Chagigah 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

Since it did not teach concerning them

in our Mishna

an additional degree of stringency,

to distinguish between those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of non-sacred food and those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of sacrificial food, and to state: The garments of those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of non-sacred food are a source of ritual impurity that renders a person or object who contacts them impure for those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of sacrificial food.

And necessarily, those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of sacrificial food are like those who eat sacrificial food itself, while the additional degree of stringency of those who eat sacrificial food is an independent matter, as we already learned in our Mishna [Rashi].

And we reject this:

Perhaps

in fact those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of sacrificial food do not possess the status of sacrificial food, because their intent is disregarded, and this is neither a binding nor an effective practice.

The law governing those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of sacrificial food is like the law governing perushim who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of non-sacred food, or like the law governing those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of teruma, whose status is like teruma itself [as the tanna’im dispute in the Mishna cited below]—

And

the reason that it did not teach an additional degree of stringency concerning them,

namely, that the garments of those beneath them [in degree of stringency] are a source of impurity for them, is because:

If they are comparable—

those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of sacrificial food—

to teruma,

the Mishna need not teach us that the garments of those beneath them are a source of impurity for them, because

it already teaches

already

teruma

in our Mishna, and this includes all those similar to them.

And if they are comparable to

those who eat non-sacred food with the purity status of

non-sacred food—

it already teaches non-sacred food,

as it teaches: The garments of an am ha-aretz are a source of impurity for perushim.

And the Gemara cites the Mishna [Tohorot, end of chapter 2], which contains a dispute over whether they are like non-sacred food or like teruma:

As we learned: Non-sacred food that was prepared with the purity status of sacrificial food is

like non-sacred food.

That is, there is no such practice or additional degree of stringency, and one who conducts himself in this manner has his intent disregarded.

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: They are like teruma.

Rather—

from here it is proved that according to the tanna of our Mishna, non-sacred food prepared with the purity status of sacrificial food is considered like sacrificial food, and is considered neither like non-sacred food nor like teruma—

from the latter clause

of our Mishna, where we learned:

Yosei ben Yo’ezer was a pious man among the priesthood,

and he would eat teruma in purity.

And his cloth

was considered

a source of impurity for sacrificial food.

Yohanan ben Gudgeda would eat with the purity status of sacrificial food all his days, and his cloth was a source of impurity for the sin-offering.

You learn from this that the cloth of Yohanan ben Gudgeda was a source of impurity only

for the sin-offering—

not

indeed was it a source of impurity

for sacrificial food—

not

was it a source of impurity.

Apparently, he holds: Non-sacred food prepared with the purity status of sacrificial food is considered like sacrificial food,

for otherwise their garments would be merely like those of people who eat teruma or like those of perushim, and with regard to sacrificial food, they should legally be considered a source of impurity.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar said:

Those who are stringent concerning purity, who eat their non-sacred food with the purity status of non-sacred food, teruma, or sacrificial food, must take care to guard every item that comes into contact with their non-sacred food. Even when they know that the item is not impure, so long as they did not take care to guard it, or diverted their attention from guarding it, that item is presumed impure; this is a rabbinic additional degree of stringency.

Therefore:

If his cloak fell [

his cloth

from him ],

and

he said

immediately

to his fellow: Give it to me! And he gave it to him—

it is

impure,

even if his fellow was pure.

The reason is explained below: both of them diverted their attention from guarding its purity. The owner of the cloak does not guard it, since one does not ordinarily guard an item that is in another person’s possession. Nor does his fellow guard it, because he reasons that the owner of the cloak is not particular about its purity, as he asked him to hand it to him even though he does not know whether I am pure.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Amram said: His Shabbat garments became mixed up [

clothes

with his weekday garments,

as he thought that they were weekday garments,

and he wore them—

the garments

became impure.

The Gemara initially assumed that the reason the garments became impure was that he guarded them as though they were his weekday garments, while in fact they were different garments. And guarding an item without guarding it as what it actually is does not constitute guarding.

