Bekhorot 38a — the Talmud in English

And it has

the same measure; it is

the filling of the hole of a yoke

that is on the animal, in which they make a hole in order to insert a peg for tying the straps of the yoke.

And from this Mishna it is proven that the measure of a “drill” is equal to the size of a “sela.” And if so, the statement of Beit Shammai, who said: until the skull is lacking the filling of a drill, and the statement of Beit Hillel [as you said in the name of Shmuel, that they said: until a sela is removed]—it is one measure.

Rav Taḥlifa was silent.

was silent.

And Rav Ḥisda said to him

Rav Ḥisda:

Perhaps “a drill and

its widening”

we learned

in the words of Beit Shammai, [for after they make a hole with the drill, they widen the hole around it with the drill so that it may enter and leave easily; that is, they widen the place where the hole begins, which is the place that “blocks” the hole by obstructing the drill from entering]. Indeed, the measure of a drill is equal to a sela, but a drill and its widening are more than a sela.

Rav Taḥlifa said

to Rav Ḥisda:

Do not say: Perhaps

we learned a drill and its widening.

Rather, certainly a drill and its widening

we learned.

And you must rely upon it.

That is, you may rely upon this matter,

as upon Ḥizkiya, the father of Ikkesh,

who is relied upon because there was no one there who disputed him .

And from here the earlier question concerning the karshina is resolved, for concerning something similar we heard, regarding the full measure of a drill, that it must enter and leave.

For it was taught in a beraita: This testimony Ḥizkiya, the father of Ikkesh, testified before Rabban Gamaliel in Yavneh, saying in the name of Rabban

Gamaliel the Elder:

There are several distinctions of law concerning the ritual impurity of vessels between earthenware vessels and vessels of rinsing. [A vessel of rinsing is a designation for all vessels that contract ritual impurity which are not earthenware vessels, and they are called so because they have purification through immersion [rinsing] in a ritual bath, as it is written: “And every wooden vessel shall be rinsed in water”].

Vessels of rinsing contract ritual impurity through contact with the source of impurity, whether the thing conveying impurity touched the vessel from outside or touched it from within; and the entire vessel contracts impurity, in every case, from outside and from within.

But earthenware vessels contract ritual impurity only through their interior, in which case the vessel contracts impurity both from within and from without; but if the thing conveying impurity touched the back of the vessel, on its outer side, the interior of the vessel does not contract ritual impurity by Torah law .

Likewise, there is a distinction among the vessels of rinsing themselves.

The “simple” metal vessels, which have no “interior,” contract ritual impurity by Torah law. But simple wooden vessels, which have no interior, do not contract ritual impurity by Torah law.

And thus Ḥizkiya, the father of Ikkesh, testified:

Every

vessel

that has no interior,

which has no receptacle but is used on one side only, if it is

an earthenware vessel—

it has no back for division!

For the back of the vessel, which is the side that is not used, is not distinct from its interior, from the side that is used.

That is, the law of this back of the vessel is like the law of the inner part [which is used] with regard to contracting ritual impurity. Its law is not like that of other earthenware vessels that have an interior, concerning which the law is: if its interior contracts impurity, its back also contracts impurity; but if its back contracts impurity, it does not contract impurity at all by Torah law, but is pure , since here we are speaking of a vessel that has no interior.

Rather, the law of this vessel is:

if its interior contracts impurity, its back contracts impurity.

And even if

its back contracts impurity, its interior contracts impurity.

And we challenge this: How can an earthenware vessel that has no interior contract impurity at all? For the law of the impurity of

an earthenware vessel

is only

in its interior did the Merciful One make it dependent,

for it conveys impurity only through its interior, as it is written: [Leviticus 11:33] “And any earthenware vessel into whose interior any of them falls shall become impure.” For only if

it has an interior does it contract impurity.

But if

it has no interior, does it not contract impurity at all!?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avin said: This is what he is saying: Every vessel that has no interior among earthenware vessels—

its counterpart among vessels of rinsing [that is, such a vessel that has no interior and is a “vessel of rinsing,” and it is speaking of a wooden vessel, whose simple parts do not contract ritual impurity by Torah law, as is explained in the conclusion]—

has no separate back,

has no back for division,

for there is no distinction in it between its back and its interior, and if

its interior contracts impurity, its back contracts impurity; if its back contracts impurity, its interior contracts impurity.

And we ask:

Why must he link it

to a vessel of rinsing

through an earthenware vessel,

by saying: “Every vessel that has no interior among earthenware vessels has its counterpart among vessels of rinsing”?

