Bekhorot 52a — the Talmud in English

And

also

not the woman —

she does not take from the appreciation by which the properties appreciated after the death of her husband, nor from what was destined to come to her husband after his death —

in her marriage settlement,

for if the properties were not worth the amount of her marriage settlement, and they appreciated, she does not take from that appreciation.

And

also

not the daughters in their support.

That is, daughters whom the mother had before she married the father, and the father accepted [the obligation] that they be supported from his properties for a period of time — they do not take from the appreciation by which their father’s properties appreciated after his death, or from what was destined to come to their father after his death.

We learned in Yevamot [40a]: A yavam who marries his yevama thereby acquires the properties of his deceased brother, and likewise he inherits his father [and takes] a double portion, that is, his portion and the portion of the deceased, because the yavam stands in the place of his deceased brother.

And

also

not the yavam —

the one who takes a double portion [his portion and the portion of his deceased brother] in the inheritance of their father, who died after the brother — does not take from the appreciation by which the father’s properties appreciated after his death, or from what was destined to come to the father after his death.

And all of them do not take from appreciation, nor from what was destined as from what was possessed — the Gemara explains this. Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The firstborn takes a double portion in the father’s properties, but does not take a double portion in the mother’s properties:

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

The Gemara asks:

And we explain: Because

the verse says: “For he recognizes the firstborn, the son of the hated one, to give him a double portion of all that will be found to him, for he is the beginning of his strength”;

to him

is the legal portion

of the firstborn.”

The legal portion of the firstborn belongs to a man.

That is, in the properties of the man for whom he is the beginning of his strength,

and the legal portion of the firstborn does not belong to a woman.

That is, the one who is the beginning of his strength has no legal portion of the firstborn in the properties of the wife of the one for whom he is the beginning of his strength.

That is, it applies to the property of the man who is the first fruit of his strength.

But the right of the firstborn does not apply to a woman.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he does not take [the firstborn] from appreciation:

And we explain the reason: Because

it is written “

of all that will be found to him

[to the father at the time of death].”

We learned in the Mishna:

Nor from what was destined as from what was possessed:

And we explain the reason: Because it is written “ of all that will be found to him [to the father at the time of death].” We learned in the Mishna:

Nor from property due to come as from property already held:

And not the woman in her marriage settlement

[she takes from appreciation or what was destined]:

And we challenge this:

Is that so? But didn’t Shmuel say: A creditor

who lent money to his fellow, and the borrower sold the properties and the purchasers improved them, the creditor

collects the

substance from the purchasers together with

the appreciation.

And what is different about a woman, that she does not collect the appreciation, when she is a creditor?!

He said

he answered:

Rabbi Abba: They taught here one of the leniencies of the marriage settlement,

this is one of the leniencies of the marriage settlement in relation to other creditors.

We learned in the Mishna:

And not the daughters in their support

[they take from appreciation and what was destined]:

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

And we explain: Because

a condition of the marriage settlement,

[a condition that he stipulates with his wife and writes for her in her marriage settlement], is also

like the marriage settlement

itself

considered.

We learned in the Mishna: And not the yavam [he takes from appreciation and what was destined]: The Gemara asks: What is the reason?

a condition that a man makes with his wife and writes in her marriage settlement— is likewise

like the marriage settlement itself

itself, it

and has the same status.

And we explain: Because

the Merciful One called him

“firstborn”

to the yavam, as the verse says: “And it shall be that the firstborn whom she bears shall rise in the name of his dead brother”; and concerning a firstborn the Torah said, “of all that will be found to him,” and not from appreciation or what was destined.

Abaye said:

They taught

that the yavam does not take from the appreciation by which the father’s properties appreciated

only in the appreciation by which

the

properties between the death

of the father

and the levirate marriage.

That is, for example, the brother died and afterward his father died, while they had not yet divided, and the properties appreciated; then the yavam came and performed levirate marriage. This appreciation is like what was destined, because it was not present for the father.

the

property between the death

of the father

But

the appreciation by which the father’s properties appreciated after he performed levirate marriage, that is,

between the levirate marriage and the division of the brothers in the father’s properties — he takes [the yavam takes it]. The Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

And we explain: Because “

he shall rise in the name of his dead brother”

for inheritance,

the Merciful One said

concerning the yavam,

and behold, he has risen

from the time of the father’s death to acquire a double portion in the father’s properties; and whatever appreciation the properties produced afterward—the appreciation is his. And you can exclude only the appreciation by which the father’s properties appreciated before the levirate marriage, for the yavam had not yet acquired them.

