Beitzah 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

And the Levites were confused in their song

which they sang for the afternoon Tamid offering. For every year, the witnesses would arrive before the afternoon Tamid offering was sacrificed, and they would sing for it the song of Rosh HaShana. This time, however, they sang the weekday song for it, because they assumed that the witnesses would not arrive at such a late hour. And they would establish Rosh HaShana for the following day.

For the morning Tamid, they established that the weekday song should be sung even if the witnesses arrived before it, because generally the witnesses arrived after the morning Tamid, and it was sufficient to sing the song of Rosh HaShana with the afternoon Tamid [Meiri], and therefore there was no “confusion” in this.

And therefore

the Sages established

that

they would accept the witnesses only until the afternoon offering,

the time of the sacrifice of the afternoon Tamid, on the thirtieth day of Elul.

And if witnesses arrived after the afternoon offering,

they would extend the month of Elul, and the month of Tishrei would be sanctified only on the following day.

However, since until the afternoon offering they treated that day as sacred because of the doubt—perhaps the witnesses would arrive and the day would be sanctified—even once the time of the afternoon offering had arrived, and it was now certain to us that the witnesses would not be accepted and that, by Torah law, Rosh HaShana would be sanctified only on the following day, they nevertheless did not permit treating that day disrespectfully by allowing labor as on a weekday, because they had already treated it as sacred because of the doubt.

Rather, the Sages established a fixed and certain enactment, that they would

observe

the entire

day as holy, and

also

the following day as holy. [They needed to establish this enactment because of the enactment that witnesses would not be accepted after the afternoon offering. Had they permitted labor after the afternoon offering, the following year people would have treated the sanctity of the beginning of the day disrespectfully, saying: Last year we observed sanctity for no reason, since after the afternoon offering we reverted to weekday practices.]

Accordingly, the very enactment of two days of Rosh HaShana was an enactment of the court; they did not observe it because of uncertainty resulting from a lack of knowledge. Rather, when they sanctified the month on the basis of sighting the moon, they sanctified the thirtieth day of Elul as Rosh HaShana in every case. If witnesses arrived that very day, they observed only one day. If witnesses did not arrive until after the afternoon offering, they observed two days even in the court itself, whose members knew that witnesses would no longer be accepted that day.

Likewise, in places where they did not know whether the thirtieth day had been sanctified, they observed the enactment of two days, which, as stated, was a certain enactment and not one based on doubt.

Therefore, an egg laid on the first day is forbidden on the second, since both days are sacred because of the doubt, and it is impossible to apply the principle of “whichever way one considers it” to them.

Rabba said: From the enactment of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai onward—

an egg

laid on the first Festival day of Rosh HaShana is

permitted

on the second Festival day.

This is because

we learned

[there]:

Once the Temple was destroyed,

and there was no longer concern that the Levites would become confused in their song for the offering,

Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai enacted that

the matter should return to its original state, before the enactment, and

they

would

accept testimony concerning the New Moon throughout the entire day.

Once Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai enacted this, the enactment to observe certain sanctity on both days was also nullified, since it was no longer necessary. For the court would once again not certainly observe two days, while those distant from the court would observe sanctity because of the doubt on the thirtieth day of Elul throughout the entire day, lest witnesses arrive at the end of the day and it be sanctified retroactively, as with the two Festival days observed in the Diaspora.

Since from that point onward they observed the two days only because of doubt, the principle of “whichever way one considers it” once again permits the egg on the second day: If the witnesses did not arrive throughout the entire day, it becomes clear retroactively that the first day was a weekday.

Abaye said to him

to Rabba:

But what of Rav and Shmuel,

who lived after the Destruction, and nevertheless

both said: An egg

laid on the first day is

forbidden

on the second!?

