Beitzah 36a — the Talmud in English

The Gemara further raises another uncertainty concerning the law of our Mishna:

There—

in that Mishna in which we learned, “They clear four and five baskets”—

we learned: “But not the storehouse.”

And

he

explained: Shmuel: “What is ‘but not the storehouse’?”—

“But he may not finish the entire storehouse.”

Although they permitted him to clear four and five baskets, this is only when there is still straw and produce there. But if there was nothing there except those [baskets], it is prohibited to clear everything and expose the ground,

because

“perhaps he will come to level depressions,”

lest he find a depression and fill it in to level the place with the surrounding ground; and it is prohibited to do so because of the labor of building.

Here—

“what?”

Did they likewise prohibit throwing down all the fruits that are on the roof?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the uncertainty:

There,

in clearing the baskets,

it is on Shabbat, which is prohibited because it is stringent,

since the prohibitions of Shabbat are stringent, and therefore the Sages were stringent concerning them.

But the Festival is lenient,

it may be said that

it is properly permitted

to clear even the entire roof.

Or perhaps,

on the contrary, one should be more stringent in the case of our Mishna, by means of a kal va-chomer:

And

there,

in the Mishna in Shabbat,

where there is interruption of the study hall, you say “no,”

they may not clear it completely.

Here, where there is no interruption of the study hall,

but merely monetary loss—

is it not all the more so

that one should be stringent and prohibit it because of concern that he will level depressions?

And

the Gemara further raises an uncertainty concerning the law of the Mishna that we learned concerning Shabbat:

Here

in our Mishna

we learned: “One may throw down fruits through a skylight on the Festival.”

And

concerning this

Rav Nahman said: “They taught”

in our Mishna that it is permitted to throw down the fruits through the skylight

only

when the skylight and the fruits are

on the same roof. But

to transfer fruits

from a roof

that has no skylight

to a roof

that has a skylight, in order to throw them down there through the skylight,

no,

they did not permit it.

And a beraita likewise teaches

in accordance with Rav Nahman’s words:

“One may not handle from roof to roof, even when their roofs are equal,”,

and one roof is not higher than the other. Although here there is only the exertion of transfer and not the exertion of going up and down, nevertheless it is prohibited to transfer them from roof to roof.

There,

in the law of the Mishna taught concerning Shabbat—

“what?”

Did they permit clearing from house to house, or only within the same house?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the uncertainty:

Would we say:

Here,

only in our Mishna,

it is prohibited because of the Festival,

since

it is lenient, and one will come to treat it lightly,

and therefore they were more stringent concerning it.

But Shabbat, which is stringent, and one will not come to treat it lightly—

it is properly permitted.

Or perhaps

on the contrary, one should be stringent in the case of the Mishna concerning Shabbat, since the removal is not because of monetary loss, and by means of a kal va-chomer:

If here, where there is loss of produce, you said no,

there, where there is no loss of produce, is it not all the more so!?

And there is another doubt concerning the words of the Mishna concerning Shabbat:

Here,

in the law of our Mishna,

it was taught:

If the roof was surrounded by a partition and there was no skylight in it, but there was a window in the partition, then

one may not lower them by rope through the windows.

For he may not take the produce in sacks and lower them by rope through the window, because there is exertion in raising the produce from the roof to the window and from there to the ground.

And

also

he may not bring them down

with him

by way of

ladders

[each step is called a ladder], since this is additional exertion.

There

in the law of the Mishna concerning Shabbat—

what?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

Is it specifically

here, on a Festival,

in the law of our Mishna, which deals with removing produce because of rain on a Festival,

that it is prohibited,

since

there is no interruption of the study hall,

but only monetary loss.

But on Shabbat,

in the law of the Mishna concerning Shabbat, which deals with removing [the produce] for the sake of the students on Shabbat,

where there is interruption of the study hall—

it is well and permitted.

Or perhaps

on the contrary, one should be stringent where it is not because of monetary loss, and by means of a kal va-chomer:

And

if here, where there is loss of produce, you said no,

there, where there is no loss of produce—

is it not all the more so!?

And we conclude concerning all the questions about which we had doubts:

teiku.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may cover the produce

with utensils because of the dripping rain:

Ulla said: And

it is permitted to cover

even the air between the bricks

[bricks arranged and ready, and set aside for building], for he was concerned that rain would fall upon them and dissolve them. And although the stones are prohibited to move because of muktze, there is no prohibition in moving a utensil for the sake of muktze.

Rabbi Yitzhak said:

Utensils may be moved only for the sake of

produce fit

itself to be moved. But stones, which are muktze, utensils may not be moved for the sake of muktze.

And Rabbi Yitzhak follows

this law

according to his reasoning

[according to his position],

for Rabbi Yitzhak said: A utensil may be moved only for something that may be moved on Shabbat.

And the Gemara proves in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yitzhak:

We learned

in our Mishna:

One may cover the produce with utensils.

And it is implied that only the

produce,

which is not muktze,

may not

indeed be covered, since one can move a utensil for its sake. But

the air between the bricks,

which is muktze—

may not

be covered, since a utensil may not be moved for its sake. And this is a difficulty against Ulla?!

