Bekhorot 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

“Three permit a firstborn animal in a place where there is no expert.”

That is,

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei

in the Mishna, who says that it may be slaughtered only on the basis of the ruling of an expert.

And that which we said,

“three annul”

and permit

the vow in a place where there is no Sage—

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

As it was taught in a beraita: The annulment of vows is performed by three

laymen.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Only when

one of them

of the three

is a Sage

; but if all three are laymen, they may not permit the vow, even in a place where there is no Sage.

And that which we said,

“In a place where there is no Sage”—such as whom?

Who is that Sage in whose place three laymen may not permit the vow?

Rav Naḥman said: Such as I!

Rabbi Yehuda says:

It is necessary that

one of them be a Sage.

And we raise an objection:

Does this imply that these

two,

may be anyone at all?

Even unlearned people? But unlearned people cannot even join the panel, as they are considered as though they are not present .

Ravina said: They must be people whom one can instruct and who understand,

meaning that they must be at least on a level such that, if the laws of vows are explained to them, they will understand them; and the Sage among them explains them to them.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if there are twenty-three judges there,

it may be slaughtered only on the basis of the ruling of an expert.

Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei!

And we raise an objection:

Is this not obvious?!

For

when an individual and the majority

dispute a matter,

the halakha follows the majority.

And we answer:

Lest you say: Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning is compelling,

as he has a reason for all his statements .

It teaches us

that the halakha follows the majority.

And we infer:

Resolve from this

that which Rav Ḥananel said in the name of Rav: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei—

for the first statement

that Rav Yehuda said, “Three permit a firstborn animal in a place where there is no expert,” and it is uncertain whether it was stated in the name of Rav or in the name of Shmuel—

was stated in the name of Shmuel. For if it was stated in the name of Rav, why would two statements be necessary?

Why state both that three permit a firstborn animal and that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

And we reject this:

One of them was stated by implication from the other.

Rav said it only once, and the second statement was also derived by inference from that statement.

Mishna:

In the case of one who slaughters a firstborn animal

and sells some of its meat,

and it becomes known

afterward

that he had not shown it

to a Sage to examine its blemish—

what the purchasers ate,

they have eaten,

and he must return the money to them.

For although they derived benefit, we fine him and require him to return the money because he caused them to eat something prohibited.

But what they did not eat, the meat must be buried,

as an unblemished firstborn animal is prohibited for benefit,

and he must return the money to them.

And similarly, in the case of one who slaughters a cow and sells it, and it becomes known

afterward

that it was a terefa—

what they ate, they have eaten,

and he returns the money to them;

but what they did not eat, they

the purchasers

must return the meat to him.

As he can sell it to a gentile,

and he must return the money to them.

If they sold it

the purchasers

to a gentile, or threw it to the dogs—

they must pay him the value of a terefa,

which is sold cheaply. That is, the seller returns to them only the difference, since he did not cause them to transgress a prohibition.

Gemara:

The Sages taught in a beraita: If one sells meat to another, and it is found

to be

firstborn-animal meat;

or if he sells him

fruit, and it is found

to be

untithed produce;

or

wine, and it is found

to be

yayin nesekh,

the law is:

What they ate, they have eaten, and he must return the money to them.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says

there is a distinction in this law:

If he sold them

things that cause the soul to recoil, he must return to them

all

the money.

For once they learn that they ate prohibited food, they derive no benefit from their eating.

And

if he sold them things

that do not cause the soul to recoil, he deducts from the money owed to them.

He does not return the entire sum to them; rather, he takes a small payment from them, since they did derive benefit.

And these are the things that cause the soul to recoil: animal carcasses, animals with fatal defects, repugnant creatures, and creeping creatures.

And these are the things that do not cause the soul to recoil: firstborn animals, untithed produce, and yayin nesekh.

And we raise an objection: Does one who sells a

firstborn animal

only

deduct

from the money, rather than return all of it?

Let the purchaser say to him,

the seller, who is a priest:

“What loss have I caused you?”

