Bekhorot 37a — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

“Three permit the firstborn in a place where there is no expert.”

That is,

to exclude the view of Rabbi Yose

of the Mishna, who says: It may be slaughtered only according to an expert.

And that which we said,

“three annul”

permit

the vow in a place where there is no sage—

to exclude the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

For it was taught in a beraita: Vows are annulled by three

laymen.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Specifically when

one of them

from the three

is a sage,

but if all three of them are laymen, they do not permit even in a place where there is no sage.

And that which we said,

“In a place where there is no sage”—such as whom?

Like whom is that sage in whose place three laymen do not permit?

Rav Nahman said: Such as I!

Rabbi Yehuda says:

It is necessary that

one of them be a sage.

And we are astonished:

Is it implied that these,

two,

may be anyone?

Even ignoramuses. But ignoramuses cannot even join [them], for they are considered as though they were not present .

Ravina said: That they can explain it to them and they understand,

that they must be at least on such a level that if the laws of vows are explained to them, they will understand them, and the sage among them will explain them to them.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yose says: Even if there is there a member of the Sanhedrin of twenty-three,

it may be slaughtered only according to an expert.

Rav Hananel said in the name of Rav: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yose!

And we raise an objection:

Is this not obvious?!

For

an individual and the many

who disagree—

the halakha is in accordance with the many.

And we answer:

It might have been said: Rabbi Yose, his reasoning is with him,

his reason is with him, for he provides a reason for all his statements .

It teaches us

that the halakha is in accordance with the many.

And we infer:

Resolve from this

that which Rav Hananel said in the name of Rav: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yose,

for this first one,

that Rav Yehuda said: Three permit the firstborn in a place where there is no expert—and it is uncertain whether it was said in the name of Rav or whether it was said in the name of Shmuel—

was said in the name of Shmuel. For if it was in the name of Rav, why do I need two statements

to say this one, that three permit the firstborn, and that one, that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yose?

And we reject this:

One was stated by implication from the other.

Rav said it only once, and from the inference of that statement the second statement was also said.

Mishna:

One who slaughters the firstborn

and sells from its meat,

and it becomes known

afterward

that he had not shown it

to a sage to examine its blemish—

what the buyers ate,

they ate,

and he returns the money to them.

For even though they benefited, we penalize him to return the money because he caused them to eat a prohibited thing.

And what they did not eat, the meat is buried,

for an unblemished firstborn is forbidden in benefit,

and he returns the money to them.

And likewise, one who slaughters a cow and sells it, and it becomes known

afterward

that it was a tereifa—

what they ate, they ate,

and he returns the money to them,

and what they did not eat, they

the buyers

return the meat to him.

For he can sell it to a gentile,

and he returns the money to them.

If they sold it

the buyers

to a gentile, or threw it to the dogs—

they pay him the value of a tereifa,

which is sold cheaply. That is, the seller returns to them only the difference, since he did not cause them to transgress a prohibition.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One who sells meat to his fellow, and it is found

to be

firstborn meat.

Or he sold him

produce, and it is found

to be

untithed produce.

Or

wine, and it is found

to be

wine of libation.

The law is:

What they ate, they ate. And he returns the money to them.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says

there is a distinction in this law:

If he sold them

things of which the soul recoils, he returns to them

all

the money.

For once it became known to them that they had eaten a prohibited thing, they have no enjoyment from their eating.

And

if he sold them things

of which the soul does not recoil, he deducts the money from them.

He does not return all of it to them, but takes from them a small payment, for they benefited.

And these are the things of which the soul recoils: carrion, tereifot, creeping things, and crawling things.

And these are the things of which the soul does not recoil: firstborn animals, untithed produce, and wine of libation.

And we are astonished: Does one who sells

a firstborn

only

deduct

from the money, and not return all of it to them?

And let the buyer say to him,

the seller, who is a kohen—

“What loss did I cause you?”

