Chullin 123b (קכג:) — the Talmud in English

Furthermore,

for if we decree in the case of the majority because of the case of half, then,

with regard to the bird burnt-offering, according to Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon,

who says that one pinches the majority of both simanim with it, but it is prohibited to pinch all the simanim,

let us also decree

lest

he perhaps fail to perform the majority of both,

out of concern that he might come to pinch all of both, and therefore pinch only half of the simanim, causing the burnt-offering to become disqualified?

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said

to Rabba: There is no difficulty for Rav Naḥman, who says that the Mishna concerning the garment is referring specifically to a garment immersed that day. For

as for what you said

that a garment immersed that day should be prohibited

as a decree lest people say that immersion on that day is effective,

this is not an argument, since

the tear

in the garment

demonstrates its status

and makes clear that this is the reason for its purification; people will not mistakenly think that the immersion purifies it.

And as for what you said:

if so,

with regard to the bird burnt-offering according to Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon, let us decree,

there is likewise no difficulty: For

the priests are zealous.

There is therefore no concern that they might fail to pinch the majority of the simanim.

Come and hear:

For we learned in the Mishna:

One who strips an animal or a beast, whether impure or pure, whether small or large—

for a mat, to the measure of a handhold.

And we infer:

This implies that

if he stripped

more than the measure of a handhold—

it is pure.

Since it is no longer a handle.

And if you say that Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha that we decree in the case of a majority because of the case of half, this is difficult:

Why

is it pure when he stripped more than the measure of a handhold?

Let us decree lest he perhaps fail to perform

to strip

more than the measure of a handhold,

so that it would still be a handle, while he would say that he had stripped more than the measure of a handhold and that it is no longer a handle,

and then come into contact with impurity

through that skin stripped from an impure animal, which in fact has the status of a handle and conveys impurity to the person who touches it—and yet

we declare him pure!?

Although Rav Naḥman decreed only in a case where there is concern that one will be concerned for the item, and here he is not concerned for the skin, since he intends to strip the entire animal, nevertheless the objection is raised because it is preferable for him initially to strip only the measure of a handhold along the length of the animal, so that it will be convenient to grasp and continue stripping. Here too, there is reason to decree lest he strip less than the measure of a handhold and say that he stripped more than that measure—Tosafot.

And we answer:

If

we are dealing

with Torah-level impurity, then indeed

there would be reason to decree. But

with what are we dealing here?

With rabbinic impurity,

and Rav Naḥman agrees that we do not decree in its case.

And we challenge this:

This works well

with what the Mishna teaches, “and pure”—namely, that a person who is

impure

stripped

a

animal

that is pure;

it is possible to answer as you said, that the person was impure with rabbinic impurity.

But with regard to what it teaches, “impure”—namely, that a

pure

person stripped

an

animal

that is impure—there is a difficulty: Every impure animal, even if it was slaughtered, is an unslaughtered carcass, and

it is Torah-level impurity;

so why should we not still decree in its case lest he strip it only to the measure of a handhold?

And we answer: This term “impure” is not referring to an actually impure animal. Rather, it is referring

to

an animal with a fatal condition.

That is, a pure animal that was slaughtered properly but had a fatal condition, which does not convey the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass by Torah law.

And we challenge this: Is

an animal with a fatal condition

that was slaughtered properly

capable of conveying impurity!?

After all, it has no impurity whatsoever, not even by rabbinic law.

And we answer:

Yes! As in the statement of Shmuel's father.

For Shmuel's father said: An animal with a fatal condition that one slaughtered—

conveys impurity with regard to consecrated animals

by rabbinic law, with the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass. That is, when the animal is consecrated, the Sages decreed that it conveys the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass even though it has a fatal condition. Here too, we are dealing with a consecrated animal that has a fatal condition, whose impurity is only rabbinic; therefore, if one stripped it to the measure of a handhold, it is pure, and we do not decree in its case.

Come and hear:

For it is taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: One who strips

the skin

of creeping animals,

it is

a connection,

meaning that the skin has the status of a handle—

until he strips it all.

