Beitzah 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan:

Go out and teach this outside!

Go out and teach this ruling outside, and not here in the beit-midrash!

As for what you taught, that one is flogged on account of

kindling and

on account of

cooking

on a Festival—

it is not a “Mishna”!

No such beraita was taught, for he certainly is not flogged for these acts, since the prohibitions of kindling and cooking were permitted even when not performed for an essential need, by virtue of the fact that they were permitted when performed for an essential need.

And if you should say

that, by means of the various tannaitic formulations of the beraitot, it was indeed taught

a Mishna

in this wording—in any event, it must be that it was taught according to

the opinion of Beit Shammai

,

as he says

in our Mishna, that

we do not say, “Since carrying out was permitted for an essential need,—

it was also permitted when not for an essential need.”

And according to Beit Shammai,

here too

with regard to the labor of kindling,

we do not say, “Since kindling was permitted for an essential need,—

it was also permitted when not for an essential need.”

Therefore, he is flogged as you said, for kindling not required for food.

For if it were according to Beit Hillel, since they say

in our Mishna,

“Since carrying out was permitted for an essential need,—

it was also permitted when not for an essential need.”

According to them,

here too

with regard to kindling, we say,

“Since kindling was permitted for an essential need,—

it was also permitted when not for an essential need,”

and he is not flogged for it.

And the Bach [section 495:2] understood that the intention of the Rambam and the Tur is that only carrying out and kindling were permitted when not for an essential need. He questioned this from the present sugya, which permitted slaughtering a voluntary burnt offering, and from Ketubot [6b], which permitted making a wound; moreover, with regard to the labor of building, Tosafot [Shabbat 95a] inclined to permit demolishing one’s house on a Festival through the principle that building was permitted for the purpose of making cheese [and they prohibited it only because of ordinary weekday activity. The Rambam, too, prohibited making cheese only because it could have been done on the eve of the Festival, even though the essential nature of the labor, namely building, is not related to food; this is difficult concerning the Maggid Mishneh]. It follows that all the labors were permitted by the rationale of “since.” In fact, the difficulty from making cheese is well resolved according to the approach explained above: only Tosafot permit building through the principle of “since” based on making cheese, because in their view the “need” is what permits it. According to the Rambam, however, we say “since” only with a labor whose essential nature serves the purpose of food. Since the essential nature of making cheese is building, it cannot generate “since” for building, for making cheese itself was permitted only for an essential need [and it has already been explained that for this reason we say “since” only when the labor is performed upon food And Penei Yehoshua explained, based on the words of Miginei Shlomo, that the nature of the permission of “since” is that labors suitable for food were not prohibited. Seemingly, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits making food-related implements, all labors should be included, since even building can apply to the improvement of eating utensils. It must therefore be that this permission applies only to labors performed upon actual food; carrying out and kindling alone were newly permitted even though they are not performed upon the food itself and resemble food-related implements. [He explained similarly in Kovetz Shiurim section 43.] Indeed, with the other labors, if they are performed directly upon the food, they are permitted even when not for the purpose of eating. Regarding his basic question as to why all labors should not be permitted through “since,” given that food-related implements were permitted, see what Nishmat Adam wrote [there]. According to what was explained above, the distinction is straightforward: food-related implements were permitted only when needed, whereas we say “since” only with labors whose entire function is for food and which were not prohibited at all on a Festival. See the words of Magen Avraham [section 518, subsection 1]. The basis of his words appears to be that of Penei Yehoshua: labors performed directly upon the food were permitted. [What he wrote—that we do not say “since” with writing and weaving, implying that they would be permitted when truly needed for food—is seemingly difficult. How could he have written this in the name of the Maggid Mishneh, when the Maggid Mishneh explicitly wrote that they are prohibited? This can be resolved according to the explanation of Pri Megadim [Introduction to the Laws of Festivals 1:12]: all the words of the Maggid Mishneh follow his position that the Rambam [Yom Tov 2:2] ruled that food-related implements are prohibited even when they could not have been prepared on the eve of the Festival. Magen Avraham, however, wrote that according to the Shulchan Arukh we rule in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda [in section 495], who permitted food-related implements; therefore, he permitted all labors when needed for food, even though we do not say “since” with them.] However, the Vilna Gaon [section 509] understood that the Rambam ruled in accordance with Rav Yehuda, and nevertheless maintained that according to him writing for the purpose of food is prohibited. Avi Ezri [Yom Tov 3:3] explained that food-related implements such as repairing a spit are a labor whose essential nature benefits food, whereas writing in order to bring food does not make the labor of writing an improvement of the food. See further the notes on Tosafot [s.v. “This is the version”] concerning “since” with food-related implements]. It is thus evident that Rabbi Yohanan’s opinion as well is that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel in our Mishna concerns permission for a labor performed when not for an essential need, based on “since a labor was permitted for the purpose of food.”

