Bekhorot 38a (לח.) — the Talmud in English

And there is

the same measure: it is

the size of the opening of a yoke

that is on the animal, in which they make a hole in order to insert a peg for tying the straps of the yoke.

And from this Mishna it is proved that the measure of a makde’aḥ is equal to the size of a sela. If so, Beit Shammai, who said that the skull must be lacking an opening the size of a makde’aḥ, and Beit Hillel [as you said in the name of Shmuel, that they said that a sela must be removed]—their measures are identical.

Rav Taḥlifa

was silent.

And Rav Ḥisda said to him

:

Perhaps “a makde’aḥ and

its widening”

is what we learned

in the statement of Beit Shammai. [After making a hole with the drill, they widen the opening around it with the drill so that it can enter and leave easily; that is, they widen the place where the opening begins, which is the place that “blocks” the opening by preventing the drill from entering.] Indeed, the measure of a makde’aḥ is equal to a sela, but a makde’aḥ and its widening are larger than a sela.

Rav Taḥlifa said

to Rav Ḥisda:

Do not say, “Perhaps

a makde’aḥ and its widening is what we learned.”

Rather, certainly a makde’aḥ and its widening

is what we learned.

And you must rely upon it.

That is, you may rely on this matter,

like Ḥizkiya the father of Akeish,

whose testimony is relied upon because there was no one present who disputed him.

And from here the earlier question concerning karsina is resolved: regarding something similar to it, we heard that a full makde’aḥ must be able to enter and leave.

As it was taught in a beraita: This testimony did Ḥizkiya the father of Akeish testify before Rabban Gamliel in Yavne, saying in the name of Rabban

Gamliel the Elder:

There are several distinctions in the laws of the ritual impurity of vessels between earthenware vessels and vessels of other materials. [“Vessels of other materials” is a designation for all vessels susceptible to ritual impurity that are not earthenware vessels. They are so called because they can be purified through immersion [shetifa] in a mikveh, as it is written: “and every wooden vessel shall be rinsed in water.”]

Vessels of other materials become impure through contact with a source of impurity whether the impure substance touched the vessel from the outside or touched it from the inside; the entire vessel becomes impure in either case, both inside and outside.

Earthenware vessels, by contrast, contract ritual impurity only through their interior, in which case the vessel becomes impure both inside and outside. But if the impure substance touched the vessel behind it, on its outer side, the interior of the vessel does not become impure by Torah law.

There is likewise a distinction among vessels of other materials themselves.

“Simple” metal vessels, which have no “interior” or receptacle, become impure by Torah law. Simple wooden vessels, however, which have no interior, do not become impure by Torah law.

And this is what Ḥizkiya the father of Akeish testified:

Every

vessel

that has no interior,

that has no receptacle but is used on only one side—if it is

an earthenware vessel—

it has no back that is distinct for purposes of division!

The back of the vessel, which is the side not used, is not regarded as distinct from its interior, the side that is used.

That is, the law of this vessel’s back is like the law of its inner part [which is used] with regard to susceptibility to ritual impurity. Its law is not like that of other earthenware vessels that have an interior, concerning which the law is as follows: If their interior becomes impure, their back also becomes impure; but if their back becomes impure, the vessel does not become impure at all by Torah law, and is therefore pure, because here we are dealing with a vessel that has no interior.

Rather, the law of this vessel is:

If its interior becomes impure, its back becomes impure.

And even if

its back becomes impure, its interior becomes impure.

And we challenge this: How can an earthenware vessel that has no interior become impure at all? Does the Torah not suspend the law of impurity of

an earthenware vessel

only

upon its interior,

so that it becomes impure only through its interior, as it is written: “And any earthenware vessel into whose interior one of them falls shall become impure”? Only if

it has an interior does it become impure.

But if

it has no interior, does it not become impure at all!?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avin said: This is what he is saying: Any vessel that has no interior among earthenware vessels—

its counterpart among vessels of other materials—[that is, such a vessel that has no interior and is a “vessel of other materials”; the discussion is referring to a wooden vessel, whose simple forms do not contract ritual impurity by Torah law, as will be explained in the conclusion]—

has no back that is distinct for purposes of division,

there being no distinction between its back and its interior, and if

its interior becomes impure, its back becomes impure; if its back becomes impure, its interior becomes impure.

And we raise an objection:

Why need he compare it

to a vessel of other materials

with an earthenware vessel,

when we say: “Any vessel that has no interior among earthenware vessels has its counterpart among vessels of other materials”?

as we say: “Any vessel that has no interior receptacle among earthenware vessels has its counterpart among non-earthenware vessels”?

Let us say:

Any vessel that has no interior among vessels of other materials has no back that is distinct for purposes of division!?

And we explain:

This teaches us that

if

it has

an interior,

it is like an earthenware vessel:

Just as an earthenware vessel

becomes impure specifically when

its interior becomes impure,

so too

its back.

