Bekhorot 43a (מג.) — the Talmud in English

Rava said: To disqualify him where there are brothers:

if the tumtum went and performed chalitza, according to Rabbi Yehuda he has accomplished nothing, and it is permitted for one of the brothers even to perform yibbum with her. But according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, she is forbidden for yibbum, lest the tumtum is not sterile, in which case his chalitza is valid, and it is then forbidden for any of the brothers to perform yibbum with her, since once “he did not build, he shall not build” ([Deuteronomy 25:9]). Rather, they perform chalitza with her because of the doubt.

And to perform chalitza where there are no brothers:

whether the tumtum is obligated to perform chalitza when there are no other brothers. According to Rabbi Yehuda, he is exempt, as he is certainly sterile; but according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, he is obligated to perform chalitza, lest he is not sterile.

In these two cases

is the difference between them.

We have returned to you, chapter “Concerning These Blemishes.”

It is stated in the Torah:

“Speak to Aaron, saying: Any man of your offspring throughout your generations who has a blemish shall not approach to offer the food of his God.”

“For any man who has a blemish shall not approach,”

“A man who is blind, or lame, or has a sunken nose, or an elongated limb.”

“Or a man who has a broken foot or a broken hand.”

“Or is a hunchback, or a dwarf, or has a growth in his eye.”

“Or has a rash, or an eruption, or crushed testicles.”

“Any man who has a blemish, of the offspring of Aaron the koen, shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of the Lord; he has a blemish; he shall not approach to offer the food of his God.” [Leviticus 21:17–21].

Mishna:

These blemishes,

which we learned in the preceding chapter disqualify an animal,

whether

the blemishes are

permanent,

which cannot heal,

or

the blemishes are

transient,

which heal and disappear,

disqualify a person,

a koen, from performing the Temple service. [As long as the blemishes remain; but if they disappear, they do not disqualify him].

And in addition to these, there are further disqualifications in a person,

who is disqualified by additional blemishes:

One whose head is like a cone,

a koen whose head is pointed above and broad below.

And one whose head is like a turnip,

whose head resembles a turnip, broad above and gradually narrowing below.

And one whose head is like a hammer,

whose head resembles a hammer [an axe], with a narrow, rounded back.

And one whose head is flattened,

whose head slopes diagonally at the front.

And one whose head is truncated,

whose head does not protrude at the back, and he appears as though a piece had been cut off the back of his head.

And those with humps 1 ,

who have a protrusion on their backs. In this matter the tannaim disagree, as

Rabbi Yehuda deems them fit, whereas the Sages deem them disqualified.

A bald person is disqualified.

Who is considered bald?

Anyone who does not have

even

a row

of hair,

that

is

continuous from one ear to the other.

But

if he has

a row of hair extending from ear to ear,

he is fit.

Gemara:

We raise a question:

Why

do these blemishes, which disqualify an animal, also disqualify a person?

But there is a wart, which is not written in the Torah

as a blemish that disqualifies

a person,

but only an animal; and from where do we know that it also disqualifies a person?

And furthermore,

concerning what we learned in the preceding chapter, regarding animal blemishes [38a],

“a thinness and a growth”

in its eye,

whose disqualification is not written

for

an animal,

from where do we know that they disqualify it?

And we answer:

They are derived from one another,

as what is stated concerning one is learned concerning the other.

As it was taught in a beraita: With regard to a person, “a wart” is not stated. With regard to an animal, “a thinness and a growth” is not stated. From where is it derived that what is stated concerning one applies to the other, and what is stated concerning the other applies to the one? The verse says: “a rash”—

“a rash”; “an eruption”—

“an eruption,”

which are stated concerning both,

for a gzera shava!

And we say: One of these two verses of the gzera shava is

superfluous,

as it was not needed for its own subject but only to derive the gzera shava from it.

For if it were not superfluous, it could be refuted [

as a gzera shava that is not explicitly available for derivation may be challenged]:

A person cannot be derived from an animal, since

with regard to

an animal itself is offered upon the altar.

This is not so with regard to a koen, for whom the blemishes disqualify him.

An animal cannot be derived from a person, since

a person

is subject to more mitzvot.

Therefore blemishes disqualify him, whereas this is not so with regard to an animal.

We raise a question:

Indeed, why must it be superfluous?

Which gzera shava is superfluous?

And we answer:

Let the Merciful One write “an eruption,” and there would be no need for “a rash.”

And I would say: If an eruption, which is not repulsive, is a blemish, then a rash,

which is more repulsive than an eruption, being hard like pottery, embedded in the flesh, and making grooves in it,

is certainly so!

Why, then, did the Merciful One write “a rash”—“a rash”?