“he shall arise in the name of his deceased brother”

with regard to inheritance,

the Merciful One said

Rava said: Even

the appreciation by which the father’s properties appreciated

between the levirate marriage and the division he likewise does not take

the yavam. What is the reason? Because the law of the yavam is like that of a firstborn; just as a firstborn has no

right to the appreciation by which the properties appreciated

before division

of the firstborn with his brothers, as explained in our Mishna,

so too a yavam has no

right to the appreciation by which the father’s properties appreciated

before division

of the yavam with his other brothers.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them do not take from appreciation:

so too, the brother-in-law has no

right to appreciation generated by the father’s property

before the division

of the brother-in-law’s share with his other brothers. We learned in the Mishna:

And none of them takes from appreciation: According to Rashi, the discussion is understood as explained in the text: the case is one in which the father died after the brother and his property then appreciated. But if the father died before the brother, and the brother had already acquired his share during his lifetime, it is obvious that the brother-in-law takes both the property itself and its appreciation. Since the brother had already acquired it during his lifetime, it is like his other property, and with regard to the brother’s own property everyone agrees that the brother-in-law takes even the appreciation. This is true both according to Rashi, who holds that no special laws apply to the brother’s inheritance, and according to the other early authorities, who hold that special laws do apply even to the brother’s inheritance: once the brother had acquired his share, any later appreciation was generated by his property, and the brother-in-law cannot be excluded from inheriting that appreciation. Just as he takes the appreciation of his brother’s other property, so too he takes appreciation of the property that his brother inherited from his father. What difference is there between them, since the brother had acquired it during his lifetime? Although the property had not yet been divided, the brother-in-law has the same right to it before division as after division, and the appreciation was generated by his property. This is also explained

in the Mordechai on Bava Batra, section 5476. The dispute between Abaye and Rava can be explained as follows: Rava compares the brother-in-law to a firstborn, since the Torah made him like a firstborn. Just as a firstborn does not take appreciation generated by the property before division, so too this is the law of the brother-in-law with regard to the father’s property: he has no share in the appreciation until after the division. Abaye, however, holds— according to Rabbenu Gershom— that the brother-in-law is considered like a firstborn only until the levirate marriage. Once he performs the levirate marriage, the law of a firstborn no longer applies to him, and he becomes a complete heir, as with an ordinary share. Therefore, he takes both the property itself and its appreciation. According to the other early authorities, however, the discussion indeed requires explanation. It must be interpreted as referring to a case in which the father died before the brother, because if the father died after the brother, their position is that the brother-in-law receives nothing, since the property is due to come with regard to the brother. Thus, the father must have died first, and the brother acquired his share of the father’s property during his lifetime. Nevertheless, our discussion indicates that the brother-in-law does not take the appreciation generated by this property. This is difficult: Why should the brother-in-law not take the appreciation? Since the brother had fully acquired his share during his lifetime, and it was an ordinary share for him—he had rights in it even before the division—then although his brother now inherits him and has the status of a firstborn, this share should legally be treated as though it were an ordinary share of the deceased brother. Just as, if the deceased had been a partner with others in some property, it would obviously follow that the brother-in-law takes the appreciation generated by that property, so too we should say that the brother-in-law takes the appreciation generated by his brother’s inherited share—even though they had not yet divided it. It should likewise follow that he takes it even if it appreciated before he performed the levirate marriage, since it is his brother’s appreciation; why should he not take it? The Mordechai in Bava Batra there used this to prove that the law follows Rashi. See there in the Mordechai, which states that according to the other early authorities, the brother-in-law takes appreciation generated by the property after the father’s death but before the brother’s death. Our discussion concerns property that appreciated after the brother’s death, although this too requires explanation. The Mordechai resolved this as follows: Since the brother’s share was not clarified during his lifetime and the property did not appreciate during his lifetime, it is considered, with regard to the brother-in-law, like property due to come, and he does not take it. See Rabbi Shmuel’s explanation of his words there. [See further in the responsa of Maimonides, Laws of Monetary Matters, section 51, where he discusses our passage at length according to Rashi’s position.]