Beitzah 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

He must vow

a thanksgiving offering,

but he does not fulfill

his obligation of the festival peace offering through it.

Likewise, if he vowed to become a nazirite on the condition that he bring his offerings from money of ma'aser sheni,

he is a nazirite, but he does not shave

using money of ma'aser sheni; rather, he must use non-sacred money.

That is, his vow takes effect, and he is obligated to fulfill it, whereas his stipulation that he fulfill his obligation of the festival offering through his thanksgiving offering, or that he fulfill his obligation of the nazirite offerings with money of ma'aser sheni, does not take effect.

The Gemara cites a similar incident, in which a person's statement takes effect, whereas his stipulation does not:

An incident occurred involving

a certain man, who said to those

standing around him at the time of his death, as a bequest:

Give

and grant

four hundred dinars to so-and-so.

And let him marry my daughter, and let him take my daughter as a wife. And the man who issued the bequest died.

and he should marry my daughter. The man then died.

Rav Pappa said: The four hundred

dinars—

he shall take them,

that man shall receive them by virtue of the bequest.

And

as for

his daughter,

the daughter of that man,

if he wishes—

he may marry her,

if he wishes, he may take her as a wife.

If he wishes—

he need not marry her.

The Gemara infers that all this applies only when he stated his instruction first and only afterward stated his stipulation. But if he stated his stipulation first, the instruction does not take effect.

The reason is that he said

first,

“Give him

four hundred dinars,” and only afterward said

“and let him marry

my daughter”; therefore, the gift of the dying man takes effect without the recipient becoming obligated to fulfill his stipulation and marry his daughter.

But if he said

the stipulation first,

“Let him marry

my daughter,” and only afterward stated the bequest of the gift,

“and give him

four hundred dinars”—then only

if he marries her,

if he takes his daughter as a wife—

he shall take them,

he shall receive the money.

And if he does not marry her—

he shall not take them.

Mareimar was sitting and reciting this teaching,

the “report” that Rabbi Yohanan had stated in response to Reish Lakish’s question,

in his own name,

in his own name.

Ravina said to Mareimar: You—

this is how you teach it,

you state this teaching in your own name, without the question and the response to the question.

But

we—

as he asked him,

as Reish Lakish asked

Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan,

and as Rabbi Yohanan answered him—so

we recite it,

this teaching.

A tanna taught before Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba:

that which is written concerning the burnt offering brought by Aaron the priest on the eighth day of the inauguration [Leviticus 9]:

“And he brought the burnt offering, and performed it according to the law

teaches that Aaron performed his burnt offering, which was an obligatory burnt offering,

according to the law of a voluntary burnt offering.

And here

it

is

teaches

the text

that an obligatory burnt offering requires the laying on of hands,

as the text requires with regard to a voluntary burnt offering.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yitzḥak said to the one who had taught this beraita before him:

The one who taught you,

who taught you this beraita and expounded the verse in it, rather than deriving this law merely by means of an av binyan from a voluntary burnt offering, which requires the laying on of hands—

whose

method does this beraita reflect? It must be that according to the method of

Beit Shammai it is

taught,

as they do not derive

the law of the laying on of hands for

obligatory peace offerings from

the law of the laying on of hands for

voluntary peace offerings,

with regard to which the Torah explicitly commanded that one perform the laying on of hands.

Therefore, they likewise do not derive the law of the laying on of hands for an obligatory burnt offering from the law of the laying on of hands for a voluntary burnt offering, because according to their view one cannot derive a law concerning an obligatory offering from a voluntary offering.

If it is according to Beit Hillel, since they derive

the law of the laying on of hands for

obligatory peace offerings from voluntary peace offerings—

then according to their view

an obligatory burnt offering would also not require a verse

to establish the obligation of laying on of hands, since

they derive

the law of an obligatory burnt offering merely by means of an av binyan

from a voluntary burnt offering,

for which it is a mitzva to perform the laying on of hands, just as they derive an obligatory offering from a voluntary offering with regard to peace offerings.

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yitzḥak’s proof:

And from where do you know that Beit Hillel

derive the law of laying on of hands for

obligatory peace offerings

from voluntary peace offerings?

Perhaps

Beit Hillel do not derive the law of laying on of hands for obligatory peace offerings from voluntary peace offerings, because one does not derive an obligatory offering from a voluntary offering.

Rather, the law of laying on of hands for obligatory peace offerings—

they derive it from an obligatory burnt offering,

as they derive an obligatory offering from another obligatory offering, and not from a voluntary offering.

And

therefore,

the obligatory burnt offering itself requires a verse

stating that it entails the obligation of laying on of hands, because without the verse requiring the laying on of hands for an obligatory burnt offering, we would know neither the obligation of laying on of hands for an obligatory burnt offering nor that for obligatory peace offerings.