Stripping the skin of creeping animals is difficult, and sometimes one stops midway; in the meantime, the stripped skin serves as a handle.

And we infer:

This implies that, in the case of a camel

[that is, in the case of every impure animal other than creeping animals], where stripping the skin is not difficult, we say that it

is not a connection

except to the measure of a handhold, and beyond that measure it is not a handle. This is so even though the camel is impure by Torah law, and we do not decree lest he strip only to the measure of a handhold and say that he stripped more than that measure. [That is, the beraita implies that the entire reason the skin of creeping animals is considered connected is only because it is difficult to strip their skin, whereas according to Rav Naḥman, the entire skin would in any event be considered connected because of the decree.] This is a difficulty for Rav Naḥman.

And we answer:

Do not say, “This implies that in the case of a camel it is not a connection,”

for in fact even in the case of a camel it is considered a connection beyond the measure of a handhold, because of the decree. [And the Mishna's case of the measure of a handhold is referring to rabbinic impurity.]

Rather, say:

In the case of a camel,

the skin upon the neck is not a connection!

The beraita concerning creeping animals is dealing with one who strips the skin in order to make a leather flask, and does so in the customary manner. In that case, the law is that it is a connection until he strips it all, as explained in the Mishna.

And it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri,

who holds that the term “all” is not meant literally, but means until the end of the chest, where stripping becomes difficult. Once he has stripped the chest, it is no longer a connection, even though the skin of the neck has not yet been stripped.

The beraita teaches us that, in the case of creeping animals, even the skin upon the neck is difficult to strip; therefore, it remains a connection until he strips the skin upon the neck as well. In the case of a camel, once he has stripped up to the neck, it is no longer a connection, in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

There is no difficulty here for Rav Naḥman: Why do we not decree, when he has stripped up to the neck, lest he fail to strip up to the neck? There is a distinguishing mark between the neck area and the rest of the body, and people will not confuse the two. This is not so with the distinction between a majority and a half, or between the measure of a handhold and more than that measure, where the boundary is not defined; therefore, we decree lest people come to confuse the two.

Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yosei: They taught

in the Mishna in tractate Kelim that a garment whose majority was torn is pure

only when he did not leave in it

in the garment

the measure of a scarf

[a scarf];

but

if

he left in it the measure of a scarf,

that is, the untorn portion is the size of a scarf—then it is

a connection.

The status of a garment has not been nullified from it, and it has not become pure from its impurity. [Since it is still fit for a use resembling its original function, the tearing does not constitute an act of tearing capable of purifying it.]

Reish Lakish said: They taught

in tractate Kelim that if the majority was torn and a measure of a scarf did not remain, it is pure

only in the case of a garment,

because even if it were sewn, it would not return to its original state.

But leather

that is impure, whose majority was torn and in which a measure of a scarf did not remain, does not become pure through this, since

it is durable.

Leather is stronger, and as long as it has not been torn completely, one can sew it and reattach the torn section to it; the leather will then return to its former state. Therefore, its original designation has not been nullified.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even leather is not durable.

Rather, its law is like that of a garment: If its majority was torn and a measure of a scarf did not remain, it becomes pure from its impurity through this.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish:

We learned in tractate Kelim:

Leather

that is

impure

with the impurity of

a seat

—the leather had been designated for sitting or lying, and a zav sat or lay upon it, thereby rendering the leather impure—and afterward

he intended it for

making

straps and sandals [

leather designated for straps and sandals does not become impure with the impurity of a zav's seat],

once he placed a knife into it,

having begun to cut the leather and thereby nullify it from being a mat—

it is pure; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

And the Sages say:

It is not pure

until he reduces it below five handbreadths.

There must not remain a complete piece of leather measuring five handbreadths by five handbreadths, which is the measure at which leather is fit to receive the impurity of a seat. As long as the leather retains this measure, the impurity of a seat does not depart from it, even though he performed an act intended to remove it from the category of an object used for lying or sitting.