But if

its back becomes impure, its interior does not become impure [that is, it is not impure at all],

so too a vessel of other materials,

if

its interior becomes impure, its back also becomes impure.

But if

its back becomes impure, its interior does not become impure.

And specifically when it has no interior, there is no distinction between its interior and its back: if it becomes impure on one side, the entire vessel becomes impure.

We inquire into this:

Granted that with regard to an earthenware vessel, the Torah revealed

the law of

its interior,

as the Torah suspended the law upon its interior: if its interior becomes impure, the entire vessel becomes impure; but if only its back becomes impure, its interior does not become impure.

But with regard to a vessel of other materials,

did the Torah reveal

to it

the law of its interior,

such that the susceptibility to ritual impurity of its interior is distinct from that of its back?

And we explain:

If this is referring to impurity by Torah law, that is indeed so:

with regard to a vessel of other materials, its interior is no different from its back.

Here, with what are we dealing? With the ritual impurity of liquids, which is by rabbinic decree.

And it is with regard to rabbinic impurity that we say that a vessel of other materials with an interior, if its back becomes impure, its interior does not become impure.

As we learned in a Mishna: A vessel of other materials whose back became impure through impure liquids

is impure—

its back is impure.

But

its interior,

as well as

its base,

the lower receptacle upon which it rests [another explanation: ugano means its rim], and also

its handle,

its place of grasp, and

its handles,

which are made on its back in order to hold it, as with a frying pan, are

pure.

But if

its interior becomes impure

through the impurity of liquids,

the entire vessel is impure.

And we explain:

By Torah law, food does not render a vessel impure, and liquid does not render a vessel impure.

It is only

the Sages who decreed

that liquids render vessels impure,

because of the liquid of a man or woman with a discharge,

such as his or her saliva or discharge, which are primary sources of ritual impurity and render vessels impure by Torah law.

Therefore, the Sages treated

a vessel of other materials that becomes impure through liquids

like the impurity

of an earthenware vessel

by Torah law, so that if it becomes impure from its back, its interior does not become impure.

But the Sages did not treat it like its own Torah impurity,

that of a vessel of other materials, [with regard to which there is no distinction in Torah law based on where it became impure].

And the reason they said that a vessel of other materials that becomes impure through liquids from its back should have the law of an earthenware vessel is that

the Sages established a distinguishing sign concerning it

to distinguish this impurity from impurity by Torah law,

so that one would not burn teruma or consecrated offerings because of it.

by Torah law

of an earthenware vessel:

if it becomes impure from its back, its interior does not become impure.

But the Sages did not treat it as the impurity intrinsic to a non-earthenware vessel by Torah law,

for with regard to such a vessel there is no distinction in Torah-law impurity based on the place where it became impure.

And we challenge this:

If so,

a vessel that

has no interior should likewise have a distinguishing sign,

so that one would not burn teruma or consecrated offerings because of it, since teruma and consecrated offerings are not burned because of rabbinic impurity. And we answer: There is no need for this distinguishing sign. Since the Sages established a distinguishing sign for a vessel of other materials that has an interior, it is known that

a vessel of other materials that

has no interior

and became impure through liquids

by rabbinic decree

does not cause teruma or consecrated offerings to be burned. For now, when it has an interior, they do not burn because of it; all the more so when it has no interior.

We inquire into this:

And a vessel of other materials that has no interior,

for which the Sages decreed impurity even through liquids, it follows that it becomes impure by Torah law through contact with a creeping creature. Earlier too we said, “If this is referring to impurity by Torah law, that is indeed so,” implying from these statements that a vessel of other materials with no interior is susceptible to impurity by Torah law.

And on this we ask:

Is it in fact susceptible to impurity by Torah law?

But

we require it to resemble a sack,

as it is written: “of any wooden vessel, or garment, or skin, or sack.” The verse juxtaposes a wooden vessel with a sack:

Just as a sack can be carried when full and when empty,

that is, it has a receptacle,

so every

item mentioned in that verse becomes susceptible to impurity only if it

can be carried when full and when empty.

But since this vessel has no interior, it cannot be carried when full and when empty.

And we answer: Here we are dealing

with those

vessels of other materials

that are fit for lying upon,

such as a chair or bench, which contract impurity by Torah law through being trodden upon, for example, when a zav sat upon them, even when they have no interior. And we have a principle that anything susceptible to impurity through being trodden upon is also susceptible to impurity through contact [Nidda 49a].

And we challenge this:

If so,

since the discussion is referring to those that are fit for being lain upon,

earthenware vessels

that are fit for being lain upon

should also be susceptible to impurity when they have no interior. Why are they not susceptible to impurity?

