Chagigah 20a — the Talmud in English

Since it did not teach concerning them

in our Mishna

an elevation,

to distinguish between those who eat their non-sacred food in the purity of non-sacred food and those who eat their non-sacred food in the purity of sacred food, and to say: The garments of those who eat their non-sacred food in the purity of non-sacred food are a midras for those who eat their non-sacred food in the purity of sacred food.

And necessarily, those who eat non-sacred food in the purity of sacred food are like those who eat sacred food itself, while the elevation of those who eat sacred food is a separate elevation in its own right, as we already learned in our Mishna [Rashi].

And we reject this:

Perhaps

in fact, those who eat their non-sacred food in the purity of sacred food do not have the status of sacred food, because their intention is nullified, and this is neither a binding nor an effective practice.

And the law of those who eat non-sacred food in the purity of sacred food is like the law of the perushim who eat non-sacred food in the purity of non-sacred food, or like the law of those who eat non-sacred food in the purity of teruma, whose status is like teruma itself [as tannaim disagree about this in the Mishna brought below]—

and

the fact that it did not teach concerning them an elevation,

that the garments of those inferior to them [in status] are a midras for them, is because:

If they are comparable—

those who eat non-sacred food in the purity of sacred food—

to teruma,

the Mishna need not teach us that the garments of those inferior to them are a midras for them. For

it already teaches

already

teruma

in our Mishna, and included in this are all those similar to them.

And if they are comparable to

those who eat non-sacred food in the purity of

non-sacred food—

it already teaches for non-sacred food,

as it teaches: The garments of an am ha-aretz are a midras for the perushim.

And the Gemara brings the Mishna [Teharot, end of chapter 2], in which there is a disagreement on the question of whether their status is like non-sacred food or like teruma:

As we learned: Non-sacred food that was prepared in the purity of sacred food is

like non-sacred food.

That is, there is no such practice or elevation, and one who conducts himself in it has a nullified intention.

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok says: Their status is like teruma.

Rather—

from here it is proven that, according to the tanna of our Mishna, non-sacred food prepared in the purity of sacred food is considered like sacred food, and is considered neither like non-sacred food nor like teruma—

from the latter clause

of our Mishna, in which we learned:

Yose ben Yo’ezer was a pious man among the priesthood,

and he would eat terumot in purity.

And his cloth

was considered

a midras for sacred food.

Yohanan ben Gudgeda would eat in the purity of sacred food all his days, and his cloth was a midras for the sin-offering.

You have therefore learned that the cloth of Yohanan ben Gudgeda was a midras only

for the sin-offering—

yes,

it was indeed a midras. But

for sacred food

no,

it was not a midras.

Evidently, he holds: Non-sacred food prepared in the purity of sacred food is considered like sacred food,

for if not, their garments would be only like those of those who eat teruma or like those of the perushim, and with regard to sacred food, by law they should be a midras.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar said:

Those who are stringent concerning purity, who eat their non-sacred food in the purity of non-sacred food, teruma, or sacred food, must take care to guard every object that comes into contact with their non-sacred food. Even if they know that it is not impure, so long as they did not take care to guard it, or diverted their attention from guarding it, that object has the presumptive status of impurity, and this is a rabbinic elevation.

And therefore:

His cloak fell [

his cloth

from him ], and

he

said

immediately

to his fellow: Give it to me! And he gave it to him—

this is

impure,

even if his fellow was pure.

And the reason is explained below: For both of them diverted their attention from guarding its purity. The owner of the cloth does not guard it, because it is not customary to guard something that is in the possession of his fellow. And his fellow also does not guard it, because he says in his heart that the owner of the cloth is not particular about its purity, since he tells me to give it to him even though he does not know whether I am pure.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Amram said: His vessels became exchanged [

garments

of Shabbat with vessels of weekday ],

for he thought that they were weekday garments,

and he wore them—

the garments

became impure.