He said to him

Rabba said to Abaye:

I am telling you,

I told you my position according to

Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai,

who was a tanna,

and

if

you

had

said to me

that you wished to refute me from the words of

Rav and Shmuel,

who were amoraim!? Now the Gemara itself raises the difficulty:

And for Rav and Shmuel,

who prohibit the egg—

the Mishna is difficult,

for it is clear from the Mishna that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai enacted that the situation should return to its original state, as it was before the enactment. At that time, they observed sanctity on the first day because of doubt and not as a certain enactment, and the egg was permitted according to either possibility on the second day. This is how one should act even today, contrary to the words of Rav and Shmuel, who prohibit it!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

For us,

for us, the Jews of the Diaspora, the enactment to observe two days remained in force as a fixed enactment, since we had never ceased observing it and had never observed only one day.

Therefore, even when Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai restored the earlier practice in Eretz Yisrael, to accept witnesses throughout the entire day, the enactment remained in force for us in the Diaspora to observe the two days as one certain, extended sanctity, and not as an observance of doubt regarding each of the two days.

And therefore Rav and Shmuel said to us that an egg is prohibited on the second day.

But for them,

for the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael, when Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai restored the practice of accepting witnesses until evening, the enactment to observe the two days with definite sanctity was automatically nullified.

For if the witnesses arrived even after the afternoon prayer, only that one day would be sanctified; and if they did not arrive, that day indeed would not be sanctified, but only the following day would be sanctified. Their observance of sanctity on the first day was therefore based only on doubt.

Accordingly, in Eretz Yisrael, if an egg had been laid on the first day, which they observed with sanctity because of doubt, and the month was not sanctified on that day, the egg would be permitted on the following day.

The Gemara cites the opinions of three amoraim who disputed Rabba,

1.

And Rav Yosef said: Even from the time of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai’s enactment onward, an egg is prohibited.

If two days were observed, even in Eretz Yisrael and even in the place of the court, where two days are observed only because of doubt, so that the first day was in fact an ordinary weekday, nevertheless an egg laid on that day is prohibited on the second day.

What is the reason?

It is

the prohibition of the egg on the second day, by force of the original enactment to observe two days with definite sanctity [when they enacted that witnesses would not be accepted from the afternoon prayer onward,]

“a matter

that was established by a quorum.”

That is, the court convened and enacted it as a rabbinic enactment.

And every “matter that was established by a quorum

requires another quorum

to convene concerning it

to permit it.”

Even if the permission follows automatically and there is no need for the court to deliberate about it, it nevertheless requires the court to permit it explicitly.

The court never convened to permit the egg on the second day. Therefore, the egg remains prohibited even after Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai enacted that witnesses should be accepted throughout the entire day.

Rav Yosef said: From where do I derive this

that every matter established by a quorum requires another quorum to permit it, even if the reason for the original enactment has ceased?

As it is written

[Deuteronomy 5:27]

“Go, say to them: Return to your tents.”

And it says:

[Exodus 19]

“When the blast of the ram’s horn sounds, they may ascend the mountain.”

The manner in which these verses are expounded will be explained below.

And

Rav Yosef brings another proof that it requires another quorum to permit it, from the fact that

we learned

in tractate Maaser Sheni [5:2]: The grapes of kerem reva’i [the produce of the fourth year, after the completion of the three years of orla] must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, or redeemed with money, with the money then brought to Jerusalem and used to purchase food, which is to be eaten there.

The Sages enacted, so that there would be an abundance of produce in Jerusalem, that the places near Jerusalem should not redeem their produce with money; rather, they should come to Jerusalem with the produce itself.

Kerem reva’i

was brought up to Jerusalem

without being redeemed, from all the places surrounding Jerusalem, at a distance of

a one-day journey in every direction.

And this is its boundary,

the distance from which they were required to bring the produce itself:

Eilat in the south, Akravata in the north, Lod in the west, and the Jordan in the east.

And Ulla said—and some say that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yohanan said: What is the reason

that they enacted that the produce should not be redeemed, but should be brought up to Jerusalem?

So as to adorn the marketplaces of Jerusalem with produce.

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer had a fourth-year vineyard east of Lod, beside Kefar Tavi,

within the boundary of a one-day journey surrounding Jerusalem.