For if the meat had been in your possession, it would have required burial, since it was slaughtered while unblemished.

And we answer:

It is necessary; for example, when he sold it

to an Israelite

from the place of the blemish,

the limb in which there was a blemish [according to his statement],

for he said to him,

the selling kohen:

“Had you not eaten it, I would have shown it

to a sage

and he would have permitted it to me.”

And this is

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who says [above, 28a]: One who slaughters the firstborn and shows its blemish after slaughter—the firstborn is permitted according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we further raise an objection:

Untithed produce—

why does he deduct from the money for them? Let him say to him: What loss did I cause you?

And we answer: The seller said to him: Had you not eaten them,

I would have prepared them and eaten them.

Wine of libation—

for what reason does he not return all the money to them?

And we answer: For he did not sell him the wine of libation itself, but

through a mixture,

which they mixed with kosher wine. The seller said to him: Had you returned it to me, I would have sold it to gentiles, and he would have paid me for the kosher wine contained in it.

And in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as we learned: Wine of libation that fell into a pit

and became mixed there with kosher wine—

all of it is forbidden in benefit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All of it may be sold to gentiles, except for the value of the wine of libation in it,

for which he does not take payment, since it is forbidden in benefit.

We will return to you, chapter “All Invalid Offerings.”

Mishna:

For which blemishes do they slaughter the firstborn:

If its ear was damaged in the cartilage,

the cartilaginous part of the ear, from which something was missing,

but not in the skin,

and the flesh that surrounds the cartilage which is not considered a blemish, since it heals.

If the ear was cracked

the ear,

even though it was not missing.

If the ear was pierced,

the ear, a hole having the measure of

the full size of a vetch

a kernel of a legume.

Or if it became dry

the ear.

What is “dry”?

Any [ear] that, when pierced,

the ear

does not emit a drop of blood,

that is a blemish.

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says:

what is

“dry”?

That it should crumble.

That it crumbles when it is handled.

Gemara:

And we object:

Why

are these [blemishes] a blemish? Is it not

written, “lame or blind”

concerning the firstborn, which is a blemish, but other blemishes are not?

And we answer:

It is also written

at the beginning of the verse:

“And when

there will be a blemish in it.”

which also implies other blemishes.

And we object:

And say: “When there will be a blemish in it”—

a general statement; “lame or blind”—

a particular statement,

and it is

a general statement followed by a particular statement,

and we expound:

The general statement contains only what is in the particular statement. “Lame or blind”—

yes.

But

nothing else.

And other blemishes do not disqualify.

And we answer: It is written afterward:

“Any bad blemish,”

and thereby

the verse returned

and

made a general statement.

And therefore it is

a general statement, a particular statement, and a general statement,

so that

you may infer only something similar to the particular statement. What is the particular statement

“lame or blind”

explicitly,

that they are

visible blemishes, and do not return

that they do not heal.

So too, all visible blemishes that do not return

are blemishes that disqualify.

And we further object:

And say,

let us expound it thus:

Just as the particular statement explicitly concerns visible blemishes, and [a blemish] renders him unable to perform his work,

for the lame one is unable to walk, and the blind one is unable to see,

and does not return—

so too, all visible blemishes that render him unable to perform his work and do not return. How, then, have we learned: “If its ear was damaged in the cartilage, but not in the skin”?

For if its ear was damaged in the cartilage, it is not unable to hear!?

And we answer: Rather, we do not expound it as a general statement and a particular statement, but from the fact that it is written

“any bad blemish”—

it is an inclusion,

to include all the blemishes.

And we object:

If so,

since “any” is an inclusion—

hidden blemishes as well

should be considered a blemish, and we should slaughter the firstborn on account of them?

How, then, have we learned

below:

the external

gums,

the outer ones,

in the middle of the mouth,

that were damaged,

from which a little was missing,

or that were blunted,

which were not missing but only cracked,

and

likewise

the inner ones,

the gums of the molars,

that were uprooted

completely?