Bekhorot 46b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

Samuel said:

Even though in the case of a viable offspring, the emergence of the head alone is considered the opening of the womb and birth, and the one who comes after him is not considered a firstborn, nevertheless

the head

alone

does not exempt

the womb

in the case of nonviable offspring,

who are not viable, until their head and most of them emerge. It follows that if a nonviable fetus whose months have not been completed brought out its head while alive and then it was returned, or if a nine-month child brought out its head dead, and his brother preceded him and emerged, then the second is a firstborn for a priest.

And Samuel explains:

What is the reason?

Because it is stated [Genesis 7:22]: “

Everything that had the breath of the spirit of life in its nostrils,”

and we expound: follow its nostrils, that is, its head. And to teach:

Wherever “

the breath of the spirit of life is in its nostrils”—

that is, where it is viable—

it is that its head is considered

[its head alone is considered significant to make it born]; but

the other

—one that is not viable—

its head is not considered

significant by itself to make it born, until most of it also emerges.

And we raise an objection against Samuel from our Mishna, for

we learned:

Who is a firstborn for inheritance but is not a firstborn for a priest?

The one who comes after a nonviable fetus whose head emerged alive, and

after

a nine-month child whose head emerged dead.

It teaches, nevertheless: “

whose

head

emerged.” It is therefore explicitly established that even a nonviable fetus exempts the womb through the emergence of its head alone, contrary to Samuel”!? And we answer:

What is meant by “

emerged

its head”?

Most of it.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

And let it teach

in the Mishna “

most of it,”

and why did we learn “his head”!?

And we explain:

By right, it should have taught ‘most of it’

[indeed, it would have been appropriate to say concerning the one who comes after the nonviable fetus that he is not a firstborn for a priest only when most of it emerged]—

And

nevertheless,

since he wished to teach in the latter clause “the one who comes after

a nine-month child whose

head emerged dead,”

and in the latter clause the tanna did not wish to change it to “most of it,” although this is the truth according to Samuel, that it exempts only through most of it, because the tanna wished to teach us:

The reason is that its head was dead

that the one who comes after it is considered a firstborn for inheritance;

but if

its

head

emerged, and nevertheless it emerged

alive, the one who comes after it is also not a firstborn for inheritance,

for everywhere the birth of the head is birth, even though all of it did not emerge. Therefore,

the first clause also the tanna taught “

his head.”

And we raise a difficulty:

And what does it teach us!?

That is to say, this is satisfactory if it is not according to Samuel, and “his head” is specifically required; if so, the tanna stated “his head” in the first clause in order to teach us that it is not according to Samuel—

But if it is as you say—that in truth the head alone does not exempt the womb, and the intention of the Mishna is most of it, and the tanna stated “his head” in the latter clause only in order to teach us

that since he brought out his head

[since he brought out his head]

it is considered birth, and the one who comes after him is not a firstborn for inheritance—this has already

and the child born afterward is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance—this has already been

been taught

in the Mishna in tractate Chullin [68a] concerning a fetus found in its slaughtered mother, which is permitted through the slaughtering of its mother:

If

the fetus brought out its

head

before the slaughtering of its mother,

even though it returned it, this is considered born,

and it is no longer permitted through the slaughtering of its mother—

It has already been taught that the emergence of the head in an animal, and likewise in a human being, is considered birth!?

And if you would say:

He taught us

in tractate Chullin that the emergence of the head is birth in an

animal, and he teaches us

here that also

in a human being

it is birth; therefore it was necessary to teach this law separately in the case of an animal and separately in the case of a human being, because

a human being cannot derive it from an animal, for it has no passageway. That is to say, its womb is not between its thighs. Therefore, the emergence of the head is considered birth, since it is exposed; but in a woman, whose thighs cover the womb [and this is the passageway], one might have said that the emergence of the head into that covered passageway is not considered birth.

That is, an animal’s womb is not situated between its thighs; therefore, the emergence of its head is considered birth, since the head is exposed. In the case of a woman, however, whose thighs cover the womb—that is, the birth canal—it might have been thought that the emergence of the head into that covered birth canal is not considered birth.

And conversely:

an animal cannot derive it from a human being

also

cannot derive

that the emergence of the head is considered birth,

because

a human being is different,

for its facial features are considered its own

[its head and facial features are significant, unlike the facial features of an animal].

In any event, a difficulty remains:

but—

that in a human being the emergence of the head is birth—

has also been taught

in the Mishna in tractate Niddah [28a] concerning the impurity of a woman who has given birth:

If

the fetus

emerged in its usual manner

[that is, its head emerged first], its mother does not contract the impurity of a woman who has given birth

until most of its head emerges; and what is most of its head? When its forehead emerges

[its brow]. We have learned that the emergence of the head in a human being is considered birth, and the days of impurity and purity of a woman who has given birth are counted from the day that the fetus brought out its head—

And

a refutation of Samuel,

for why did our Mishna also have to teach us this, since according to Samuel this must be the Mishna’s main novelty.

