Beitzah 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara raises another uncertainty concerning the law of our Mishna:

There,

in the Mishna where we learned that one may clear four or five baskets,

we learned: But not the entire storehouse.

And

Shmuel

explained: What does “but not the entire storehouse” mean?

But he may not finish clearing the entire storehouse.

Although he was permitted to clear four or five baskets, this applies only when there is additional straw and produce there. But if there was nothing there except those four or five baskets, he may not clear everything and expose the ground, because

perhaps he will come to level depressions,

and if he finds a depression, he may fill it in to level the area with the surrounding ground; this is prohibited because it constitutes the labor of building.

Here—

what

is the law?

Did they likewise prohibit throwing down all the produce on the roof?

The Gemara explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

There,

in the case of clearing the baskets,

it is on Shabbat, which is prohibited because it is stringent,

since the prohibitions of Shabbat are stringent, and therefore the Sages were stringent with regard to them.

But a Festival is lenient;

one may say that

it is entirely appropriate

to clear even the entire roof.

Or perhaps, on the contrary, one should be more stringent in the case of our Mishna by means of a kal va-chomer:

If

there,

in the Mishna concerning Shabbat,

where there is cancellation of the study hall, you say that one may not

clear it completely,

here, where there is no cancellation of the study hall

but merely financial loss—

is it not all the more so

that one should be stringent and prohibit it because of the concern that he might level depressions?

And

the Gemara raises another uncertainty concerning the law in the Mishna that we learned with regard to Shabbat:

Here,

in our Mishna,

we learned: One may throw down produce through a skylight on a Festival.

And

concerning this

Rav Naḥman said: They taught

in our Mishna that it is permitted to throw down produce through the skylight

only

when the skylight and the produce are

on the same roof. But

to transfer produce

from a roof

that does not have a skylight

to a roof

that has a skylight, in order to throw it down there through the skylight,

they did not

permit.

And a beraita likewise teaches

in accordance with Rav Naḥman’s statement:

One may not move [produce] from roof to roof, even when their roofs are level,

with neither roof higher than the other. Although this involves only the exertion of transferring it, and not the exertion of going up and down, it is nevertheless prohibited to transfer it from roof to roof.

There,

in the case of the Mishna taught with regard to Shabbat—

what

is the law? Did they permit clearing it from house to house, or only within the same house?

The Gemara explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

Should we say:

Here,

in our Mishna alone,

it is prohibited because of the Festival,

since it

is lenient, and people may come to treat it lightly,

and therefore they were more stringent with regard to it.

But Shabbat, which is stringent, and people will not come to treat it lightly—

it is entirely appropriate.

Or perhaps

on the contrary, one should be more stringent regarding the case in the Mishna concerning Shabbat, since the removal is not necessitated by monetary loss, and this can be derived by a kal va-chomer:

If here, where there is a loss of produce, you said that it is not permitted,

there, where there is no loss of produce, is it not all the more so forbidden?!

There is also another uncertainty concerning the statement of the Mishna about Shabbat:

Here,

in the case of our Mishna,

it was taught:

If the roof was surrounded by a partition and had no opening, but there was a window in the partition,

one may not lower them by rope through the windows.

One may not place the produce in sacks and lower them by rope through the window, because it is burdensome to raise the produce from the roof to the window and from there to the ground.

And

also

one may not lower them

with him

by way of

ladders [each step is called a ladder],

as this involves excessive exertion.

There

in the case of the Mishna about Shabbat,

what is the ruling?

The Gemara explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

Is it specifically

here, on a Festival,

in the case of our Mishna, which discusses removing produce because of rain on a Festival,

that it is prohibited,

since

there is no interruption of the study hall

but only monetary loss?

But on Shabbat,

in the case of the Mishna about Shabbat, which discusses clearing the area for the sake of the students on Shabbat,

where there is interruption of the study hall—

it is properly permitted.

Or perhaps

on the contrary, one should be more stringent where the matter does not involve monetary loss, and this can be derived by a kal va-chomer:

And

if here, where there is a loss of produce, you said that it is not permitted,

there, where there is no loss of produce—

is it not all the more so forbidden?!

And we conclude concerning all the uncertainties that we raised:

the matter remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may cover the produce

with utensils because of dripping rain:

Ulla said: And

it is permitted to cover

even a stack of bricks with air between them [stacked bricks, prepared and set aside for construction],

as he was concerned that rain might fall upon them and dissolve them. Although the bricks are prohibited to move because they are muktze, there is no prohibition against moving a utensil for the sake of muktze.

Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

Utensils may be moved only for the sake of

produce that is fit

to be moved itself. But bricks, which are muktze, do not permit moving utensils for the sake of muktze.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak followed

this ruling

in accordance with his own reasoning [his method],

as

Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A utensil may be moved only for something that may be moved on Shabbat.

The Gemara proves Rabbi Yitzḥak’s opinion:

We learned

in our Mishna:

One may cover the produce with utensils.

This indicates that only

produce,

which is not muktze,

may not—

indeed, one covers it, since one may move a utensil for its sake. But

a stack of bricks with air between them,

which is muktze—

one may not

cover it, because a utensil may not be moved for its sake. This is a difficulty for Ulla?!