And we answer:

There is no impurity through being lain upon in the case of earthenware vessels,

because it is impossible to sit on an earthenware vessel, as it would break if one sat upon it.

such as a chair or bench, which become impure by Torah law through such use—for example, if a person with a gonorrheal discharge sat on them—even when they have no interior receptacle. We have an established principle that anything susceptible to impurity through being sat upon is also susceptible to impurity through contact [Nidda 49a].

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Rav Pappa said:

The difficulty you raised—that if the measure of Beit Hillel, who said “until it can be removed from the living creature and it dies,” is a sela, then you have made Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel identical—is not difficult. In the Mishna there, concerning a perforation made by a person, where a full makde’aḥ was equated with a sela nironit—

a large drill

is what we learned; by inference, an ordinary drill

is

smaller than a sela,

and Beit Shammai are discussing an ordinary drill and did not make their measure equal to that of Beit Hillel, who state their measure in terms of a sela.

And we challenge this:

This works well according to Rabbi Meir, who says: We learned

the measure of the drill according to Beit Shammai with regard to a small physician’s drill, which is used to make a hole in the head for medical purposes,

is what we learned.

But according to the Rabbis, who say: We learned with regard to

a

large chamber drill—

what can be said?

As we learned in a Mishna: With regard to which drill did they say

that according to Beit Shammai the measure of the deficiency in a skull is the size of a full drill?

With a small physician’s drill, the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: With a large chamber drill.

According to the Sages, who maintain that Beit Shammai are discussing a large drill equal to a sela, the difficulty arises: If so, you have made the statements of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel identical!?

And we raise another objection:

But according to Rabbi Meir, is it satisfactory

that the measure of Beit Shammai is smaller than that of Beit Hillel?

For if so,

it would be one of the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel,

meaning that Beit Shammai are more lenient than Beit Hillel. For according to Beit Shammai, even with a slight deficiency in the skull, the size of a small drill, the status of impurity conveyed through a tent has already departed from that skull, whereas according to Beit Hillel this skull continues to convey impurity through a tent until it is lacking the size of a sela.

But we

specifically learned

in the Mishna

only the six matters in which Beit Shammai were lenient, as taught in tractate Eduyot.

And we did not learn

the other matters that are among the leniencies of Beit Shammai

there.

Rav Naḥman said: We learned of a sela nironit! A sela nironit

is

equivalent to a large drill.

But

an ordinary sela

is

smaller even than an ordinary drill

and even than a small physician’s drill. Therefore, even according to Rabbi Meir, the measure of Beit Hillel, who said an ordinary sela, is smaller than that of Beit Shammai.

Mishna:

The Mishna lists defects of the eye, as it is stated in the Torah concerning defects in an animal: “or חרוץ” [Leviticus 22:22].

The eyelash,

the eyelid,

that was perforated,

or

that was chipped,

or

that was split,

even by any amount.

These three defects are included in the term “חרוץ” stated in the Torah.

But

an ordinary sela

It is stated in the Torah concerning defects in priests: “or a membrane or a blemish in his eye” [Leviticus 21:20]. And below, at the beginning of the seventh chapter, the Gemara derives through a gzera shava that the defects stated with regard to a person were also stated with regard to an animal.

If there was

a defect

in its eye:

A membrane,

a film over the eye.

the eyelid of the eye,

A blemish,

something that confuses the eye.

A snail, a snake, and a grape.

or

if it was split,

even by any small amount.

These three defects are included in the term “חרוץ” mentioned in the Torah .

The Torah states concerning defects in priests: “Or a thin film or a blemish in his eye” [Leviticus 21:20]. In the Gemara below, at the beginning of the seventh chapter, a deduction by identical wording establishes that the defects stated with regard to a person are also stated with regard to an animal.

If there was

in its eye

a thin film:

A film,

a membrane over the eye .

A blemish,

something that confuses or distorts the eye.

What is a blemish?

A white thread that interrupts the ring and enters the black part. “Ring” [from the term “row”] means the dark circle in the eye surrounding the black part. The “black” is the pupil [the innermost part], through which rays of light enter the eye. The “white” is the outermost background of the eye. If a white thread extends from the white part, interrupts that ring, and enters the black part, it is a defect. Black and entering the white part, if a black thread extends from the black part of the eye, interrupts the ring, and enters the white part, it is not a defect, because this defect is in the white of the eye, and there is no defect in the white part, as it is not the eye itself but the fat of the eye.

What is a blemish?

A white thread that interrupts the ring and enters the black part.

“The ring,” from the word meaning “row,” is the dark circle in the eye surrounding the black part. “The black part” is the pupil, the innermost part, through which rays of light enter the eye. “The white part” is the outermost background of the eye. If a white thread emerges from the white part, interrupts that circle, and enters the black part, this is a defect .

Black

and

entering the white part:

if a black thread emerges from the black part of the eye, interrupts the ring, and enters the white part,

it is not a defect,

because this defect is in the white part of the eye, and

there is no defect in the white part,

for it is not considered the eye but rather the fat of the eye.