And we conclude: Indeed,

a refutation,

and in truth, even in the case of nonviable offspring, the head alone exempts the womb.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

The emergence of the

forehead

[the brow] of the fetus

exempts in every place,

so that it is considered born through the emergence of the forehead alone,

except for the firstborn

for

inheritance,

for if only the forehead of the first emerged, the one who comes after him is a firstborn.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason

that the law of inheritance is different? And we explain: Because “the firstborn

he shall recognize”

the Merciful One said, teaching that one is not considered a firstborn unless his head emerged sufficiently for recognition. Reish Lakish holds that with the emergence of the forehead it is still impossible to recognize him, until his face emerges.

teaching that a child is considered a firstborn only if his head emerged sufficiently for him to be recognizable. Reish Lakish holds that when only the forehead emerges, the child cannot yet be recognized until his face emerges.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Even

with regard to a firstborn

for inheritance,

the emergence of the forehead alone is considered birth, for recognition is already possible with the emergence of the forehead; and if the first brought out his forehead and returned it, and the second preceded him and emerged, he is not a firstborn.

The Gemara asks: “The forehead exempts

in every place”—

as Reish Lakish said—

what does this come to include

[what does this come to include]?

And we explain:

It comes to include that which the Sages taught:

A female convert whose child’s forehead emerged while she was a gentile,

and the child returned his forehead,

and afterward she converted

and gave birth,

she is not given days of impurity and days of purity

of a woman who has given birth,

and she does not bring a childbirth offering,

like an ordinary woman who has given birth. This is the law of a gentile woman who gave birth: she has no days of impurity or days of purity and does not bring an offering, even if she converted after giving birth.

And this law is taught to us by Reish Lakish: that even for this purpose, the emergence of the forehead is considered birth.

Here the Gemara returns to the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, whether “yakir” is significant with the emergence of the forehead alone, or only with the emergence of the face:

[Meitivei]

to Rabbi Yohanan from what we learned in a beraita: “

[Yakir]”

stated regarding a firstborn

this is recognition of the face,

for the child is considered a firstborn only once his face has been recognized,

and what is recognition of the face? The facial form together with the nose.

Here it is explicitly in accordance with Reish Lakish, that the emergence of the forehead alone is not considered recognition!? And we answer:

Teach

in the beraita:

up to the nose.

[Ta shma]

in accordance with the words of Reish Lakish, from what we learned in the Mishna in Yevamot [120a]:

If one died, and witnesses saw him and came to testify to his wife that her husband had died,

they testify only concerning the facial form

together with the nose,

but if his nose was removed, they do not testify concerning him, for this is not visual recognition that this is the husband of this woman. Here it is explained that a person can be recognized only through the entire face!?

And we answer:

Teach: up to the nose.

And we still raise an objection:

[Ta shma]

in accordance with the words of Reish Lakish, from what we learned in a beraita:

A forehead without a facial form, or a facial form without a forehead: they do not testify, until both of them are present together with the nose,

but if his nose was removed, they do not testify concerning him—

And Abaye said—and some say Rav Kahana: What is the verse?

[From where do we learn that they testify only concerning the face?] Because it is stated [Isaiah 3]:

The recognition of their faces testified against them,

[the recognition of the form of their faces is their testimony]. Here we have learned that recognition is significant only with the entire face, and in accordance with Reish Lakish!?

Therefore, the Gemara answers in another manner:

The testimony concerning a woman is different

[testimony that comes to permit a married woman]

for the Sages were stringent with regard to it.

And we object:

But were they stringent

and did the Sages indeed act stringently with regard to testimony concerning a woman!?

But

on the contrary,

we learned

in tractate Yevamot [122a]:

They became accustomed to arranging a marriage

for a woman on the basis of testimony that her husband had died, even when the testimony was given by

one witness from the mouth of another witness,

and even

from the mouth of a woman,

and even

from the mouth of a slave, from the mouth of a maidservant.

Here it is evident that they were lenient with regard to this testimony in a manner in which they were not lenient with other testimony!? And we answer:

When the Sages were lenient, it was at its conclusion,

that is, after it had been clarified that the seeing constituting the testimony was proper; at that point the Sages were lenient, believing even one who is generally not trustworthy. But

at its beginning, namely,

the seeing of the testimony itself,

the Sages were not lenient,

but, on the contrary, they were stringent with regard to it, not relying on testimony that was not entirely clear.