Bekhorot 43a — the Talmud in English

Rava said: To disqualify where there are brothers

for if the tumtum went and performed halitza, then according to Rabbi Judah he has done nothing, and it is permitted for one of the brothers even to perform yibbum with her. But according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Judah, she is forbidden for yibbum, lest the tumtum is not a saris, and his halitza is valid, and again it is forbidden for any of the brothers to perform yibbum with her, since “he did not build her, he shall no longer build her”; rather, they perform halitza with her because of the doubt.

And to perform halitza where there are no brothers

whether the tumtum is obligated to perform halitza when there are no other brothers. According to Rabbi Judah, he is exempt, for he is certainly a saris; and according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Judah, he is obligated to perform halitza, lest he is not a saris.

In these two matters

is the difference between them.

We shall return to you, chapter “Concerning these defects.”

It is stated in the Torah:

Speak to Aaron, saying: Any man of your offspring throughout your generations who shall have a defect shall not approach to offer the food of his God.

For any man who has a defect shall not approach,

a man blind, or lame, or split-nosed, or deformed.

Or a man who shall have a broken foot or a broken hand.

Or one with a high forehead, or a low forehead, or a blemish in his eye.

Or a scab, or a rash, or crushed testicles.

Any man who has a defect, of the offspring of Aaron the koen, shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of Hashem; he has a defect; he shall not approach to offer the food of his God. [Leviticus 21:17–21].

Mishna:

These defects,

which we learned in the preceding chapter disqualify an animal,

whether

defects

permanent,

which do not heal,

whether

defects

temporary,

which return and heal,

disqualify a man

a

koen, from performing the Temple service. [As long as they are in him; but if they pass, they do not disqualify]. And he has additional [defects] over them in a man,

who is disqualified by additional defects:

The pointed-headed,

a koen whose head is pointed above and wide below.

And the turnip-headed,

whose head resembles a turnip, wide above and becoming narrow below.

And the mallet-headed,

whose head resembles a mallet [an axe], whose nape is narrow and rounded.

And one whose head is sloped,

whose head is sloped before him diagonally.

And one whose head is cut away,

whose head does not protrude behind him, and he appears like one from whom a piece was cut away behind him.

And those with humps 1,

who have a protrusion on the back. In this the tannaim dispute, that

Rabbi Yehuda declares fit, whereas the Sages declare disqualified.

The bald one is disqualified.

Who is a bald one?

Anyone who does not have

even

a row

one line

of hair,

which is

encircling from ear to ear.

But

if he has

a row of hair encircling from ear to ear,

he is fit.

Gemara:

And we raise the question:

Why

do these defects that disqualify an animal disqualify a man as well?

But there is a wart, which is not written in the Torah

as disqualifying

a man,

but only an animal; and from where do we know that it disqualifies a man as well?

And furthermore,

that which we learned in the preceding chapter concerning animal defects [38a],

“a low forehead, a blemish”

in his eye,

their disqualifications are not written

for them

in an animal;

from where do we know that they disqualify him?

And we answer:

They learn from one another,

learning what is stated concerning this one from that one.

For it was taught: Concerning a man, “wart” was not stated. Concerning an animal, “a low forehead, a blemish” was not stated. From where is it to give what is stated concerning this one to that one, and what is stated concerning that one to this one? The verse says: “scab” —

“scab.” “rash” —

“rash,”

which were stated concerning both,

for a gzera shava!

And we say: One of these two verses of the gzera shava

is superfluous,

for it was not needed for itself, but only to derive from it a gzera shava.

For if it were not superfluous, there is room to refute [a gzera shava that is not superfluous can be challenged]:

[because an identical-expression derivation based on nonredundant verses can be challenged]:

A man cannot be learned from an animal, since

in an animal

itself is offered upon the altar.

Unlike a koen, in whom defects do not disqualify.

An animal cannot be learned from a man, since

a man

was included in many mitzvot.

Therefore defects disqualify him, unlike an animal.

And we raise the question:

Indeed, which verse is superfluous?

Which gzera shava is redundant?

And we answer:

Let the Merciful One write “rash,” and “scab” would not be needed.

And I would say: If a rash, which is not repulsive, is a defect, a scab, which is more repulsive

than a rash, being hard like pottery and embedded in the flesh and making furrows in it,

is it not all the more so!?

Why, then, do I need “scab, scab,” which the Merciful One wrote?

Necessarily it is

to make it superfluous,

and since the gzera shava is superfluous, it cannot be refuted.

