Bekhorot 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

To explain it according to his reasoning: We do not say that an animal can give birth after an incomplete period of gestation,

but rather, she is pregnant for five complete months. It is impossible that she waited thirty days from the tinuf until she received a male and then became pregnant for another five complete months within her year. Therefore, this cannot have been a mere tinuf.

To explain it according to his reasoning: We do say that an animal can give birth after an incomplete period of gestation,

and perhaps she gave birth before completing five months, while her pregnancy indeed began after thirty days from the tinuf. The offspring that was born is not considered a firstborn, since the womb had already been discharged through the tinuf.

The third approach:

Alternatively, if you wish, say:

Everyone agrees that

we do not say that an animal can give birth after an incomplete period of gestation

until she has completed five months—

And here, it is a case of part of a day—

that is, part of the thirtieth day from the tinuf and part of the final day of her gestation—

being considered as the entire day.

That is, the thirty days are completed at the beginning of the day, and on that same day she receives a male; and likewise, on the final day of her five months of pregnancy, she gives birth—

they disagree:

According to his reasoning: We say that part of a day is considered as the entire day,

and it follows that even if she had a tinuf on the day after she reached six months, she could give birth during the final two days of the year. For she could become pregnant on the final day of the seventh month from her previous birth and give birth on the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth month from her previous birth; alternatively, she could become pregnant on the day after the seventh month ended and give birth on the final day of her year, since we say that part of a day is considered as the entire day.

According to his reasoning: We do not say that part of a day is considered as the entire day,

and whenever she had a tinuf on the day after the end of the sixth month, it is impossible for her to receive a male until the first day of the eighth month, and she would give birth on the day after the end of her year. Therefore, if she gave birth within her year, it necessarily follows that this was not a complete tinuf.

The Gemara further explains the continuation of the beraita:

Rabbi Akiva said: I did not arrive at this degree of precision; rather, whenever it is known

that she had already given birth, there is nothing here for the kohen, and whenever she had not previously given birth, the animal belongs to the kohen. In a case of uncertainty, he may eat it in its blemished state as the owners’ property:

What difference is there between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehoshua!?

Surely Rabbi Akiva’s reason is certainly based on the tinuf, since he would not dispute what Rabbi Yishmael said: If a goat that is one year old gives birth, there is no concern that it had given birth previously!?

Rabbi Hanina of Sura said: Whether milk exempts is the difference between them.

That is, when a goat gives milk and subsequently gives birth, is it certain that it must already have given birth earlier and its womb was thereby discharged, or not?

Rabbi Akiva holds: Milk exempts,

because

follow the majority of animals, and the majority of animals do not give milk unless they have given birth; and since it gave milk, it must have given birth

since, once we saw that she was giving milk, it necessarily follows that she had already given birth.

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We take a minority into consideration,

namely, those animals that give milk without giving birth, and we are concerned that the one that gave birth after giving milk is a firstborn.

And we raise an objection to this:

But does Rabbi Yehoshua take a minority into consideration

[does Rabbi Yehoshua really take a minority into consideration]!?

But we learned:

A woman who went with her husband overseas, and her husband died without children and without brothers, and

she had

as

a widow

a mother-in-law, she need not be concerned

that perhaps her mother-in-law gave birth to a brother of her deceased husband, in which case she would be bound to him in yibbum, but if

the woman left

her place while her mother-in-law was

pregnant

[literally: full], she

must be concerned

that perhaps she gave birth to a male child, the brother of her deceased husband, and she is bound to him in yibbum.

Rabbi Yehoshua says:

Even if her mother-in-law was pregnant,

she need not be concerned.

And we say: What is Rabbi Yehoshua’s reasoning?

It is because

he holds: The majority of pregnant women

indeed

give birth, but

the

minority miscarry; and all women who give birth

give birth to

half males

who would make her subject to yibbum

and half

females

who would not make her subject to yibbum.

And the males

who survive

are a minority, and we do not take a minority into consideration.

Thus, Rabbi Yehoshua does not take a minority into consideration.

Rather,

do not say that the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva in our beraita is whether milk exempts—according to Rabbi Yehoshua, milk does not exempt, while according to Rabbi Akiva, milk exempts. Rather,

reverse it:

Say: Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Follow the majority of animals, and the majority of animals do not give milk unless they have given birth; while Rabbi Akiva holds: We take a minority into consideration.

The Gemara offers support for reversing the opinions:

And it was taught

[as a statement of agreement]:

Milk exempts; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. Rabbi Akiva says: Milk does not exempt.

b. The view of Tosafot here is that the halakha is that milk does not exempt the animal, and they proved this from the Mishna below, on page 23b; this will be brought in the notes there. They explained that although, in general, we do not take the minority into consideration, here there is a presumption that she had not given birth. Therefore, the minority joined with the presumption, making the matter evenly balanced between two possibilities. Although Rabbi Meir is the one who holds this view in tractate Chullin, on page 18b, he said it only to be lenient. In this matter Rabbi Meir is the one who said so, but when stringency is involved, even the Sages agree that the minority joins with the presumption, making the matter evenly balanced, and one must rule stringently. However, Rambam, Ramban, and the Rosh hold that the halakha is that milk exempts the animal, because we do not take the minority into consideration. For an explanation of the view of the early authorities who disagree, that the minority does not join with the presumption, see what Mahariṭ Algazi wrote, section mem, first section, subsection alef.

The Sages taught:

a. The beraita and the discussion based on it are explained here according to Rashi’s interpretation, as recorded in his text by Ḥak Natan [cited in Ohel Moshe].

b. Animals are combined for the obligation of animal tithe only if they were born in the same year, and the established halakha is that the New Year for animal tithe is the first of Elul.

A female kid

that gave birth to three females

in a single womb,

and each of her daughters gave birth to three females,

[females],

all of them,

that is, all twelve animals—the three daughters and the nine granddaughters—

enter the pen to be tithed.

That is, it is possible that all of these were born in a single year, so that they would be fit to be tithed together.

Rabbi Shimon said: I saw a female kid that produced a tithe within its year.

That is, within a year of the birth of her daughters, the daughters themselves gave birth until they completed ten animals suitable for the animal tithe, similar to the statement of the first tanna. And below, the Gemara explains what the difference between them is.

And we raise an objection to the first tanna:

Why must he teach “

and each of her daughters gave birth to

three each”?

After all, we need only ten animals from the daughters and granddaughters, and if so,

it would suffice for one of them to give birth

[of the daughters]

to three, while the others

the daughters would suffice if they gave birth to

two each

[that is, it would suffice for one of the three daughters to give birth to three daughters, while her sisters gave birth to two daughters each, yielding ten animals subject to animal tithe]!?

And we answer:

Since there is one

of the daughters

for whom it is not possible

that there be an obligation of animal tithe

without

her giving birth to

three

daughters,

the tanna taught concerning all of them

the daughters

that they gave birth to three each

[since one of the daughters must necessarily be understood to have given birth to three daughters, the tanna therefore stated that her sisters too gave birth to three daughters rather than two].

We nevertheless ask:

Why must he teach “three”

daughters to the daughters

at all!?

Let all of them give birth

daughters

to two

daughters, yielding nine animals among the daughters and granddaughters,

and let she herself give birth together with them

[and let the mother herself give birth to one additional offspring in that same year], yielding ten animals subject to animal tithe!?