Bekhorot 56b (נו:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

and let her tithe herself

[She should tithe the prostitute herself]. Why, then, did the beraita explain that the etnan is obligated in animal tithe only in a case where he subsequently bought it back from her? After all, even while the etnan is in the prostitute’s possession, it should already become obligated in animal tithe!?

And we answer: This statement that we explained—that the etnan becomes obligated in animal tithe when the man who had intercourse with her subsequently buys it back—

concerns a gentile prostitute.

That is to say, apparently the beraita that obligates an etnan in animal tithe is speaking of a gentile prostitute, and in the case of a gentile prostitute it is possible to impose the obligation of animal tithe only on the man who had intercourse with her, or on someone else who subsequently bought it from him.

And we raise an objection:

Let us establish the case as one involving a Jewish prostitute—

that is, a woman who is forbidden to the man who had intercourse with her, who nevertheless had intercourse with her and gave her an etnan—

and let her tithe it herself;

[Let us explain the beraita as referring to a Jewish prostitute, in which case the obligation of animal tithe indeed rests upon her]!? In other words, who compelled us to explain that the beraita is speaking of a gentile woman and to force the interpretation that the subject is the man who bought it from her, when it can be explained simply as referring to her, in which case the matter concerns a Jewish woman?

And we answer:

This is what the beraita teaches us:

the

etnan of a Jewish prostitute is not an etnan.

That is to say, it is impossible to explain the case as involving a Jewish woman who is forbidden to the man who had intercourse with her, because this prohibition does not render her intercourse intercourse of prostitution with regard to the laws of an etnan. Only a gentile prostitute, with whom betrothal is not effective, has intercourse that is considered intercourse of prostitution with regard to the laws of an etnan; and it is precisely this law that the tanna came to teach us.

And

in accordance with Abaye! For Abaye said:

The etnan of a gentile prostitute is forbidden.

And

nevertheless,

a priest—

to whom the prostitute is forbidden, and who is liable to lashes for her—

the man who has intercourse with her is not liable to lashes on account of

[Leviticus 21]: “He shall not take a widow, a divorced woman, or a profaned woman, a prostitute; these he shall not take ...

and he shall not profane his offspring

among his people,” as the reason is explained below.

A Jewish prostitute,

meaning one who is forbidden to the man who had intercourse with her,

her etnan—

which the man who is forbidden to her gave her—

is permitted,

since this is not considered prostitution with regard to the laws of an etnan,

and

if

a priest who has intercourse with her,

after he has engaged in forbidden intercourse with her,

is liable to lashes

for her

because of “

and he shall not profane his offspring

among his people,” because through intercourse with one who is forbidden to him she became a prostitute and became forbidden to a priest; and the reason why the law of an etnan differs from the prohibition of a prostitute is explained below.

And we explain the reason for Abaye’s ruling:

The etnan of a gentile prostitute is forbidden,

because

he derives “

abomination” from “

abomination”

from the section concerning forbidden sexual relations.

[Regarding the etnan of a prostitute it is stated—Deuteronomy 23:19: “You shall not bring the etnan of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God, for both of them are an abomination of the Lord your God”; and at the end of the section concerning forbidden sexual relations it is stated [Leviticus 18:26], “You shall not perform any of these abominations”],

Just as in the case of forbidden sexual relations, betrothal is not effective, so too, in the case of a prostitute, it is one with whom betrothal is not effective;

and betrothal is not effective with a gentile woman.

And

if

a priest who has intercourse with her is not liable to lashes, because

the Merciful One

stated, “He shall not profane his offspring,”

and this one is not his offspring

[The son she bears from him is not considered his offspring], since when a Jew has intercourse with a gentile woman, the child does not trace his lineage to his father.

But

the etnan of a Jewish prostitute is permitted, since betrothal is effective with her,

and the derivation is “abomination” from “abomination.”