If so, this beraita is in accordance with everyone’s view!

Rabbi Yitzḥak answers: According to your argument, that Beit Hillel do not derive obligatory peace offerings from voluntary peace offerings—

what is the difference

between obligatory peace offerings

and voluntary peace offerings, such that they do not derive

them? The reason must be

that

voluntary peace offerings are

common,

whereas obligatory peace offerings are not common; and one does not derive what is uncommon from what is common.

If so, with regard to obligatory peace offerings, Beit Hillel

also—from an obligatory burnt offering

they do not derive,

since there is a distinction between them:

As

the burnt offering is burned

entirely

for the Lord, whereas peace offerings are eaten by their owners and by the priest.

The Gemara rejects this: In fact, the beraita can also be in accordance with Beit Hillel. And one must expound the verse, “And he brought the burnt offering and performed it according to the law,” to teach that an obligatory burnt offering entails the laying on of hands as does a voluntary burnt offering, since one does not derive an obligatory offering from a voluntary offering merely by means of an av binyan.

And as for your claim that, if so, Beit Hillel would not derive obligatory peace offerings from an obligatory burnt offering, since the burnt offering is burned entirely, one can say that obligatory peace offerings

are derived from the combination of the two,

by means of an av binyan, from the two offerings for which the obligation of laying on of hands is already known: from voluntary peace offerings, mentioned explicitly in the verse, and from the obligatory burnt offering, whose requirement is derived in the beraita from the verse.

For if you challenge the derivation based on what we find with regard to voluntary peace offerings, saying: What is unique about obligatory peace offerings? They are common. The obligatory burnt offering, which is uncommon, will prove that an offering can entail the laying on of hands.

And if you challenge the derivation based on what we find with regard to the obligatory burnt offering, saying: What is unique about an obligatory burnt offering? It is burned entirely, then voluntary peace offerings will prove that an offering need not be burned entirely and nevertheless entails the laying on of hands.

The Gemara now discusses Rabbi Yitzḥak’s statement:

And

is it

that Beit Shammai hold

that

obligatory peace offerings do not require the laying on of hands?

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the laying on of hands itself

for obligatory peace offerings,

that it is required

to perform it.

With regard to what did they disagree—

with regard to

the principle that

“slaughter must immediately follow the laying on of hands.”

As Beit Shammai say: It is not required

to slaughter immediately after the laying on of hands; rather, one may perform the laying on of hands on the eve of the Festival and slaughter on the following day, on the Festival.

And Beit Hillel say: It is required

to slaughter immediately after the laying on of hands; therefore, one may not perform the laying on of hands on the eve of the Festival, but performs it on the Festival.

Thus, the beraita holds contrary to Rabbi Yitzḥak’s opinion, and according to the tanna of the beraita, Beit Shammai do perform the laying on of hands on obligatory peace offerings.

And we answer:

It is

Rabbi Yitzḥak, who holds that according to Beit Shammai one does not perform the laying on of hands on obligatory peace offerings,

who said—

in accordance with this tanna,

the tanna of a beraita who holds as he does:

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to “slaughter immediately following the laying on of hands”—

that it is required.

With regard to what did they disagree—

with regard to the laying on of hands

on obligatory peace offerings

itself.

As Beit Shammai say: It is not required

to perform the laying on of hands on obligatory peace offerings.

And Beit Hillel say: It is required.

The Sages taught: There was an incident involving Hillel the Elder, who brought his burnt offering

[a burnt offering of appearance]

to the Temple courtyard,

and he wished

to perform the laying on of hands on it on the Festival.

The students of Shammai the Elder gathered around him and said to him: What is the nature of this animal?

They did not determine whether it was male or female; rather, they sought to ask for which type of offering he had brought it.

He said to them: It is female,

this animal, and it is not fit to be a burnt offering,

and I brought it as a peace offering.

It is permitted to alter the truth for the sake of peace. Hillel did not wish to tell them the truth: that he was bringing it in accordance with his own view, that a burnt offering of appearance may also be sacrificed on the Festival.

He wagged its tail at them,

in order to mislead them, so that they would think that he was showing them that it was female,

and they went away.

And that day the power of Beit Shammai prevailed over Beit Hillel,

for Hillel had thereby conceded to them that he himself did not bring a burnt offering of appearance on the Festival, but only a peace offering.

And they sought

Beit Shammai

to establish the halakha in accordance with their opinion.

And there was one elder there, one of the students of Shammai the Elder, whose name was Bava ben Buta, who knew that the halakha

in this dispute was

in accordance with Beit Hillel.