Although, with regard to a garment, we learned above that if one tore it and nullified it from the category of a garment, it becomes pure through this even if he did not reduce it below the measure of a garment, Rashi answered that there the tearing nullifies its original designation: It is no longer used as a garment, but for another purpose, and therefore it becomes pure through the act of tearing. In the case of leather, however, its use for lying or sitting remains until he reduces it below five by five handbreadths; therefore, it does not become pure until he reduces it below that measure.

And from the statement of the Sages we infer:

This implies that when he reduces it

the leather below five handbreadths,

it is at least pure,

even though he did not cut the leather along its entire length, but left part of it connected.

Why

is it pure?

Let us say:

“It is durable,”

for he can return and sew the tears, and the leather will return to the state it was in previously!?

And we answer:

When they said that it is durable,

it was specifically

where he cut it in a straight line,

cutting the leather straight along its length or width. But

here, what are we dealing with? With cutting it away and proceeding around its circumference.

He cuts the leather all around, in which case, even if he sews it, it can no longer return to its original state; Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees in this case that we do not say, “It is durable.”

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection

to Reish Lakish: We learned in the Mishna:

One who strips an animal or a beast, whether pure or impure, whether small or large—

for a mat, to the measure of a handhold—

it is a handle with regard to impurity.

And we infer:

This implies that

if he stripped

more than the measure of a handhold—

it is pure.

Why!? Let us say—

“It is durable,”

for just as Reish Lakish said that torn leather is considered connected because it is strong, so too we should say that stripped leather is considered connected to the flesh, and should be a handle for the flesh as though it had not been stripped!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Avin explained it: The first one, the first one,

each section of skin that is stripped

becomes detached.

It is like something that has separated entirely, since it is not destined to become reconnected to the flesh. This is not so with leather that was torn, regarding which Reish Lakish said, “It is durable,” meaning that it is destined to be sewn; and since it is strong, it returns to its former state.

Rav Yosef raised an objection

to Reish Lakish: We learned in the Mishna:

The skin upon the neck

whose connection to the neck is tenuous and is destined to detach on its own—

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is not a connection!

If one touches the skin, he does not become impure from the carcass.

And

why

is it not a connection?

But it is durable and remains in place!?

Here we are dealing with skin that has not yet been stripped. If so, according to Reish Lakish, who holds that skin that has already been torn is considered connected because it is durable, here too the skin of the neck, which has not yet been torn, should be considered connected, even though it is destined to detach on its own. [But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who does not say “it is durable” when the skin has been torn, the same applies to skin attached by a tenuous connection: We do not say that it is considered a connection—Tosafot.]

Abיי said

to Rav Yosef: Rather than raising a difficulty to Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri,

say the latter clause,

which teaches:

And the Sages say: It is a connection!

This is proof for Reish Lakish from the statement of the Sages, since we say, “It is durable.”

Rather, Abיי said: They disagree with regard to a protective layer that is destined to detach on its own,

the Sages and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Is it considered a protective layer or not? For the skin of the neck is stripped on its own.

One Master,

the Sages,

holds

that it

is a protective layer

as long as it has not detached; therefore, the skin of the neck that remains attached to the flesh has the status of a protective layer.

And one Master,

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri,

holds: It is not a protective layer.

But Reish Lakish is speaking about skin that was torn, whose intact portion is not destined to detach on its own. Therefore, we say in its case, “It is durable”: Through the intact portion, the torn portion too is considered connected.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection

to Reish Lakish: We learned:

An oven

that was initially a vessel resembling a pot, and afterward was fixed to the ground and plastered with mud all around it. [The thickness of the mud is called “the supplementary coating”; it surrounds the oven from the outside in order to preserve its heat.]

that became impure,

How is it purified?

For the law of an oven is like that of an earthenware vessel, which is not purified from its impurity except through breaking. How can the breaking that purifies it be performed?

They were divided,

they were broken from top to bottom, from the inside,

into three

parts, so that a majority would not remain in one part,

and he scrapes off

with a scraper

the secondary layer,

the layer of plaster that is upon it,