It must be

to make it available for derivation,

and once the gzera shava is explicitly available, it cannot be refuted.

We challenge this:

Let the Merciful One write

all

of

the blemishes

in one

passage, either among the blemishes of a person or among those of an animal.

And

let Him also write

“a rash and an eruption” both here and there;

“a rash” for the gzera shava, and “an eruption” to show that “a rash” is available for derivation.

And let them be derived from one another;

why did the Torah need to write two passages concerning blemishes?

And we answer:

With regard to which should the Merciful One write it? If He wrote it concerning a person,

we would derive an animal from it.

I might say: Every

blemish

that disqualifies a person disqualifies an animal.

But

“cloven together,”

whose hooves are joined and not split,

and damaged gums,

which are blemishes of the gums,

are not found in a person,

as they are not applicable to him: he has no hooves, and he does have teeth . And I might say that

they should not disqualify an animal either. Therefore the blemishes are written concerning an animal, in order to write there the blemishes of “cloven together” and “split,” which include damaged gums.

Therefore the blemishes of an animal were written, in order to include among them the blemishes of a fused hoof and a split, the latter including damaged gums.

And if the Merciful One had written all

the blemishes

concerning an animal, I might say: Every

blemish

that disqualifies an animal disqualifies a person.

But

a hunchback and one with a sunken nose, which are not found in an animal, see Rashi; I might say that they should not disqualify a person either.

Therefore the blemishes are written concerning a person.

We continue to challenge this:

Let the Merciful One write them all in one

passage, for example, concerning a person, except for

those

blemishes

that are not found in a person [

cloven-together hooves and damaged gums];

let the Merciful One write those concerning an animal.

Or let them all be written concerning an animal,

and those that are not found in an animal [

a hunchback and a sunken nose]

let Him write concerning a person. “A rash and an eruption”

let Him write

both here and there, and let them be derived from one another,

those blemishes that are found in both. And we answer:

Rather,

the reason the verse stated them in two passages is

as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. For the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Every passage

in the Torah

that was stated and repeated was repeated only because of a matter that was newly introduced in it.

Here, the new matters concerning a person are a hunchback and a sunken nose; and concerning an animal, cloven-together hooves and damaged gums. The other blemishes were repeated incidentally with these.

Rava said: Why did the Merciful One need to write blemishes concerning a person, [

Leviticus 21:18],

blemishes concerning sacrificial animals

all offerings [there, 22:22],

and blemishes concerning a firstborn animal [

Deuteronomy 15:21]?

And we answer:

It is necessary.

If the Merciful One had written a blemish concerning a person,

I might have said that a person is different

because he is subject to more mitzvot.

And if the Merciful One had written it concerning a firstborn animal, I might have said:

A person cannot be derived from a firstborn animal, since

a firstborn animal

itself is offered upon the altar.

And similarly,

sacrificial animals cannot be derived from a firstborn animal, since

a firstborn animal

is sanctified from the womb.

And if the Merciful One had written it concerning sacrificial animals, I might have said:

A person cannot be derived from sacrificial animals, since they themselves are offered; a firstborn animal cannot be derived from sacrificial animals, since its sanctity is greater,

as sacrificial animals include many offerings—sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings—and they apply both to males and to females, unlike a firstborn animal.

We raise a question:

One cannot be derived from another,

as it can be refuted.

Let one be derived from two.

And we answer:

Which one should not be written?

Let the Merciful One not write it concerning a firstborn animal, and let it be derived from the other two,

a person and sacrificial animals.

It can be refuted:

What is true of those two? Their sanctity is greater,

as sacrificial animals include sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, while a person’s sanctity is greater because of his mitzvot.

And they apply

their sanctity applies

to ordinary ones,

as a koen is holy even when he is not a firstborn, and similarly an animal.

Let Him not write

it

concerning sacrificial animals, and let it be derived from the other two,

a firstborn animal and a person. It can be refuted:

What is true of those two? Their sanctity comes automatically,

as there is no need to sanctify a firstborn animal or a koen.

Let Him not write

it

concerning a person, and let it be derived from the other two,

a firstborn animal and sacrificial animals. It can be refuted:

What is true of those two? They themselves are offered upon the altar.

Therefore all of them are necessary

for all three.

We learned in the Mishna:

“In addition to these, there are further disqualifications in a person.”

We raise a question:

From where are these matters

that all these disqualify a person derived?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse states, “Any man who has a blemish, of the offspring of Aaron

the koen, shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of the Lord; he has a blemish.” And we derive:

A man who is equal among the offspring of Aaron

requires a blemish in order to be disqualified; but if he is not equal among the offspring of Aaron, meaning that he differs from other people, such as all those enumerated in our Mishna, he is disqualified even without a blemish.