Likewise

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said:

There was an incident involving two associate women [

who ate their non-sacred food in purity ],

whose garments became mixed up [

clothes

in the bathhouse. The incident came before Rabbi Akiva, and he declared them impure,

because neither woman guarded the garments as what they were [this was the initial assumption].

Rabbi Oshaya raised an objection:

If that is so,

if

a person extended

his

hand into a basket

in order

to take wheat bread, but barley bread came up in his hand,

would

likewise

it be said

that the bread became impure, since he did not guard it as what it was?!

[The following segment is included in the preceding sentence’s meaning: “since he did not guard it as what it was.”]

And if you would say

that one might answer

likewise,

the bread is impure since he did not guard it as what it was—

It is impossible to say so, because:

But it was taught

in a beraita that nevertheless it is guarded. As it was taught:

One who guards a barrel on the presumption that it contains wine, and it is found to contain oil—

the barrel is pure

from

rendering

others impure?!

We learn from this that even though he did not guard it as what it was, it is pure.

The Gemara answers Rabbi Oshaya’s objection by proving that this beraita is corrupt [and indeed, one who guards a barrel on the presumption that it contains wine and finds that it contains oil, or one who extends his hand to take wheat bread and barley bread comes up in his hand, it is impure, since he did not guard it as what it was, in accordance with the statements of Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Amram]:

And we challenge this:

For your reasoning, Rabbi Oshaya, who maintain that this beraita is properly formulated and not corrupt [Rashi below]—

Say its latter clause

of that same beraita:

And what is in the barrel is

forbidden

to

eat,

lest it be impure.

And

why?!

What difference is there between its rendering others impure and its own impurity, such that it should itself be forbidden to eat but remain pure with regard to rendering others impure?

Rather, you are forced to say that this beraita is corrupt.

Rabbi

rejected

Rabbi Yirmeya

the proof that the beraita is corrupt:

For one can say that the beraita is discussing

a case

in which

the one who guards it says:

I guarded it—

the barrel and its contents—

from something that renders impure [

from severe impurity capable of rendering others impure ],

but not

I guarded it

from something

that disqualifies it itself [from a minor impurity incapable of rendering others impure]. Therefore, the barrel is pure with regard to rendering others impure, but it is itself forbidden because of the concern that it became impure.

And the beraita teaches us a novelty by presenting the case of “he guarded it as wine and it was found to be oil”: although this guarding was only partial, and was not guarding it as what it was, it nevertheless constitutes guarding [Chazon Ish].

And we raise a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yirmeya’s interpretation of the beraita:

Is there such a thing as partial guarding?!

Can guarding of purity that is not complete guarding, but only partial and limited to a particular type of impurity, be considered guarding?!

And we answer:

Yes,

there is indeed partial guarding!

But it was taught

without objection:

He extended his hand into a basket

of figs,

and

the basket was

on his shoulder, and the rake [

an implement for separating attached figs ]

was inside the basket. And he intended concerning the basket

and the figs inside it to guard them in purity,

but he did not intend concerning the rake

that it be guarded in purity;

the basket

and the figs inside it were

pure, while the rake was impure.

And we inquire: Is it really the case that

the basket is pure?!

Surely

the rake should render the basket impure?!

And we answer:

An implement does not render another implement impure.

We still inquire:

And should [

become impure ]

what is in the basket [

the figs inside it ] through the impurity of the rake?!

And

Ravina said

to resolve this:

It is referring to one who says: I guarded it

the rake

from something that renders it impure,

from an impurity capable of rendering others impure,

but not from something that disqualifies it

with an impurity that does not render others impure [as in the version of the Rashash; see the Bach]. We learn from this that partial guarding is effective guarding, and that the reason for the beraita of one who guards the barrel is likewise partial guarding.