The Gemara now assumed that the reason the garments became impure is that he guarded them as though they were his weekday garments, while in reality they were different garments. And whenever one does not guard them according to what they are, this is not guarding.

And likewise

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said:

An incident involving two fellow women [

who ate non-sacred food in purity ],

whose vessels became exchanged [

their garments ]

in the bathhouse; and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva, and he declared them impure,

because each one did not guard the garments according to what they were [this was the initial assumption].

Rabbi Oshaya raised an objection against him:

But if that is so,

if

a person extended

his

hand into a basket

in order

to take wheat bread, and barley bread came up in his hand,

would

so too

it be said

that the bread became impure,

since he did not guard it according to what it was?!

And if you would say

to answer:

so too,

the bread is impure, since he did not guard it according to what it was.

It is impossible to say this. For:

But it was taught

in a beraita that it is nevertheless guarded. As it was taught:

One who guards a barrel as though it were one of wine, and it is found to be one of oil—

pure

is the barrel

from rendering

others impure?!

We have therefore learned: Even though he did not guard it according to what it was, it is pure.

The Gemara answers Rabbi Oshaya’s question by demonstrating that this beraita is corrupted [and indeed, one who guards a barrel as though it were one of wine and finds it to be one of oil, or extends his hand to take wheat bread and barley bread comes up in his hand, it is impure since he did not guard it according to what it was, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Amram]:

And we refute:

But according to your position,

Rabbi Oshaya, who hold that this beraita is properly formulated and not corrupted [Rashi below]—

Say the latter clause

of that same beraita:

And it is forbidden

what is in the barrel

to eat,

lest it be impure.

And

why?!

What difference is there between impurity that renders others impure and its own impurity, such that it itself should be forbidden to eat, yet be pure from rendering others impure?

Rather, inevitably, this beraita is corrupted.

He said—

he rejected

Rabbi Yirmeya

the proof that the beraita is corrupted:

For it may be said that the beraita is speaking

of

a case in which

he says,

the one guarding:

I guarded it

the barrel and what is inside it

from something that renders impure [

from severe impurity that is fit to render others impure ],

but not

did I guard it

from something

that disqualifies it

itself [light impurity that does not have the power to render others impure]. And therefore the barrel is pure from rendering others impure, but is itself forbidden because of concern that it became impure.

And the beraita teaches us a novelty by stating the case of “he guarded it as one of wine and it was found to be oil”: Even though this guarding was partial, and was also not guarding according to what it was, nevertheless it is guarding [Hazon Ish].

And we question Rabbi Yirmeya’s interpretation of the beraita:

Is there such a thing as guarding for half?!

Can it be that guarding of purity that is not complete guarding, but only partial and directed against a particular form of impurity, is considered guarding?!

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed there is partial guarding!

But it was taught

as an unqualified statement:

He extended his hand into a basket

of figs,

and

the basket was

on his shoulder, and the rake [

an implement for separating stuck-together figs ]

was inside the basket. And he had it in mind concerning the basket

and the figs inside it to guard them in purity,

but he did not have it in mind concerning the rake

that it should be guarded in purity;

the basket

and the figs inside it were

pure, while the rake was impure.

And we raise the question: Is it so that

the basket is pure?!

But

should the rake not render the basket impure?!

And we answer:

One vessel does not render another vessel impure.

And we still raise the question:

And let [

let it become impure ]

what is in the basket [

the figs in it ], through the impurity of the rake?!

And

Ravina said

to answer:

In a case where he says: I guarded it

the rake

from something that renders it impure,

from impurity fit to render others impure,

but not from something that disqualifies it

the rake through impurity that does not render others impure [as in the version of the Rashash; see the Bach]. We have therefore learned that partial guarding is effective guarding, and the reason for the beraita of one who guards the barrel is likewise partial guarding.