For if the meat had remained in your possession, it would have required burial, since it was an unblemished firstborn animal when slaughtered.

And we answer:

It is necessary—for example,

if he sold it to an Israelite

from the place of its blemish,

the limb that, according to his claim, bore the blemish—

as the priest said to him:

the seller

“Had you not eaten it, I would have shown it

to a Sage

and he would have permitted it to us.”

And this is

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who said [above, 28a]: If one slaughters a firstborn animal and shows its blemish after the slaughter, Rabbi Yehuda permits it.

And we raise another objection:

Untithed produce—

why does he deduct from the money owed to them? Let the purchaser say to him, “What loss have I caused you?”

And we answer: The seller says to him: Had you not eaten it,

I would have tithed it and eaten it.

Yayin nesekh

—why does he not return all the money to them?

And we answer: He did not sell him the yayin nesekh itself, but rather

through a mixture,

as he mixed it with kosher wine. The seller says to him: Had you returned it to me, I could have sold it to gentiles, and they would have paid me for the kosher wine contained in it.

And this is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as we learned in the Mishna: If yayin nesekh falls into a pit

and becomes mixed there with kosher wine,

all of it is prohibited for benefit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All of it may be sold to gentiles, except for the value of the yayin nesekh in it,

for he may not take payment for that part, as it is prohibited for benefit.

We shall return to you, chapter “All Those Disqualified from Consecrated Offerings.”

Mishna:

Concerning these blemishes they slaughter the firstborn animal:

If its ear was damaged in the cartilage,

the cartilaginous part of the ear, from which some portion is missing,

but not in the skin,

and the flesh surrounding the cartilage, which is not considered a blemish, since it heals.

If the ear was split

the ear,

even though nothing is missing.

If the ear was pierced

the ear, with a hole measuring

the size of a vetch

a legume seed,

or if it became dry

the ear.

What is the definition of dry?

Any ear that, when pierced,

the ear

does not emit a drop of blood,

is considered a blemish.

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says:

What is the definition of

dry?

That it crumbles.

For it disintegrates when it is handled.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection:

Why

are these considered a blemish? Is it not that

“lame or blind” is written

concerning the firstborn animal, indicating that this is a blemish, but not other blemishes?

And we answer:

It is also written

at the beginning of the verse:

“And if

there will be in it a blemish.”

This also indicates other blemishes.

We raise an objection:

But say: “If there will be in it a blemish” is

a general statement; “lame or blind” is

a specification,

and therefore it is

a generalization followed by a specification,

and we expound:

The generalization contains only what is specified. “Lame or blind”

—yes.

But

nothing else.

Other blemishes should not disqualify it.

And we answer: It is written afterward:

“Any bad blemish,”

and thereby

the verse returned

to

a generalization.

If so, it is

a generalization, specification, and generalization,

in which case

you may derive only cases similar to the specification. What is characteristic of the specification “lame or blind”

—

explicitly,

that they are

visible blemishes and do not heal,

meaning that they do not recover.

So too, all visible blemishes that do not heal

are blemishes that disqualify the animal.

We further raise an objection:

But say

that we should expound as follows:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to visible blemishes, which incapacitate it for its function,

for a lame animal is incapacitated for walking, and a blind animal is incapacitated for seeing,

and do not heal,

so too, all visible blemishes that incapacitate it for its function and do not heal. But we learned in the Mishna: If its ear was damaged in the cartilage, but not in the skin.

Yet when its ear is damaged in the cartilage, it is not incapacitated for hearing!?

And we answer: Rather, we do not expound it by means of a generalization and specification; instead, since it is written

“any bad blemish,”

it is an amplification,

to include all blemishes.

We raise an objection:

If so,

if “any” is an amplification,

concealed blemishes as well

should be considered blemishes, and we should slaughter the firstborn animal because of them?

Why, then, did we learn

below:

The gums,

the gums

on the outside,

in the middle of the mouth,

that were damaged,

that have been slightly diminished,

or worn away,

that are not diminished but merely split,

and

likewise

the inner gums,

the gums of the molars,

that were uprooted

entirely.