Bekhorot 56b — the Talmud in English

And we object:

Then let her tithe [that is, let the harlot herself tithe], and why did the beraita explain that the etnan becomes obligated in the animal tithe only in a case where he returned and purchased it from her? For even while it is in the harlot’s possession, the etnan becomes obligated in the animal tithe!?

And we answer: this statement that we said to explain that the etnan becomes obligated in the animal tithe in a case where the fornicator returned and purchased it—

And we answer: The case in which we said that the payment becomes subject to the animal tithe when the man who had relations with the prostitute later bought it from her

we are dealing with a gentile harlot. That is, presumably, the beraita that obligates an etnan in the animal tithe is dealing with a gentile harlot [as will be explained later in the sugya], and in the case of a gentile harlot it is possible to obligate in the animal tithe only the fornicator, or another person who returned and purchased it from him.

That is, the beraita presumably obligating the payment to a prostitute in the animal tithe concerns a gentile prostitute, and in the case of a gentile prostitute, the animal can become subject to the animal tithe only in the possession of the man who had relations with her, or of someone else who later buys it from him.

And we object:

Then let us establish it as a Jewish harlot, that is, a woman who is forbidden to the fornicator, with whom he had intercourse and to whom he gave an etnan,

that is, a woman who is forbidden to the man who had relations with her, but he nevertheless had relations with her and gave her the payment—

and let her tithe, [let us explain the beraita as referring to a Jewish harlot, with the obligation of the animal tithe indeed applying to her]!? That is, who compelled us to explain the beraita as referring to a gentile woman, and to force the interpretation that the discussion concerns the fornicator who purchased it from her? Let us explain it according to its plain meaning: that the discussion concerns her, and that we are dealing with a Jewish woman.

Let us interpret the beraita as referring to a Jewish prostitute, with the obligation of the animal tithe indeed resting upon her. In other words, who compelled us to interpret the beraita as referring to a gentile prostitute and to force the interpretation that the subject is the man who bought the animal from her, rather than the prostitute herself? It can be understood simply as referring to her, in a case involving a Jewish woman.

And we answer:

this is what the beraita teaches us

the lesson of the beraita:

that the etnan of a Jewish harlot is not an etnan. That is, it is impossible to explain it as referring to a Jewish woman who is forbidden to the fornicator, because this prohibition does not cause her intercourse to be considered harlotry with regard to an etnan. Only a gentile harlot, with whom betrothal does not take effect, has intercourse that is considered harlotry with regard to an etnan, and this very law is what the tannai came to teach us.

That is, it is impossible to interpret the beraita as referring to a Jewish woman who is forbidden to the man who had relations with her, because this prohibition does not make her intercourse legally “prostitution” with regard to the payment. Only a gentile woman, with whom a valid marriage bond cannot take effect, has intercourse that is considered prostitution with regard to the payment. This very law is what the tanna, a sage of the Mishnaic period, came to teach us.

And

in accordance with Abaye! For Abaye said:

The etnan of a gentile harlot is forbidden.

And

nevertheless

a kohen—

to whom the harlot is forbidden, and who receives lashes for her—

one who has intercourse with her does not receive lashes on account of [Leviticus 21]: “A widow, a divorced woman, and one profaned, a harlot, these he shall not take …

the prohibition stated in Leviticus 21: “He shall not take a widow, a divorced woman, or a woman who has been profaned or is a prostitute”

and he shall not profane his offspring among his people,” as the reason is explained below.

among his people, as the reason is explained below.

A Jewish harlot,

that is, one who is forbidden to the fornicator,

her etnan—

which the fornicator, who is forbidden to her, gave her—

is permitted,

for this is not harlotry with regard to an etnan,

and

if

a kohen who has intercourse with her

after she has engaged in forbidden intercourse, then he

receives lashes

for her

on account of “

and he shall not profane his offspring among his people,”

and because through her intercourse with one forbidden to her she became a harlot and was forbidden to a kohen, as it is explained below: what is the difference between an etnan and the prohibition of a harlot?

And we explain Abaye’s reason:

the etnan of a gentile harlot is forbidden,

because

he derives “

abomination” “

abomination”

from the forbidden sexual relations, [“An etnan of a harlot and the price of a dog you shall not bring into the House of the Lord your God, for even both of them are an abomination of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19) is stated regarding the etnan of a harlot, and “You shall not perform any of these abominations” (Leviticus 18:26) is stated at the end of the section of forbidden sexual relations],

as “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” is stated concerning the payment to a prostitute (Deuteronomy 23:19), and at the end of the passage of forbidden sexual relations it says: “You shall not commit any of these abominations” (Leviticus 18:26).

just as regarding forbidden sexual relations, betrothal does not take effect with them, so too, regarding a harlot, it is specifically one with whom betrothal does not take effect,

and betrothal does not take effect with a gentile woman.

