman after childbirth belonging to

his wife,

where it is uncertain whether she gave birth before he converted, in which case he is exempt, or after he converted, in which case he is obligated. This is a case of uncertain prohibition, because she is forbidden to eat consecrated food until she brings her atonement offering, and one who lacks atonement is liable to karet for eating consecrated food.

And challah,

as we said above, is a case of uncertain prohibition because one is liable to death for it.

And the firstborn of an impure animal,

that is, a firstborn donkey, according to the one who says that it is forbidden to derive benefit from it until it is redeemed [but after he designates a lamb for its redemption, it is a case of uncertain monetary liability, since no sanctity rests upon the lamb, and the burden of proof rests upon the claimant].

And the firstborn of a pure animal,

with regard to slaughtering it outside the Temple courtyard—it is a case of uncertainty involving karet for slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard. Rather, he must wait until it develops a blemish, at which point it has only the status of a monetary matter. In all these cases, we follow

the obligation 16 .