And since we rejected what we sought to prove—that the beraita of “one who guards the barrel” is corrupted—then:

In any event, there is a difficulty,

from that beraita, against the view that guarding is effective only when he guards it according to what it is. For here he guarded it as one of wine, and it was found to be oil, and nevertheless it is pure with regard to what he guarded?!

And furthermore, Rabba bar Avuha raised an objection

against the view that says so:

An incident involving a certain woman

a fellow woman [Rashi]

who came before Rabbi Yishmael and said to him: Rabbi! I wove this garment in purity,

I know that from the time that three by three fingerbreadths had been woven into it and it became fit to receive impurity, no impurity touched it [Rashi].

And

indeed

I did not have it in mind to guard it in purity,

I only know that it did not become impure.

And as a result of the examinations with which Rabbi Yishmael examined her

in order to know whether the garment had indeed not become impure,

she said to him: Rabbi! A menstruant woman pulled a rope with me.

Rabbi Yishmael said: How great are the words of the Sages, who would say:

If he had

it in mind to guard it,

it is

pure,

but if

he did not have it in mind to guard it,

it is

impure.

For in the case of this woman, since she did not have it in mind to guard it, it became clear that the garment was impure, even though she said with certainty that it was not impure.

Again, an incident involving a certain woman

a fellow woman,

who came before Rabbi Yishmael,

and

said to him: Rabbi! I wove this cloth in purity!

From the time I wove it, it has been in purity.

And

indeed

I did not have it in mind to guard it in purity [Bach].

And as a result of the examinations with which Rabbi Yishmael examined her, she said to him: Rabbi! A thread [

And as a result of the examinations with which Rabbi Yishmael examined her, she said to him: Rabbi, a thread [

a strand ]

broke for me

before I began to weave,

and I tied it

when I was a menstruant woman

with my mouth.

And although the saliva of a menstruant is a primary source of impurity, I was not concerned for the purity of the cloth, since I had not yet woven three by three into it, so that it would be fit to receive impurity.

And since this was the incident, there is concern for the impurity of the cloth, for perhaps the saliva was still wet until she wove three by three into it, and the cloth became impure.

Rabbi Yishmael said: How great are the words of the Sages, who would say:

If he had

it in mind to guard it,

it is

pure,

but if

he did not have it in mind to guard it—

impure.

We have therefore learned that the law depends only on whether he had it in mind to guard it; and whenever he had it in mind to guard it, it is pure, even if he did not intend to guard it according to what it was?!

And we answer:

It is satisfactory according to Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok,

who said: There was an incident involving two fellow women whose vessels became exchanged in the bathhouse, and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva, and he declared them impure [the initial assumption being: because each one did not guard them according to the presumption that they were hers]; there is no difficulty. For the reason may be explained:

Because

each and every one—

when she sensed that the garments had been exchanged—

said

in her heart:

My fellow

who is wearing my garments

is the wife of an am ha-aretz, and her garments have the presumptive status of impurity,

is a woman whose garments have the presumptive status of impurity,

and

therefore

she diverted her attention from it, from guarding them while they were upon her fellow. And therefore Rabbi Akiva declared them impure [explained according to the Meiri].

Likewise,

And likewise

according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Amram,

who said: The vessels of Shabbat became exchanged with those of weekday and he wore them, and they became impure [the initial assumption being: because he did not guard them according to what they were],

also

there is no difficulty, for the reason may be explained:

Since he gives the vessels of Shabbat extra guarding [

it is customary to guard them with extra guarding ],

he diverted his attention from them

from that guarding, since he thought that they were weekday vessels, and therefore the matter is considered as though he had not had it in mind to guard them at all.

Rather, according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar

who said: If his cloak fell from him, he said to his fellow, “Give it to me,” and he gave it to him, it is impure—then it is difficult: why is it impure?

Let us make safeguarding for it in the hand of his fellow

[he should guard it in his fellow’s hand]?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: There is an established presumption that a person does not guard what is in his fellow’s hand.

And we challenge this:

And

for is it so that

a person does not

guard what is in his fellow’s hand?!