Mishna:

One may not separate terumot and tithes from produce that is tevel on a Festival, because this appears as “repairing” or

as consecrating . Since he had the opportunity to separate them on the eve of the Festival, they did not permit him to perform this labor on the Festival.

But the Sages permitted separating ḥalla from dough on a Festival, so that a person could knead dough on the Festival and eat fresh bread. If they had required him to knead his dough on the eve of the Festival in order to separate the ḥalla on the eve of the Festival, he would not have fresh bread on the Festival.

Similarly, the Sages permitted removing [separating] from an animal slaughtered on a Festival the portions given from it to a koen: the foreleg, cheeks, and maw. For although the rest of the meat is not prohibited for eating before these portions are separated, they must be detached from it so that one will not eat them together with the rest and thereby nullify the positive mitzva of the priestly portions.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute in our Mishna whether the Sages also permitted carrying the ḥalla and the portions to the koen.

Beit Shammai say: One may not carry

ḥalla and the portions to the koen on a Festival, whether they were separated

already

on the previous evening or whether they were separated that day,

Once the Sages enacted a general decree not to separate terumot and ma‘aserot on Shabbat and festivals, and as part of that decree they said that one may not transport them, nor even give them to kohanim and Levites at the owner’s home.

The Sages permitted, for the sake of food preparation, only the separation of challah, in order to remove the dough from the status of tevel, and the removal of the gifts from an animal, so that they would not eat them together with the animal’s meat. But the giving and transporting remained subject to the general prohibition: one may not separate, transport, or give any of the priestly gifts on Shabbat or festivals.

And Beit Hillel permit

even transporting and giving challah and the gifts from an animal to a priest, whether they were removed that day or the previous evening.

Beit Shammai said to them

to Beit Hillel: We can derive this by means of a

“gezerah shavah”

, that is, we can compare these rabbinic laws—for the entire prohibition against separating, giving, and transporting is only rabbinic—as follows:

Challah and the gifts

are

a gift to a priest, and

also

teruma

is

a gift to a priest.

Just as

you concede to us that

one may not transport

on a festival

the teruma

that was separated the previous day to the priest—so

too

you should concede to us that

one may not transport the gifts

to the priest, even if they were removed that day, since transporting them to him is not necessary for the festival.

Beit Hillel said to them: No,

do not compare these laws! For

if you say with regard to teruma

that one may not transport it on a festival, that is because

he is not “entitled” to separate it

on a festival. The Sages did not grant him the right and authority to separate it on a festival, and therefore one may neither give nor transport to the priest the teruma that was separated the previous day.

But how

can you say with regard to the gifts

of challah and an animal

that he is entitled to remove them

on a festival? Just as he has the right to remove them, so the Sages granted him the right to transport them and give them to the priest!

Gemara:

We find below in a beraita that several tannaim disagreed about how to establish the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerning transporting challah and the gifts on a festival. The Gemara discusses according to which of these tannaim the Mishna understood the dispute, and explains how our Mishna is understood according to those tannaim:

Initially,

it might have entered your mind,

the Gemara assumed that the Mishna’s intention in the words of Beit Shammai—“one may not transport on a festival gifts that were removed, whether that day or the previous evening”—was simply as it sounds:

Whether

they were removed that day from

animals

that were slaughtered that day, and

whether

they were removed the previous evening, and

that is, from animals

that were slaughtered the previous evening.

Thus, Beit Shammai maintain that even gifts removed from an animal slaughtered that day, or challah from dough kneaded that day, may not be transported to the priest.

On the basis of this assumption, the Gemara proposes:

Whose opinion is expressed in our Mishna?

It is not Rabbi Yosei

’s,

and it is not Rabbi Yehuda

’s;

rather,

it is that of the Aḥerim

.

As it was taught

: Three tannaim disagreed about how to establish the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:

1.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the gifts

of an animal—and the same applies to challah

that were removed on the eve of the festival:

they may be transported

to the priest together

with the gifts removed that day and from animals slaughtered that day.

As for gifts removed from an animal slaughtered that day, it is obvious that even according to Beit Shammai they may be transported, since it is permitted to remove them on a festival and he need not keep them with him until the following day.

They disagreed only with regard to transporting them

the gifts removed from an animal slaughtered the previous day

by themselves:

For Beit Shammai say: One may not transport them, and Beit Hillel say: One may transport them.

And this is how Beit Shammai reasoned: Challah and the gifts

are

a gift to a priest, and

also

teruma

is

a gift to a priest.