And a priest who has intercourse with her is liable to lashes because of “

he shall not profane his offspring,”

for he is indeed his offspring

[since he is indeed his offspring].

a. All Jews are obligated to give a half-shekel [the sela] for the communal offerings once a year.

a. Everyone who gives a half-shekel must add a kalbon [a small coin] to his contribution. There are two reasons given for the obligation to add the kalbon. The first is on account of “the shortfall,” so that the half-shekel will not be exact and perhaps will not constitute a complete half. The second is on account of “exchange”: When two half-shekels are exchanged for one shekel with the money changer, a small payment must be added as compensation for the exchange.

b. When two people weigh one whole sela together, although strictly speaking they should be exempt from a kalbon, nevertheless, since most people weigh separately and each add a kalbon, even two who weigh together add two kalbonot, so as not to diminish the funds of the Temple treasury.

c. But when a father weighs a sela on behalf of his two sons, since this is the usual practice—that a person obligated to give two half-shekels gives one whole sela, rather than two halves—he is not obligated to give a kalbon.

d. Our Mishna will explain that when brothers weigh a whole sela from their father’s estate before they have divided it, we regard them as though their father had weighed it on their behalf together, since the estate before its division is considered the “estate held in inheritance from their father,” and they are exempt from a kalbon. But if they have already divided the estate among themselves and afterward joined together again in a partnership, we henceforth regard them as two other people weighing one sela together, and they are obligated to give a kalbon.

Mishna:

Brothers who are partners

in the property of their deceased father:

When

the state of the partnership between them is

such that they are obligated to give a kalbon

when they weigh the half-shekel, they are

exempt from animal tithe.

And

conversely, when the state of the partnership between them is

such that they are obligated in animal tithe,

they are

exempt from the kalbon

when they weigh the half-shekel together.

In other words, there are two states of partnership among brothers who inherited from their father, as the Mishna proceeds to explain:

The first: Their father died, they divided the property, and afterward joined together in partnership again. This is a partnership like that of all other partners. Therefore, if they weigh the half-shekel together from the partnership’s funds—one whole shekel for both of them—they are obligated to give a kalbon, like other partners who weigh together. For this same reason, they are exempt from giving animal tithe from the animals, because a partnership is not obligated in animal tithe, as the Gemara will explain.

The second: Their father died, but they had not yet divided the property, and they are therefore in the status of an “estate held in inheritance.” If they weigh one shekel for both of them from the funds of the estate held in inheritance, their status is as though their father had weighed it on their behalf, in which case he would not be obligated to give a kalbon. For this same reason, they are obligated to give animal tithe from the animals they inherited, since this is not a full partnership that exempts from animal tithe; rather, it is as though the animals remain in their father’s possession. The Mishna explains the two cases:

They acquired them as part of the estate held in inheritance.

That is, they inherited animals while they were still part of the estate held in inheritance, they are

obligated

in animal tithe [and exempt from the kalbon]]—

And if not, they are exempt.

But if the

brothers divided

the property,

and

afterward

joined together in partnership again, they are obligated

in

a kalbon

like other partners,

and exempt from animal tithe

on account of the partnership, as explained.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written [Exodus 13:12]: “You shall transfer every first issue of the womb to the Lord, and every first issue of the offspring of an animal that

shall be yours, the males shall be for the Lord,”

which implies: That which is exclusively yours. This teaches us:

and not that of a partnership,

for partners are not obligated in animal tithe, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

It could even mean that they acquired the animals from the estate property. That is, could it even mean animals that they inherited and that are still part of the estate property—would they not be obligated in the animal tithe?

That is, could it even mean that animals which the brothers inherited, while they still remain part of the undivided estate, would not be obligated in the animal tithe?

The verse therefore states:

“It shall be”,

in any event.

And we raise an objection:

But

after all,

this

verse

is written with regard to the firstborn,

as it is

written, so how did we derive from this verse a ruling concerning the animal tithe!?

And we answer:

And we answer:

If

this verse

is not relevant to the firstborn, since it applies even in a partnership, [that is, even partners are obligated],

—even partners are obligated—

as it is written:

“And the firstborn of your cattle and of your flocks,”

in the plural, which indicates that this applies even to partners,

apply it

to this verse

with regard to the animal tithe,

to exempt partners.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: There are instances when

brothers who are partners

are obligated in both this and that [in the kalbon and in the animal tithe],

—in the kalbon, the small surcharge added when contributing the half-shekel, and in the animal tithe.

and there are instances when

brothers who are partners

are exempt from this and that,

and

there are instances when they are obligated

in

the kalbon and exempt from the animal tithe, and there are instances when they are obligated in the animal tithe and exempt from the kalbon.