And

if

a kohen who has intercourse with her does not receive lashes, on account of “

the Merciful One, meaning the Torah,

he shall not profane his offspring,”

the Merciful One said, and this one is not his offspring [her son whom she bears from him is not considered his offspring], because when an Israelite has intercourse with a gentile woman, the child is not attributed to his father.

since the son whom she bears from him is not regarded as his offspring: when an Israelite has relations with a gentile woman, the child is not attributed to his father.

But

the etnan of a Jewish harlot is permitted, for betrothal does take effect with her,

and we derive it through “abomination, abomination.”

And a kohen who has intercourse with her receives lashes on account of “

he shall not profane his offspring,”

for he is his offspring [for indeed it is his offspring].

as it is his offspring.

a. All Israelites are obligated to give a half-shekel [the coin] for the communal offerings, once a year.

a. Everyone who gives a half-shekel must add a kalbon [a small coin] to his contribution. And we find two reasons for the obligation to add the kalbon. The first is on account of “making up the shortfall,” so that the half-shekel should not be exact, lest it not be a complete half. The second is on account of “exchange”: when two half-shekels are exchanged for one shekel with the money-changer, a small payment must be added to him as the fee for the exchange.

b. Two who weighed a complete sela together—even though by law they should be exempt from a kalbon—nevertheless, since most people weigh separately and each adds a kalbon, even two who weighed together add two kalbonot, so as not to diminish the sacred funds.

c. But a father who weighs a sela for his two sons is not obligated in a kalbon, since this is the usual manner: a person obligated in two half-shekels gives one complete sela, and not two halves.

d. It will be explained in our Mishna that brothers who weigh a complete sela from their father’s property before they divided it are treated as though their father were weighing for them together, because before division the property has the status of “the estate of their father’s house,” and they are therefore exempt from a kalbon. But if they already divided the property among themselves and afterward again entered into partnership in it, from then on we treat them like any two other people who weigh one sela together, who are obligated in a kalbon.

Mishna:

Brothers who are partners

in the property of their father who died:

when

the state of their partnership is

that they are obligated in a kalbon

when they weigh the half-shekel, they are

exempt from the animal tithe.

And

conversely, when the state of their partnership is

that they are obligated in the animal tithe,

they are

exempt from the kalbon

when they weigh the half-shekel together.

That is, there are two states of partnership among brothers who inherited from their father, as the Mishna proceeds to explain:

The first: their father died, they divided the property, and afterward entered into partnership in it again. This is a partnership like that of other partners. Therefore, if they weigh the half-shekel together from the partnership funds—one complete shekel for both of them—they are obligated in a kalbon, like other partners who weigh together. For this same reason, they are exempt from giving the animal tithe from the animals, since a partnership is not obligated in the animal tithe, as the source for this will be explained in the Gemara.

The second: their father died, but they have not yet divided the property, and they are in “the estate of the household.” Thus, if they weigh a shekel for both of them from the funds of the estate, their law is as though their father were weighing on their behalf, and he is not obligated in a kalbon. For this same reason, they are obligated to give the animal tithe from the animals they inherited, since this is not a complete partnership that exempts from the tithe; rather, it is as though it remains in their father’s possession. And the Mishna explains the two cases:

They acquired them from the estate.

That is, they inherited animals and are still in the estate, they are

obligated in the animal tithe, [and exempt from the kalbon]—

in the animal tithe [and exempt from the kalbon]—

And if not, they are exempt.

But if

the brothers divided

the property,

and

again

entered into partnership, they are obligated

they

in a kalbon

like other partners,

and exempt from the animal tithe

on account of partnership, as has been explained.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written [Exodus 13:12]: “And you shall pass over every first issue of the womb to the Lord, and every first issue of an animal that

shall be yours, the males shall be for the Lord,”

which implies: designated for you, teaching us:

and not one of a partnership,

for partners are not obligated in the animal tithe, as it proceeds to explain.

Could it even be that they acquired them from the estate’s undivided property.

That is, could it even be that livestock which they inherited, and which are still part of the estate’s undivided property, would not be liable for the animal tithe?

The verse says:

“It shall be”,

in any event.