Just as one may not transport

on a festival

the teruma,

since it may not be separated on a festival—

so

one may not transport the gifts

on a festival.

Beit Hillel said to them: No! If you say with regard to teruma

that one may not transport it, it is because

he is not entitled to separate it

on a festival.

Can you say with regard to the gifts

of an animal

that he is entitled to remove them

on a festival, and therefore transporting them to the priest is also permitted.

And since transporting them is permitted, transporting all the gifts from an animal is also permitted, including those removed the previous evening; it is even permitted to transport them by themselves.

This beraita contains another view regarding the subject of the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:

Rabbi Yosei said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the gifts

of an animal, whether it was slaughtered that day or the previous day:

they may transport

them even by themselves. For they permitted transporting even gifts removed on the eve of the festival, since it is permitted to remove and transport them on a festival. [This is the view of Beit Hillel according to Rabbi Yehuda.]

They disagreed only with regard to teruma—

For Beit Shammai say: One may not transport

teruma.

And Beit Hillel say: One may transport

even teruma.

And this is how Beit Hillel reasoned: Challah and the gifts are a gift to a priest, and teruma is a gift to a priest.

Just as one transports the gifts

so one transports teruma

on a festival.

Beit Shammai said to them: No! If you say

with regard to the gifts

that one transports them because he is

entitled to remove them

on a festival, can you

say

the same

with regard to teruma, to which he is not entitled to remove!?

And when they prohibited separating teruma on a festival, they likewise prohibited transporting teruma to the priest on a festival.

Another view was taught in this beraita in explanation of the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:

The Aḥerim say: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to teruma, concerning which one may not transport it.

They disagreed only with regard to the gifts,

whether the gifts were removed that day or the previous evening.

For Beit Shammai say: One may not transport them, and Beit Hillel say: One may transport them.

In light of the Gemara’s assumption that Beit Shammai do not permit transporting even gifts from an animal slaughtered that day, it is clear, on the one hand, that our Mishna does not follow Rabbi Yosei, who held that Beit Shammai permit transporting the gifts, while Beit Hillel permit transporting even teruma; and, on the other hand, it is clear that the Mishna accords with the view of the Aḥerim.

The Gemara now asks: Is it necessary to say

let us say

that our Mishna follows only

the Aḥerim, and not

the view of

Rabbi Yehuda!?

After all, Rabbi Yehuda said that Beit Shammai agree that gifts removed on a festival may be transported, and he even permitted transporting together with them gifts removed on the eve of the festival.

Rava said: No. It is not necessary to say that the Mishna follows specifically the view of the Aḥerim; in fact, it can also be established according to Rabbi Yehuda. One must simply revise the initial assumption that according to Beit Shammai no gifts at all may be transported on a festival, even those removed that day.

Rather,

for

who

—does the Mishna

teach

that according to Beit Shammai the rule that one may not transport gifts removed the previous evening or that day applies even to gifts

that

also

“were removed that day and that

also

“were slaughtered that day”?

But the Mishna says only: “One may not transport gifts

removed

that day,”

it teaches,

and it does not say that this includes those from animals slaughtered that day.

And in fact,

their slaughter

was

the previous evening

and only their removal was that day. Therefore, one may not transport them, since this could have been done the previous evening, after they were slaughtered the previous evening.

But if the animals were slaughtered that day, on the festival, since it was impossible to bring the gifts on the previous day, it is permitted to bring them that day even according to Beit Shammai.

According to this new assumption, our Mishna accords with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara considers the matter according to the new assumption with which Rava has now established our Mishna:

If so,

let us say

that our Mishna follows only

Rabbi Yehuda, and not the Aḥerim!?

For according to the Aḥerim, Beit Shammai prohibit transporting even gifts removed that day.

And we conclude:

Even if you say

that nevertheless our Mishna was taught according to the view of

the Aḥerim

!

And

what Beit Shammai prohibit, according to the Aḥerim, is transporting gifts only

from those slaughtered the previous evening,

but gifts from animals slaughtered that day may also be transported according to Beit Shammai.

The Gemara objects:

If so,

the view of the Aḥerim

is

the same as the view of

Rabbi Yehuda,

so in what do they disagree!?

The Gemara answers:

The practical difference between them is whether one may attach them

—whether according to Beit Shammai it is permitted to transport together with the gifts from animals slaughtered that day also gifts from animals slaughtered the previous evening.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, Beit Shammai permit “attaching” them and combining them for transport to the priest, whereas according to the Aḥerim it is prohibited.

And our Mishna, which does not deal with attaching items, but only with the prohibition against transporting gifts from an animal slaughtered the previous day, accords both with Rabbi Yehuda and with the Aḥerim.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, according to Beit Hillel, who permit transporting even teruma.