The Gemara rejects this:

The same law applies that one

may cover

even a stack of bricks with air between them.

The fact that the Mishna mentioned “produce” does not come to exclude a stack of bricks with air between them. Rather,

since

when

it first taught, “one may lower produce”,

therefore it

taught

in the

latter clause as well, “one may cover the produce.”

The Gemara brings another proof for Rabbi Yitzḥak:

We learned

in our Mishna:

And likewise, jugs of wine and jugs of oil

may be covered with utensils because of dripping rain.

This indicates that one covers only jugs of wine and jugs of oil, which themselves may be moved, but not a stack of bricks with air between them. For if not, why did the Mishna not teach that one may also cover a stack of bricks with air between them, which may not be moved on Shabbat—and all the more so jugs of wine and jugs of oil?!

The Gemara rejects this proof:

Here,

with regard to the jugs of wine and the jugs of oil mentioned by the Mishna,

with what are we dealing? With untithed produce.

They contain tevel, which is muktze and may not be moved on Shabbat. The novelty of the Mishna is the opposite: it teaches that one may move the utensils even for the sake of something that may not be moved.

The Gemara proves this interpretation:

This too is clearly so,

as we explained the words of the Mishna.

For if it should enter your mind

that the Mishna is speaking of

jugs of wine and jugs of oil containing permitted contents [containing tithed wine and oil, which are permitted]—

it already taught this

in the

first clause, “produce.”

We already learned at the beginning of the Mishna that it is permitted to exert oneself in order to save produce; what need was there for the tanna to add and teach us that it is permitted to exert oneself for the sake of jugs of permitted wine and oil?

Rather, it must be that our Mishna is dealing with prohibited wine and oil. The Mishna comes to teach that the utensil may be moved even for the sake of something that may not be moved.

The Gemara rejects this necessity: In fact, our Mishna is speaking of permitted wine and oil. However,

jugs of wine and jugs of oil

even when containing permitted contents

were necessary for him

the tanna of our Mishna to mention, in order to teach that it is permitted to exert oneself to prevent their loss, since

it might enter your mind to say:

Only

for a substantial loss,

such as produce, which would immediately rot from the rain if it were not covered,

did

the Sages take concern and permit the exertion.

But

for a minor loss—

such as jugs of wine and oil, which, even if they are not covered, will be damaged only slightly by the dripping rain, since once night falls one can remove the rainwater or move the jugs from that place—

the Sages did not take concern

to permit exertion on their behalf.

Therefore,

it comes to teach us

that our Mishna teaches that the Sages took concern for every monetary loss, whether great or small, and permitted the exertion.

The Gemara now raises a difficulty against Rabbi Yitzḥak, who prohibits moving a utensil for the sake of something that may not be moved on Shabbat:

We learned

in our Mishna:

One may place a utensil beneath dripping rain on Shabbat.

This shows that the utensil may be moved in order to collect the dripping rain, which itself may not be moved on Shabbat, since it consists of dirty water dripping from the roof, which is unfit for any use and is muktze. This is a difficulty against Rabbi Yitzḥak?!

And we answer: Our Mishna is dealing

with fit dripping rain,

which is clear, fit for an animal to drink, and is not muktze.

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rabbi Yitzḥak:

Come and hear: One may spread a mat over bricks on Shabbat,

which shows that one may move a mat in order to protect bricks that may not be moved?!

And we answer: The beraita is dealing with bricks

that remained from the construction,

which were left over from the bricks prepared for construction and are not muktze, since

they are fit to recline upon [fit to lean against],

as that was the manner in which people sat: sitting somewhat and leaning somewhat on their left side [Rashi, Shabbat 43a].

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rabbi Yitzḥak:

Come and hear: One may spread a mat

because of the rain

over stones [dry stones prepared for construction, whose becoming moist causes them not to receive mortar properly]

[dry stones prepared for construction, whose becoming moist causes them not to receive mortar properly]

on Shabbat,

even though the stones may not be moved on Shabbat?!

And we answer: The beraita is dealing

with sharp stones [sharp stones],

which are not muktze, since

they are fit,

as they are intended

for

use for wiping in

a lavatory,

to wipe with them.

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rabbi Yitzḥak:

Come and hear: One may spread a mat over a beehive on Shabbat.

In

the days of

sun,

one spreads it

because of the sun, and in

the days of

rain, because of the rain.

Provided that he does not intend to trap

the bees! But the bees are muktze, and it follows that one is moving something for the sake of an object that may not be moved?!

And we answer:

There too,

the mat is brought for the sake of something permitted, such as

when there is

inside the hive

honey,

which is something that may be moved on Shabbat; he spreads the mat over the hive in order to protect the honey inside it.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rav Ukva of Meishan to Rav Ashi,

concerning the Gemara’s answer:

But

this works well

with regard to our answer

during the sunny season, when there is honey.

But

during the rainy season,

when there is no honey in the hives, and he moves the mat then only for the sake of the bees, which may not be moved on Shabbat—

what can be said?!

