Bekhorot 21b — the Talmud in English

And it was taught [ [A0003]in a calm manner]:

as an agreeable corroboration]:

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

An animal lacking the requisite time enters the pen to be tithed and becomes sanctified with the sanctity of animal tithe, even though it is not brought upon the altar until the eighth day;

and thereby acquire the sanctity of animal tithe, even though it may not be sacrificed on the altar until the eighth day;

and it is like a firstborn. Just as a firstborn becomes sacred before its time, since as soon as it emerges from the womb it is sacred,

as it becomes sacred immediately upon emerging from the womb,

so too an animal tithe that is

an animal tithe that

lacking the requisite time becomes sacred before its time, and is brought after its time.

And

we challenge this:

Rather than deriving it from a firstborn, let us derive it from sacrificial offerings, which may not be consecrated when they lack the requisite time!?

which may not be consecrated when their time has not yet arrived!?

We answer:

It is more reasonable that he should have derived it from a firstborn for the animal tithe,

and not from sacrificial offerings,

since

the animal tithe resembles sacrificial offerings in four respects: 1.

Redemption: both a firstborn and an animal tithe cannot be redeemed [ransomed], even when a defect has arisen in them.

neither a firstborn nor an animal tithe may be redeemed [ransomed], even when it develops a blemish.

2.

A defect: both a firstborn and an animal tithe are fully sacred even if they have a defect. Can you say this concerning other sacrificial offerings? If a permanent defect preceded their consecration, they are not sacred except with the sanctity of their monetary value.

both a firstborn and an animal tithe retain complete sanctity even if they have a blemish. Can this be said of other sacrificial animals? If a permanent blemish preceded their consecration, they acquire only sanctity of value.

3.

Substitute: neither the substitute of a firstborn nor that of an animal tithe is brought upon the altar.

the substitute for neither a firstborn nor an animal tithe is sacrificed on the altar.

4.

Eating: both a firstborn and an animal tithe in which a defect has arisen are eaten: the firstborn by the koen, and the animal tithe by its owners. Can you say this concerning other sacrificial offerings, which are eaten only after being redeemed?

both a firstborn and an animal tithe that developed a blemish may be eaten: the firstborn by a kohen, and the animal tithe by its owner. Can this be said of other sacrificial animals? They may not be eaten; they are redeemed.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, he should have derived it from sacrificial offerings for the animal tithe,

and not from a firstborn,

since

the animal tithe resembles them in four other respects: 1.

Ordinary: both an animal tithe and other sacrificial offerings are ordinary animals, and are not firstborn.

both an animal tithe and other sacrificial animals are ordinary animals, and are not firstborn.

2.

Male: both an animal tithe and other sacrificial offerings apply even when the animal is not male. Can you say this concerning a firstborn, which applies only to males?

both an animal tithe and other sacrificial animals apply even to females. Can this be said of a firstborn? It applies only to males.

3.

Sacred: neither an animal tithe nor other sacrificial offerings become sacred by themselves. Can you say this concerning a firstborn, which becomes sacred by itself?

neither an animal tithe nor other sacrificial animals become sacred automatically. Can this be said of a firstborn? It becomes sacred automatically.

4.

Priestly gifts: neither an animal tithe nor other sacrificial offerings are among the priestly gifts. Can you say this concerning a firstborn, which is among the priestly gifts?

neither an animal tithe nor other sacrificial animals are among the gifts of the kehunah. Can this be said of a firstborn? It is one of the gifts of the kehunah.

Rather, Rabbi Shimon

learns the expression “passing, passing” from a firstborn: [“Whatever passes under the rod,” “And you shall pass over every first issue of the womb to the Lord”],

[“Whatever passes under the rod,” “And you shall cause every first issue of the womb to pass to the Lord”],

he derives from a firstborn that even an animal lacking the requisite time enters the pen to be tithed.

from the firstborn that an animal whose time has not yet arrived may likewise enter the pen to be tithed.

We learned in the Mishna: The sign of a birth in a small animal is tinuf:

The Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances of tinuf?

Rav said: As the shepherds say,

[пастухи]:

“the female sheep has stopped the animal’s life-force” [

the shepherds: her womb stopped and the fetus dissolved].

And Shmuel said: Bubbles of blood [

she emits bubbles of blood].

The Gemara adds:

And one must show it to a sage,

to know whether it is a fetus, so that it exempts the one born after it from the law of the firstborn.

And we wonder:

How does the sage know [

how can he know]!?

He said—

he explained—

Rav Pappa:

One must show it to a

wise shepherd.