Rav Tovi, son of Rav Neḥemya, had a jug of wine

a measure of wine

of teruma.

He came before Rav Yosef.

He said to him: What is the ruling regarding bringing

this jug of teruma wine

to the priest now,

at this time, on the festival?

He said to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

, who said that according to Beit Hillel it is permitted to transport even teruma.

His host

the innkeeper

of Rava bar Rav Ḥanan had bundles of mustard stalks

—bundles of mustard stalks [or pods], containing mustard seeds.

He said to him

to Rava bar bar Ḥanan:

What is the ruling regarding crushing

—is it permitted to extract the mustard seeds by crushing them with one’s hands from the pods in which they are found—

and eating some of them

and consuming them

on a festival,

even though this dismantling is a derivative of the labor of threshing? The question is whether crushing is permitted on a festival like cooking, because it is required for food preparation, or whether, since it could have been done on the eve of the festival, it is prohibited as a derivative of threshing.

He did not have the answer

to this question from Rava bar bar Ḥanan.

He came

the innkeeper

before Rava,

and asked him.

Rava said to him:

Rava said:

One may crush

by rubbing and pressing with the hands

“soft ears of grain”

to remove the wheat kernels from the husks surrounding them,

and

likewise

crush

by rubbing forcefully the pods of

legumes,

to extract the legumes from them,

on a festival.

Although labors that could have been performed on the eve of the festival were not permitted on a festival even for the sake of food preparation, the law of crushing by hand differs, since these are considered labor performed “in an unusual manner” ; therefore, on Shabbat they are prohibited only rabbinically , whereas on a festival they are permitted for the sake of food preparation .

Abaye raised an objection to Rava

from a beraita that we learned in the Tosefta:

For it was taught:

One who shells ears of grain on the eve of Shabbat

and after shelling, the kernels and husks remained mixed together—

the next day he blows

in an unusual manner, unlike the ordinary manner of blowing on weekdays; that is, he blows them with his mouth and transfers them by blowing

immediately

from one

hand

to the other, and in this way the kernels are separated from the waste—

and eats

the kernels immediately.

But not

may he select them on Shabbat from among the husks—not

with a kanon or with a tamḥui—

which are utensils for separating waste from food, designed for separating a small quantity .

One who shells ears of grain on the eve of Yom Tov—

the next day

on Yom Tov

blows “a little at a time

little by little,

and eats,

because on Yom Tov it is permitted to select without a change in order to eat that same day.

Therefore, he may select

even with a kanon and even with a tamḥui,

which are used to select a small amount for that day,

but not by

means of a

tray, nor with a sieve nor with a sifter,

which are utensils designed for extensive selection; one who selects with them appears to be doing so for the following day, and it is prohibited to perform labor on Yom Tov for the needs of the following day, even if it is for the sake of food.

It follows from the beraita that shelling the ears of grain only

on the eve of Yom Tov—

yes,

it is permitted to do so, but

on Yom Tov

itself

no,

they did not permit shelling, since it could have been done on the eve of Yom Tov.

This would apparently prove against Rava’s statement, for he permitted shelling on Yom Tov.

Rava said to resolve the difficulty:

Even say,

it is possible to say that it is permitted to shell them

on Yom Tov.

And

the statement we learned at the end of the beraita, “One who shells on the eve of Yom Tov,” does not intend to prohibit shelling on Yom Tov. Rather,

since

because

the tanna

at the

beginning

of the beraita, with regard to Shabbat, taught: “He shells

on the eve of Shabbat”—

and it was necessary to teach this way because it is prohibited to shell on Shabbat—

the tanna

also taught, incidentally, at the

end as well: “He shells

on the eve of

Yom Tov.”

We raised a difficulty:

If

so—if it is permitted to shell ears of grain in order to eat them on Yom Tov—it would apparently follow that

we find teruma whose separation is permitted

on Yom Tov! For by shelling them, their processing is completed and the status of tevel takes effect upon them, making them subject to the obligation of separating teruma [because people do not ordinarily separate teruma while they are still in the ears of grain, when they are exempt from separation]. And if he cannot separate teruma from them on Yom Tov, he may not shell them, since shelling was permitted only for the sake of eating on Yom Tov; necessarily, then, they permitted separating teruma from shelled grain on Yom Tov, since the obligation of teruma takes effect upon them that very day.

And

if we

had learned

in our Mishna that Beit Hillel say to Beit Shammai:

“No. If you said this with regard to teruma, from which he is not entitled to separate it, and so on,”

it implies that in every case it is prohibited to separate teruma on Yom Tov!?

And we answer: This is not difficult.

In truth, everyone agrees that one may shell ears of grain on Yom Tov, but not everyone agrees that one may separate teruma on Yom Tov.