For the beraita states: In the sun, because of the sun, and in the rain, because of the rain?!

And we answer:

It was necessary only with regard to those two honeycombs

of wax that people customarily leave in the hive after extracting the honey from them.

The honey is stored inside the holes in the wax “honeycombs.” After the honey has been extracted from the holes in the wax honeycombs, two wax honeycombs are left in the hive, and the bees eat from these honeycombs throughout the rainy season.

The Gemara challenges this answer: But even

those two honeycombs

too

are muktze,

as they were set aside for the bees’ food and may not be moved on Shabbat. How, then, is it permitted to move the mat for their sake?!

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing?—

With one who had thought about them,

those two honeycombs, intending to remove them from the hive in order to feed them to a person, so that they are no longer muktze. Therefore, it is permitted to move a mat for their sake.

The Gemara challenges this answer:

But if he had not thought about them, what is the law?

Is it

prohibited

to move the mat for their sake?!

If so,

rather than teaching

in the latter clause:

Provided that he does not intend to trap,

it is implied that the tanna found no prohibition in moving the mat except because of trapping.

And if it is as you say, this is difficult:

Let him distinguish and teach it in that very matter.

You could find a circumstance in which it is prohibited to move the mat because of the prohibition against moving it, the very matter with which the tanna is dealing. The tanna of the beraita should have distinguished and said:

When is this statement applicable?

That moving it is not prohibited, only when

he had thought about them

to eat them.

But if he had not thought about them

to eat them, but had designated them as food for the bees—

it is prohibited

to move a mat for their sake?!

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna

is saying:

Even though he had thought about them to eat them, it is prohibited for him to take them,

provided

that

he does not intend to trap.

The Gemara questions the course of the discussion:

The entire ruling of Rabbi Yitzḥak—that a utensil may be moved only for the sake of something that may be moved—can apply only according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is muktze. That is, a person sets aside in his mind even an object fit for use. For only according to Rabbi Yehuda can one state Rabbi Yitzḥak’s ruling that a utensil may be moved only for the sake of something that may be moved; that is, a person mentally sets aside his utensils from moving them and from using them for the sake of something that is muktze.

But according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold of muktze, it is not possible for a person to mentally set aside his utensils from using them and moving them for the sake of muktze. [This is explained according to Rashi here, following Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s explanation in tractate Shabbat 43b.]

And according to Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted to move the mat for the sake of covering the bees in the hive, since the mat is a utensil and he cannot mentally set it aside.

Yet the Gemara establishes the beraita in a manner consistent with Rabbi Yitzḥak’s ruling, who follows Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is muktze: he may move the mat because of the honey or because of the honeycombs that he had intended to eat.

The Gemara now asks:

By what did you establish it,

that you established the beraita as referring to a hive containing honey or to one containing honeycombs that he had intended to eat, rather than establishing it according to Rabbi Shimon, who permits bringing the mat for the sake of the bees? You did so in order to establish it in accordance with Rabbi Yitzḥak, who holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is muktze,

and according to him, a person can designate his mat as unavailable for use for the sake of something that is muktze, and therefore he must take the mat only for the sake of something that may be moved.

But this is difficult:

Come, say the latter clause: “Provided that he does not intend to trap.”

This shows that if he does not intend to trap, it is permitted to spread the mat, even though the bees are thereby trapped, since anything that one does not intend to do is permitted when one performs one act and the second act occurs incidentally. Here, for example, he covers the hive in order to protect the honeycombs inside it, and the bees in the hive are trapped incidentally.

And this law

comes

only

according to Rabbi Shimon, who said: An unintentional act is permitted.

It is not according to Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits performing an act whose consequence one does not intend.

It follows that the first clause is according to Rabbi Yehuda, while the latter clause is only according to Rabbi Shimon, who disputes Rabbi Yehuda with regard to muktze?!

The Maharsha wrote: The words “And can you really maintain” through “and it will not die” that appear in the Gemara before us are not part of the Gemara; rather, they are a marginal gloss that was mistakenly added. See there.

And can you really maintain

that this is the interpretation of the beraita, that the bees are trapped automatically, but it is permitted to spread a mat over them because he does not intend to do so, and that it is according to

the

words of

Rabbi Shimon,

who permits an unintentional act?!

But Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to a case of “cut off its head and it will not die” [a parable for a person who says: I will cut off the head of this animal on Shabbat, but I do not want it to die].

For when a prohibited act will certainly occur, it is prohibited even though the person performing the act does not intend to bring it about.

Rabbi Shimon permitted an act only when it is not certain that the prohibited result will occur and he does not intend to bring it about.

It follows that if the bees were indeed trapped automatically, it would be prohibited to spread a mat over the hive even according to Rabbi Shimon.

Up to here is a marginal gloss!

And we answer:

In fact,

the words of the beraita can be explained as meaning that

the entire beraita is according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that there is muktze and prohibits an unintentional act.

And

this is the interpretation of the beraita:

With what are we dealing here? With a hive that has an opening [there is a window in the hive],

so that the bees are not trapped, since they have an escape route.

And do not say: According to Rabbi Yehuda, “provided that he does not intend

to trap,”