Let him say—

Every vessel that has no interior among vessels of rinsing has no back for division!?

And we explain:

This teaches us that:

if

it has

a vessel of rinsing

an interior, it is like an earthenware vessel—

just as an earthenware vessel,

specifically when

its interior contracts impurity, its

also

back

contracts impurity. But if

its back contracts impurity, its interior does not contract impurity [that is, it is not impure at all],

so too a vessel of rinsing,

if

its interior contracts impurity, its

also

its

back

contracts impurity. But if

its back contracts impurity, its interior does not contract impurity.

And specifically when it has no interior, there is no distinction in it between its interior and its back, so that if it contracts impurity on one side, it all contracts impurity.

And we consider this:

Granted, concerning an earthenware vessel, the Merciful One revealed

the law of

its interior,

for the Merciful One made it dependent on its interior: if its interior contracts impurity, the entire vessel contracts impurity; but if its interior did not contract impurity, but only its back did, its interior does not contract impurity.

But concerning a vessel of rinsing—

did

He reveal in it

the Merciful One

a law of

its interior,

that the contracting of impurity by its interior is distinct from that of its back?

And we explain:

If it concerns impurity by Torah law, it is indeed so,

for with regard to a vessel of rinsing, its interior is no different from its back.

Here with what are we dealing? With the ritual impurity of liquids, which is rabbinic.

And it is with regard to rabbinic impurity that we say that a vessel of rinsing that has an interior, if its back contracts impurity, its interior does not contract impurity.

For we learned in the Mishna: A vessel

of rinsing

whose back became impure through liquids

that are impure—

its back is impure.

But

its interior,

and likewise

its base,

the lower receptacle upon which it rests [another explanation: its rim], and likewise

its handle,

the place by which it is held,

and its handles,

which they make at its back in order to hold it, such as a pan,

are pure.

But if

its interior contracts impurity

from the ritual impurity of liquids,

the entire vessel is impure.

And we explain:

By Torah law, food does not convey impurity to a vessel, and

only

the Sages

decreed

that liquids convey impurity to vessels,

because of the liquid of a man or woman with a flux.

For example, his saliva and his flux, which are a primary source of ritual impurity and convey impurity to vessels by Torah law.

Therefore, the Sages made

a vessel of rinsing that contracts impurity through liquids

like the impurity

of Torah law

of an earthenware vessel,

so that if it contracts impurity from its back, its interior does not contract impurity.

But the Sages did not make it like the Torah impurity proper to it

of a vessel of rinsing [in which there is no distinction in Torah impurity according to the place from which it contracted impurity].

And the reason they said that a vessel of rinsing that contracts impurity through liquids from its back shall have the law of an earthenware vessel is that

the Sages made a distinction in it

to distinguish between this impurity and Torah impurity,

so that one should not burn teruma and consecrated things because of it 6 .

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And we challenge: If so,

a vessel that

has no interior should also have a distinction made in it,

so that one should not burn teruma and consecrated things because of it, for teruma and consecrated things are not burned because of rabbinic impurity.

And we answer: There is no need for this distinction.

Since they made

the Sages

a distinction in the case where it has

a vessel of rinsing

an interior, it is known that

a vessel of rinsing that

has no interior

and contracts impurity through liquids

by rabbinic law

does not cause teruma and consecrated things to be burned because of it. For now, when it has an interior, they are not burned, all the more so when it has no interior.

And we consider this:

And a vessel of rinsing that has no interior,

for the Sages decreed impurity upon it even through liquids, and it follows that through the impurity of a creeping creature it contracts impurity by Torah law; and above as well we said, “If it concerns impurity by Torah law, it is indeed so,” and it follows from these that a vessel of rinsing that has no interior contracts impurity by Torah law.

And we challenge this: Is it in fact

fit by Torah law to contract impurity?

But

we require it to resemble a “sack,”

as it is written: “From any wooden vessel or garment or skin or sack.” The verse juxtaposes a wooden vessel with a sack

just as a sack is carried when full and when empty,

that is, it has a receptacle,

so too every

thing mentioned in that verse contracts impurity only if it is

carried when full and when empty.

But here, since it has no interior, it is not carried when full and when empty.

And we answer: Here it is speaking

of those

vessels of rinsing

that are fit for lying impurity,

such as a chair and a bench, which contract impurity by Torah law through lying impurity, for example, when a man with a flux sat upon them, and even when they have no interior. And it is an established principle that everything which contracts lying impurity also contracts impurity through contact [Nidda 49a].