And the Gemara rejects this:

The same law applies that

one may cover

even the air between the bricks.

And what the Mishna mentioned, “produce,” does not come to exclude the air between the bricks. Rather,

since

when

it first taught, “one may lower produce,”

therefore it

taught

in the

end as well, “one may cover the produce.”

And the Gemara brings another proof for Rabbi Yitzhak:

We learned

in our Mishna:

And likewise wine-jars and oil-jars

may be covered with utensils because of the dripping rain.

And it is implied that one covers only wine-jars and oil-jars, which themselves may be moved, but not the air between the bricks. For if not, why did the Mishna not teach that one also covers the air between the bricks, which may not be moved on Shabbat, and all the more so wine-jars and oil-jars?!

And the Gemara rejects the proof:

Here,

with regard to the wine-jars and oil-jars mentioned by the Mishna,

with what are we dealing? With untithed produce.

For they contain tevel, which is muktze and may not be moved on Shabbat. And the innovation of the Mishna is the opposite: to teach that it is permitted to move the utensils even for the sake of something that may not be moved.

And the Gemara proves according to this interpretation:

This too is reasonably inferred,

as we interpreted the words of the Mishna.

For if it should enter your mind

that the Mishna is speaking of

wine-jars and oil-jars containing permitted contents

[containing tithed wine and oil, which are permitted]—

it has already taught this

already in the

beginning, “produce.”

For we already learned at the beginning of the Mishna that it is permitted to exert oneself in order to save the produce; what need was there for the tanna to add and teach us that it is permitted to exert oneself for wine-jars and oil-jars containing permitted contents?

Rather, necessarily, our Mishna is dealing with wine and oil of prohibition. And the Mishna comes to teach us that the utensil may be moved even for the sake of something that may not be moved.

The Gemara rejects the necessity: In fact, our Mishna is speaking of permitted wine and oil. Rather,

wine-jars and oil-jars,

even those containing permitted contents,

were necessary for him—

the tanna of our Mishna needed to teach us that it is permitted to exert oneself because of their loss, since

it might enter your mind to say:

only

for substantial loss,

such as produce, which, if he does not cover it immediately, will rot from the rain,

they were concerned,

the Sages, and permitted the exertion.

But

for slight loss—

such as wine-jars and oil-jars, which, even if he does not cover them, will be damaged only slightly by the dripping rain, since when it becomes dark he can remove the rainwater or the jars from this place—

they were not concerned,

the Sages, to permit exertion for their sake.

And therefore

it comes to teach us

that our Mishna teaches that for every monetary loss, whether great or slight, the Sages were concerned and permitted the exertion.

And now the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Yitzhak, who prohibits moving a utensil for the sake of something that may not be moved on Shabbat:

We learned

in our Mishna:

One may place a utensil beneath the dripping rain on Shabbat.

Thus, the utensil is moved in order to receive within it the dripping rain, which itself may not be moved on Shabbat, since it is dirty water dripping from the roof, which is fit for nothing and is muktze. And this is a difficulty against Rabbi Yitzhak?!

And we answer: our Mishna is dealing

with fit dripping rain,

which is clear and fit for an animal to drink, and is not muktze.

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rabbi Yitzhak:

Come and hear: One may spread a mat over bricks on Shabbat,

so it follows that one may take a mat in order to protect bricks that may not be moved?!

And we answer: the beraita is dealing with bricks

that remained from the building

that remained from among the bricks prepared for building, and they are not muktze, since

they are fit to recline upon

[fit to lean upon them], for all their sitting was in this manner: sitting somewhat and leaning somewhat on his left [Rashi, Shabbat 43a].

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rabbi Yitzhak:

Come and hear: One may spread a mat

because of the rain

over stones

[dry stones prepared for building, whose becoming wet causes them not to receive the mortar properly]

on Shabbat,

even though the stones may not be moved on Shabbat?!

And we answer: the beraita is dealing

with pointed stones

[sharp], which are not muktze, since

they are fit

for they stand

for

use for wiping in

the privy,

to wipe with them.

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rabbi Yitzhak:

Come and hear: One may spread a mat over a beehive on Shabbat.

In

the days of

sun

one spreads it

because of the sun, and in

the days of

rain, because of the rain.

Provided that he does not intend to trap

the bees! But the bees are muktze, and it follows that he is moving [the mat] for the sake of something that may not be moved?!

And we answer:

There too,

it is speaking of bringing the mat for the sake of something permitted, such as

there is

inside the beehive

honey,

which is something that may be moved on Shabbat, and he spreads the mat over the beehive in order to protect the honey inside it.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rav Ukva of Mishan, to Rav Ashi,

concerning the answer of the Gemara:

But

our answer is satisfactory

for

the hot seasons, when there is honey.

But

in the rainy seasons,

when there is no honey in the beehives, and then he moves the mat only for the sake of the bees, which may not be moved on Shabbat—

what can be said?!

But the beraita states: in the heat, because of the heat, and in the rain, because of the rain?!