And we challenge:

Let the Merciful One write them

all

all

the defects

in one

section, either among the defects of man or among those of an animal.

And

let Him also write

“scab and rash” here and there, “scab” for the gzera shava, and “rash” to reveal that “scab” is superfluous.

“skin eruption” for the identical-expression derivation, and “chronic skin disease” to show that “skin eruption” is redundant.

And let them be learned from one another;

why did the Torah need to write two sections concerning defects?

And we resolve:

Concerning which should the Merciful One write? If He wrote it concerning a man,

and we would learn an animal from it,

I would say: Every

defect

that disqualifies a man disqualifies an animal.

But

“cloven-together,”

whose hooves are cloven together and not split,

and gums,

which are defects in the gums,

are not found in a man,

for they are not applicable to him: he has no hooves, and he has teeth . And I would say that

they should not disqualify an animal either;

therefore the defects were written concerning an animal, in order to write in it the defect of “cloven-together” and “split,” which includes damaged gums.

And if the Merciful One had written them all

the defects

concerning an animal, I would say: Every

defect

that disqualifies an animal disqualifies a man.

But

a high forehead and a split nose, which are not found in an animal—see Rashi—should not disqualify a man either.

Therefore the defects were written concerning a man.

And we still challenge:

Let the Merciful One write them all in one

section, for example concerning a man, except for

those

defects

that are not found in a man [cloven-together and gums],

which

let the Merciful One write concerning an animal.

Or let them all be written concerning an animal,

and those that are not found in an animal

[a high forehead and a split nose]

let Him write concerning a man. “And scab and rash”

let Him write

here and there, and let them be learned from one another, those defects that exist in both? And we resolve:

—those blemishes that are found in both. And they answer:

Rather,

for this reason Scripture stated them in two sections,

as the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught. For the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: Every section

in the Torah

that was stated and repeated was repeated only because of a matter newly introduced in it.

Here, in man, a high forehead and a split nose were newly introduced; and in an animal, cloven-together and gums. And alongside these, the other defects were repeated.

Rava said: Why do I need the Merciful One to write defects concerning a man,

[Leviticus 21:18],

defects concerning consecrated offerings

in all offerings [there, 22:22],

defects concerning a firstborn

[Deuteronomy 15:21]?

And we resolve:

It is necessary.

For if the Merciful One had written a defect concerning a man,

I would say that the reason is: What is distinctive about a man?

Since he was included in many mitzvot.

And if the Merciful One had written it concerning a firstborn, I would say:

A man cannot be derived from a firstborn, since

a firstborn

itself is offered upon the altar.

And likewise,

consecrated offerings cannot be derived from a firstborn, since

a firstborn

has its sanctity from the womb.

And if the Merciful One had written it concerning consecrated offerings, I would say:

A man cannot be derived from consecrated offerings, since they themselves are offered; a firstborn cannot be derived from consecrated offerings, since its sanctity is greater,

for there are many offerings among consecrated offerings—sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, peace-offerings, and more—and they apply both to males and to females, unlike a firstborn.

And we raise the question:

One cannot be derived from one,

for there is room to refute.

Let one be derived from two.

And we answer:

Which one should not be written?

Let the Merciful One not write it concerning a firstborn, and let it come from these,

a man and consecrated offerings.

There is room to refute:

What is distinctive about these? Their sanctity is greater,

for consecrated offerings include sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings; and a man’s sanctity is greater through mitzvot.

And they apply

their sanctity applies

to ordinary ones,

for a man who is a

koen is holy even though he is not a firstborn, and likewise an animal. Let Him not write

the Merciful One

concerning consecrated offerings, and let it come from these,

a firstborn and a man. There is room to refute:

What is distinctive about these? Their sanctity comes by itself,

for it is not necessary to sanctify the firstborn or the koen.

Let Him not write

the Merciful One

concerning a man, and let it come from these,

an animal firstborn and consecrated offerings. There is room to refute:

What is distinctive about these? They themselves are offered upon the altar.

Therefore all of them are necessary

all of them.

We learned in the Mishna:

He has additional [defects] over them in a man:

And we raise the question:

From where are these words

that all these disqualify a man?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: For the verse says, “Any man who has a defect, of the offspring of Aaron

the

koen, shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of Hashem; he has a defect.” And we expound: A man who is equal among the offspring of Aaron

is the one who requires a defect in order to be disqualified; but if he is not equal among the offspring of Aaron, being different from other creatures, such as all those enumerated in our Mishna, he is disqualified even without a defect.