And we challenge:

If so,

that it is speaking of those fit for lying impurity—

earthenware vessels

that are fit for lying impurity

also,

when they have no interior, why is there no impurity in them?

And we answer:

There is no lying impurity with earthenware vessels,

because it is impossible to sit upon an earthenware vessel, for if one sits upon it, it will break .

Rav Pappa said:

The difficulty that if the measure of Beit Hillel, who said “enough that it may be removed from the living creature and it dies,” is a sela, then you have made Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel one—this is not difficult. For in the Mishna there, concerning a light made by human hands, in which the full measure of a drill was equated with a Nironian sela,

a large drill

we learned; it follows that an ordinary drill

has the measure of

smaller than a sela,

and Beit Shammai is speaking of an ordinary drill, and they did not make their measure equal to that of Beit Hillel, who speak of a sela.

And we challenge:

This works for Rabbi Meir, who says: With a

drill

of the small physicians

which they use to make a hole in the head for medical purposes,

we learned

the measure of a drill according to Beit Shammai.

But according to the Sages, who say: With a

drill

of the large chamber we learned—

what can be said?

For we learned: With which drill did they say

that Beit Shammai holds that the measure of the deficiency in the skull is the filling of a drill?

With the small one of the physicians, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: With the large one of the chamber.

And according to the Sages, that Beit Shammai is speaking of a large drill that is equal to a sela, it is difficult: if so, you have made the words of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel one!?

And we further challenge:

And for Rabbi Meir, is it satisfactory

that the measure of Beit Shammai is smaller than that of Beit Hillel?

For if so,

it would be among the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel,

for it emerges that Beit Shammai are more lenient than Beit Hillel. For according to Beit Shammai, even with a small deficiency of the skull, the measure of a small drill, the law of tent impurity departs from that skull; whereas according to Beit Hillel, this skull continues to convey impurity through a tent until it is lacking a sela.

And

whereas

we,

only six matters

that we learned

in tractate Eduyot in which Beit Shammai were lenient

did we learn.

But other matters

that we did not learn

there as being among the leniencies of Beit Shammai

we did not learn.

Rav Naḥman said: We learned a Nironian sela! A Nironian sela

is what

is equal to a large drill.

But

an ordinary sela

is

smaller even than an ordinary drill

and even than a small drill of the physicians; therefore, even according to Rabbi Meir, the measure of Beit Hillel, who said an ordinary sela, is smaller than that of Beit Shammai.

Mishna:

The Mishna enumerates blemishes of the eye. It is stated in the Torah concerning blemishes of an animal: “or חרוץ” [Leviticus 22:22].

The eyelash of the eye,

the eyelid of the eye,

that was pierced,

or

that was damaged,

or

that was split

to any extent.

And these three blemishes are included within “חרוץ” stated in the Torah .

It is stated in the Torah concerning blemishes of priests: “or a thin film or a spot in his eye.” [Leviticus 21:20]. And in the Gemara below, at the beginning of the seventh chapter, we derive by gzera shava that the blemishes stated with regard to a person were also stated with regard to an animal.

If there was

in

his eye:

A thin film,

a membrane over the eye .

A confused spot,

a thing that confuses the eye.

A snail, a serpent, and a grape .

A white thread that interrupts the ring and enters the black part. “Ring” [from the term “row”] means the dark circle in the eye surrounding the black part. The “black” is the pupil [the innermost part], through which rays of light enter the eye. The “white” is the outermost background of the eye. If a white thread extends from the white part, interrupts that ring, and enters the black part, it is a defect. Black and entering the white part, if a black thread extends from the black part of the eye, interrupts the ring, and enters the white part, it is not a defect, because this defect is in the white of the eye, and there is no defect in the white part, as it is not the eye itself but the fat of the eye.

What is a confused spot?

A white thread that cuts through the sira and enters the black part.

“Sira” [from the expression “row”] means the dark circle in the eye surrounding the black part. And “black” is the pupil [the innermost part], through which rays of light pass into the eye. And “white” is the outermost background of the eye. And if a thread of white emerges from the white part, cuts through that row, and enters the black part, it is a blemish .

Black

and

enters the white,

if a thread of black emerges from the black part of the eye, cuts through the sira, and enters the white,

it is not a blemish,

because this blemish is in the white of the eye, and

there is no blemish in the white

for it is not the eye, but the fat of the eye.