Chullin 101a (קא.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Shimon exempts!

As it proceeds to explain.

And we raised an objection:

But as for Rabbi Shimon, in either case!?

If the gidin impart flavor, then—

If one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

he should also be liable for the prohibition of the gid!

If one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

he should be liable,

at least,

for

the prohibition of

impurity, which preceded it!?

And if the gidin do not impart flavor—

he should be liable,

at least,

for the gid!

For if the gidin do not impart flavor, there is no prohibition of impurity here; and if so, the prohibition of the gid hanasheh can take effect.

And we answer:

Rava said: Actually, he holds

that Rabbi Shimon

holds that the gidin do not impart flavor,

and therefore there is no prohibition against eating an impure animal here. And the reason that one is not liable for the gid is a different one, for

it is different there,

with regard to the gid hanasheh,

as the verse states: “Therefore the children of Israel shall not eat the gid hanasheh,”

and we derive:

The one whose gid is forbidden but whose flesh is permitted

is the one whose gid hanasheh is forbidden to eat;

this one is excluded,

the impure animal, for if we were to prohibit its gid hanasheh, it would be included in the category of “one

whose gid is forbidden and whose flesh is forbidden.”

Therefore, the prohibition of the gid hanasheh does not take effect upon it at all!

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who eats the gid hanasheh of an animal carcass—

Rabbi Meir holds him liable for two,

for the prohibition against an animal carcass and for the prohibition of the gid hanasheh.

And the Sages say: He is liable only once,

for eating the gid hanasheh, whose prohibition took effect during the animal’s lifetime, before the prohibition against an animal carcass took effect only when it died; and the Sages hold that one prohibition does not take effect upon another in such a case.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir with regard to one who eats the gid hanasheh of an olah,

for since the prohibition against eating an olah is more stringent, it can take effect upon the less stringent prohibition of the gid.

And

the Sages likewise concede to Rabbi Meir with regard to one who eats the gid hanasheh

of an ox sentenced to stoning,

for since the prohibition of an ox sentenced to stoning is more stringent than the prohibition of the gid—as an ox sentenced to stoning is forbidden even for benefit—the prohibition of the ox sentenced to stoning takes effect upon the gid. Therefore, one who eats the gid hanasheh of an olah or of an ox sentenced to stoning

is liable

even according to the Sages

for two!

The prohibition against an animal carcass is an “inclusive prohibition” with regard to its taking effect upon the gid hanasheh. For when we come to prohibit the gid with the additional prohibition of an animal carcass, it is not the gid alone that becomes prohibited; rather, it includes with it all the flesh of the animal, which became forbidden to eat when the animal became a carcass.

With an inclusive prohibition, there is reason to say that since the prohibition takes effect upon the flesh, it likewise takes effect upon the gid. Since the additional prohibition does not apply only to the already prohibited object, but also takes effect upon a permitted object,

indeed, there are tannaim who hold that one prohibition does not take effect upon another, but an inclusive prohibition can take effect upon another prohibition.

And here we find that the Sages hold that although the prohibition against an animal carcass is an “inclusive prohibition,” it cannot take effect upon the prohibition of the gid hanasheh.

On the other hand, the Sages concede that if “the inclusive prohibition” is also “a more stringent prohibition,” as in this case, where the prohibitions against eating an olah or an ox sentenced to stoning are both “inclusive prohibitions” [for when the olah was consecrated or the ox gored, all the flesh of the animal became forbidden together with the gid], and also “more stringent prohibitions” [for an olah and an ox sentenced to stoning are forbidden even for benefit, whereas the prohibition of the gid is only a prohibition against eating], then the inclusive and more stringent prohibition takes effect upon the other prohibition.

And now we raise the question:

And who

is

this tanna,

according to the Sages,

who holds that with

a merely inclusive

prohibition, one prohibition does not take effect upon another,

whereas

with an inclusive and more stringent prohibition

he does hold

that the inclusive—and more stringent—prohibition takes effect upon the other prohibition!?

Rava said: It is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili!

For we find that he does not hold that one prohibition takes effect upon another in the case of a merely lenient inclusive prohibition, but we do not find that he holds that in the case of a more stringent prohibition, one prohibition does not take effect upon another when it is also both inclusive and more stringent.

As we learned

in tractate Zevachim:

A person

in a state of ritual impurity who ate

flesh of

sacred meat, whether

that flesh was

impure sacred meat,

or

whether

that flesh was

pure sacred meat—

he is liable,

liable to karet if he ate it intentionally, and to a sin-offering if he ate it unwittingly.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: A person

in a state of ritual impurity

who ate

the flesh of sacred meat

that was pure,

only he

is liable

to karet for intentional eating and to a sin-offering for unwitting eating; whereas a person

in a state of ritual impurity who ate

the flesh of sacred meat that was

impure is exempt

from karet and from a sacrifice, because

he ate only an impure thing

of sacred meat,

which was impure!

The Sages said

to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

Even

a person

in a state of ritual impurity who ate

the flesh of sacred meat

that was pure, since he touched it

before eating it—

he rendered it impure!

It follows that the Torah imposed karet and a sacrifice for eating impure sacred meat!

And we raised the question:

The Sages have indeed argued well with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

for it is demonstrated from this that the Merciful One imposed karet and a sacrifice for eating sacred meat while the person’s body is impure, rendering one liable even for eating impure flesh; for anyone who eats sacred meat renders it impure before eating it by touching it!

And Rava said: If the person’s body became impure and afterward the flesh became impure, everyone agrees that he is liable,

because

the prohibition involving karet

for eating sacred meat while the person’s body is impure

preceded

the impurity of the flesh. Rabbi Yosei concedes that since the impurity of his body preceded the impurity of the flesh, and the impurity of the body did not lapse, the prohibition against eating this sacred meat while the person’s body was impure preceded the prohibition against eating impure sacred meat.

They disagree when the flesh became impure,

and became prohibited by the prohibition against eating impure sacred meat, which does not involve karet,

and afterward the person’s body became impure

and he became prohibited from eating sacrificial meat because of the impurity of his body.

The Sages hold that there is an inclusive prohibition,

which has the power to take effect upon another prohibition, and they say

that since he becomes liable

when his body becomes impure for eating

pure pieces

of sacred meat

elsewhere, he likewise becomes liable

for eating while his body is impure

a piece

of sacred meat

that was impure,

even though it had already been prohibited because of the impurity of the piece.

But Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not hold of an “inclusive prohibition”; that since

he becomes liable for this one, he likewise becomes liable for that one,

we do not say!

And we raise the question according to the view of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

And as for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that he does not hold of an inclusive prohibition

that it should take effect upon another prohibition, but here,

in the case of a lenient prohibition,

why did he not say:

Let a more stringent prohibition come

and

take effect upon a lenient prohibition!?

And we explain:

And what is

“a more stringent prohibition”?

The impurity of the body,

for eating sacred meat while the person’s body is impure is

punishable by karet!

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: Who can tell us that the impurity of the body is more stringent

because it is punishable by karet?

Perhaps the impurity of the flesh is more stringent

than it,

for it has no

possibility of

purification in a ritual bath!