And we answer:

It was necessary only for those two “honeycombs”

of wax that people customarily leave in the beehive after extracting the honey from them.

The honey is stored inside the holes in the wax “honeycombs.” After extracting the honey from the holes in the wax honeycombs, they leave two wax honeycombs in the beehive, and from these honeycombs the bees eat throughout all the rainy seasons.

And the Gemara objects to the answer: But even

those two honeycombs

themselves

are muktze,

for they set them aside for the bees’ food, and they may not be moved on Shabbat. How, then, is it permitted to move the mat for their sake?!

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing—

with one who thought about them,

those two honeycombs, to remove them from the beehive in order to feed them to a person, and they are no longer muktze. Therefore, it is permitted to move the mat for their sake.

And the Gemara objects to the answer:

But if he did not think about them, what

is the law? Is it

prohibited

to move the mat for their sake?!

If so,

rather than teach

in the end:

“Provided that he does not intend to trap,”

it follows that the tanna found no prohibition in moving the mat except because of trapping.

And if it is as you say, this is difficult:

let him distinguish and teach it in that matter itself

for you have a case in which it is prohibited to move because of the prohibition of moving, which the tanna is discussing. The tanna of the beraita should have distinguished and said:

When are these words applicable

that moving is not prohibited? Only when

he thought about them

to eat them.

But if he did not think about them

to eat them, but designated them for the bees’ food—

it is prohibited

to move a mat for their sake?!

And we answer:

This is what he is saying,

the tanna:

Even though he thought about them

to eat them, it is prohibited for him to take them,

provided,

unless

he does not intend to trap.

And the Gemara objects to the course of the discussion:

All of Rabbi Yitzhak’s law—that a utensil may be moved only for the sake of something that may be moved—can be only according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is muktze. That is, a person sets aside in his mind even something fit for use. For only according to Rabbi Yehuda is it possible to state Rabbi Yitzhak’s law, that a utensil may be moved only for the sake of something that may be moved. That is, a person sets aside in his mind his utensils from moving them and using them for the sake of something that is muktze.

But according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold of muktze, it is not possible for a person to set aside in his mind his utensils from using them and moving them for the sake of muktze. [This is explained according to Rashi here, following the explanation of Rabbi Akiva Eiger in tractate Shabbat 43b.]

And according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted to move the mat for the sake of covering the bees in the beehive, for the mat is a utensil, and he cannot set it aside in his mind.

But the Gemara establishes the beraita, so that it accords with Rabbi Yitzhak’s law, who follows Rabbi Yehuda, who holds of muktze, as saying that he can move the mat because of the honey or because of the honeycombs about which he thought to eat them.

And now the Gemara raises a difficulty:

With what did you establish it,

this—that you established the beraita as referring to a beehive containing honey, or containing honeycombs about which he thought to eat them, and you did not establish it according to Rabbi Shimon, who can bring the mat for the bees? This is in order to establish it according to Rabbi Yitzhak, who holds

like Rabbi Yehuda, who holds of muktze,

and according to him a person can set aside his mat so as not to use it for something that is muktze; therefore, he must take the mat only for the sake of something that may be moved.

And this is difficult:

Say the end: “Provided that he does not intend to trap.”

For it follows that if he does not intend to trap, it is permitted to spread the mat, even though the bees are trapped, since anything that he does not intend to do is permitted for a person to do when he does one action and the second act occurs incidentally. For example, here, he covers the beehive for the sake of protecting the honeycombs inside it, and incidentally the bees in the beehive are trapped.

And this law

comes

only

according to Rabbi Shimon, who said: An unintentional act is permitted.

And not according to Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits doing something that he does not intend [to do].

It follows that the first clause is according to Rabbi Yehuda, and the final clause is only according to Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda concerning the law of muktze!?.

The Maharsha wrote: what they said in the Gemara before us, from “And can you understand it” until “and will not die,” is not words of the Gemara, but a marginal addition that was added in error; see there.

And can you understand it

that this is the interpretation of the beraita: that the bees are trapped by themselves, but it is permitted to spread a mat over them since he does not intend [to trap them], and it is according

to the

words of

Rabbi Shimon,

who says that an unintentional act is permitted?!

But Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon agrees concerning a “cut off its head and will it not die”

case

[it is an analogy to a person who says: I will cut off the head of this animal on Shabbat, but I do not want it to die].

For when a prohibited act will certainly be performed, it is prohibited even though the person performing it does not intend to perform it.

Rabbi Shimon permitted only when there is no certainty that the prohibition will be performed, and he does not intend to perform it.

It follows that if the bees were indeed trapped by themselves, it would be prohibited to spread a mat over the beehive even according to Rabbi Shimon.

Up to here is from the marginal addition!

And we answer:

Actually,

the words of the beraita may be interpreted as saying that

the whole of it is Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds of muktze and prohibits an unintentional act.

And

this is the interpretation of the beraita:

Here, with what are we dealing? With one in which there is a window

[there is a window in the beehive], so that the bees are not trapped, since they have an escape opening.

And do not say: According to Rabbi Yehuda, “provided that he does not intend

to trap,”