And we raise an objection:

and

behold,

this

verse

concerning the firstborn

is

written, and how did we learn from this verse concerning the animal tithe!?

And we answer:

If

this

verse

does not pertain to the firstborn, for it applies to partnership [

even partners are liable],

as it is written:

“And the firstborn of your cattle and of your flocks”,

in the plural, implying even partners,

apply it

to this verse

concerning the animal tithe

to exempt partners.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: There are times when

the brothers who are partners

are liable for both this and that [

for the kalbon and for the animal tithe],

and there are times when

the brothers who are partners

are exempt from this and that,

and

there are times when

they

are liable for the kalbon and exempt from the animal tithe, and there are times when they are liable for the animal tithe and exempt from the kalbon.

How?

They are liable for both this and that: when they divided the money [

the money] and then became partners in it again,

but did not divide the livestock,

and it is still part of the estate’s undivided property. Therefore, they are liable for the kalbon, since with regard to the money from which they contribute they are like ordinary partners, whereas with regard to the livestock for which they become liable to give the tithe, this is not a partnership that exempts them from the animal tithe.

They are exempt from this and that: when they divided the livestock

and then became partners again, and with regard to the livestock they are like ordinary partners who are exempt from the animal tithe.

But did not divide the money,

and the money is still part of the estate’s undivided property, which exempts them from the kalbon.

They are liable for the kalbon and exempt from the animal tithe: when they divided both this and that,

and with regard to both they are like other partners.

They are liable for the animal tithe and exempt from the kalbon: when they divided neither this nor that.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious,

for we have already learned that from property belonging to the estate’s undivided property they are exempt from the kalbon and liable for the animal tithe, whereas when they divided and then became partners again, their law is the reverse. And it is obvious that with regard to the kalbon the law depends on the state of the money from which they contribute, and with regard to the animal tithe the law depends on the state of the livestock for which they are liable for the tithe!?

And we answer:

When they divided the livestock but did not divide the money

that they are exempt from the kalbon

was necessary to state,

for if Rabbi Yirmeya had not taught us this,

it might enter your mind

that we should not be lenient with them by exempting them from the kalbon, but rather be stringent with them and make them liable. For one might say:

Since they divided the livestock, they revealed their intention that they stand ready to divide [

they revealed their intention that they stand ready to divide]

and

if so,

let them be liable for the kalbon—

he teaches us

Rabbi Yirmeya that they are exempt from the kalbon, since, in the end, they still have not divided the money.

Rabbi Anan said: They taught

in our Mishna that brothers who divided and then became partners again are treated as ordinary partners, so as to exempt them from the animal tithe,

only

in a case

where they divided young goats corresponding to adult goats, and adult goats corresponding to young goats,

one took young goats and the other took adult goats corresponding to their value; because with this division it cannot be said that each one came to divide his inheritance, since each one has a share in each species, and when they became partners again, it is an ordinary partnership, which is exempt from the animal tithe—

But when they divided

at the outset

young goats corresponding to young goats, and adult goats corresponding to adult goats,

and then became partners again,

one says: This is his share that reached him from the first moment.

That is, we say that yesh berera, “there is retroactive designation”: each one acquired those young goats that had been his share of the inheritance, and the other likewise acquired his own young goats. Since they became partners again in “their inheritance,” the partnership again has the status of a partnership in the estate’s undivided property, which is liable for the animal tithe.

And Rav Naḥman said:

“There is no retroactive designation,” and therefore:

even when they divided young goats corresponding to young goats, and adult goats corresponding to adult goats

and then became partners again,

we do not say

with regard to their original division:

This is his share that reached him from the first moment,

but it is an ordinary purchase, and when they became partners again, they are ordinary partners, who are exempt from the animal tithe.

And Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan also disagreed in this dispute, except that Rabbi Elazar added a condition in order for us to say, “There is retroactive designation”:

And Rabbi Elazar said:

They taught only when they divided

young goats corresponding to adult goats, or even young goats corresponding to young goats, but they were not equal in value, and they divided

nine corresponding to ten, and ten corresponding to nine,

so that it is impossible to say that this one “inherited” nine and that one “inherited” ten.

But when they divided nine

young goats

corresponding to nine

young goats,

and ten corresponding to ten, one says: This is his share that reached him from the first moment,

because there is retroactive designation.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Even when they divided nine

young goats

corresponding to nine

young goats,

and ten corresponding to ten, one does not say, This is his share that reached him from the first moment,

because there is no retroactive designation.