How is it that they are

obligated in both this and that? When they divided the money [the money] and then entered into a partnership with regard to it,

—they divided the money and then became partners in it again—

but did not divide the animals,

which therefore remain part of the estate property. Accordingly, they are obligated in the kalbon, since with regard to the money from which they contribute, they are ordinary partners; whereas with regard to the animals for which they are obligated to give the animal tithe, this is not a partnership that exempts them from the animal tithe.

“Exempt from this and that”: When they divided the animals

and then entered into a partnership again, with regard to the animals they are ordinary partners, who are exempt from the animal tithe.

But they did not divide the money,

and the money remains part of the estate property, which exempts them from the kalbon.

“They are obligated in the kalbon and exempt from the animal tithe”: When they divided both this and that,

and with regard to both they are ordinary partners.

“They are obligated in the animal tithe and exempt from the kalbon: When they divided neither this nor that.”

And we object:

Is this not obvious?

For we already learned that from the property of the estate they are exempt from the kalbon and obligated in the animal tithe, whereas when they divided and then entered into a partnership again, their status is the reverse. It is obvious that with regard to the kalbon, the law depends on the status of the money from which they contribute, and with regard to the animal tithe, the law depends on the status of the animals for which they are obligated to give the tithe!?

And we answer:

The case where they divided the animals but did not divide the money,

and are exempt from the kalbon,

was necessary to state.

For had Rabbi Yirmeya not taught us this,

it might enter your mind to say

that we should not be lenient with them by exempting them from the kalbon, but should be stringent and obligate them. For one might say:

Since they divided the animals, they revealed their intention that they stand ready to divide [they made it clear that they intend to divide]

—they have shown that they intend to divide it—

and

therefore

let them be obligated in the kalbon.

Rabbi Yirmeya teaches us

that they are exempt from the kalbon, since in the final analysis they have not yet divided the money.

Rabbi Anan said: They taught

in our Mishna that when brothers divided and then entered into a partnership again, their status is that of ordinary partners, exempting them from the animal tithe,

only

in a case where

they divided kids in exchange for goats, and goats in exchange for kids: one took kids, and the other took goats of equivalent value. Since in this division it cannot be said that each one came to divide his inheritance—for each of them has a share in each species—when they entered into a partnership again, it is an ordinary partnership, which is exempt from the animal tithe—

One brother took the young goats, and the other took adult male goats equal in value. Since in this division one cannot say that each brother came to take his particular inheritance, for each of them still had a share in every species, when they became partners again it is an ordinary partnership, which is exempt from the animal tithe.

but when they divided

initially

kids in exchange for kids, and goats in exchange for goats,

and then entered into a partnership again,

one says: “This is the portion that was allotted to him from the outset.”

That is, we say that there is retroactive designation: each one received those kids that constituted his share of the inheritance, and the other likewise received his own kids. Since they then entered into a partnership again with regard to “their inheritance,” the partnership once again has the status of a partnership in estate property, which is obligated in the animal tithe.

And Rav Naḥman said:

“There is no retroactive designation,” and therefore

even when they divided kids in exchange for kids, and goats in exchange for goats,

and then entered into a partnership again,

we do not say

with regard to their initial division:

“This is the portion that was allotted to him from the outset,”

but it is an ordinary purchase, and when they then entered into a partnership again, they are ordinary partners and are exempt from the animal tithe.

There is also a dispute concerning this matter between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan, except that Rabbi Elazar added a condition for us to say, “There is retroactive designation”:

And Rabbi Elazar said:

They taught only when they divided

kids in exchange for goats—or even kids in exchange for kids, but the animals were not equal in value—and they divided

nine in exchange for ten, and ten in exchange for nine,

for it is impossible to say that one “inherited” nine and the other “inherited” ten.

But when they divided nine

kids

in exchange for nine

kids,

and ten in exchange for ten, one says: “This is the portion that was allotted to him from the outset,”

because there is retroactive designation.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Even when they divided nine

kids

in exchange for nine

kids,

and ten in exchange for ten, one does not say: “This is the portion that was allotted to him from the outset,”

because there is no retroactive designation.