And since we have rejected what we sought to prove—that the beraita of “one who guards the barrel” is corrupt—then:

In any event, there is a difficulty

from that beraita for the one who says that guarding is effective only when one guards an item as what it is. For here he guarded it as wine and it was found to be oil, and nevertheless it is pure with regard to the matter for which he guarded it?!

And furthermore, Rabba bar Avuha raised an objection

against the one who says so:

There was an incident involving one woman

an associate woman [Rashi]

who came before Rabbi Yishmael and said to him: Rabbi, I wove this garment in purity,

and I know that from the time that three by three fingerbreadths had been woven into it and it became susceptible to impurity, no impurity touched it [Rashi].

And

indeed

I did not intend to guard it in purity,

but I know that it did not become impure.

And as a result of the examinations with which Rabbi Yishmael examined her,

in order to determine whether the garment had in fact become impure,

she said to him: Rabbi, a menstruating woman pulled a rope with me.

Rabbi Yishmael said: How great are the words of the Sages, who would say:

If he had

intended to guard it,

it is

pure,

but if

he did not intend to guard it,

it is

impure.

For this woman, since she had not intended to guard it, it became clear that the garment was impure, even though she had stated with certainty that it was not impure.

There was again an incident involving one woman

an associate woman,

who came before Rabbi Yishmael

and

said to him: Rabbi, I wove this cloth in purity!

From the time I wove it, it has remained pure.

And

indeed

I did not intend to guard it in purity [Bach].

[The remainder of the source’s meaning continues in the next segment.]

And as a result of the examinations with which Rabbi Yishmael examined her, she said to him: Rabbi, a thread [

thread ]

was severed for me

before I began to weave,

and I tied it

when I was menstruating

with my mouth.

And although a menstruating woman’s saliva is a primary source of impurity, I was not concerned for the purity of the cloth, since I had not yet woven three by three fingerbreadths into it, and it was not yet susceptible to impurity.

Since this was what happened, there is concern that the cloth became impure, for perhaps the saliva was still moist when she wove three by three fingerbreadths into it, and the cloth became impure.

Rabbi Yishmael said: How great are the words of the Sages, who would say:

If he had

intended to guard it,

it is

pure,

but if

he did not intend to guard it—

it is impure.

We learn from this that the law depends solely on whether he intended to guard it: whenever he intended to guard it, it is pure, even if he did not intend to guard it as what it actually was?!

And we answer:

Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok,

who said: There was an incident involving two associate women whose garments became mixed up in the bathhouse, and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva, and he declared them impure [the initial assumption being that each failed to guard the garments as the garments belonging to her], there is no difficulty. The reason can be explained as follows:

Because

each and every one—

when she noticed that the garments had been switched—

said

to herself:

My fellow,

who is wearing the garments of

an eshet am ha-aretz,

is a woman whose garments have the presumptive status of impurity,

and

therefore she

diverted her attention from them, from guarding them while they were upon her fellow. Therefore Rabbi Akiva declared them impure [explained according to the Meiri].

Likewise,

according to

Rabbi Yonatan ben Amram,

who said: His Shabbat garments became mixed up with his weekday garments, and he wore them and they became impure [the initial assumption being that they became impure because he did not guard them as what they were],

also

there is no difficulty, for the reason can be explained as follows:

Since he gives greater guarding to Shabbat garments [

it is customary to guard them with an additional degree of care ],

he diverted his attention from them

from that guarding, since he believed that they were weekday garments. Therefore, it is considered as though he had not intended to guard them at all.

Rather, according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar

who said: If his cloak fell from him, he said to his fellow, “Give it to me,” and the latter gave it to him, it is impure; this is difficult: Why is it impure?

Let us have his fellow safeguard it in his hand

[Let him safeguard it in his fellow’s hand]?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is a presumption that a person does not safeguard what is in his fellow’s hand.

And we challenge this:

And

is it so that

not

does a person safeguard what is in his fellow’s hand?!