Rav Hisda said:

They said: The formation of a fetus in a woman takes forty days

from the night on which she had intercourse; and a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day must observe the days of impurity and purity of a woman who has given birth, but if she miscarried before that, it is merely water. But

Rav Hisda inquired [

asked]:

Rav Ḥisda

The formation of the fetus of

an animal takes how long,

with the practical consequence that if the tinuf occurred before this time, it is not a fetus that exempts the one born after it from the law of the firstborn?

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

But

is this not the very statement of Zeiri, for Zeiri said: Tinuf is no less than thirty days,

and Rav Pappa thought to explain that the tinuf is not considered tinuf unless thirty days had passed since a male mounted her? Thus, the formation of a fetus in an animal is thirty days?

Abaye said to him:

That

which Zeiri said does not mean that the tinuf remained in the animal’s womb for thirty days, but rather

to receive a male

was stated, meaning that a female that has produced tinuf does not receive a male until thirty days after her tinuf.

It was stated:

an animal that experienced tinfuf does not accept a male until thirty days after its tinfuf.

It was stated:

We find

in our Mishna the law of

one who purchases from a gentile,

that if the animal gives birth after its year, it is a doubtful firstborn.

What is the law concerning one who purchases from an Israelite?

Rav said:

The first one born while in the purchaser’s possession—even after its year—

is a definite firstborn,

for if it were the case that it had already given birth

while in the seller’s possession,

he would certainly have praised it to him [

the seller would have praised it before the purchaser], saying that his animal had already given birth and would no longer be endangered by the next birth.

b. The essential words of Rashi require explanation: Why should we not rely on the gentile’s silence—that he did not praise his purchase—as proof that it certainly had not yet given birth, as with an Israelite; and what difference does it make that he is a gentile and that his words have no substance!? In Ohel Moshe it was explained that the gentile thinks that they will not believe him, and therefore he does not praise it. And later he found in the Taz Yoreh Deah 316 that he explained Tosafot’s words this way. But he wrote there that it is forced to say that the gentile would not praise it because they would not believe him. [His intention is: Granted, if the gentile says something relevant to halakha, it can properly be said that gentiles know that Jews do not rely on them in a matter of halakha. But here the gentile should have told him the virtue of his purchase, especially since it does not concern halakha, but only that it would not be endangered; does he know that Jews do not believe gentiles at all?]. And in Mahariṭ Algazi [letter 29] he brought Tosafot’s words and raised an objection in this style: This is understandable if we say that we establish that it had already given birth on the basis of the gentile’s statement that it had given birth; in that case it is relevant to say that even when he speaks innocently his words are not true, because he says it to enhance his purchase. But when the gentile said nothing at all, why should we not say that, presumably, it is established that it had not given birth? For if it had given birth, he would have praised it, and since he remained silent, we learn from this that it had not given birth. It is forced to say that the case of a gentile is different, and that we attribute his failure to praise it to the purchaser to his knowing that the Israelite does not believe his words—for a gentile is not believed in matters of prohibitions whenever it can be said that he says this to enhance his purchase. From where do we know that the gentile presumably knows that we do not believe him and therefore remains silent? [And according to what was explained above, even if we say that the gentile knows that he is not believed with regard to matters of prohibitions, why should he know that we do not believe him concerning the enhancement of his purchase? It also appears from Mahariṭ Algazi’s wording that he did not understand Tosafot’s proof concerning one who speaks innocently in the manner explained above. The same appears to one who examines his further words there; he did not understand it this way, and the matter requires study]. And in the Hazon Ish [Firstborn 20:7], after he brought Rashi’s words as cited by Tosafot, he wrote: One must examine this: In any event, let us say that since the gentile did not praise it, it must certainly be a firstborn!? It may be answered that this is no proof, for even if it had not given birth, he would not have refrained from praising it falsely; necessarily, he did not concern himself with this. c. Tosafot explained that the praising mentioned here means that it had already become exempt from the law of the firstborn. Mahariṭ Algazi [letter 29, end of s.v. ve-le-in im] explained that we do not say this concerning a gentile, because a gentile is not expert in the laws of Israel and therefore did not praise it. Mahariṭ Algazi raised the following objection [letter 29]: According to most of the early authorities who explain that we are concerned for the minority of animals that produce tinuf—apart from the Ramban, as explained in the sugya above, 20a, and in the notes there—how did Rashi explain that we rely on the seller’s failure to praise the animal as evidence that it had already given birth and therefore would no longer be endangered, when we should be concerned that perhaps it produced tinuf and was exempt with regard to the law of the firstborn, but there is nothing in this for the seller to praise, since it could still be endangered in giving birth, as it did not have a complete birth? And even according to Tosafot it is difficult: Perhaps the seller does not know that tinuf exempts, and therefore did not inform him!? d. Mahariṭ Algazi raised, in the name of Maharanah [Part I, section 22], an objection to what Tosafot learned from Rashi’s words: that a gentile who speaks innocently and says at the time of the sale that the animal had already given birth is not believed, because he intended to enhance his purchase. How can they attribute the reason for the gentile’s lack of credibility to his saying this to enhance his purchase? Even without this, a gentile who speaks innocently is not believed concerning a matter of Torah law, and the doubt concerning a firstborn is obviously a doubt concerning Torah law!? Mahariṭ Algazi answered: Tosafot hold that one who purchases an animal from a gentile, when there is a doubt whether it had already given birth, does not face a doubt of Torah law. For initially the Gemara raised an objection against the Mishna’s statement, “From this point onward it is doubtful”: Why is this so? Follow the majority of animals, and the majority of animals conceive and give birth within their year. Surely it certainly gave birth!? Rava answered that Rabbi Yishmael follows Rabbi Meir, who is concerned for the minority. Tosafot here and in Hullin wrote that concern for the minority is only rabbinic, and therefore the gentile would be believed when speaking innocently. And concerning Ravina’s answer, he likewise inclined there [see the notes to 20a], that the fact that we do not rely on a majority dependent upon an act is only rabbinic, and therefore the gentile is believed when speaking innocently. But the later authorities—see the notes concerning Mahariṭ Algazi—pointed out that this case is a matter of Torah law that has become transferred to the realm of rabbinic law, and in such a case it is by no means obvious that it is considered rabbinic; see there. And see further what he brought to resolve the matter in the name of Maharanah, and what Mahariṭ Algazi wrote about this. And see further in the explanation of the Gaon of Vilna Yoreh Deah, section 16, subsection 16. And in the Hazon Ish Firstborn 20:7. And Shmuel said:

It is only

a doubtful firstborn,

and no proof may be brought from the seller’s failure to say anything, because

he thought that he needed it for slaughter

and not to produce offspring, and it did not matter to the purchaser that it had not yet given birth.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

The first one born

is definitely non-sacred. And

And

what is the reason?

Because

if it were the case that it had not given birth, since there is a prohibition

concerning the first offspring born,

he would have informed him

the purchaser and warned him about it; he would not have refrained from doing so because he thought that the animal had been purchased for slaughter.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, who said that it is non-sacred,

from what we learned in Hullin 83a:

On four periods of the year [when it is customary for Israelites to hold banquets, and an ordinary purchaser of an animal purchases it only in order to slaughter it immediately], one who sells an animal to his fellow must inform him: “I sold its mother to be slaughtered; I sold its daughter to be slaughtered.” And these are they: the eve of the final festival day of Sukkot...

And in the beraita [there] it is stated:

If he did not inform him

the seller: “I sold its mother to be slaughtered,”

the purchaser goes

and

slaughters it and does not refrain

because of the prohibition, “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day.” Thus, we rely on the assumption that the seller would have warned him in order to prevent him from violating a prohibition; the same applies here, that he would have warned him not to transgress and profane the sanctity of a firstborn.

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that this is

this beraita

a refutation of Rav and Shmuel,

who disagree with Rabbi Yohanan?

And we answer according to their positions:

There,

with regard to “it and its offspring,”

the matter depends on the seller—

that is, he is obligated to inform him during these days that he sold the mother to be slaughtered, and since he did not inform him, he certainly did not sell the mother. But

here, the matter depends on the purchaser,

because the animal belongs to him and he must separate his firstborn animals, and this is not the seller’s concern.

Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

A large animal

that is about to give birth

which discharged a clump of blood, this

clump

must be buried, and it is exempt from the law of the firstborn,

for the offspring born after it is not considered a firstborn. The Mishna will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rabbi Hiyya taught

in a beraita, as a continuation of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s words: But

it does not impart impurity—

the clump—

neither through contact nor through carrying,

even though a carcass imparts impurity through contact and carrying.

And we challenge this: We learned in the Mishna that it must be buried, and the simple meaning is that this is because we are concerned that perhaps it was a male fetus which dissolved, and it is forbidden to benefit from it because of the firstborn. But according to Rabbi Hiyya, the difficulty is:

And since it does not impart impurity neither through contact nor through carrying,

and it does not have the status of a fetus,

why must it be buried!?